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The statutory responsibilities of governing bodies have increased greatly since the 
1988 Education Reform Act, yet unresolved issues persist concerning how well 
governing bodies have adjusted to their new role. This thesis focuses on one such 
issue: the discrepancy between policy and practice regarding the statutory 
responsibility of governing bodies to ‘provide a strategic view’. After reviewing the 
existing literature and presenting the research design (comprised of five qualitative case 
studies and a quantitative survey), this thesis poses three questions about the strategic 
planning processes of inner London state-maintained secondary school governing 
bodies: First, do governors in these schools perceive their role as strategic? Second, 
is there an evident absence of strategic planning within these governing bodies? And 
third, if there is such an absence, then why?
The research begins by providing affirmative answers to the first two questions. 
Evidence demonstrates that it is possible to outline a definition of strategic planning 
based on governors’ own beliefs, and that governors did not believe that this 
definition of strategic planning was being fulfilled in practice. In relation to the third 
question, this thesis argues that two sets of ‘barriers’ impede governing body 
strategic planning. The research explores these barriers in detail, identifying four 
main institutional-level barriers to governing body strategic planning (a ‘monitoring 
culture’, varying levels of governor involvement, an emphasis on ‘tangible’ tasks, 
and extensive delegation to staff) and six main central governmental-level barriers 
(time constraints, paperwork, legislation and regulation, the current financing system, 
communication, and trust).
Finally, a fourth research question asks whether identifying these ‘strategic planning 
barriers’ has any practical policy relevance; ‘business involvement in education’ is 
selected as the policy lens through which to examine this proposition. Governors’ 
opinions about business involvement in education are explored, and this research 
confirms that governors believed strategic planning on this issue was desirable yet 
absent. The thesis then illustrates that the heuristic application of these barriers 
provides a robust explanation for the absence of governing body strategic planning 
on business involvement issues, thereby illustrating the practical policy relevance of 
these barriers. The thesis concludes by outlining the contributions of this study, 
offering policy recommendations, and suggesting avenues for further research.
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C h a p t e r  O n e  
I n t r o d u c t io n
In recent years, Conservative and Labour governments alike have placed a 
significant emphasis on institutional-level responsibility and accountability in 
education and other public services. Because of these policies, and in particular 
because of the 1988 Education Reform Act, school governing bodies have become 
statutorily more important than ever before. Comprised entirely of volunteers and 
required of every state-maintained school in England, governing bodies now possess 
a wide range of responsibilities and duties, from balancing budgets to adjudicating 
appeals over pupil exclusions. Yet while the list of governing body responsibilities 
continues to grow, so too do serious questions about how well governing bodies 
fulfil the three fundamental tasks set for them by central government: providing a 
strategic view, acting as a critical friend, and ensuring accountability (DfE/Ofsted 
1995). The aim of this study is to investigate the potential discrepancy between 
policy and practice on first of these three fundamental responsibilities -  the 
governing body’s responsibility to provide a strategic view. By employing a 
combined qualitative and quantitative research approach, this study seeks to provide 
answers to the following four main research questions:
1. Do governors in inner London state secondary schools view their role as a 
strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?
2. Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?
3. If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why 
is this the case?
4. Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning 
barriers has practical policy relevance and importance?
In order to establish the general context and specific aims of this study, Chapter 
Two reviews the existing literature on school governance and on strategic planning 
in education, respectively. After briefly outlining the history of school governance, 
Chapter Two analyses the literature in the six main categories of existing school 
governance research. This review and analysis will establish the absence of existing
10
research on the first three main research questions. The fourth research question, 
posed as a logical exploratory extension of the first three, will then propose that the 
policy issue of business involvement in education be employed as the illustrative lens 
through which the ‘practical policy relevance’ of any potential strategic planning 
barriers be studied. The suitability of this proposition is then justified through a 
further review of the literature on business involvement. With the four main research 
questions thus established, Chapter Three presents the design of the research study 
itself. This chapter explains the methodological decisions made regarding the 
format, scope, and content of the study, describe the implementation of the 
qualitative-quantitative research design and the methods used to analyse the resulting 
research data, and describe the characteristics of the qualitative and quantitative 
research samples.
Having established the context of the research (Chapter Two) and the methods 
employed in its execution (Chapter Three), Chapters Four through Eight present the 
research data gathered to answer the four main research questions. Where possible, 
qualitative and quantitative data are presented together, enabling the reader to 
construct a more complete picture of a given issue than might be possible if these 
data were presented separately. The first of these data chapters, Chapter Four, 
presents the evidence that addresses the first two main research questions:
Do governors themselves in inner London state secondary schools view their role
as a strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?
Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually evident
in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?_____________
Chapter Four employs qualitative evidence from the governor interviews to outline a 
three-point definition of strategic planning. The chapter then presents qualitative and 
quantitative evidence to demonstrate that governors in this study did not believe that 
their own definition of strategic planning was being met. Finally, this chapter 
addresses the role of the School Development Plan in the strategic planning process 
of governing bodies.
Having established the lack of strategic planning amongst governing bodies in the 
study area, Chapters Five and Chapter Six present the evidence that addresses the 
third main research question:
11
If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why is 
this the case?_________________________________________________________
These chapters present two distinct yet related sets of ‘barriers’ that, it is argued, 
impede governing body strategic planning. It is proposed that one set is created at 
the institutional level, while the other set is created at the central governmental level. 
Chapter Five outlines the theory behind taking this barrier-based approach to the 
data presentation and analysis, and then presents the overall quantitative evidence 
regarding governor opinions about different potential strategic planning barriers. 
Chapter Five then provides the detailed evidence for the first set barriers to 
governing body strategic planning: the four main barriers created at the institutional 
level. Before moving to the second set of barriers in Chapter Six, a coda to Chapter 
Five presents the evidence for why this research focused on the institutional and 
central governmental levels while devoting less attention to the local authority level. 
Chapter Six then provides the detailed evidence for the second set barriers to 
governing body strategic planning: the six main barriers created at the central 
governmental level. It is argued that these six barriers, in conjunction with the four 
institutional-level strategic planning barriers identified in Chapter Five, provide a 
robust answer to the question of why there is a lack of strategic planning amongst the 
governing bodies in inner London state-maintained secondary schools.
Chapters Seven and Eight then present, in two stages, the evidence that addresses the 
fourth main research question:
Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning barriers 
has practical policy relevance and importance?_____________________________
First, Chapter Seven presents the research evidence confirming the suggestion made 
in the literature review: that business involvement provides an appropriate lens 
through which the practical policy relevance of the strategic planning barriers 
(identified in Chapters Five and Six) can be examined. Chapter Seven then provides 
the contextual background necessary for interpreting the findings that are to be 
presented in Chapter Eight. In particular, evidence is presented to illustrate 
governors’ perceptions of business involvement in education, and outline governors’ 
views regarding the potential advantages of including business involvement issues in 
the strategic planning process. Having thus established the suitability of business
12
involvement as a policy lens, Chapter Eight then provides the research evidence to 
illustrate that the systematic application of the strategic planning barriers identified in 
Chapters Five and Six does provide a robust explanation for the absence of 
governing body strategic planning on business involvement issues. As such, it will 
be argued these barriers do help to explain the absence of governing body strategic 
planning on a specific issue of practical policy importance, thereby demonstrating 
their practical policy relevance as a tool for understanding strategic planning 
problems in inner London state secondary schools.
Finally, Chapter Nine draws together the evidence and arguments of the first eight 
chapters in order to provide a final analysis of the value of this research study. This 
chapter summarises the empirical research findings and illustrates how these findings 
answered the four main research questions. This chapter then discusses the 
implications of the research findings, their contribution to the existing research 
literature, and the extent to which these findings can be generalised. A set of 
substantive policy recommendations emanating from this research are proposed, and 
further avenues of potential research in this field are suggested. A final set of 
reflective observations then concludes this thesis.
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C h a pt e r  T w o  
R e v ie w  o f  th e  E x ist in g  L ite r a t u r e
2.0 Introduction
In order to establish the general context and specific aims of this study, this chapter 
reviews the existing literature on school governance and strategic planning in 
education. Section 2.1 provides the context for this study by presenting a brief 
history of school governance. Section 2.2 then turns to the two main types of 
literature on school governance: advice literature and research literature. After 
briefly examining the former, it will be argued that there are six main categories of 
the latter: theoretical research on governance, demographic research on governance, 
research on specific categories of governors, research on governing body 
relationships, research on the normative role of governors and governing bodies, and 
research on governing body operation. The remainder of Section 2.2 surveys the 
state of the literature in the first four of these categories. Due to their particular 
relevance to this research study, the final two categories will then be discussed 
individually, with research on the normative role of governors and governing bodies 
explored in Section 2.3, and research on governing body operation explored in 
Section 2.4. Based on the results of this portion of the review, three main research 
questions about governing bodies and strategic planning will be proposed. Section
2.5 then poses the fourth research question, and it will be argued that this fourth 
question can best be addressed via the lens of an actual policy issue. The issue of 
business involvement in education will be proposed for this purpose, and the history 
and recent developments in this policy area will be examined. Finally, Section 2.6 
summarises the chapter and outlines the benefits of the proposed study.
2.1 A Brief History of School Governance
2.1.1 The Early Years
School governing bodies are a relatively new institution in their current form, 
although the concept of school governance has spanned several centuries -  from the 
boards of trustees that ran church schools in the sixth century (Gann 1998:8), to the 
lay ‘town councils’ that fought for the right to appoint local schoolmasters in the 14th 
century (Adamson 1919:64), to the craftsmen who oversaw the guild schools of the
t l i16 century (Gillett 1966:68). However, the first notion of a system of school 
governance in England arose in 1833, when Parliament, not yet ready to commit to
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funding its own state-run education system, voted a grant to assist in providing 
education through church-run schools. One major condition of this grant was that 
the schools receiving assistance were to organise local management bodies, thereby 
providing Parliament with an entity that could be held accountable for the 
expenditure of said funds (Sallis 1995:5).
This state of affairs continued until the passage of the 1870 Elementary Education 
Act, which legislated for universal -  although not compulsory -  primary education 
(Murphy 1972). Importantly, this new school system was to be administered by local 
school boards, and Section 15 of the 1870 Act legislated that the school board may 
delegate its powers to ‘a body of managers appointed by them, consisting of not less 
than three persons,’ thereby establishing the first system of state school governance 
in England. Unfortunately for these nascent local governors, there was no system for 
establishing ‘either a relatively uniform or coherent board system throughout the 
country’ (Bacon 1978:15), and as Baron and Howell (1968) observed, ‘most of the 
large boards...preferred to administer their schools centrally rather than delegate 
duties to bodies of managers as they were permitted to do under the Elementary 
Education Act’ (1968:19). London was a notable exception, with each of its board 
schools having its own ‘body of managers’ -  although Gordon (1974) suggested that 
the quality of these boards was somewhat uneven, with London reporting problems 
in recruiting ‘suitable governors’ as far back as 1884 (1974:161).
The next step came in 1902, when the 1902 Education Act complemented the earlier 
provision of universal primary education by establishing universal secondary 
education. In order to administer this newly-expanded education system, the 1902 
Act created Local Education Authorities -  LEAs -  and required secondary schools, 
like their primary counterparts, to have boards of governors. Through the 
establishment of governing bodies at the secondary level, the 1902 Act firmly 
ensconced local governing bodies in the hierarchy of the English educational system. 
In a few county councils, such as London, a great deal of authority was delegated to 
these local governing bodies; Baron and Howell (1968) noted that these secondary 
school governing bodies in London had extensive responsibilities, including:
‘[DJrawing up an annual report, checking school records, inspecting premises 
and equipment, advising on the appointment of staff, investigating complaints 
against teachers, promoting visits of educational value and helping in
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arrangements for school meals, play centres, school savings banks and school 
open days’ (1968:19).
However, the 1902 Act also empowered LEAs to set the regulations under which all 
of the governing bodies in their respective jurisdictions would operate (Gann 
1998:14), meaning that governing bodies had no inherent autonomous authority of 
their own. Instead, the 1902 Act allowed the decision about how much authority 
governing bodies should hold to be made by each local council. Although some 
LEAs, like London, devolved considerable authority to their governing bodies, others 
LEAs were significantly more parsimonious. As such, although governing bodies 
were now established in law, the extent of their authority varied greatly in practice.
2.1.2 Post-War Changes
However, the historic 1944 Education Act fundamentally overhauled the state 
education system, providing free primary and secondary education to all under the 
slogan ‘A national service locally administered.’ To provide the ‘local 
administration’ component, the 1944 Act required that each state-maintained primary 
school have a managing body, and that each state-maintained secondary school have 
a governing body (although the legislation permitted multiple schools to be 
‘grouped’ under a single governing/managing entity under certain circumstances). 
These governing institutions were ostensibly responsible for running their respective 
schools in a manner that both reflected community desires and supported the 
interests of the schools themselves. However, while these governors had a role in 
appointing the head teacher, their influence was extremely limited in practice. Baron 
and Howell suggested that governors often had ‘only a perfunctory interesting the 
curriculum, merely noting what the Head chooses to tell them’ (1968:98), and that 
‘in practice governors’ involvement in [financial matters] is very small and does not 
generally go beyond rubber-stamping estimates drawn up by the authority’s staff...’ 
(1974:118). This limited role came about because the bulk of the authority under the 
1944 Act was vested in the Local Education Authorities (LEAs). First, LEAs 
controlled the appointments to county school governing bodies, a factor that led to 
significant party political influence at the local level (Sallis 1995:6). Second, LEAs 
had the authority to determine the organisation of the system of governing bodies 
within their jurisdiction, and the vigour with which school governing bodies were 
organised varied widely throughout the country in the decades following the 1944 
Act. For example, the implementation of the Act’s ‘one school, one governing body’
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mandate led to significant variation in practice, with some counties appointing a 
board for every school, and other counties appointing a single board for all their 
schools (Baron and Howell 1968:58)! The result of this LEA dominance after the 
1944 Act meant that governing bodies had very limited power, leading observers to 
note that ‘for the most part, governors tended to be seen as having symbolic rather 
than actual authority... ’ (Baginsky et al. 1991:1).
2.1.3 People Power
For the next 30 years, governing bodies remained largely peripheral entities. Yet by 
the mid- 1970s, there was increasing interest in the state of the education system and 
the right of the public to have a voice in the way education was provided. Events 
such as the 1975 William Tyndale controversy demonstrated that governing bodies 
could potentially become outlets for such a discussion (see Gretton and Jackson 
1976), and Prime Minister James Callaghan’s 1976 ‘Great Debate’ about the future 
of the education system further pushed education issues into the political foreground 
(Tomlinson 1992:43). In this context of renewed public interest in state education, in 
1977 the Taylor Commission published its proposals for the first major changes to 
governing bodies since 1944. These proposals were viewed as both wide-ranging 
and radical; as Mahoney (1988) observed, the Taylor Report argued for establishing 
the position of governing bodies ‘in direct line of responsibility between LEA and 
school’ (1988:9). The Report, entitled A New Partnership for our Schools, 
recommended establishing a unique governing body for each county school, altering 
the composition of governing bodies to include equal numbers of teachers, parents, 
LEA representatives, and community members, and giving governing bodies shared 
responsibility (with the LEA) for appointing the head and deputy. Additionally, the 
Report recommended greater governing body responsibilities in the areas of staffing, 
curriculum, budget, and community relations (Taylor 1977). Yet the most important 
aspect of the Taylor Report was its focus on the importance of bringing public input 
and accountability into the school system via governing bodies; as Dean (2001) 
noted, ‘The Taylor Report suggested that people not involved in education had an 
important contribution to make to how schools were run... ’ (2001:3).
However, the Taylor recommendations were implemented neither en bloc nor 
immediately. Although the 1980 Education Act eventually provided for parent and 
teacher representation on governing bodies, the provisions of the 1980 Act were not
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applicable retroactively. Instead, the 1980 Act ‘set the pattern for future 
developments in school government...but did not require existing governing bodies 
to fall in line’ (Kogan 1984:2). These ‘future developments’ came in 1986, as the 
Conservative government, taking its first steps towards moulding a more locally- 
devolved power structure and parent-centred education system, passed the Education 
(No 2) Act of 1986. The 1986 Act formalised the organisation of governing bodies 
and implemented many of the Taylor Report recommendations in the process. Most 
important, for the first time parents and LEA appointees were represented in equal 
numbers on governing bodies, a swing in favour of parent representation that was a 
strong blow to local (often Labour) party political control over governing bodies 
(Earley and Creese 1998). Teachers received one or two seats depending on the size of 
the school, and governing bodies were encouraged to seek members from the business 
community if they felt their governing body would benefit from such representation.
2.1.4 Devolution and Responsibility
However, it was not until two years later, with the 1988 Education Reform Act 
(ERA), that governors and heads received sweeping new responsibilities for greater 
school oversight. As Donnelly (1999) stated, ‘In keeping with the broad ideology of 
the ‘new public management’, [the 1988] educational reform was based on the idea 
that parents and lay governors, as educational consumers, would be empowered to 
monitor the work of professionals’ (1999:238). The ERA implemented a national 
curriculum (and national assessment systems), and charged governing bodies with 
the responsibility for overseeing its implementation. Most important, however, was 
that nearly every school received a delegated budget under Local Management of 
Schools (LMS), providing governing bodies with substantial direct control and 
accountability over both funding allocation and staffing at the expense (literally and 
figuratively) of the LEA. Governing bodies were also given the option (although 
later revoked in 1998) of severing their ties with their LEAs completely, if  a majority 
of balloted parents agreed. By so ‘opting out’ of the state system and becoming 
‘grant-maintained’, a school could acquire significant autonomy -  and would receive 
its funding directly from central government. This rapid and thorough decimation of 
LEA authority and power fundamentally changed not only the direction of 
educational policy, but also the relationship between the local authorities and the 
schools. In quantitative terms, the effect of this change is clearly evident: whereas 
prior to 1988 school funding was controlled almost entirely by the LEAs, by the year
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2000, 85 per cent of funding was going directly to schools, bypassing the LEA in all 
but an administrative sense (Under siege 2000:16). The qualitative evidence is 
equally as stark: as the preface to Field’s (1993) study of governing bodies stated, 
‘Any current debate about the management of schools in England and Wales must 
focus upon where the power now resides.... therefore [this research] examines the 
shift of control away from the local authority to the governing body... ’ (1993:165).
In the wake of the ERA, there was substantial concern amongst education observers 
that governing bodies would be unable to cope with their new responsibilities, or that 
there would be confusion and chaos as governors tested the limits of their new role 
(see e.g., Knight 1988; Leighton 1989; Wilson 1990). However, the subsequent 
literature suggests that these new governing bodies performed neither as poorly as 
these observers had predicted, nor as effectively as government had hoped. For 
example, research into the role of governing bodies in dealing with LMS (Marren 
and Levacic 1994; Levacic and Glover 1997) suggested that governing bodies 
eventually learned to cope with their financial responsibilities. However, this and 
other literature also suggested that in many cases, head teachers had assumed the 
financial responsibilities of governing bodies, either by choice or by default (Sheam 
et al. 1995). Similarly, research showed that these ‘new’ governing bodies often 
struggled to find their ‘niche’ within the political and educational system in which 
they were deposited; for example, governors have usually avoided curriculum 
issues, and as Earley (2000) argued, ‘Governors’ involvement in the curriculum and 
its delivery -  the school’s core business -  and its monitoring, is still seen by 
governors and others as predominantly a matter for the professionals and not for the 
lay governing body’ (2000:200). These new responsibilities and the research into 
them will be discussed at greater length in Sections 2.2 through 2.4.
A flurry of additional education acts followed in the 1990s, each affecting governing 
bodies in various ways. The Schools Act 1992 created the Office of Standards in 
Education (Ofsted) as the agency charged with inspecting schools for their quality; 
governing bodies were given the task of writing the response to the inspection reports 
and taking the lead on making any post-inspection improvements. The Education 
Act 1993 incorporated governing bodies as legal entities and created the Funding 
Agency for Schools to administer grant-maintained funding. Additionally, the 1993 
Act channelled more authority to governing bodies and central government, further
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weakening the role of the LEAs and increasing the potential influence of governing 
bodies. A change of political control at the national level brought Labour to power 
in 1997 under the slogan ‘education, education, education,’ yet far from increasing 
the dwindling authority of the LEAs, Labour pursued its agenda for change at the 
national and institutional levels (see e.g., Riley et al. 1999; Power and Whitty 1999). 
Governing body responsibilities continued to change and expand in this new political 
climate. The School Standards and Framework Act 1998 charged governing bodies 
with setting overall achievement targets for pupils’ results on key assessments, while 
the Education Act 2002 gave governing bodies the ability to sponsor enterprises 
related to the school and reduced their responsibilities for staff hiring (yet increased 
their responsibilities in other areas).
2.1.5 The Current Situation
At present (August 2003), each state secondary school in England has a governing 
body that varies in size between 14 and 21 members, depending on the number of 
pupils and the type of school. (New regulations, to be fully implemented by 2006, 
will permit governing bodies to determine their own size irrespective of pupil 
numbers or school type (see DfES 2003a)). The governing body must meet at least 
once a term, is chaired by a governor elected by his or her peers to the post, and has 
authority over issues including curriculum, health and safety, discipline, physical 
infrastructure, financial management, and strategic planning (DfES 2001). Some of 
these responsibilities are delegated to the headteacher for day-to-day administration, 
while others must (by statute) be exercised by the governing body. The headteacher 
is generally a member of the governing body; other members include teachers and 
parents (elected by their peers) and community members (some nominated by the 
local education authority and some ‘co-opted’ by the governing body). The 
minimum number of seats for each category is legislated by statute. In addition, 
voluntary aided, voluntary controlled, and foundation schools have seats allocated 
for governors who are appointed by the voluntary or foundation entity. While a 
small number of routine responsibilities can be discharged by the chair through a 
procedure known as ‘chair’s action’, governing bodies can, in general, exercise their 
authority only as a collective. Unless individual governors receive expressly delegated 
authority from the governing body as a whole, they cannot make binding decisions on 
behalf of the governing body. Furthermore, delegation is impermissible on a substantial 
number of issues (DfES 2001). The standard term length for a governor is four years.
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2.2 T h e  G o v e r n a n c e  L it e r a t u r e
Given this historical context, this section examines the two main types of literature 
on school governance. The first of these is the ‘advice’ literature, which will be 
examined briefly in Section 2.2.1, while the second is more traditional academic 
research literature. Sections 2.2.2 to 2.2.5 begin the examination of the research 
literature, which can be divided into six broad categories. For the purposes of this 
thesis, these categories are designated as: theoretical research on governance, 
demographic research on governance, research on specific categories of governors, 
research on governing body relationships, research on the normative role of 
governors and governing bodies, and research on governing body operation. The 
first four of these categories will be discussed in this section. The final two 
categories, due to their particular relevance to this research study, will be discussed 
separately in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
Before beginning this review, it is important to bear in mind two key points about 
school governance literature. First, because of the radical changes instituted under 
the 1988 ERA, it is somewhat difficult to compare the pre-1988 governing bodies 
with their post-1988 counterparts. As such, the most relevant research literature on 
governance dates from 1988 onwards. Second, the government entity in charge of 
education has undergone several name changes since the 1960s: the Department of 
Education and Science (DES) from 1964 to 1992, the Department for Education 
(DFE) from 1992 to 1995, the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) 
from 1995 until 2001, and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) from 
2001 to the present. As such, government documents are cited according to the name 
of the entity as it was at the time of the document’s publication.
2.2.1 The Advice Literature
Given that at approximately 300,000 strong, governors form ‘the largest volunteer 
force in the country’ (Consultation on governors 2000:9), and given the numerous 
responsibilities acquired by governing bodies since 1988, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that there is a vast amount of ‘advice’ literature that seeks to provide essential and 
important information to confused and overwhelmed governors on how to ‘govern 
well’. Besides the numerous advice articles in journals such as Managing Schools 
Today and the extensive array of official government guidance (see e.g., Ofsted 
2001), a wide range of governance guides provide information about governing body
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responsibilities, observations about governing body good practice, and suggestions 
about governing body improvement (see e.g., Bullivant 1988; Sallis 1994; Wragg 
1995; Dean 2001). These guides often seek to cover the huge range of governor 
responsibilities, including: the annual report to parents, the head’s report, special 
meetings, legal obligations, staffing and hiring, curriculum responsibilities, exclusion 
procedures, visiting the school, budget planning, meeting management, dealing with 
inspections, discipline and equal opportunities, admissions, delegation decisions, 
team working, cost management, vocational curriculum, staff pensions, special needs, 
and home-school agreements, among others. These contents are worth listing simply 
to demonstrate the breadth of issues with which governors are now expected to deal.
Yet this explosion in the advice literature on school governance has not been 
matched by a similar growth in academic research. As Scanlon et al. (1999) 
observed in their major study of governing bodies, although governing bodies have 
acquired substantial responsibilities since 1988, ‘surprisingly, issues of 
governance.. .have attracted relatively little attention by researchers’ (1999:13). This 
concern about the prevalence of advice literature at the expense of solid research is 
echoed more generally by Ozga (1992) and Bush (1999), respectively. Ozga 
protested over a decade ago that while there were a ‘seemingly limitless supply of 
books on ‘how to manage’ the post ERA system,’ these books were inadequate due 
to the ‘missing dimension... [of] the external policy context -  almost never discussed, 
and if briefly reviewed then taken for granted’ (1992:278). Similarly, Bush 
complained that many education management texts were ‘descriptive or prescriptive, 
‘manuals’ on how to become better managers.... [Yet] while books providing ‘tips 
for teachers’ may be useful for busy practitioners, they oversimplify the issues and 
underestimate the importance of analysis’ (1999:248). Given the relative absence of 
research on school governance in the context of its increased importance, it seems 
unfortunate that a large amount of the literature on school governance has focused on 
what Ozga termed the ‘how to’ questions rather than on the ‘why do’ ones. 
However, the academic research that does exist on school governance provides a 
solid base upon which to expand, and it is the aim of this portion of the literature 
review to outline the trends and findings of this work.
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2.2.2 Theoretical Research on Governance
The first category of academic research concerns the theory surrounding school 
governance -  the broad general themes about how governing bodies and their actions 
should be conceived. Unfortunately, the number of theoretical works on the 
dynamics of contemporary governing bodies is limited, with a particular dearth in 
output since the mid-1990s. Early theoretical work on governing bodies tended to 
emanate from the sociological school of ‘power theory’, which sought to explain 
governing bodies in strongly structural terms. For example, Bacon (1978) offered a 
simple theoretical treatise on public accountability in state education, arguing that 
governing boards were rather passive policy institutions whose function was to act as 
an independent fa9ade, defending and legitimising education policies proposed by 
professionals within the school system. Taking a more active view of governing 
bodies as political entities, Kogan (1984) explored the power dynamics within 
governing bodies in the context of organisational behaviour and regime theory. After 
conducting fieldwork with four governing bodies, Kogan suggested four main 
models of governing body types -  accountable, mediating, advisory, and supportive 
-  and suggested that most governing bodies tended towards one of the latter two 
models. These four models were re-evaluated (and confirmed) in light of the 1988 
ERA by Dodds (1991), and have been used as the standard template by many 
subsequent researchers for interpreting governing body actions (see e.g., Levacic and 
Glover 1998; Thody 1999a).
However, one shortcoming of power-based models of governance is that an over­
reliance on strict structuralism can imply that the models are deterministic, 
suggesting that the power hierarchy is an ‘unalterable given’ that can only be 
changed by completely restructuring the system itself. Such a view therefore tends 
to portray other potential change factors, such as individual motivation, as either 
minor or irrelevant. However, Kogan’s limited use of organisational theory 
suggested a potentially more dynamic and nuanced theoretical model for governance. 
One such area was the theory of ‘policy networks’, which argued that patterns in 
governance could be explained by the interaction of actors at the local level as well 
as by ‘macro’ decisions at the state level. As Raab (1994) argued, theorising the 
governance of education required taking:
‘[A] bottom-up view of action in the policy networks even where there is a
dominant, ostensible ‘policy’ decision taken at the top that sets the
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framework for action lower down.... [This approach is] especially conducive 
to exploring the interactive networks that function as implementation 
structures, in which actors and organisations wherever located may in fact 
take part’ (1994:9).
This ‘bottom-up’ approach was pursued by Thody (1994a), who employed 
organisational theory in an attempt to create a theoretical framework for explaining 
governing body actions and motivations. Thody proposed a theoretical schema in 
which governing bodies performed their main functions -  including representation, 
democracy, and management -  either covertly or overtly. In applying this theory, 
Thody argued that governing bodies ‘are not performing effectively their overt 
functions of democratic representation [or] the direction of managerial effectiveness 
and efficiency. The covert functions of providing illusory democracy and 
managerial legitimation are being performed’ (1994a:210). While Thody’s model 
leads to some conclusions similar to those of Bacon (1978), the advantage of 
Thody’s organisational approach is that it provides for a more dynamic and less 
deterministic view of governance than does Bacon. Indeed, Thody concluded that 
‘as governing bodies mature and learn how to assert their role and authority in 
selected educational and political spheres, they may evolve into a more potent force 
for educational change and partnership’ (1994a:225).
In exploring how governing bodies might evolve in this way, Walters and Richardson 
(1999) provided a new theoretical contribution on school governance through their 
notion of ‘governing through policy.’ Although Walters and Richardson intended to 
provide a practical guide for governors, the theoretical model they proposed was a 
tailored adaptation of broader theoretical work on the effective governance of non­
profit organisations undertaken by Carver (1990). Arguing that ‘policy clarification 
is the central feature of board leadership’ (1990:23), Carver suggested that governing 
boards were most effective when they focused on determining the ends to be 
achieved, while leaving the processes for meeting those ends to the organisational 
staff. In adapting Carver’s theoretical construct of non-profit governance 
specifically for English school governing bodies, Walters and Richardson provided a 
new operational-theoretical perspective on governance: one which extends upon the 
organisational model set forth above, while implicitly arguing against a more static 
and deterministic model of governance under which change is perceived as both 
difficult and unlikely.
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Finally, the most recent academic research on governing body theory came from 
Deem et al. (1995), who combined power theory, organisational theory, and 
decision-making theory in their broad-ranging attempt to construct a theory of 
governance centred on the notion of active citizenship. Although earlier work by 
Viant (1992) sought to determine the extent to which governorship could be 
perceived as a ‘democratic and participatory activity, undertaken as a public service 
through ‘active citizenship’ (1992:2), Deem et al. conducted an extensive four-year 
multi-site qualitative study of governing bodies, aimed at determining whether 
governors should be perceived as ‘active citizens’ or ‘state volunteers’. By arguing 
that the activity of governance should be viewed as a trade-off between democracy 
and efficiency, Deem et al. sought to situate school governance in the wider political 
context of the ‘new managerialism’ approach to public service provision. In this 
way, Deem et al. contributed to the theoretical literature on governance by adding the 
political aspect of governance to the structural and organisational aspects provided 
by previous theorists. In summary, although the theoretical work on governors is 
limited, it does provide sufficient competing perspectives to both encourage an open 
evaluation of the dynamics of contemporary governing bodies and to provide the 
background for further development of theory concerning the actions of governors 
and governing bodies.
2.2.3 Demographic Research on Governance
The second category consists of research that has sought to provide a better 
understanding of who these 300,000 governors are. Immediately following the ERA, 
a small-scale study by Thody (1989) found that the newly-reconstituted governing 
bodies were populated by more ‘professionals’ than many observers had expected, as 
well as by fewer retirees and fewer church vicars -  two traditionally (or possibly 
anecdotally) popular sources of governors. Another smaller scale demographic study 
conducted by Buckby (1992) found that governors were generally middle class, 
older, and male. Additionally, the then-Department of Education and Science (DES) 
commissioned larger-scale studies into governing body demographics from both 
Streatfield and Jeffries (1989) and Keys and Fernandes (1990). The former 
examined governor recruitment patterns following the 1988 Education Reform Act 
(ERA), while the latter obtained demographic information on governors as part of a 
broader study on the adaptation of governors to their increased delegated 
responsibilities post-ERA.
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The first comprehensive attempt to build upon and update the work of Keys and 
Fernandes came from Earley (1994a), who, as a part of a larger survey-based study 
on the progress of governing bodies, sought to determine who became governors and 
why. Earley examined factors such as age, ethnic origin, length of service as a 
governor, educational qualifications, occupation, and governors’ stated reasons for 
becoming governors, and his more extensive research confirmed the demographic 
findings of both Keys and Fernandes (1990) and Buckby (1992). Earley’s 1994 
model was utilised again by Scanlon et al. (1999), who found that although 
percentages for governors’ ethnic origin, age, gender, and educational qualifications 
were similar to those reported by Keys and Fernandes (1990) and Earley (1994a), a 
much higher percentage of governors reported being from professional occupations 
than was the case in previous studies. In addition to this broader demographic 
research, a small amount of more specialised demographic research has been 
conducted on the role of gender and race in governance (Deem 1989; Deem et. al. 
1995), and on the implications of having governing bodies that are comprised 
overwhelmingly of individuals from the middle socio-economic classes (Eiles 1989; 
Dodds 1994). However, most of the demographic research of the type discussed here 
is generally uncontroversial, due largely to the straightforward factual nature of the 
evidence being presented.
2.2.4 Research on Specific Categories of Governors
The third category of research investigates the issues pertaining to specific categories 
of governors. Since the 1986 Education Act, governing bodies have included 
representation from parents, teachers, local authorities, and the community, while 
governing bodies of voluntary sector and foundation schools have included spaces 
for foundation governors as well. In the late 1990s, legislation created a seat for a 
non-teaching staff governor. Much of the research into specific categories of 
governors has been devoted to micropolitical issues: determining the roles played by 
governors from these respective constituencies and examining the extent to which 
their opinions are either influential or important. Notably, very little research has 
been conducted in reference to the categories of either LEA or foundation governors, 
with the exception of a survey by Farrell and Law (1999) that found LEA governors 
felt ‘somewhat accountable’ to their local authorities. Additionally, there is little 
research on the role of the staff governor; this is likely because this position is 
relatively new, and because there is also a degree of uncertainty about its future.
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There is a modestly wider range of research on several other categories of governors. 
The category most comprehensively researched has been that of parent governors, 
since there was considerable interest in the role of parent governors once parents 
became the most numerous single component of governing bodies after the reforms 
of the 1980s. Early research into parent governors identified the diverse set of roles 
that parent governors had carved out for themselves (Brigley and Golby 1989; Golby 
and Wrigley 1989), while simultaneously noting the difficulties of engaging parent 
governors in terms of both experience and commitment. Subsequent research raised 
similar concerns about whether parent governors were able to fulfil these expanded 
responsibilities (Morgan 1990; McCallan 1993; Munn 1998), as well as whether 
parent governors were merely ‘window dressing’-  as Stanton (1989) argued, ‘Does 
the Education Department have real respect for parents’ views? Or will [the 
Education Department] do whatever suits themselves?’ (1989:5). However, much of 
the research on parent governors has been on a very small scale -  often examining 
only a single governing body. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to 
which the findings of the existing research in this area can be generalised, leaving a 
substantial gap in the current literature. The question of how parent governors are 
meant to ‘represent’ their ‘constituency’ has also featured in the non-research 
normative literature (Sallis 1994; Thody 1992), as has the question of whether 
parents are too ‘one school-minded and short term’ (Sallis 1997:17); however, these 
issues have not yet been fully examined in a more rigorous research context.
Significantly less research has focused on other specific categories of governors. In 
relation to teacher governors, research in the early 1990s found that teacher 
governors’ views on non-curricular issues were often discounted by other governing 
body members, and that teacher governors felt that they were frequently perceived as 
representing the ‘union line’ (New 1993a; 1993b). Although Deem et al. (1995) 
addressed the role of teacher governors briefly, the research by New was the only 
examination of teacher governors until Earley and Creese (2001), who sought to 
determine how teachers perceived their role and their effectiveness. Combining 
survey and interview data, Earley and Creese confirmed New’s findings that teacher 
governors were often uncertain about their role on the governing body, and suggested 
that teacher governors fell into three broad categories: watchdog (protecting teacher 
interests), communication link (liasing between teachers and the governing body), 
and minimalists (fulfilling a largely symbolic role).
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Turning to co-opted governors, the only significant research in this area has been on 
the impact that ‘business’ governors have had on their governing bodies, specifically 
in terms of their positive contributions to school management and planning. While 
Opie (1993:177) posed several ‘key questions for industrial governors’ based upon a 
convenience sample research design, Thody (1994b) conducted the first formal study 
of business governors. This study examined three companies who encouraged their 
employees to become governors, and concluded that in addition to bringing specialist 
knowledge to their schools, ‘the experience of school governorship appears to 
contribute to the management experience of govemor-employees’ (1994:354). 
Subsequent research into the value of business governors by Punter (2000) and 
Thody and Punter (2000) employed an experimental design, in which thirty-five 
schools with governor vacancies were ‘matched’ with willing prospective governors 
from the business community. After tracking these matches for eighteen months, 
Thody and Punter reported that the most valuable contributions of business 
governors were ‘the outsider role adopted by these governors, their objectivity, their 
strategic non-operational approach to governance and their clear understanding of the 
distinction between governance and management...’ (2000:196). However, as 
Punter (2000) observed, such contributions were ‘more obviously and more 
immediately [apparent] in schools where there were few other governors with 
business expertise or management experience’ (2000:208).
Finally, there has been very limited research into the unique function and role of the 
chair of the governing body. While there is a great deal of research on the interaction 
between the chair and the head, and the chair and the governing body (see Section
2.2.5 below), only recently has research focused primarily on the chair alone (see 
Grady 2000; Watson 2001). Again, this research has been quite limited in scope, and 
has reached the generally unsurprising and uncontroversial conclusion that the chair 
is an important factor in determining how well a governing body operates. As should 
be clear from the overview above, research into issues pertaining to specific 
categories of governors generally addresses such issues on a micropolitical level -  
that is, examining the operation of a specific category of governor within the context 
of the governing body as a political entity. Although this type of research is 
important because of the contribution it makes to the understanding of the structure 
of governing bodies, its application to policy is somewhat less than direct, 
particularly as the authority of governing bodies is collective rather than individual.
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Having touched upon the micropolitical approach to governance research, it seems 
appropriate to now explore research into issues facing governing bodies as a whole.
2.2.5 Research on Governing Body Relationships
This fourth category of research concerns the relationship between governing bodies 
and the other key actors in the school governance equation. Possibly the most well- 
developed strand of research on governing bodies is that which examines their 
relationships with heads. Without exception, the research into the governing body- 
head relationship has described this rapport as ‘crucial,’ ‘critical,’ or ‘fundamental’ 
to determining the effectiveness of the governing body. In addition to the strong face 
validity of these claims, the research evidence also provides strong support for this 
contention (see e.g., Earley 1994a; Scanlon et al. 1999). Underpinning this common 
conclusion are three main interconnected themes -  the negotiation of the boundary 
between the role of the head and the role of the governing body, the power 
relationship between the two entities, and the part that information dissemination and 
acquisition plays in the manifestation of that power relationship.
Turning first to the boundary between the roles of the head and the governing body, 
the existing research suggests that the absence of a well-defined statutory boundary 
leads to different interpretations when negotiating this boundary in practice. 
Immediately following the ERA, research by Hellawell (1990) suggested that there 
was substantial underlying tension between heads and governing bodies, with some 
governing bodies seeking to test the extent of their newfound powers at the expense 
of the authority of the head. Subsequent researchers agreed that the prevalence of 
this type of ‘open’ boundary dispute declined as the ERA reforms bedded down, yet 
disagreed to some extent about the reasons for this decline. In their qualitative study 
of chairs and heads, Esp and Saran (1995) examined the process of role 
differentiation in over 20 governing bodies, and argued that the boundary between 
the head and governing body roles needed to be (and had in practice become) a 
flexible one, actively negotiated to fit the needs of each individual school. In 
contrast, Sheam et al. (1995) argued that conflict had decreased simply because 
heads had moved to take either de facto or de jure control over issues (such as 
finance) that might otherwise have been grounds for negotiation.
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This leads to the issue of the power relationship between the head and the governing 
body, since Sheam et al. argued that the early concerns of those who worried that 
governing bodies would either dominate the head or seek to engage in day-to-day 
management appeared to be largely unfounded. Instead, as Sheam et al. observed, 
although the statutory powers of governing bodies increased post-1988, the actual 
power arrangements remained as the were pre-ERA, and that ‘for most schools, the 
governor’s role seems to be very limited’ (1995:187). While there is certainly merit 
in this argument, it also neglects the fact that simply by virtue of their existence, 
statutorily stronger governing bodies may provide a level of procedural 
accountability that acts as a check on the actions of heads. As Deem and Brehony 
(1993) argued, heads and governing bodies have the capacity to control each other’s 
actions, the latter through either the use of statutory powers (including budgetary 
authority and the right of dismissal) or the threat of use thereof, and the former 
through the provision of information.
It is on this practical point of ‘information provision’ that much of the existing 
research in this area has focused. Most studies agree that, in the absence of any 
independent and systematic way to obtain substantial information about their 
schools, governing bodies have been forced to rely on the information provided to 
them by their heads (see Esp and Saran 1995; Creese and Bradley 1997; Earley
2000). As the main information conduit to the governing body, heads therefore have 
the considerable ability to influence the perceptions and decisions of governors, 
leading those like Deem et al. (1995) to argue that if knowledge is indeed power, 
heads will always retain the advantage over their governing bodies. Some have 
therefore implied that this control over information could be used malevolently -  as 
Hellawell (1990) argued, ‘The most striking general feature to emerge from the 
heads’ comments...was the extent to which they were ready to admit that their 
reports to governors revealed only ‘what the head wants [governors] to know” 
(1990:74). Others point out that such a ‘pruning’ approach is necessary, if only in 
order to avoid overwhelming governors with non-essential information (Baker et al. 
1995). However, while there are open questions as to how this information balance 
might be redressed, these debates should not overshadow the fundamental finding 
that trust and support between heads and governing bodies provides the most solid 
foundation for a strong governing body (Scanlon 1999:62).
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The relationship between governing bodies and LEAs has been less extensively 
researched, possibly due to the perceived decline in importance of the LEAs in the 
overall education equation. As was noted in the Section 2.1.4, many education 
researchers have shifted their focus away from the LEA locus and towards either the 
central governmental or the institutional level (although research on the latter is 
usually directed towards school staff rather than towards the governing body). After 
the 1988 ERA, the education system took what Thomas and Levacic (1991) 
described as ‘two contrasting thrusts -  one towards increased centralisation and the 
other to greater managerial decentralisation...’ (1991:401), a sentiment echoed by 
numerous other researchers (see Field 1993; Gann 1998; Riley et al. 1999). While 
some researchers have argued that LEAs retain a level of relevance in the current 
educational schema (Cordingley and Kogan 1994; Lee and Derrington 2000), in 
2000 the then-DfEE confirmed that the era of the powerful LEA was over, remarking 
in its report The Role o f  the Local Authority in School Education that ‘Education 
Authorities have precise and limited functions [emphasis added]’ (2000a:3). The few 
pieces of research that do exist on the LEA-goveming body relationship reflect this 
new, more pragmatic, political arrangement, focusing on the value governing bodies 
place on engaging LEAs as service providers (Radnor et al. 1997; Riley et al. 1999). 
As Radnor et al. (1997) concluded:
‘With increased organisational autonomy and responsibility, there is a 
disinclination [for schools] to look to the LEA for strategic educational and 
professional guidance, and rather [an inclination] to treat the authority as 
business partners or providers’ (1997:212).
In short, the research evidence suggests that neither governors nor researchers 
perceive LEAs as commanding either the authority or the relevance that they once did.
Yet beyond the topics of head teacher and LEA relations, there is a surprising dearth 
of research into the relationships between governing bodies and other major policy 
actors. For example, very little research focuses on the relationship between 
governing bodies and teaching staff, despite anecdotal observations from 
practitioners suggesting the importance of building and maintaining good 
relationships between staff and governors (see Cleland and Brockman 1990; Sallis 
1991a). When mentioned in the research literature at all, the govemor-staff 
relationship is usually discussed in the broader philosophical context of where 
governance should end and implementation should begin. Only Creese (1993; 1994;
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1995; 1998; 1999) has investigated thoroughly the importance of the govemor-teacher 
relationship, and pointed to the importance of this relationship in governing body 
effectiveness. Similarly, there is no research on the relationship between governing 
bodies and the pupils whose schooling they govern, and there is very little research on 
the relationship between governing bodies and the wider school community -  
geographic, parental, or otherwise. Both omissions are equally surprising, although the 
latter more so if only because of the numerous normative opinions from those who 
believe that governing bodies provide an essential bridge between the school and the 
wider world (see e.g., Glatter 1991; Thody 1992; Naybour 1993).
However, one of the most fundamental yet under-explored relationships is that 
between governing bodies and central government. Much of the research in this area 
has focused on central government in the form of the non-ministerial government 
department Ofsted (the Office for Standards in Education), and has examined the 
liaison role governing bodies play between their schools and Ofsted in implementing 
post-inspection improvements (Earley 1997; 1998; Gray 1999). Yet other research 
on the Ofsted process has raised deeper questions about the relationship between 
governing bodies and Ofsted -  and by extension, central government. For example, 
Creese and Earley (1999) asked whether the inspection process is o f  the governing 
body or for  it, while Creese (1999) suggested that Ofsted perceives governing bodies 
4as an instrument of central government, with the governors as part of a system 
which monitors the school’s compliance with national policy’ (1999:243). This kind 
of research suggests important broader questions about the dynamics of the 
governing body/central government relationship, yet there does not seem to have 
been any significant pursuit of these questions in the literature. With education 
researchers shifting their focus away from the local authority level, it might be 
presumed that increased attention would be focused on the relationship between the 
two entities that were the major recipients of the authority relinquished by the LEAs. 
Certainly, a number of studies have concluded that this redistribution of authority has 
been unequal in practice, with central government acquiring a larger measure of de 
facto authority than governing bodies (see Deem et al. 1995; Glatter 1999; Glatter
2001). Indeed, as Brehony (1994) argued in his study of governing body 
accountability, ‘Of all the contradictions surrounding the conduct and place of school 
governing bodies in the school system, none is greater than that between the rhetoric 
of local decision making and the reality of expanded state power’ (1994:62).
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However, neither these studies nor other existing research have investigated the 
dynamics of the relationship between governing bodies and central government, 
leaving an opening in the literature surrounding questions such as how governing 
bodies’ perceptions of central government influence this relationship.
2.3 Research  on the N ormative Role of Governing B odies and 
Governors
The next two sections examine the final two categories of governance research: 
research on the normative role of governing bodies and governors, and research on 
governing body operation. This section examines the research into the normative 
question of what the role of the governing body should be, while Section 2.4 
examines the research into how governing bodies operate in practice.
2.3.1 Perspectives on the Normative Role
While there has been no shortage of popular commentary about the ‘best’ role for the 
governing body, there has been substantially less formal research into the role that 
governing bodies should play. A crucial starting point for research in this area is the 
official view of central government as to the role of the governing body, yet central 
government has provided only a general tripartite definition of how it perceives the 
governing body role: that governing bodies should provide a strategic view, act as a 
critical friend, and ensure accountability (DfE/Ofsted 1995). Unfortunately, this 
broad definition is not extremely helpful for governors on a practical level. Indeed, 
the existing research suggests that in the absence of a definitive lead from central 
government, many of the more practical aspects of the governing body role remain 
hazy. As MacBeth (1990) argued:
‘Without prior articulation of the purposes of governance, it is impossible to 
plan the governing body’s functions and priorities in a coherent and cohesive 
way [and] ad hoc governance results...’ (1990:18).
While it is therefore important for the role of the governing body to be well- 
articulated, doing so in practice has proved more difficult than doing so in theory. 
For example, there are numerous varying opinions about how governors should 
approach their responsibilities in practice, although not all of these opinions are 
mutually exclusive. Wragg (1995) argued that the role of governors should be to 
‘influence the general direction of policy and practice, and get the best possible deal
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from outside agencies’ (1995:3). Elkin (1996) believed that the role should be to 
provide equal parts policy making and staff support, while Sallis (1999) believed that 
the role of the governing body is to provide ‘a strong lay voice in the running of 
schools, accountable to parents and the community and seeking accountability from 
professionals’ (1999:10). Even more confusing, there are numerous opinions 
regarding the model that best describes the governing body role. Baginsky et al. 
(1991), in the first major post-1988 study of governance, found that most governors 
saw themselves as ‘a board of directors, a support, a consultant, [or] a helper’ (1991:8), 
and each of these aspects have been championed by various authors. Some have 
promoted the ‘boards of directors’ analogy (Adams 2001), whereas others have 
suggested that this business-based model is incompatible with the public sector. Such 
observers prefer a model in which ideally, governing bodies would operate as a sort of 
democratic town meeting (see Thody 1994a). Further complexity ensues with 
suggestions by Golby (1992) that both of these models are deficient, and that governing 
bodies should actually approach their responsibilities as though they were jurors -  called 
upon to form a ‘political fora with occasional decisive judgements to make’ (1992:172).
Yet at their base, these divergent opinions are manifestations of a more fundamental 
question about the governors’ role, posed by Saran and Taylor (1999): ‘should 
governors lead schools or should they ensure that schools are effectively led?’ 
(1999:10). The absence of a definitive answer to this question from central 
government illustrates the crux of a more specific problem: the apparent lack of 
clarity in the governing body role, which becomes evident when governing bodies 
attempt to fulfil that role in practice. Existing research suggests that at minimum, 
most governing bodies have attempted to draw a line between day-to-day 
management and governance, while also attempting to support their school by acting 
as what government terms ‘critical friends’. Thody (1994a) argued that ‘the division 
needs to be made between what constitutes the proper sphere of the school staff in 
the day-to-day running of the school and of the governors in the effective oversight 
of school activities’ (1994a:219), and research suggests that most governing bodies 
have accepted the validity and necessity of this general division in the abstract 
(Scanlon et al. 1999:21). Yet the literature also suggests that the apparent clarity of 
this division often dissipates when governors seek to move beyond the generalities 
and attempt to clarify the specific extent of their responsibilities in practice. The 
literature contains numerous studies that reveal, to varying extents, the desire of
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governing bodies to have the practicalities of their tripartite role better delineated by 
central government (see e.g., Baginsky et al. 1991; Creese and Bradley 1997; 
Scanlon et al. 1999), yet as Creese has argued, ‘While the responsibilities themselves 
may be clearly stated, far harder to define is what governors are actually to do in 
carrying them out’ (1995:9).
2.3.2 The Normative Views of Governors Themselves
This situation therefore suggests an interesting question. As has been argued above, 
central government holds a broad normative position about how governing bodies 
should operate: that they should provide a strategic view, act as critical friends, and 
ensure accountability. This position has subsequently been elaborated upon at the 
practical level by the ‘advice literature.’ However, there has been little research into 
whether the role that central government expects governing bodies to play is, in 
practice, the same normative role that governing bodies (and governors) actually see 
for themselves. This normative issue is therefore slightly -  but crucially -  different 
from the operational issue of how well governing bodies fulfil their responsibilities. 
Furthermore, research on the alignment of central government and governing body 
perceptions regarding the governing body’s role is uneven, having been conducted in 
some areas of responsibility while being noticeably absent in others. Creese (1998) 
succinctly highlighted the issues at the two ends of this spectrum, arguing that 
governing bodies ‘have often failed to address in any meaningful way the main 
business of their schools -  which is teaching and learning -  and have rarely 
discussed strategic issues’ (1998:120). It is to these two issues -  curriculum and 
strategy -  that the remainder of this section is devoted.
The Curriculum
The area in which research has been conducted is on the mismatch of perceptions 
regarding the governing body’s role as a ‘critical friend’ in relation to curricular 
issues. On one side, central government has stated that governing bodies have the 
duty to act as supportive yet ‘critical’ friends in order to ensure that the curriculum is 
implemented effectively by school staff. Researchers have argued that ‘teaching and 
learning should become the major issue for governing bodies, replacing their current 
administrative tasks’ (Thody 1999b:40), and that it is vital for governors to have a 
grasp of curricular matters if they are to understand the broader issues facing their 
schools (Baginsky et al. 1991; Creese 1995; Downes 1996). Yet despite these pleas,
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there is substantial research evidence suggesting that many governing bodies do not 
view involvement in curricular matters -  in the active manner suggested by the 
‘experts’ -  as an important or desirable aspect of their role. Rather, this research 
suggests that governors seemed content to receive information about the curriculum 
on a general level, while perceiving any more extensive involvement in curricular 
matters as a potential encroachment upon an area of professional expertise. To wit, 
Sheam et al. (1995) found that governing bodies ‘invariably delegate curriculum 
matters...[since governors] feel they do not have the expertise to become closely 
involved with decisions in this domain’ (1995:176), and almost identical findings 
have been reported by Baginsky et al. (1991), Esp and Saran (1995), and Earley
(2000). Although these findings may be disheartening, the value of this kind of 
research is that by identifying such discrepancies in interpretation, such research 
highlights important issues that require reconciliation.
The Strategic View
However, the other area mentioned by Creese (1998) is one on which research is 
noticeably absent -  the interpretation by governing bodies of central government’s 
position that governing bodies should ‘take a strategic view.’ In particular, there has 
been almost no research into a) whether governing bodies believe they do have a 
strategic role to play, and if so, b) how governors themselves define that strategic 
role. As with the curricular involvement issue, there is no shortage of normative 
opinions from either central government or governance experts. Both central 
government and governance experts alike view strategic planning as an important 
governing body responsibility, as well as one that has acquired increased importance 
in light of the decline in LEA authority over the past decade. Indeed, the Education 
Regulations 2000 clearly assert that setting a strategic framework is the primary 
responsibility of governing bodies. Under the heading ‘The Role of the Governing 
Body’, the Regulations state:
‘The governing body shall exercise their functions with a view to fulfilling a 
largely strategic role in the running of the school. The governing body shall 
establish a strategic framework for the school...monitor and evaluate 
progress in the school towards achievement of the aims and objectives set, 
and regularly review the strategic framework for the school in the light of that 
progress’ (2000:3).
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This statutory responsibility for strategic planning is reinforced in the guidance that 
the then-DfEE and now-DfES provides to governors. For example, the DfES states 
in its Guide to the Law that ‘A good governing body will take a mainly strategic 
view, through setting suitable aims and objectives, agreeing policies, priorities, plans 
and targets and monitoring and evaluating results’ (DfES 2001:5/2). Similarly, the 
main heading of the November 2000 DfEE consultation paper on governing bodies -  
‘A More Strategic, Less Operational Role’ (2000b:2) -  clearly indicated the desire of 
central government to steer governing bodies in this direction. Numerous 
governance experts also concur with this position: Pounce stressed ‘the importance 
of the governing body being actively involved at the strategic level’ (1996:ii), Creese 
argued that ‘the strategic role of a governing body [includes]...planning for the 
future, deciding on policies [and] monitoring progress’ (1998:124), and Holt 
observed that ‘the essence of governing is to provide thoughtful, strategic leadership 
that is accountable to the children, their parents, and the wider community’ 
(2002:27). In addition, the ‘advice literature’ has recently begun including sections 
on the strategic planning role of governing bodies (see Gann 1998; Dean 2001; 
Martin and Holt 2002). However, it should be noted that these advice compilations 
often present strategic planning and development planning as synonymous, rather 
than as related but distinct. While this juxtaposition is common, nearly all scholars 
of strategic planning in education (see e.g., Davies and Ellison 1996; Bennett 2000; 
Fidler 2002) have argued strongly for distinguishing between strategic planning 
(focused on longer-term policy creation), and development planning (focused on 
short-term policy implementation).
In any event, researchers during the early to mid- 1990s were optimistic that, as with 
the issue of curricular involvement, research into governors’ own perceptions of their 
strategic responsibilities would soon be forthcoming. As Corrick (1996) opined:
‘[R]esearch should begin to indicate whether governing bodies do in fact 
define their tasks in such [strategic] terms, whether such notions are the 
currency of their discussions, [and] whether they are in any real sense the 
parameters against which they assess their own work’ (1996:145).
Yet this research has not transpired. While there have been numerous research 
studies on perceptions of strategic leadership in education, almost all of them focus 
exclusively on the role of the head (see e.g., Busher and Saran 1994; Lawlor and 
Sills 1999; Harris 2000; Day et al. 2001). Only two pieces of research give even
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minimal attention to this question, and even then only in the context of broader 
issues. The case studies conducted by Scanlon et al. (1999) found that governors 
agreed that their role included strategic planning, but a closer analysis of this work 
indicates that the respondents were actually referring to their short-term school 
development planning processes as strategic planning. Otherwise, the only research 
in this area comes from Earley et al. (2002), whose broader study on school 
leadership focused briefly on the strategic role of governing bodies, and suggested 
that the governing body ‘was not generally seen as playing a leadership role in 
strategic planning’ (2002:7).
Given the obvious importance that central government has placed on the governing 
body’s strategic role, it therefore appeared that there was an opportunity for further 
research that would build upon these preliminary findings. Furthermore, the existing 
literature does not contain any research on how governors themselves define 
‘strategic planning’. Given the amorphous nature of the term and the numerous 
competing definitions in the strategic planning literature, it seemed reasonable to 
suggest that if governing bodies did perceive their role as incorporating strategic 
planning, a greater understanding of how governors ‘operationalised’ this term would 
be of significant public policy importance. For methodological reasons outlined in 
Chapter Three, it was decided to limit the scope of this research to inner London 
state secondary schools. As such, these openings in the literature formed the basis 
for the first research question of this thesis:
Do governors in inner London state secondary schools view their role as a
strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?______
2.4 Research on Governing Body Operation
The final category of governing body research addresses operational issues: the ways 
in which governing bodies actually work. This particular category appears to hold 
substantial potential for new contributions, since while the structure and organisation 
of the governing body has been fairly stable for over a decade, the responsibilities of 
governing bodies have continued to expand. As Creese and Earley (1999) observed, 
‘the demands made upon schools and their governing bodies will not decrease -  
indeed they will almost certainly increase! Only those governing bodies that are 
well-organised and well-led are likely to be able to meet the new challenges’ 
(1999:112). The existing research on governing body operation can be loosely
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grouped into three sub-areas: organisation, training, and effectiveness. As the issues 
regarding the governing body’s strategic role are best situated in the third of these 
sub-areas, the first two areas will be addressed briefly in section 2.4.1. Section 2.4.2 
will then provide a general overview of the research into governing body 
effectiveness, and will argue that research into the ‘planning’ component of 
effectiveness in relation to governing bodies can be divided into ‘development 
planning’ (section 2.4.3) and ‘strategic planning’ (section 2.4.4.), the latter of which 
is examined extensively. Finally, the limited existing research into the reasons for 
the absence of governing body strategic planning will be addressed in section 2.4.5.
2.4.1 Organisation and Training
Research into how governing body organisation affected its operation was most 
substantial during the first few years following the ERA. Given the new 
responsibilities and composition of governing bodies, such research sought to 
determine whether governing bodies were finding it necessary to meet more 
frequently, ascertain how the meetings themselves were being run, and answer other 
administrative questions (see e.g., Baginsky et al. 1991; Curtis 1994). Additionally, 
the work of Deem et al. (1995) provided a wealth of micro-level information on how 
governing bodies organised themselves during the early 1990s, and how their 
organisational decisions influenced their operation. Yet the existing research 
suggests that after this initial post-ERA period of change, most secondary school 
governing bodies adopted a relatively common organisational format -  holding 
several meetings per term (including those of committees), establishing a set of 
committees, and formalising procedures for conducting their meetings (Earley 
1994a; Scanlon et al. 1999). Given this state of affairs, any additional research on 
governing body organisation would likely be most valuable in the context of its 
influence on governing body effectiveness. This issue will be discussed in Section 2.4.2.
The second operational issue, in the sense that it is intended to provide governors 
with the skills and perspectives necessary to fulfil their responsibilities in practice, is 
that of governor training. Research into governor training has led to two somewhat 
contradictory conclusions; that while governors apparently desire increased and more 
comprehensive training, many governors do not actually participate in the training 
that is on offer. First, there is substantial evidence that governors often feel that they 
do not have a sufficient grasp of the issues they are being required to address, a
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finding that has led to calls for better training (e.g., Schlechte 1995; Jones 1998; 
Phillips 2002). Furthermore, while governors may feel overwhelmed by the breadth 
of their responsibilities, there is also evidence that the quality of training has 
improved since the early 1990s (Scanlon et al. 1999; Thody 1999a). Yet despite 
governors’ apparent desire for training, there is less agreement on whether training 
actually achieves its goals. The first obstacle is attendance; as Scanlon et al. (1999) 
pointed out, only 51 per cent of non-chair governors in their study actually attended 
formal training after induction. Indeed, other research has shown that governors 
often decline to engage in the training that is on offer. As Earley (1994b) observed:
‘The take-up [of training] amongst the case study governing bodies was 
patchy. Some governors, having attended training courses ‘in the early days’ 
no longer felt they needed or had the time for further course attendance, 
whereas others simply refused to be trained, regarding participation in 
governing body meetings or ‘on-the-job’ training as sufficient’ (1994b: 159).
Yet the research indicates further discrepancies even amongst those governors who 
do attend training. For example, both Earley (1994a) and Scanlon et al. (1999) found 
that the majority of governors who attend such training courses find them helpful, 
while others, like Evans (1998), have found that ‘chairs were critical of the largely 
irrelevant content of the courses they had attended and described a creeping 
disillusionment with training’ (1998:11). Although few researchers have gone as far 
as to argue that training has an adverse impact on governors who attend (Burt 1991; 
Waring 1992), it is evident that there are still issues surrounding training that merit 
additional research. However, it is also important to put these issues into 
perspective, as the issue of training is arguably less central to the understanding of 
governing bodies than is the issue of how well governing bodies perform their 
responsibilities. It is this issue, therefore, to which this review now turns.
2.4.2 Examining Effectiveness
The research into how well governing bodies perform their responsibilities has 
generally been categorised under the heading of ‘effectiveness,’ although research 
into this issue has been somewhat limited to date. For example, while Ofsted (2002) 
conducted research on the advantages of an effective governing body, (finding that 
there was a high correlation between ‘effective’ governing bodies and successful 
schools), Ofsted also admitted that ‘it is not possible to prove that good governance 
leads to good schools, as the cause and effect evidence is impossible to isolate
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[emphasis added]’ (2002:11). One reason for the limited amount of research on 
governing body effectiveness may be the significant emphasis that has been placed 
upon defining the term ‘effectiveness’ itself. As is evident from the existing 
literature, the term is somewhat ambiguous, as the standards of effectiveness -  and 
the components by which it is measured -  vary depending on the researcher. In 
general, as Creese and Earley (1999) observed, ‘there has been much less research 
into what constitutes an effective governing body than there has been into the 
effectiveness of schools’ (1999:7). For example, while Baginsky et al. (1991) 
sought to define the principles behind ‘effective governance’, their work focused on 
governing bodies during the period of substantial change immediately following the 
ERA. Earley (1994a) provided the first perspective on governing bodies after their 
adaptation to the ‘new’ system, finding that although governors felt that effectiveness 
was ‘largely a matter of good fortune’ (1994a:6), effective governing bodies usually 
shared tasks well, offered commitment, and had complementary skills, among other 
attributes. However, as Corrick (1996) pointed out, there is no reference by the 
respondents in Earley’s work to policy making as a component of governing body 
effectiveness. Creese (1995) remedied this omission by including strategic planning 
in his list of effectiveness criteria (indeed, calling it ‘the major activity of the 
governing body’ (1995:12)), a factor to which this review will turn in Section 2.4.4. 
More recently, Scanlon et al. (1999) proposed several broader definition of 
effectiveness, including ‘whether or not the governing body is actually performing 
the functions as outlined by recent legislation and in official publications’ (1999:13). 
One such official publication is the most recent Ofsted school inspection framework 
(Ofsted 2003a), which provides yet another variation by requiring inspectors to evaluate 
effective governance in terms of -  amongst other criteria -  ‘the extent to which the 
governing body helps shape the vision and direction of the school’ (2003a:41).
However the limited empirical research into governing body operational 
effectiveness has found that governors generally believe that they are operating 
effectively. Indeed, Scanlon et al. found that 78 per cent of heads, 85 per cent of 
governors and 94 per cent of chairs felt that their governing bodies were either 
‘effective’ or ‘very effective’ (1999:29). Yet the value of such findings is somewhat 
muted, since as is evident from the variety of definitions provided above, the 
components of ‘effectiveness’ can vary considerably. Although Earley (1994a) 
provided a starting point by identifying the factors that governors and heads believed
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constituted an effective governing body, it is somewhat difficult to determine from 
the existing research whether governors believe that their governing bodies are 
uniformly effective, or whether they believe their governing bodies are effective 
simply in engaging in a smaller number of self-defined components of effectiveness 
(such as good teamwork and strong delegation). As Earley (1994a) observed, there 
are ‘basic or ‘bottom line’ factors [necessary] for governing bodies to achieve 
minimal effectiveness,’ including conduct of meetings, clerking, regular attendance 
(1994a: 105); it should therefore be apparent that competence in these basic factors 
should in no way imply effectiveness in the broader sense. In particular, there has 
been little specific research into the ‘planning’ component of governing body 
effectiveness, a factor that forms part of the effectiveness definitions of both Creese
(1995) and Scanlon et al. (1999). It is to this particular issue that this review now turns.
2.4.3 Governing Bodies and Development Planning
Two main types of planning -  development planning and strategic planning -  need to 
be distinguished from one another. As was noted in Section 2.3.2, scholars agree 
that in general, development planning should be concerned with short-term planning, 
while ‘by contrast, strategic planning is concerned with the medium- and long term 
future of the school... ’ (Creese and Earley 1999:40). In relation to governing bodies, 
research into involvement in development planning is the better developed of the 
two. This is likely because the widespread emphasis on the value of school 
development planning immediately following the ERA (see Bromley Education 
Department 1988; Smetherham 1989; Hargreaves 1991) was sustained and 
institutionalised during the 1990s, while the focus on strategic planning has been 
comparatively both less consistent and more recent (Levacic and Glover 1998).
While most researchers now agree that ‘a well thought out and agreed school 
development plan is at the heart of the work of every effective school’ (Creese 
1995:62), research has demonstrated that governor involvement in the development 
planning process has often been both varied (Creese and Bradley 1997) and 
somewhat controversial (Cuckle et al. 1998). Both of these aspects are likely to be 
attributable to the fact that in practice, the school development plan is often a short­
term implementation plan, usually designed to cover one academic year (see e.g., 
Davies and Ellison 1996; Fidler 2002). While early post-ERA commentators argued 
that it was essential for governors to be involved in the development planning
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process (Glover 1990; Baker 1991), it was also acknowledged that school staff 
should have a strong role in the design of the plan itself. Yet despite this 
collaborative ideal, Creese and Bradley (1997) suggested that governor involvement 
in the development planning process was often limited by governors’ perception that 
school staff had both more knowledge about the issues that such a plan should 
address, and more time to devote to its design. As Cuckle et al. (1998) observed, ‘far 
from helping provide an overview of what was required for improving the school, the 
most that was said in several schools by governors and headteachers alike was that 
governors ‘could suggest items if they wanted” (1998:30). At its extreme, 
governing body involvement in the development planning process has been limited 
to nominal approval of the finished document, thereby clearly placing governing bodies 
‘on the margins of the development planning process’ (Martin and Bullock 1997:3).
However, the other end of the governor involvement spectrum yields similarly 
unsatisfactory results. Cuckle et al. (1998) suggested that there is often significant 
tension surrounding the active involvement of the governing body in the 
development planning process, a tension that they attribute to staff concerns about 
micromanagement. Similarly, Scanlon et al. (1999) found that when asked about a 
wide variety of governing body responsibilities, the highest level of head-govemor 
disagreement was in regards to the statement ‘the governing body works with staff in 
an on-going monitoring and evaluation of the development plan’ (1999:23). Given 
that governing bodies are, in theory, supposed to set the policies while the school 
staff are supposed implement them, the existing research suggests that conflict often 
ensues when governor involvement in the development planning process is perceived 
by staff as an incursion into issues of implementation.
Therefore, despite the nominal importance of governing bodies in determining school 
policies, many observers felt that neither of the above options regarding the 
relationship between governing bodies and the planning process appeared to be even 
vaguely ideal. On one hand, too little involvement by governors suggested an 
abdication of responsibility, while on the other hand, too much involvement 
suggested meddling. Since some researchers have implied that this dilemma might 
stem partly from the perception that the development plan was the only lever by 
which governors could influence school policy (e.g., Glover 1997), others (e.g., 
Davies and Ellison 1990) have suggested that while governing bodies still require an
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understanding of the school development plan, a more suitable responsibility for 
governing bodies might be in longer-term strategic planning. These researchers 
believe that this approach would permit governors to engage in policy making whilst 
largely avoiding conflicts over issues of implementation. This review therefore 
turns to strategic planning, the issue which is at the very centre of this thesis.
2.4.4 Governing Bodies and Strategic Planning
The concept of strategic planning has been discussed in the educational context for a 
number of years, although the interest in and emphasis on strategic planning in 
education has increased substantially since the mid-1990s. This section begins by 
outlining the evolution and definition of strategic planning in the education literature, 
and then moves to an evaluation of the existing research into how governing bodies 
have approached their strategic planning responsibilities.
Defining Strategic Planning
While research into the nature and value of strategic planning in business had been 
conducted since the mid-1960s (see e.g., Ansoff 1965; Steiner 1979), it was not until 
the mid-1980s that the business community demonstrated a sustained and substantial 
interest in research that proposed systematic approaches for improving business 
strategic planning (see e.g., Johnson and Scholes 1984; Minzberg and Waters 1985; 
Quinn et al. 1988). It was from this business-based research into issues of strategic 
planning that interest in strategic planning arose in the education community, 
beginning in the early 1990s. Before examining this literature, it should be noted 
that achieving consensus on a precise definition of strategic planning within the 
educational context has always been elusive. Writing in 1996, Fidler noted that 
‘strategy is...beginning to appear in the education management literature, but often 
as a word which is not clearly defined and [which] appears to [be] little more than a 
general reference to the longer term’ (1996:13). This semantic ambiguity still 
remains quite problematic; writing in 2003, Davies and Davies lamented that ‘there 
is not always a common understanding of what strategy and strategic planning 
[means] in schools’ (2003:79).
Yet initially, the use of the term ‘strategic planning’ in education was largely 
confined to issues pertaining to the long-term management of finance. This 
limitation is understandable, as much of the existing literature on and thinking about
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strategic planning in the early 1990s was focused on the financial needs of 
businesses. For example, in 1990 Davies and Ellison made one of the first references 
to strategic planning in the education context, arguing that ‘senior managers and 
governors have to view immediate financial decisions within a longer time frame’ 
(1990:27). Similarly, Murgatroyd (1991) sought to explore the role of strategy in 
what he termed ‘school wide quality improvement’ (1991:7), outlining potential 
approaches to strategic planning that schools might pursue. However, Murgatroyd’s 
aim in presenting these four options was also fiscally-based, as he perceived strategic 
planning primarily as a way to eliminate waste and duplication, make better use of 
scarce resources, and ensure systematic management of costs (1991:18).
By the mid-1990s, as interest in the education community about strategic planning was 
beginning to increase, the traditional conception of strategic planning as a ‘linear 
process’ was fading from acceptability. The most prominent critic of this traditional 
model was Minzberg (1994), who (based upon his observations of the business world) 
proposed that an ‘emergent’ model of strategic planning -  based on flexibility and an 
emphasis on ‘strategy’ over ‘planning’ -  was more valuable and realistic than was the 
traditional linear model (whose rigid determinism over time often led to conflicts with 
practical realities). While adapting Minzberg’s new approach for use in educational 
strategic planning, education researchers further suggested that the concept of strategic 
planning should be applied not simply to school financial management, but to other 
aspects of school management as well. For example, Hargreaves (1995) drew upon 
Minzberg’s ‘emergent’ model in order to argue that strategic planning in education 
was most effective when it was accompanied by both appropriate monitoring schemes 
and clearly-defined agreements about who was responsible for making adjustments to 
the strategy (1995:221). In other words, Hargreaves was arguing that strategic 
planning in education required flexibility, not rigidity.
Similarly, Fidler (1996) adhered strongly to Minzberg’s model in constructing his 
own definition of strategic planning for school improvement, incorporating the ideas 
of Johnson and Scholes (1993) in order to construct a whole-school definition of 
strategic planning: that such planning should involve 1) the long term, 2) the future 
of the whole school in an integrated way, 3) taking account of future trends in the 
world outside the school, and 4) taking account of its present, and likely future, 
resources (1996:1). The importance of Fidler’s definition was that it provided one of
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the first education-specific strategic planning models, as up until this point many 
educationalists were simply borrowing definitions and models that had been 
designed for business needs. Furthermore, Fidler’s model provided the first 
education-specific model that a) applied to more than the financial planning sphere, 
and b) proposed planning on a timeframe that exceeded that of the standard School 
Development Plan. It should also be noted that the increasing interest in educational 
strategic planning was not limited to schools, but extended to central government as 
well. As such, schools engaging in strategic planning (or simply those who sought to 
achieve good inspection results!) needed to accommodate central government’s own 
‘definition’ of strategic planning, which Glover et al. (1996) suggested was ‘highly 
rational and technicist’:
‘Rational in regarding good practice as the informed selection of the best 
allocation of resources...[and] technicist in expecting a complex and 
analytical decision making process, involving the schools’ stakeholders, 
which is formally documented’ (1996:136).
More recent work from the late 1990s sought to further identify and define the key 
components of educational strategic planning in this new broad-based and non-linear 
world. For example, Knight (1997) argued that strategic planning should be sub­
divided into ‘strategic positioning’ and ‘systems analysis’, with the former 
examining a school’s current internal and external contexts, and the latter being an 
examination of the school’s objectives and means of attaining them (1997:13). 
Alternatively, Middlewood (1998) sought to define strategic planning as an integral 
sub-component (along with a concept he termed ‘strategic thinking’) of a broader 
approach labelled ‘strategic management.’ Under Middlewood’s model, strategic 
planning draws upon strategic thinking in order to create a blueprint for strategic 
management; for Middlewood, effective strategic planning consists of enabling 
adaptation in changing circumstances, ‘environmental scanning’, and formulating 
generic strategies (1998:11).
Yet the most substantial and sustained research on strategic planning in education 
has come from Davies and Ellison; in their 1998 study, Davies and Ellison sought to 
create a more subtle sub-division of the term ‘strategic planning’ than had Knight 
(1997), arguing that a tripartite model of ‘futures perspectives’, ‘strategic intent’, and 
‘operational target setting’ was more precise and robust than was the single term 
‘strategic planning’ (1998:465). Davies and Davies (2003) then further clarified this
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tripartite model, echoing Middlewood in stating that ‘strategic planning and strategic 
thinking are not the same’ (2003:79). In elaborating upon the ‘Davies’ model, 
Davies and Ellison (2003) presented their own set of four components of what they 
believe constitutes ‘strategy’: that it deals with 1) the medium to longer term, 2) 
fundamental or important key issues, 3) broad aggregated data, and 4) acts as a 
template against which to benchmark current activity (2003:36). In summary, 
although the existing literature contains numerous semantic differences about 
precisely what is meant by the phrase ‘strategic planning’, the practical definitions of 
the term have been largely similar: emphasising the long-term nature of strategic 
planning and the importance of focusing such planning on key issues facing the 
whole school. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter 3, this thesis drew upon these 
similarities in creating the definition of strategic planning used in the quantitative 
survey: ‘future planning beyond the current and next school year’.
Governing Bodies and Strategic Planning
Having outlined the ways in which strategic planning has been perceived in the 
existing education literature, this review now turns to the relationship between 
governing bodies and strategic planning. While Sallis argued as early as 1993 that 
‘The main thing wrong with governing bodies...is that their focus is on the past 
rather than the future’ (1993:29), it is only relatively recently that any substantial 
attention has been paid to the concept of strategic planning as a governing body 
responsibility. As was noted in Section 2.2.5, governing bodies have been charged 
by central government with a primarily strategic role, and most observers believe that 
this role is one for which governing bodies are well suited. For example, Fidler
(1996) built upon the proposition that governors needed to ‘provide a strategic view’ 
(DfE/Ofsted 1995), by arguing that that the role of the governing body in strategy 
formation ‘needfs] to be considered’ (1996:79). Gann (1998) expanded upon this 
observation, urging governors to engage in what he termed ‘strategic governance,’ 
defined as ‘planning, monitoring, and evaluating’. In Gann’s schema, ‘planning’ 
consisted of setting the aims and objectives of the schools, and then devising and 
overseeing policies and procedures (1998:46). More recently, Martin and Holt (2002) 
observed that ‘creating strategy is the essence of the governing body’s role’ (2002:17), 
and Earley (2003) argued that ‘for governing bodies to become more effective.. .the[ir] 
role clearly needs to give greater emphasis to strategy... ’ (2003:364).
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In light of these arguments that governing bodies should engage in strategic 
planning, there have been several attempts to provide governors with practical 
assistance in achieving this goal. For example, Burt (2001) has championed the use 
of an self-evaluative tool for governing bodies called the ‘Index of Governance,’ in 
which strategic planning is one of four key components of effective school 
governance (the others being ensuring progress, real partnership, and sound practice). 
Burt’s model provides a template against which governing bodies can measure how 
well their current strategic planning processes shape a clear direction, decide a 
strategy for improvement, have clear documentation, ensure timely decisions, and 
allow governors to fulfil their statutory responsibilities (2001:2). Alternatively, 
Walters and Richardson (1999) have proposed a planning model based on Carver 
(1990) specifically designed for governing bodies (see section 2.2.2), in which 
governing bodies ‘govern through policy’ by setting the broad policy aims, while 
allowing staff to decide how those policies can be best implemented.
Unfortunately, the limited existing research into the actual involvement of governing 
bodies in strategic planning suggests that in practice, governing bodies are not 
embracing this responsibility. In the spring of 1998, Ofsted asked its inspectors to 
give particular attention to how well governing bodies fulfilled their strategic role; 
three quarters of governing bodies inspected were rated satisfactory or better (Creese 
and Earley 1999:7). However, the Chief Inspector remained critical of the minimal 
involvement of governing bodies in strategic planning (Ofsted 1999), and as Adams
(2001) has argued, despite central government’s position, ‘the vast majority of work 
that governing bodies become involved in would in no sense be described as 
‘strategic”  (2001:35). For example, researchers have pointed out that making the 
leap from development planning to strategic planning requires acknowledging that 
strategic planning and development planning are not synonymous (see e.g., Fidler 
1998; Middlewood 1998), yet as Davies and Ellison (1998) argued, ‘what [many] 
schools have, of late, been calling strategic plans are, in fact, detailed operational 
plans’ (1998:471). This was confirmed by the survey research on governing bodies 
of Scanlon et al. (1999).
Similarly, Earley (1994a) found that strategic planning was one of the primary areas 
in which heads sought more governing body involvement (1994:40), while Giles 
(1995) found a ‘growing concern at the lack of strategic planning taking place in
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what is now a relatively experience decentralised school system’ (1995:5). However, 
research conducted by Giles three years later suggested that little had changed in the 
interim; governing body planning was still ‘ad hoc and incremental, with...schools 
reacting to change rather than assuming the strategic responsibility for planning...’ 
(1998:409). While Giles’ work was based on a convenience sample (which may 
raise questions about the validity of the results), her general conclusion is also 
supported by Creese (1998), who drew on the preliminary large-scale data of Scanlon 
et al. (1999) in one of the only analyses to specifically examine governing bodies and 
strategic planning. As Creese concluded, ‘There is a clear expectation that governors 
will be involved in school improvement and yet, at present, many are not’ (1998:30).
This apparent paradox, of governing bodies having a strategic planning role but 
failing to exercise it, leads to the second research question. The first research 
question, noted in Section 2.3.2, seeks to determine whether governors themselves 
view their role as a strategic one. The second research question seeks to expand 
upon the first and determine whether these findings from the literature -  that 
governing bodies often fail to engage in strategic planning -  are applicable to the 
specific circumstances of this project. This second question therefore asks:
Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually evident
in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?
2.4.5 Reasons for the Lack of Strategic Planning
One final interrogation of the existing literature, however, reveals what appears to be 
an important question that has only been addressed in passing: given the apparent 
relative lack of strategic planning by governing bodies, why is this the case? The 
answer cannot be found in the advice literature, despite the fact (noted above) that 
recent advice literature has increased its coverage of strategic planning issues. 
Indeed, the advice literature frequently takes a pragmatic approach, implying that 
many of the circumstances in which governing bodies currently find themselves 
cannot be substantially changed. As such, this literature often limits itself to 
providing governing bodies with valuable ‘stop-gap’ advice for correcting the 
symptoms of poor strategic planning -  such as suggesting better teamwork, more 
efficient meetings, and improved procedures for school visits -  rather than 
investigating potential systemic causes. As Ozga (1992) argued:
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“ How to’ texts create a false and unreliable impression that, if the correct 
procedures are followed, education is manageable. This both exaggerates the 
impact of tidy systems, and distracts managers from their obligation to 
establish direction and purpose as a preliminary to efficient system operation’ 
(1992:279).
Turning then to the research literature, there has been limited work on the reasons for 
why governing bodies may not operate effectively in general. Both Earley (1994a) 
and Scanlon et al. (1999) asked governors about the factors preventing governor and 
governing body effectiveness; this query elicited a wide range of responses -  from a 
lack of time, to concerns over the adequacy of governor knowledge, to complaints 
about their heavy workload. However, in both of these studies, these findings were 
quantified from responses to an open-ended qualitative survey question. While this 
type of research provides an excellent indication of the factors preventing 
effectiveness, this type of research does have three drawbacks. First, it does not offer 
(nor does it claim to provide) a systematic or methodologically rigorous attempt to 
identify such factors. Second, it does not offer an assessment of the overall impact of 
these factors (although it does provide an indication of the relative impact of factors 
in relation to one another). Third, this research was limited to examining the broader 
question of governing body ‘effectiveness,’ rather than the more specific question of 
strategic planning. While it may be true that some of the factors identified by Earley 
and Scanlon also explain the absence of strategic planning, their research neither 
claims nor attempts to do so. The only other research-based attempt to identify 
factors inhibiting governing body strategic planning is that of Earley et al. (2002), 
which, as was noted in Section 2.3.2, was part of a broader study on school leadership 
that focused briefly on the strategic role of governing bodies. Earley et al. suggested 
that governing body leadership was limited by ‘the extent to which it depends on the 
head and leadership team for information; the restricted time governors can spend in 
the school; and their lack of ‘professional’ knowledge’ (2002:43), all of which appear 
to be valid criticisms. However, these findings are somewhat limited in their scope, as 
they concentrate on institutional-level issues to the exclusion of potential external 
factors that may impede governing body strategic planning.
There have been a few additional conjectures about reasons why governing bodies 
have not engaged in strategic planning, yet such arguments are derived from 
interpretations of the empirical research outlined immediately above. Corrick (1996) 
drew upon Earley (1994a) to suggest four factors that inhibited governing body
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effectiveness: ‘the hostility of teachers and educationalists; the inappropriateness of 
most governor training; the inherent deference of governors; and the difficulty of the 
task given to them’ (1996:155). While a valuable list, these factors refer only to 
general governing body effectiveness and not to strategic planning in particular; 
additionally, Corrick’s analysis is somewhat uneven, alluding to the ‘difficulty’ of 
governors’ task while providing neither a definition of nor supporting evidence for 
this claim. As Gann (1998) observed, while Corrick argued that ‘routine and 
relatively minor matters are evidently allowed to take precedence’ (1996:149) in 
governing body operations, Corrick also appeared to hold an overly broad definition 
of ‘minor’ matters -  including resources, staff appointments, the school development 
plan, curriculum issues, staffing structure, and -  most notably for the context of this 
research -  ‘aims and objectives of the school.’ As such, although Corrick 
contributed valuable general observations about effectiveness, he provided no new 
primary research evidence and leaves several major issues less than fully explored.
The only other piece of applied research comes from Creese (1998), who, as noted in 
Section 2.4.4, drew on the preliminary data of Scanlon et al. (1999) in analysing 
governing bodies and their specific role in strategic planning. Although the main 
thrust of this analysis was to highlight the important role of governing bodies in 
strategic planning, Creese suggested that the three main factors affecting governing 
body effectiveness in strategic planning were governor information, governor 
recruitment, and time. Creese’s argument is more closely reasoned than is Corrick’s, 
yet the limited number of factors (particularly in relation to the broader list of factors 
outlined in by the research of Scanlon et al. (1999)) suggests that there is room for a 
broader exploration of these factors than such a brief outline could reasonably be 
expected to provide.
This state of the existing literature suggests a number of opportunities for further 
research, for the following reasons. First, the existing research has identified a 
number of concerns, including the time governors need to spend (Deem et al. 1995; 
Creese and Bradley 1997; NAGM 2001), the amount of information governors 
receive (Brehony 1992; Mahoney and Riley 1996; Creese 1999), the complexity of 
the financing system (Marren and Levacic 1994), and the uneven commitment of 
governors (Earley 1994a; Sallis 2001). However, these research studies have 
generally sought to identify passive complaints, rather than to determine whether (or
51
how) these (or other) situations create active barriers to governing bodies becoming 
more engaged in strategic planning. Second, as was noted earlier, none of these 
particular studies were designed to focus specifically on strategic planning. As such, 
the research into barriers to governing body strategic planning has been remarkably 
ad hoc, with no attempt to collect research evidence specifically related to strategic 
planning in any systematic or heuristic manner. Finally, existing research on 
governing body strategic planning has tended to focus solely upon institutional-level 
factors. However, research on a single level is of little use to governing bodies in the 
real world, who are operating at the ‘sharp end’ of the system and who, as such, 
interact not only the institutional level but other levels as well. As was noted in 
Section 2.2.5, there has been little research into the relationship between central 
government and governing bodies, and particularly on the issue of strategic planning.
Given this state of the existing literature, there therefore appeared to be value in 
research that would build on the contributions of Earley, Scanlon et al., Creese, and 
Corrick, and offer a systematic and heuristic approach to identifying and interpreting 
the barriers that make governing bodies less effective in terms of their strategic 
planning. The underlying rationale for this approach is that identifying and 
eliminating these structural barriers can be just as valuable as proposing short-term 
solutions for circumventing them, and that a systemic understanding of these barriers 
is preferable to the existing ad hoc approach. As such, the third main research 
questions for this thesis, building upon the previous two questions, is:
If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why is 
this the case?_________________________________________________________
2.5 Policy Relevance and Business Involvement in Education
Finally, in the event that the first three research questions prove answerable, a fourth 
and final research question is proposed:
Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning barriers 
has practical policy relevance and importance?_____________________________
If the strategic planning barriers identified via the first three questions are merely 
theoretical or abstract, and do not adequately or accurately reflect the main reasons 
for the absence of governing body strategic planning on real policy issues, the
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practical value in identifying such barriers is clearly reduced. The purpose of posing 
this final question is therefore to address two issues. First, whether the systematic 
application of these barriers in the context of a policy issue of practical importance 
does provide a robust explanation of the reasons for the absence of governing body 
strategic planning on that substantive policy issue. Second, whether the systematic 
application of these barriers can provide a valuable heuristic analytical tool for 
understanding the absence of governing body strategic planning on other substantive 
policy issues, which in turn could offer policy makers new perspectives on how to 
better remedy such absences.
Demonstrating the practical policy relevance of these barriers requires applying them 
in a policy context where governing body strategic planning is desirable yet currently 
absent. The policy context chosen for this purpose is ‘business involvement in 
education,’ and the remainder of this chapter outlines the history of this issue and 
presents the literature that explains its relevance to the strategic planning question. 
Section 2.5.1 provides a history of business involvement in education, followed by 
an examination of the renewed interest in this issue by both the previous 
Conservative government (Section 2.5.2) and current Labour government (Section 
2.5.3). Finally, Section 2.5.4 will turn to the limited literature regarding the role of 
the governing body in relation to business involvement. It will be argued that the 
state of this literature indicates first, the suitability of business involvement as a lens 
through which the applicability of the strategic planning barriers can be examined, 
and second, the value of further research in this field.
2.5.1 A Brief History of Business Involvement in Education
There has been business and industrial involvement in English education for many 
years, from the guild schools of the 16th century to the Mechanics Institutes of the
th19 , the latter of whom used apprenticeships to promote ‘links between practical 
training and extended education for young workers’ (Miller 1995:35). However, 
business involvement in the state education system has historically been 
accompanied by a mutual antipathy towards such connections -  both on the part of 
businesses and on the part of educational institutions. Many historians trace this 
suspicion to the ambivalent attitudes of the traditional Victorian social and 
intellectual elite (see Reeder 1979; Sanderson 1999:40-54). On one hand, while 
most of the Victorian elite acknowledged the importance of the Industrial Revolution
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in maintaining the status and pre-eminence of Britain on the world stage, these same 
elite often viewed industry and business with a level of aristocratic distain. In order 
to maintain and perpetuate the class boundary that separated the historically 
aristocratic from those whose wealth had been acquired through business and 
industry, these aristocratic elite sought refuge in their elite halls of learning. As 
Watts (1983) argued, ‘the elite educational institutions from the Victorian era tended 
to propagate a particular academic and cultural heritage, which was associated with a 
gentlemanly disdain for vocational application and particularly for industrial 
manufacture’ (1983:3).
Yet on the other hand, the Victorian elite were also great social reformers. From the 
decision in 1839 by Lord John Russell to arrange for a Committee of the Privy 
Council to ‘distribute grants for education’ (Armytage 1964:113) to the eventual 
creation of the system of universal state-funded schooling, these reformers sought to 
bring wholesale reform to the education system. However, these reformers also 
imbued this new system the same anti-industrial ethos that had shaped their own 
public school education (Wiener 1981:18-24). By the end of the 19th century, 
however, industry began to demand that the education system recognise the realities 
of the post-schooling employment that most working-class schoolchildren were 
facing (Roderick and Stephens 1981:243). Similar sentiments were expressed by
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various governmental education committees during the early 20 century, whose 
reports indicate that the divide between schools, government, and industry was 
neither as intractable nor as longstanding as some contemporary observers might 
now believe. In 1926, the government’s Hadow Report on the state of compulsory 
schooling made the following observation concerning education-industry links:
‘A number of headteachers have established relations with local employers 
and have attained useful results thereby. We think, however, that in general, 
there has not been sufficient contact between teachers and employers and that 
in future it would be desirable for Headteachers to obtain the views of local 
employers and employees before giving any trend or bias, particularly of an 
industrial character, to the curriculum...’ (1926:117).
Two years later, the Malcolm Committee on Education and Industry (1928), 
commissioned to examine increasing complains about the literacy standards of 
British students, made similar observations. The committee noted that ‘industry 
must define their needs, and no other body can do it for them; but if such definition is
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to be of any use, it should be based on a reasonably full and sympathetic knowledge 
of what schools are doing, and trying to do’ (1928:10). However, although these 
reports suggest that there was room for negotiation and cooperation between the two 
sides, the unification of the education system under the 1944 Education Act and the 
growing emphasis on the professionalism and unionisation of teachers led to 
increased animosity between industrialists and educationalists. As was noted in 
Section 2.1.2, the 1944 Education Act consolidated state dominance over the 
education system, and in doing so largely excluded business and industry from a role 
in the state’s new educational framework. Yet by decreasing the role of industry in 
the state educational framework, central government also freed industry from 
assuming any responsibility for educational outcomes. Without any responsibility or 
obligation to help improve educational standards, business and industry now felt free 
to criticise inadequacies in the state-run system, particularly on issues of work 
preparedness and training. If ‘interdependence and mutual benefit form the basis of 
any partnership between business and education’ (Marsden and Priestland 1989:1), 
the retrenchment of the two sides in mutual suspicion following the 1944 Education 
Act fostered a substantial break in any fledgling cooperation that may have existed.
This animosity became more pronounced through the 1960s and 1970s, with the 
growing debate about whether educational standards were declining. The Plowden 
Report (1967) on primary education was the first government report to voice concern 
over the condition of the state education system, while pointing to increased child- 
centred teaching and greater parental involvement as the solutions. In response, the 
Black Papers on Education (Cox and Dyson 1971), a series of Conservative 
monographs (supported by many industrialists) decried the failing state of the 
education system and laid the blame on incompetent teachers and education 
professionals (Male 1974:168). This debate over standards coincided with the 
increasing unease about the value of the new ‘comprehensive’ secondary system, 
which was implemented partly in order to remedy the academic-vocational divide 
that some felt characterised the previous system of grammar, technical, and 
secondary modem schools (Kerckhoff et al. 1996:266-73). This increased concern 
over the inadequacy of the school system was also accompanied by a precipitous 
decline in economic prosperity; although the latter was accelerated by the oil crises 
of the 1970s, the public began to link the poor economy with poor educational 
standards. As a result, by the early 1970s the public was becoming increasingly
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worried that Britain was roiled in a ‘low skills equilibrium, in which the majority of 
enterprises staffed by poorly trained managers and workers produce low quality 
goods and services’ (Finegold and Soskice 1990:18).
The first concerted attempt to address this downward spiral came in Prime Minster 
James Callaghan’s Ruskin College speech in 1976, in which he opened the ‘Great 
Debate’ on education. Tellingly, a major focus of this address was on the divide 
between schools and industry, as Callaghan proclaimed:
‘I have been concerned to find that many of our best trained students...have 
no desire to join industry. Their preferences are to stay in academic life or to 
find their way into the Civil Service.... [As such,] there is the need to 
improve relations between industry and education’ (1976:10-11, 19).
The Ruskin College speech was followed by the Green Paper on Education in 
Schools (1976), which, among other recommendations, formalised this desire for 
better links between education and industry. Yet while the Ruskin Speech and the 
Green Paper brought the connection between industry and education into the 
spotlight once more, there had never been a complete exclusion of business from 
education. For example, British Petroleum had sponsored a series of ‘school links’ 
since the 1960s, in which ‘link officers’ and ‘link teachers’ collaborated to provide 
work shadowing and curricular development for secondary school students (Marsden 
1989; 1991). Most of the new education-business partnerships that emerged in the 
wake of Ruskin followed the British Petroleum model, focusing on school leavers 
and school-to-work transitions, with explicit emphasis on introducing students to the 
skills and attitudes that they would need to succeed in business or industry following 
graduation. Yet while this model led to a large number of independently designed 
work placement schemes for students, these link activities still ‘tended to be ad hoc 
and dependent upon the mutual goodwill of local companies and the schools’ (Miller 
1995:35). By 1980 there were enough existing links for the Department of Industry 
to publish a ‘review’ of these initiatives (see Department of Industry 1980) -  yet 
while a number of smaller private-sector ventures (such as Project Trident and 
Young Enterprise) were launched, ‘neither they nor any more official efforts seemed 
likely to bring about the kind of redirection of the education system called for in the 
Great Debate and [1976] Green Paper’ (Dale 1990:15). While the rhetorical 
promises of the Callaghan government therefore remained largely unrealised in
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practice, the Great Debate had succeeded in heightening the prominence and 
awareness of education issues in the minds of both politicians and the general public.
2.5.2 The Conservative Approach
It was in this environment of significant national consciousness regarding 
educational issues that Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government came to power 
in 1979. The Thatcher government echoed the charges that the failure of the 
education system was to blame for Britain’s economic woes, yet unlike the previous 
Labour government, Thatcher resolved to redress this problem via legislation rather 
than discussion. Given the Conservative’s link between education and the state of 
the workforce, it should not be surprising that Thatcher’s first legislative attempt at 
reforming education system came in the form of the Technical and Vocational 
Education Initiative (TVEI) of 1982. Developed ‘with the general intention of 
arresting ‘national decline’ by improving Britain’s economic and industrial 
competitiveness’ (Gleeson 1987:22), TVEI was a ‘pilot scheme for new institutional 
arrangements for technical and vocational education for 14-18 year olds, within 
existing financial resources, and, where possible, in association with local 
authorities’ (Thatcher 1982). In practice, TVEI created a great increase in demand 
for work placement spaces, and while TVEI initially met with some resistance from 
educators, it proved to be fairly successful in bringing together industry and 
education. Not only did students appear to benefit, but within only six years, every 
LEA in England and Wales was participating in TVEI to some extent (Dale 
1990:169). The overall effect of TVEI was to both reassert central government 
authority over education and to re-establish connections between education and 
industry on a national level, even if only a limited scale. As such, TVEI not only 
altered what schools were supposed to teach, but also signalled a change in how the 
central government would go about enforcing those changes. No longer were the 
(predominantly Labour-controlled) local education authorities to be relied upon to 
make the changes necessary for reforming education. Instead, these changes could 
(and would, if necessary,) be directed by central government itself, and implemented 
at the local level with the cooperation and support of LEAs.
Yet despite this large-scale attempt to connect schools and industry, TVEI was not 
entirely persuasive in allaying the historic suspicion between business and education. 
On one side, business leaders continued to complain about the inadequacies of the
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education system. For example, in 1984, the Director of the Institute of Directors 
argued that ‘for nearly two decades, large parts of the state system have been subject 
to mismanagement, general lack of clarity of purpose and the plummeting of 
standards...’ (Goldsmith 1984:25), while the chairman of the Alliance of Small 
Firms argued that teachers were ‘often hostile to enterprise and profit-seeking’ 
(Gorman 1984:80). On the other side, research by Dale (1990) found that educators 
believed initiatives like TVEI ‘emphasised what [such initiatives] could do for 
participating firms, rather than students and schools,’ and that these initiatives were 
designed ‘for firms to see what it was like participating in schools, rather than the 
other way around’ (Dale 1990:125).
However, efforts continued to bridge this gap, and in 1986, industry groups and 
government proclaimed the Industry Year, a year-long set of programmes aimed at 
strengthening these new but fragile connections between business and education. 
Touted by Secretary of State for Education Kenneth Baker as ‘one of a number of 
ways in which we are working to correct the anti-industrial culture which has grown 
up in this country over the last 130 years’ (1986:7), Industry Year activities included 
attempts to link all British secondary schools with local companies and the 
organisation of Industry Weeks, where local businesses would give presentations and 
tours to pupils (Jamieson and Blandford 1986). This momentum continued into 
1988, when the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) released its landmark report, 
Building stronger partnerships between industry and secondary education. This 
document was the first systematic study of the scope and effectiveness of different 
types of education-business partnerships, examining the resources and commitments 
necessary to meet what the authors termed the ‘pressing need to strengthen the 
partnership between companies and state secondary schools’ (1988:11).
However, the most substantial alteration of the business-education relationship came 
with the 1988 Education Reform Act, which introduced decentralisation through 
local management of schools (LMS), the option of Grant-Maintained (GM) status, 
and the expansion of the City Technology Colleges (CTC) programme, while 
retaining central control via a national curriculum and national assessment standards. 
The ERA provided several new avenues for business involvement in education. 
First, companies could now provide schools with curriculum products and programs 
with the knowledge that they would fit into the national curriculum framework
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(Pearce 1992). Second, the ERA provided the opportunity for expanding the 
business-led City Technology Colleges programme, based upon an Industry Year 
experiment that was intended to create a new breed of technically-focused urban 
secondary schools, freed from the authority of LEAs and financed by partnerships 
between businesses and government (McCulloch 1989; Whitty et al. 1993). Finally, 
LMS was introduced in order to encourage schools to be run themselves ‘more like 
businesses’ by giving local schools increased authority over their budgets (and 
increased responsibility for their results). These three components were potentially a 
comprehensive step forward towards greater industry-education integration.
Throughout the early 1990s, a broad range of business involvement activities were 
designed, implemented, and praised by schools throughout the country -  from 
projects in science and mathematics to those in physical education and food 
technology (see e.g., Lovelace 1991; Churchill 1994; Wallis 1994). Additionally, 
numerous organisations were either formed or expanded in response to this renewed 
interest, including the Technology Colleges Trust, Business in the Community, and 
Understanding Business and Industry (Neal 1991). The most widespread of these 
types of organisations were the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and the 
Education Business Partnerships (EBPs). TECs were local-level not-for-profit 
entities, designed to combine public and private resources in addressing local needs 
for workforce training and economic regeneration. While TECs focused largely on 
skills development, EBPs were designed with the broader aim of increasing ‘the 
quality and quantity of links between education and business’ (Hillage 1994:1). 
These various organisations and initiatives appeared to have a measurable positive 
impact on business-education interaction. For example, a 1990 survey of CBI 
members reported that 50 per cent of respondents had no links to education, and 37 
per cent of schools surveyed had with no links with business (Campbell and John 
1991:34). However, a similar survey only four years later found that 92 per cent of 
businesses surveyed were involved in work experience and 89 per cent sponsored 
company visits, while 79 per cent of business respondents were aware of their local 
Education Business Partnership (Bennett 1994:15).
Admittedly, some of these renewed attempts at linking business and education were 
less than successful. For example, despite the Thatcher government’s hope that City 
Technology Colleges would ‘cement the permanence of the link between education
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and the world of employment’ (Baker 1993:177), the CTC program in practice was 
‘ill-conceived and poorly implemented at the national government level’ (Edwards et 
al. 1992:49), hampered by both an inability to find committed industrial sponsors and 
opposition from the education sector. Yet while there were still critics who were 
opposed to business involvement on principle, the tenor of the debate was changing 
during the 1990s. For example, after observing the development of education- 
business links post-1988, Warwick (1993) argued that overall, these activities were 
still diffuse, varied greatly in quality and commitment, and remained largely ad hoc. 
Similarly, Miller (1993) argued that ‘The development of industry/education links in 
the past decade has been characterised by a focus on setting up and running activities 
rather than on evaluating them’ (1993:255). Yet in making these criticisms, these 
observers were arguing for a more rigorous and integrated approach towards 
increasing business involvement. No longer was the main disagreement about 
whether businesses should be involved in schools; indeed, Vinten (1996) argued that 
‘the aim of cultivating closer links between education and business has become the 
accepted wisdom and practice in the UK over the past decade’ (1996:27). Instead, 
the disagreement was over to what extent businesses should be involved and what 
form  this involvement should take.
2.5.3 The Labour Approach
With the election of a Labour government in 1997, it might have been expected that 
the emphasis on business involvement in education would decline, given the 
traditional suspicion on the political left of private involvement in the public 
services. Instead, this emphasis merely shifted. The Conservative reforms of the 
1980s had emphasised role of the education system in both developing the future 
workforce and improving the image of industry. In contrast, Labour initiatives 
emphasised the greater integration of business into the education system, employing 
a ‘new public management’ philosophy that sought to bring the resources and skills 
of the private sector to bear in solving public sector problems (Power and Whitty 
1999). Elected on a platform of ‘education, education, education,’ the Labour 
government made education reform its main focus during its first term, and many of 
its education initiatives were designed to incorporate business involvement into the 
reform process. These initiatives can be broadly divided into two sets -  those 
focusing on increasing academic achievement, and those focusing on improving 
public sector efficiency -  each of which will now be discussed in turn.
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One of Labour’s first education initiatives was to re-focus, re-launch, and rapidly 
expand a scheme initiated by the Conservative government in 1993, which allowed 
certain state-maintained secondary schools to compete for designation as one of a 
nationally-limited number of ‘specialist schools’ (DfEE 1998a). Under this initiative 
(as it stood at the time this study commenced), institutions that were awarded 
specialist status received additional funding from central government in order to 
specialise in a specific curricular area -  technology, languages, sports, or the arts -  in 
addition to delivering the national curriculum. In order to be designated as specialist, 
schools needed to submit bids to the DfES competition and raise £50,000 from 
outside sponsors -  usually businesses. Successful schools would receive the 
‘specialist’ designation, as well as associated additional funding, from central 
government (West et al. 2000:1). The sheer extent of the specialist schools 
programme (with over 500 specialist schools in operation across England by 
September 2000, and nearly 1,000 in operation by September 2002 (DfES 2003b)) 
makes this initiative one of Labour’s most prominent forays into the arena of 
business-education partnerships. Another early Labour initiative was the statutory 
Education Action Zone (EAZ) scheme (DfEE 1998b), which then-schools minister 
Stephen Byers described as ‘the test-bed for the school system of the next century’ 
(Chitty 1998:79). Located in geographic areas identified as educationally and 
economically deprived, statutory EAZs were ‘clusters’ of schools that were to 
receive special funding from the central government after building local coalitions of 
schools, businesses, community groups and voluntary sector organisations. 
Designed ‘in line with New Labour managerialism, [as] all EAZ bids contained] 
very explicit and ambitious commitments about achievement targets’ (Gamamikow 
and Green 1999:13), statutory EAZs were almost immediately beset by both 
administrative problems and philosophical criticism. Administratively, numerous 
researchers revealed the failure of the Zones to gamer widespread community or 
business support (see Clifford 1999; Ward 1999; Jones and Bird 2000), while 
philosophically, opponents seized on the argument that the statutory EAZ initiative 
entailed ‘a conception of ‘business-school’ links that would have been anathema to 
any previous Labour administration’ (Anderson 2001:66). Together, these combined 
weight of these criticisms meant that plans for expanding the EAZ programme were 
quietly dropped in 2001, while many existing statutory EAZs have since been 
modified substantially from their original design. In many cases these statutory 
EAZs have been largely subsumed by the broader education improvement initiative
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known as Excellence in Cities (EiC) -  although within EiC, the government has 
retained the option of creating smaller ‘EiC Action Zones’ where and if the demand 
for such structures arises.
Bolstered by other initial successes in education reform, however, and undeterred by 
criticisms of the ill-fated statutory EAZs, Labour continued to pursue connections 
between education and the private sector. Then-schools minister Charles Clarke 
argued in 1999 that ‘the government is seeking to stimulate a wide variety of means 
[for]...much stronger relationships and working partnerships between schools and 
the economic community’ (1999:19), and the initiatives continued to flow. In 2000, 
Labour revived the legislation that created the CTCs in order to create a similar 
programme of ‘publicly funded independent secondary schools with sponsors from 
the private or voluntary sectors’ (Technology Colleges Trust 2001:3) under the label 
of ‘City Academies’ -  this despite Labour having been opposed to the original CTCs 
during the 1980s. Furthermore, these new City Academies require external funding 
of ‘around twenty per cent of initial capital costs, or up to about £2 million’ (West 
and Pennell 2002:214), making substantial private sponsorship crucial to their 
success. The recent government Green Paper entitled Schools: Building on Success 
(DfEE 2001) further confirmed the vigour with which the Labour government has 
pursued a broad range of business involvement initiatives and programmes for 
education, implying that such involvement was not only valuable, but also vital:
‘What matters is that all schools break out of isolation and introversion and 
constantly work with and learn from others, as many already do.... Many 
schools are now working closely with businesses. Examples include the 
specialist schools and Education Action Zones which have business 
sponsors, the business mentoring programme for headteachers organised by 
Business in the Community and the Adopt-a-School arrangement that 
Nottingham City Education Authority has developed with its local business 
community’ (DfEE 2001:85).
Labour also broadened the scope of business involvement in education, seeking to 
improve public sector efficiency by both supporting and encouraging limited forms 
of privatisation. This was done through the introduction of the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) and through the introduction of policies allowing for the for-profit 
management of failing state schools and local authorities. Under PFI, the private 
sector ‘builds, designs, finances, and sometimes operates a capital asset which the 
public sector pays a charge to use’ (Ball et al. 2000:96). The private sector is meant
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to assume the development ‘risk’ on the project, and in exchange the public sector 
‘leases’ the asset over an extended period (often 20 to 30 years), after which time the 
asset reverts to public control. Under the for-profit management scheme, LEAs (and 
more recently, individual schools) deemed to be failing can be taken over by private 
companies, who are expected to reverse this decline by applying private sector 
management principles. Although the initial results of these two initiatives have 
been mixed (see Audit Commission 2003; National Audit Office 2003), both 
initiatives have, like the statutory EAZs, met with intense political criticism. Critics 
have argued that initiatives like PFI and for-profit management blur the lines of 
public responsibility, weaken attempts at ensuring social justice through education, 
and undermine democratic accountability (see e.g., National Union of Teachers 
1999; Lushington 1999; Hatcher 2001).
What is not in dispute, however, is that the range of business involvement initiatives 
outlined in this section indicates the extent of the current Labour government’s desire 
to increase business involvement in education. In its 2000 report The Role o f  Private 
Sector Organisations in Public Education, the parliamentary Education and 
Employment Committee examined the range of programmes described above, and 
recommended that ‘the Department for Education and Employment and local 
authorities [continue to] consider ways in which the involvement of private sector 
organisations could support and enhance the quality of education services’ (2000:11). 
Such encouragement provides a clear sign of the importance and emphasis that the 
current government is placing on the prospect of business involvement in education. 
Similarly, a 2001 editorial in Managing Schools Today provided a striking 
cumulative quantitative assessment of these programmes, observing:
‘The extent to which private investment in education has developed over the 
past five years is extraordinary. In February [2001] the figure was put at 
£120 million over the five years of the previous government. This global 
total covered education action zones (£37 million), specialist schools (£28 
million), the City Academies programme (£7 million), Maths Year 2000 (£30 
million) and the National Year of Reading (£20 million). It is estimated that 
outside investment is running currently at around £30 million a year, [and] 
that overlooks intervention in local education authorities and incidental 
sponsorships... ’ {Private funding o f  public education 2001:24).
A second Managing Schools Today editorial provided the broadly accepted political 
analysis of these figures, arguing that ‘The government’s desire to encourage the
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private sector to take a more active role in state education was already known. The 
fact it has pushed it to the forefront of its agenda shows just how strongly Tony Blair 
believes in business, business, business’ (Times are changing 2001:7). Indeed, in the 
DfES’s own press release on the 2004-05 Budget -  entitled ‘Budget shows 
government means business when it comes to education’ -  Education and Skills 
Secretary Charles Clarke accentuated this emphasis, arguing that ‘It is vital we get 
schools working more closely with business’ (DfES 2003c). In short, since the 
election of New Labour in 1997, business involvement has become substantially 
more central and important to the government’s education agenda than it has been at 
almost any point in the past one hundred years.
2.5.4 Business Involvement and the Fourth Main Research Question
As was noted in the introduction to Section 2.5, illustrating the practical policy 
relevance of any identified strategic planning barriers requires applying them in a 
policy context where governing body strategic planning is desirable yet currently 
absent. This final section seeks to demonstrate that business involvement meets the 
three necessary criteria: that it has practical policy relevance, strategic value, and a 
currently undeveloped strategic role for governing bodies in its regulation.
The first criterion is practical policy relevance. Given the historical literature 
outlined above, it seems uncontroversial to suggest that business involvement, 
particularly under the current Labour government, meets this criterion. In addition to 
the clearly positive governmental endorsement of business involvement, other 
research supports the notion of current policy relevance. For example, Davies (1999) 
noted that between 1995 and 1999, there was a 70 per cent increase in the number of 
businesses involved in business-education activities, and a 90 per cent growth in the 
number of participating secondary schools (1999:38). The second criterion is that of 
strategic value; here again the literature is limited but convincing. The idea that 
business involvement should be addressed in a strategic rather than an ad hoc manner 
is raised by several researchers, and there is little (if any) research suggesting the 
contrary. After examining a number of business-education partnerships, Antelo and 
Henderson (1992) concluded that effective partnerships must include both strategic 
and operational components, and that the strategic dimension needed to be 
‘concerned with the long term decision making process about the nature and 
direction of the collaborative effort between schools and businesses’ (1992:56).
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Research by Chambers (1996) led to similar conclusions, as did work by Nuttall 
(1994), who observed that:
‘[A] 11 too often, schemes are piecemeal and lack coherent strategy or clearly 
defined outcomes.... Quality links make a valuable contribution to the 
teaching of the curriculum and the management of schools [but] to be 
effective, they must he part o f  an agreed policy. . . [emphasis added]’ 
(1994:36).
In a more general sense, a number of commentators have implied that such a 
strategic approach needs to include setting boundaries on the extent of business 
involvement in education. Looking objectively at the issue of boundaries, Comforth 
(1999) proposed dividing business involvement activities into four categories: ‘total, 
partial, peripheral, and no [involvement]’ (1999:20). Comforth suggested that ‘total’ 
would include privatisation, ‘partial’ would include outsourcing, ‘peripheral’ would 
include sponsorship, and ‘no’ would indicate ideological opposition. While Clarke 
(1999) might suggest that Comforth’s schema implies four discrete entities, arguing 
that ‘contracting out certain educational services [and]...building local employer, 
industrial, and commercial partnerships with the education service’ are ‘qualitatively 
different types of involvement’ (1999:18), many other observers view Comforth’s 
schema as a more seamless continuum. As Hatcher (1998) argued:
‘Business defines the purposes of school, shapes its curriculum, provides 
placements for its students and models for its management. It is vital that we 
clarify, in each of these areas, what boundaries we want to draw between 
what is acceptable on educational terms, and what is not’ (1998:16).
Support for this notion of setting boundaries is offered by Beckett (1999), yet 
Beckett also argued that such a boundary should not be drawn so tightly as to create 
a de facto exclusion of business involvement. ‘Once we have drawn a line, we need 
not fear bringing the private sector into education and drawing on its expertise,’ he 
argued; ‘What we must not do is allow the private sector to dictate the 
curriculum...or allow schools to become dependent on its handouts’ (1999:52). Yet 
the crucial practical question in this abstract discussion about boundaries is: who 
should draw the line. The existing literature suggests that those best equipped to do 
so are the governing bodies.
This touches upon the third and most important issue: whether there is an 
undeveloped strategic role for governing bodies in regulating business involvement
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in education. The suggestion that governing bodies play an active role in business 
involvement issues is not new; indeed, the Taylor Report (1977) noted that ‘another 
matter of considerable concern...[is the] gap between schools and the wealth- 
producing sector of the economy. We recommend that governing bodies should do 
what they can to narrow this gap [emphasis in original]’ (1977:46). Furthermore, the 
early issues of School Governor magazine ran regular columns urging governors to 
acquire knowledge of the advantages and drawbacks of business involvement (see 
e.g., Stevens 1987; Hancock 1990). More recently, there have been calls for 
governing bodies to not just become informed, but to take a much more active role in 
regulating the level and extent of business involvement in their schools. In 2000, the 
Education and Employment Committee stated that when it came to the determining 
the principles surrounding private sector involvement in education:
‘Although...a pragmatic approach to raising standards of achievement is 
necessary... the underlying principles of public accountability should [not] be 
disregarded by the DfEE, by local education authorities or by school 
governors [italics added]’ (2000:11).
Clearly governors are implicitly being expected to play an important role in this area, 
although precisely what that role entails is often unclear. For example, although 
Thody (1994a) suggested that some business governors ‘contributed to the 
curriculum...through facilitating industrial contacts and through participating in 
education-industry links’ (1994a:364), Thody also acknowledged that governors and 
heads viewed such contributions as ‘bonuses’. Similarly, Punter (2000) argued that 
although the skills of business governors generally appeared to be valuable to 
schools, the precise role of these governors in relation to education-business 
relations was left undefined. ‘There has been no national rationalisation or 
consistency of purpose in any [business involvement programmes],’ claimed 
Punter, ‘except to agree that links between businesses and schools are beneficial, 
particularly to schools’ (2000:273). However, the recent rapid expansion of the 
specialist schools programme -  with its requirements that schools (and their 
governing bodies) both acquire substantial outside funding and create a four-year 
school and community development plan -  suggests that the connection between 
governing bodies, business involvement, and strategic planning is increasingly 
crucial in the current educational climate, particularly when such involvement 
carries potential financial incentives. Indeed, the first major study on the impact of 
the specialist schools programme by West et al. (2000) found that around half of the
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chairs of governing bodies surveyed stated that the ‘additional funds available were a 
reason for seeking specialist school status’ (2000:1).
Yet despite these recent policy changes, both the existing research literature and the 
academic commentary on this connection is extremely limited. Given the financial 
management role of governing bodies, Thody (1992) argued that it was incumbent 
upon governing bodies to understand the advantages and disadvantages of all 
potential sources of income, including ‘business activities, fundraisers...[and] 
industrial sponsorships’ (1992:114). In a similar vein, Glegg (1997) argued strongly 
for increased governing body involvement in setting strategies and policies about 
business involvement, writing:
‘School-business partnerships raise fundamentally serious questions which 
much be answered by school administrators.... Merely claiming that such 
[business involvement] strategies ought not be necessary does nothing to ease 
the situation, and closing ones eyes to reality is a notoriously unsuccessful 
tactic’ (1997:33).
Extending upon this position, Tulloch (1999) argued that the responsibility for 
setting a school’s strategy and boundaries regarding business involvement should 
rest primarily with governing bodies. Suggesting that governing bodies should view 
this task as an increasingly important obligation, Tulloch asserted:
‘[When] it comes to drawing the line about sponsorship and fundraising or 
whether the school bids to be a specialist school and thereby to raise money 
from private sponsorship, the governing body ultimately is responsible. If 
lines are to be drawn about how far a school enters the market place, it seems 
only the governing body can do it [emphasis added]’ (1999:37).
Given both the state of the existing literature and the pressing practical policy 
importance, it appeared that business involvement was an issue on which there was a 
potential yet undeveloped strategic role for governing bodies. As such, it is 
concluded that having met the three necessary criteria of policy relevance, strategic 
value, and undeveloped potential for governor involvement, the issue of business 
involvement is an appropriate context through which to pursue the fourth main 
research question.
Furthermore, such applied research would provide an additional contribution to the 
existing literature. While there have been a small number of studies on how business
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involvement is perceived by both employers (Bennett 1994, Hillage 1995) and 
educators (Bloomer 1985), there has been almost no research on the opinions of 
governors in relation to this topic. While Baginsky et al. (1991) made a brief 
reference to governors’ ambivalence about increasing business involvement in 
schools, and while Punter (2000) discussed the role of governors who worked in the 
business sector, there has been no subsequent critical research regarding either 
governors’ views of business involvement in general, or their strategic approach 
towards its management in particular. As such, the research proposed herein not 
only provides the context for illustrating the influence of the strategic planning 
barriers, but also provides potentially new information regarding governor opinions 
and perspectives on the issue of business involvement.
2.6 Chapter Two Summary and the Proposed Study
In order to establish the context and aims of this study, this chapter reviewed the 
existing literature on school governance, strategic planning in education, and 
business involvement in education. After presenting a brief history of school 
governance, this chapter examined the two main types of literature on school 
governance: advice literature and research literature. After briefly examining the 
advice literature, this section identified six main categories of research literature. Of 
these six categories, this chapter focused mainly on the existing research into the 
normative role of governors and governing bodies, and the research into governing 
body operation and strategic planning. From this review of the literature, the first 
three main research questions were proposed. A fourth main research question, 
which seeks to determine whether the answers to the first three research questions 
have practical policy relevance, was proposed as the logical extension of the first 
three. After arguing that business involvement in education would be a suitable 
policy issue for providing the context for such an analysis, the literature on business 
involvement in education was reviewed, as were developments in this area of policy 
under the most recent Conservative and Labour governments.
The Proposed Study
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the state of the existing literature 
suggests the opportunity for a research study that would provide answers to the four 
main research questions identified herein. In specific, it is argued that this proposed 
study would be beneficial for the following seven reasons, as it would:
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1. Contribute to the understanding of how governors perceive their own role;
2. Provide evidence that a systematic framework of strategic planning barriers 
can be used to better analyse and understand the absence of governing body 
strategic planning;
3. Demonstrate that these barriers have practical policy relevance, and in doing 
so provide new insights into the opinions of governors about business 
involvement in education;
4. Contribute new evidence on the role of central government in governing body 
activities, the exploration of which has been limited to this point;
5. Provide a more detailed understanding of inner London state secondary 
school governors and governing bodies, as there is no existing research 
literature with this specific focus;
6. Update the existing literature on school governance, as much of this literature 
is between five and ten years old; and
7. Provide independent research on school governance and business 
involvement, not sponsored or supported by the governmental agencies or 
industry groups who may have a direct interest in its outcome.
Having thus outlined the value of a study that would answer the four main research 
questions identified herein, the next chapter describes the methodology and research 
design of the study itself.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
M e t h o d o l o g y , R e s e a r c h  D e s ig n , a n d  R e s e a r c h  Sa m p l e
3.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology, research design, and research sample 
employed in this study. Section 3.1 outlines the scope and parameters of the study, 
and presents the three major components of the research design: a preliminary study 
of local authority officers, an institution-level qualitative interview study of school 
governors, and a quantitative mail survey of chairs of governors and head teachers. 
Each component is then discussed in detail. Section 3.2 presents the justification, 
design, and lessons of the preliminary study itself. Section 3.3 presents the design of 
the qualitative phase of the main study and the protocols that regulated the conduct 
of the qualitative interviews. Section 3.4 presents the methodological and analytical 
issues surrounding the quantitative portion of the research, and Section 3.5 addresses 
how this research design meets the tests of construct validity, reliability, and external 
validity. Finally, Section 3.6 provides descriptions of the qualitative and quantitative 
research samples. Section 3.7 summarises the main points in this chapter.
3.1 Research Design Overview
Given the state of the existing research and the opportunities identified in Chapter 
Two, this thesis sought to build upon the existing literature in order to answer these 
four research questions:
1. Do governors in inner London state secondary schools view their role as a 
strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?
2. Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?
3. If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why 
is this the case?
4. Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning 
barriers has practical policy relevance and importance?
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The research design, therefore, needed to maximise the potential for answering these 
four main questions thoroughly and convincingly, whilst remaining viable within 
time and resource constraints.
3.1.1 The Research Parameters
In order to remain within these constraints, it was decided to limit the research 
parameters in four main areas. The first limitation was in the scope of the research, 
the second limitation was in the location of the research, the third limitation was in 
the school type being researched, and the final limitation was in the academic level 
being researched. The rationale for each of these four limitations is discussed below.
Scope
For theoretical and practical reasons, it was decided to limit this research to the direct 
study of governors and head teachers, the latter of whom are full-fledged governors in 
their own right.1 First, it was felt that strategic planning and school governance were 
best studied from the perspective of the governors themselves, as it is at the governing 
body level where abstract policies and regulations on issues like strategic planning 
must prove viable in practice. Focusing on governors’ own perceptions of these issues 
was also felt to be important, since regardless of the factual accuracy of such 
perceptions, it is often such perceptions that determine whether policies succeed. This 
limitation also provided logistical advantages, as the relatively small size of governing 
bodies (about 20 governors) meant that it was possible to interview a large percentage 
of the ‘population’ in each case without exceeding time and resource constraints.
Second, it was decided that this research would not focus on the ‘catastrophic’ 
reasons for strategic planning failure -  for example, a complete breakdown in the 
relationship between the head and the governors, or a debilitating ideological split in 
the governing body that prevented decisions from being made. Clearly, such 
situations will fundamentally impede not only strategic planning, but also almost 
every other functional task of the governing body. Instead, this research was limited 
to determining why governing bodies that appeared to be operating normally (i.e., 
those that did not exhibit manifestly obvious signs of dysfunction) did not seem to 
engage in strategic planning to the extent that might be expected.
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Location
There were three reasons for limiting this research to inner London. First, the 
problems of urban schools have received considerable attention from both central 
government and the general public in recent years. As such, it was felt that focusing 
on urban schools would generate data and conclusions that would be of both 
academic and policy value. As King et al. argued, ‘A research project should pose a 
question that is ‘important’ in the real world [and] consequential for political, social, 
or economic life ...’ (1994:15). Second, in order to maximise the time and resources, 
all case study sites were drawn from one city -  London. It was felt that this 
restriction would permit comparisons of governing bodies that were operating under 
(broadly) similar general political and economic conditions. Third, the geographic 
limits were restricted to inner London, as the density of schools in inner London 
provided a high number of potential sites within a reasonable travel area. 
Additionally, inner London schools provided substantial variation in levels of 
academic achievement, socio-economic deprivation, and other key indicators. For 
the purposes of this study, inner London was defined as the boroughs of the former 
Inner London Education Authority,2 plus the borough of Newham. The City was 
excluded because it has no state maintained secondary schools. Newham was 
included both because of its geographical contiguity within the ‘ring’ of Inner 
London boroughs (see map, Appendix A) and because its schools shared a number of 
key demographic characteristics with many of those in inner London boroughs.
School Type
For practical reasons, this study focused only on mainstream state-maintained 
schools. Although comparisons of state-sector governing bodies to those in the 
independent sector (or to those in state-sector special schools) would be valuable, 
doing so would have required resources beyond those available. It was felt that the 
variety of institutions within the state-maintained sector meant that sufficient breadth 
and depth could be obtained without compromising either the quality of the data or 
the overall research design.
1 Although head teachers retain the statutory right to decline a place on the governing body, this right 
is rarely invoked in practice -  Scanlon et al. (1999) reported that of the head teachers surveyed in their 
quantitative research, 87 per cent had ‘opted to become governors of their schools (1999:43).’
2 Camden, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith & Fulham, Islington, Kensington & Chelsea,
Lambeth, Lewisham, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, and Westminster.
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Academic Level
For practical and theoretical reasons, this study focused only on secondary schools 
within the state sector. Not only do primary and secondary schools focus on 
different aspects of education, the governing bodies of secondary schools are almost 
inevitably required to deal with a more complex array of issues -  concerning a 
greater number of pupils -  than are those of primary schools. It was also apparent 
from the literature that if  business involvement were to be used as a lens for 
examining the theoretical findings of this research, a problem might arise in that 
there are qualitative and quantitative differences in the business involvement activities 
of secondary and primary schools, respectively. Quantitatively, the literature shows 
that businesses are much more likely to target secondary schools than primary schools 
(Iredale 1996). The literature also shows that the approaches made by business to 
secondary schools often differ qualitatively to approaches made to primary schools 
(Warwick 1993; Hillage 1995). As such, it was felt that any advantage gained by 
covering both sectors would be outweighed by the added complexity of analysis, and 
compounded by the difficulties of making clear cross-sector comparisons.
3.1.2 Previous Research Designs for Governance Research
Previous research designs for governance research have generally relied upon 
observation, interviews, surveys, or a combination of these three methods. As a 
conscious decision was made (for reasons of time and resources) not to make the 
examination and observation of governing body meeting dynamics a central 
component of this study, meeting observation -  although done on occasion -  was not 
a key component of this research. Therefore, the choice of methods was between 
interviews, surveys, or a combination of the two. Previous interview-only 
approaches include Kogan’s seminal study (1984) of eight governing bodies in four 
different authorities, and Deem et al. (1995), who combined individual governor 
interviews and governing body meeting observations in their study of ten separate 
governing bodies. In contrast, the survey-only approach has been employed by 
Streatfield and Jeffries (1989), who surveyed governors at 500 schools in ten LEAs 
following the 1986 Act, and Keys and Fernandes (1990) who conducted a national- 
level survey of primary and secondary school governors.
However, the majority of studies on school governance have combined interviews 
and surveys, with the earliest examples being the studies of Baron and Howell (1968;
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1974), and Bacon’s intensive study of governors in a single authority (1978). More 
recently, Baginsky et al. (1991) conducted an in-depth survey of governors in 41 
primary and secondary schools across eight LEAs, followed by nine case studies in 
selected primary and secondary schools. Earley (1994a) surveyed head teachers, 
chairs of governors, and governors in 500 schools nationwide, and drew upon the 
results of that survey to conduct six detailed case studies (comprised of governors, 
teachers, and heads) of seven to nine interviews apiece; this research design was also 
employed by Scanlon et al. (1999). Additionally, Esp and Saran (1995) focused on 
‘elites’ by both surveying and interviewing pairs of head teachers and chairs of 
governors from 21 primary and secondary schools.
3.1.3 The Final Research Design
Given this range of available research options and the parameters outlined in Section 
3.1.1, four potential research options emerged. The first was to follow Bacon’s approach 
(1978) and conduct in-depth research at several schools in a single local education 
authority. However, it was felt that the ability to generalise from such a study would be 
extremely limited, outweighing the advantages of ‘rich description’ that such a study 
would provide. The second option, mirroring the approach of Esp and Saran (1995), was 
to retain the interview format, but sacrifice depth for breadth. This option would entail 
selecting approximately ten schools from different boroughs, yet interviewing only a 
selected few ‘elites’ at each. However, it was felt that this approach alone would not 
provide sufficient depth, nor would it would be easy to ascertain the veracity of the 
qualitative data based upon only two interviews per site. The third option was to avoid 
qualitative research entirely, and focus on conducting one or more quantitative surveys. 
However, this option was eliminated because it was felt that a quantitative approach 
alone would fail to capture the subtlety and depth afforded by interviews. The final 
option was to combine the interview and survey approach in a manner that most closely 
reflected the approach of Earley (1994a) and Scanlon et al. (1999). While the final 
research design was tailored to meet the needs and demands of this specific study, the 
overall structure of the design most closely resembled this final option. This approach is 
also endorsed more generally by Cohen and Manion (1994), who argue that ‘multiple 
methods are suitable where a controversial aspect of education [policy] needs to be 
evaluated more fully’ (1994:240). In general, it was felt that this research design 
(summarised below) offered the best combination of breadth and depth while remaining 
both financially and logistically viable.
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a) Preliminary study interviews with Governor Services and Education Business 
Partnership directors in the thirteen inner London boroughs. These interviews 
provided opportunities for testing potential interview and survey questions, 
collecting valuable contextual background information, and evaluating the 
feasibility of the proposed main study. This particular cohort was chosen 
because of its ability to provide broad expert and up-to-date knowledge of the 
issues being studied without being influenced by the particular circumstances of 
any one individual school.
b) Five qualitative case studies in five schools in five different boroughs, with each 
case comprising semi-structured interviews with seven to nine governors. These 
interviews were conducted with the full range of governor types, including 
parent, teacher, staff, co-opted, and LEA governors. This range also increased 
the robustness of the research by providing perspectives from throughout the 
governing body membership.
c) Supplementary qualitative interviews with eight chairs of governors from eight 
additional secondary schools. Esp and Saran’s approach (1995) of interviewing 
‘elites’ suggested that chairs (and heads) have the greatest influence in guiding 
the general direction of the governing body. By interviewing additional chairs, it 
was possible to explore the broader generalisability of patterns and themes 
identified in the five case studies without the increased logistical difficulties of 
pursuing additional full case studies at numerous additional sites.
d) Documentary analysis of written governing body policies and reports, school 
newsletters, full governing body and committee minutes, and other materials. Such 
documents provide important contextual information about organisational goals 
and policies, as well as a longitudinal perspective on issues with which 
interviewees may have only limited experience. Although rarely highlighted in the 
data presentation portions of this thesis, documentary analysis nonetheless played 
an integral role in establishing the context and focus of this research.
e) A quantitative mail survey sent to the chairs and heads of all 139 inner London 
state secondary schools, which received an overall response rate of 57 per cent. 
This component provided a quantitative balance to the issues that had been 
investigated through the qualitative case studies. The survey provided triangulation 
data on governors’ perceptions of business involvement, created a picture of how 
governing bodies perceive their strategic role, and most significantly, covered the 
entire population of the research area. By combining the qualitative component of
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this research with this quantitative survey, this study was able to pursue the most 
robust research design possible given the stated resource constraints.
3.1.4 Research Time Line
Although the overall research design reflects the combination qualitative-quantitative 
approach taken by Earley (1994a), it is important to point out that the methodology 
used in this research differs from that used by Earley in one significant respect. In 
this research, the interviews were conducted first, and followed by the survey. In 
contrast, Earley employed the survey first, followed by the case studies. Because the 
specific issues being studied in the current research were already highly defined 
(strategic planning and business involvement), the survey was employed in current 
research in order to verify whether trends observed in the case studies were reflected 
in the wider population. In Earley’s work, the survey served to identify those issues 
that merited more in-depth study, and the case studies were then used to investigate 
the themes that had been raised by the survey.
As Table 3.1 illustrates, the bulk of the data collection phase of this research was 
conducted within a single academic year (September 2000 to July 2001). This table 
provides a visual breakdown of when the main data collection stages of this research 
were undertaken, as well as the length of those stages.
Table 3.1: Main Data Collection Stages
Preliminary Case Study , , 0 













—  -  --------------------------------------------------
The length of the data collection phase was determined by two main factors. First, as 
both the school governance and business involvement in education are becoming
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increasingly important public policy issues, it was felt that there was an urgent need for 
a thorough yet timely analysis of these issues. As David Blunkett noted during his 
tenure as Secretary of State for Education, the usefulness of social science research to 
government policy rests on ‘the focus, relevance, and timeliness of much of the 
research which is currently undertaken [as well as] the accessibility and intelligibility 
of the lessons of research to potential users beyond the research community itself 
(Blunkett 2000:6). While there are certainly circumstances in which a longitudinal 
design is preferable, the value of this research was in its ability to provide more rapid 
insight into several under-researched yet important areas of public policy.
Second, if a set of comparative case studies are carried out sequentially over a long 
period of time, the possibility arises that intervening factors will prevent the data 
gathered from the first cases from being compared accurately to the data gathered 
from the last cases. Such a scenario might occur if changes in external conditions 
(such as the impact of new central government regulations) influenced the data 
collection in final case study, but which did not exist during the data collection for 
the first case study. By conducting the fieldwork stage of this research in a relatively 
compact time span, the potential for this external interference was reduced.
3.2 The Preliminary Study
Before beginning the main research study, a preliminary study was designed and 
conducted in order to acquire both the information and the experience necessary to 
implement the main research study. This approach is endorsed by Robson 
(1993:164) and others for three main reasons. First, preliminary studies allow 
researchers to test their research designs on a smaller scale before commencing their 
main studies, thereby decreasing the likelihood that substantial alterations will need 
to be made to the research design during the main study itself. In this instance, it was 
felt that a preliminary study would enable potential interview and survey questions to 
be tested and refined via the comments and suggestions of people who had intimate 
knowledge of the issues being investigated. Second, preliminary studies permit the 
collection of substantial background information about the topic being researched, 
which can prove valuable to understanding the issues that arise during the 
implementation of the main study itself. In this instance, it was felt that a 
preliminary study would enable the researcher to become more fluent in and 
informed about the specific issues and concerns facing governors before engaging in
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the main research study itself. Finally, preliminary studies allow researchers to 
estimate the feasibility and practicality of the scope of the main study and the 
logistics required for implementation. In this instance, it was felt that a preliminary 
study would help ensure that both time and financial resources were budgeted 
effectively during the main research phase.
3.2.1 The Preliminary Study Cohort
The preliminary study cohort consisted of the directors of Governor Services and the 
directors of the local Education-Business Partnerships (EBPs) in each of the thirteen 
inner London boroughs. Governor Services are a division of every Local Education 
Authority in inner London, and are charged with the task of assisting governing 
bodies in carrying out their responsibilities. Their typical responsibilities include 
organising governor training, informing governing bodies about new regulations and 
legislation, providing clerking services, and acting as a liaison between governing 
bodies and the LEA. Education-Business Partnerships are either LEA-run or 
independently-run, depending on the borough, and their aim is to increase the 
interaction between educational institutions and the business community at the local 
level. Because each EBP sets its own agenda, their activities vary widely. However, 
some common EBP activities include providing assistance in arranging work 
experience, organising partnerships between specific institutions and companies, and 
facilitating mentoring schemes.
There were several key advantages in using this cohort for the preliminary study. 
First, members of this cohort had substantial knowledge of the issues facing the 
schools across their specific boroughs. Given the time and resource constraints of 
this research, it was therefore felt that this cohort would provide an excellent 
overview of the main governance and business involvement issues (respectively) 
facing the inner London education system, as well as a perspective on how research 
on those issues could best be focused. Second, although the main research study 
sought to understand these issues from the perspective of governors, it was felt that 
designing the research questions based upon the perspective of governors might 
introduce an inadvertent institutional bias to the research. As Bryman (2001) argues, 
preliminary work ‘should not be carried out on people who might have been 
members of the sample that would be employed in the main study’ (2001:155). By 
running the preliminary study with borough-level professionals, the potential for
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institutional-level issues taking precedence in the research design was diminished. 
Finally, the information provided by this cohort provided a measure of contextual 
‘face validity’ for the data gathered in the main research study, as the preliminary 
study cohort provided an independent template against which governor comments 
from the main research could be evaluated.
3.2.2 Preliminary Study Procedures
Each of the 26 potential members of this cohort was contacted via telephone to 
ascertain his or her willingness to participate in the preliminary study. Each potential 
member was informed about the proposed research, and asked if he or she would be 
willing to be interviewed for about one hour on topics related to their issue of 
expertise. Of the 26 potential cohort members, all thirteen EBP directors and eleven 
of the thirteen Governor Services directors agreed to be interviewed. This extremely 
high level of participation meant that all areas of inner London were represented 
more or less equally, thereby avoiding any geographic imbalance. After agreeing to 
participate, each individual was sent a list of potential topics for discussion in the 
interview, and was asked think about additional research questions and approaches 
that might be worth pursuing in the main research study (see Appendix A for the full 
interview schedules). Each interview was arranged for the time and place most 
convenient for the interviewee, usually at their office.
3.2.3 Preliminary Study Contributions
The preliminary study made major contributions to the overall research study in three 
specific areas: Question Design, Logistics, and Background Information / Further 
Assistance. Each of these areas is now addressed in detail.
Question Design
The first major contribution of the preliminary study was in the design of the 
interview questions. As was noted above, being able to modify the interview 
schedule before its implementation helped ensure that the validity of the data 
collected during the main study was not circumscribed by the need to make 
substantial alterations to the data collection instruments during the main study itself. 
In particular, this method of ‘testing out’ interview questions served to increase the
3 For details of the interviewing protocol, which was also used for the qualitative interviews in the 
main study, see Section 3.3.4.
79
focus of -  and decrease the level of interviewer bias in -  the final set of interview 
questions. After identifying the main research questions through the review of the 
literature (set out in Chapter Two), over one hundred potential interview questions 
were devised by brainstorming, consulting with the research supervisor, and breaking 
down the main research questions into smaller components. The initial contribution 
of the preliminary study was to simulate the field conditions of the main study in 
order to determine the number of questions that could feasibly be asked during the 
course of a one-hour interview. After conducting the preliminary study, it was 
determined that a maximum of 20 questions could be reasonably asked and answered 
over the course of an hour-long interview. The initial list of over one hundred 
questions was then pared down considerably, again by drawing upon the comments 
and the responses of the preliminary study interviewees.
The preliminary study made three significant contributions in this respect. First, this 
process assisted in identifying questions that were similar, tangential, or redundant. 
This process also helped to identify questions that frequently led to ambiguous 
responses, responses that duplicated responses to other questions, and responses that 
were equivocal or otherwise uninformative. Eliminating or reformatting these 
questions greatly assisted in the focusing of the remaining questions. Second, this 
process helped to ensure that questions were phrased clearly, and in a way that would 
ensure consistent interpretation by respondents. This approach minimized potential 
confusion regarding ‘question intent’, thereby adding a degree of internal reliability 
to the final interview schedule. Third, this process identified important issues that 
were inadvertently ‘missed’ by the initial proposed questions, as well as issues that 
were potentially controversial or which might make the respondent uncomfortable. 
The value of this particular preliminary study cohort was that they were able to make 
these recommendations based upon their substantial knowledge and experience with 
governance and business involvement. In summary, the preliminary study 
contributed to the question design phase by ensuring that poor questions were 
jettisoned, while new questions -  acquired from the suggestions and responses of 
preliminary study interviewees -  were added. This procedure ensured that the use of 
the limited interview time during the main study maximised, and that the questions 
themselves were designed to obtain the most relevant and valuable responses.
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Logistics
The second major contribution of the preliminary study was in testing the logistics of 
the proposed research study. While obtaining ‘the research data’ may be the ultimate 
goal of the field research, the effectiveness with which those data are collected 
depends greatly upon how the logistical procedures for data collection and 
processing. The preliminary study was essential in honing these procedures, which 
ensured that the procedures for the main research study interviews were consistent 
and professional.
First, the preliminary study provided an opportunity for the researcher to gain a 
general familiarity with issues related to the interviewing process, thereby avoiding 
the difficulties of testing questions and collecting data simultaneously. Through 
these preliminary interviews, it was possible to learn how to ask the interview 
questions in a fluid yet structured manner, as well as how best to make the 
interviewee comfortable and open to answering questions. The preliminary study 
also provided experience in pacing interviews, in order to ensure that all the 
necessary questions could be asked and answered in the time available -  as well as 
experience in knowing what questions could be skipped if it was necessary to cut the 
interview short. Furthermore, the preliminary study provided experience in dealing 
with potential objections from interviewees (such as not wishing to be recorded), and 
in gauging and maintaining interviewee interest throughout the session.
Second, the preliminary study provided an opportunity to test the proposed data 
collection techniques (see Section 3.3.5 below). For example, by running the 
preliminary study under ‘field conditions’, it was possible to identify the need for an 
external microphone (as the internal microphone of the cassette recorder proved 
insufficient). It was also possible to identify and remedy various quirks in the 
operation of the recording device itself. Had these problems first arisen during the 
main study, they almost certainly would have led to the loss of substantial amounts 
of important data. The preliminary study also identified the need for taking 
handwritten notes in conjunction with the recording. The preliminary study 
experience demonstrated that written notes were needed to provide a backup if the 
tape recording failed, but also to enable important aspects of the interview to be 
identified quickly during transcription. Additionally, it was observed that taking
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handwritten notes often diverted the attention of the respondent from the tape 
recorder, and as a consequence led respondents to be more open with their opinions.
Finally, the preliminary study highlighted potential timing and scheduling issues. In 
order to minimise the inconvenience to interviewees, the researcher travelled to 
interview them at the place they found most convenient. Through this process, it 
became easier to estimate both the travel time and the best transportation routes to 
individual interviews in the main study. More broadly, the preliminary study 
identified the frequent difficulty in navigating government bureaucracies when 
attempting to contact potential interviewees, as well as the potentially lengthy delays 
between scheduling and conducting interviews. This experience helped significantly 
in planning the length of time necessary for completing the main study interviews. 
Lastly, the preliminary study demonstrated the importance of timing interviews to 
coincide with the ‘academic’ calendar, since most of the preliminary study cohort 
operated in parallel with this schedule. By understanding the implications of this 
schedule (for example, that the least hectic time to interview in schools is several 
weeks after the start of a term, or during the summer term after A-level students have 
gone on study leave), it was possible to ‘target’ the scheduling of interviews with 
institutionally-based main study interviewees with greater success.
Background Information /  Further Assistance
The third major contribution of the preliminary study was in the background 
information and further assistance provided by the preliminary cohort. The members 
of the preliminary cohort were exceptionally well informed about the historical and 
contemporary issues surrounding governance and business involvement. Cohort 
members therefore were able to suggest potential avenues for additional research, 
offer perspectives on how the historical context of specific issues might influence 
current events, report on observed on-the-ground gaps between theory and 
implementation, and explain local issues that might be referred to by interviewees. 
By using their experience to identify potential unexpected problems and oversights in 
the initial research design, the preliminary cohort provided information and insights 
that proved invaluable in maintaining the focus and consistency of the main study. 
Additionally, being able to understand and use the numerous and ever-changing 
acronyms and ‘catch phrases’ surrounding governance and business involvement was 
an essential part of conducting intelligent and knowledgeable interviews, and the
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knowledge base of the preliminary cohort aided the researcher in the acquisition of 
this fluency. Finally, cohort members provided the researcher with numerous 
documents and publications that greatly facilitated the understanding of the issues 
being studied. Importantly, many of these documents were ‘grey’ literature -  
pamphlets, ‘trigger packs’, guidance memoranda -  that, while essential to 
understanding both governance and business involvement, are often unavailable in 
academic libraries.
Besides providing background information and context, the preliminary cohort also 
provided substantial ‘further assistance.’ For example, many cohort members 
offered to put the researcher in touch with other individuals whom they believed 
could contribute to the research study. Others offered their informed opinions about 
which specific schools and governing bodies might be the most willing to participate 
as case study sites, and several of the Governor Services directors offered to provide 
letters of introduction to the relevant individuals at those institutions. Finally, nearly 
every Governor Services director provided a covering letter and home addresses for 
the survey (see Section 3.4.3), a facet that almost certainly increased the survey 
response rate. Without the network of support and contacts provided by the 
preliminary study cohort, the actual execution of the main research study would have 
been significantly more difficult.
In summary, the preliminary study provided a valuable outlet for testing interview 
questions and the overall research design, gaining familiarity with logistical issues, 
obtaining important contextual information, and acquiring further support for the 
execution of the main research study itself. However, the intentionally exploratory 
nature of this work meant that the extent of participation of individual cohort 
interviewees, the focus of individual interviews, and the emphasis on the types of 
questions asked of interviewees varied significantly. As such, it was felt that data 
collected in this phase should not be incorporated in the formal data presentation 
portion of this thesis. Nevertheless, the preliminary study made substantial and 
valuable contributions in framing the issues and questions addressed therein.
3.3 The Main Qualitative Study
This section presents the research design for the qualitative phase of the main study. 
First, Section 3.3.1 explains the rationale for pursuing an interview-based qualitative
83
approach, as well as the rationale for employing the general principles of the case 
study method as a research framework. Section 3.3.4 then explains the important 
decision to modify the traditional case study approach in the data analysis phase, by 
departing from the traditional interpretation of ‘cases’ as units of comparative 
analysis and instead treating cases as vehicles for systematic data collection. Section
3.3.3 then outlines the institutional criteria used to identify potential research sites. 
Section 3.3.4 describes the logistical process of choosing the five eventual research 
sites, as well as the process of and rationale for incorporating supplementary chairs 
of governors interviews into this research stage. Section 3.3.5 then outlines the 
protocol for conducting the interviews themselves, Section 3.3.6 discusses the 
protocol employed for tape recording and transcription, and Section 3.3.7 outlines 
the logistical procedures used in analysing the qualitative data.
3.3.1 The Advantages of a Qualitative Approach
The major advantage of employing a qualitative research approach is that it permits 
researchers to examine what Wellens described as the ‘nature, breadth, depth and 
quality’ of governors’ perceptions and opinions’ (1993:10). It was decided to collect 
qualitative data using a semi-structured interview-based approach, which was 
deemed the most appropriate tool because of its ‘controlled flexibility’ -  as Wragg 
(1978) noted, the semi-structured interview permits ‘respondents to express 
themselves, but offers enough shape to limit aimless rambling’ (1978:10). In this 
format, although the interviewer constructs a set of ‘guiding’ questions for the 
interview to follow, these questions do not need to be asked in a strict order, nor do 
they require a constrained set of responses. It was felt that this kind of approach to 
qualitative data collection offered three main advantages. First, this approach 
permits researchers to seek elaboration, explanation, and clarification of interviewee 
responses. This can therefore allow researchers to obtain a more complete contextual 
understanding of a given issue than might be provided by either a more structured 
interview or a quantitative approach. Second, this approach gives the researcher the 
ability to adjust the direction of the discussion in response to new information 
provided by interviewees during the course of the conversation. For example, 
valuable and useful information is often revealed when an interviewee decides to 
answer a slightly different question than the one that was asked. Third, this approach 
provides interviewees with the opportunity to volunteer information, in contrast to 
other research approaches that can constrain responses to the range of those pre­
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identified by the researcher. Indeed, the semi-structured format gives the interviewee 
the opportunity to comment more broadly, while being flexible enough to 
accommodate potentially valuable tangents and more in-depth discussions. As such, 
it was felt that this ‘controlled flexibility’ made the semi-structured interview 
approach the most appropriate qualitative tool for this study.
3.3.2 The ‘Modified Case Study’ Design
However, qualitative research is often criticised -  rightly or wrongly -  for being 
haphazard, unmethodical, and less rigorous than quantitative research. In order to 
avoid these criticisms, the research design for the qualitative component of the main 
study followed the general principles of the case study method, and modified the 
method in one extremely important respect (see below). First, according to Yin, the 
case study approach is most valuable where ‘a how or why question is being asked 
about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no 
control’ (1994:9). Given that the proposed research fell clearly within these 
parameters, it was felt that the general tenets of the case study approach would be 
appropriate for this research design. Second, it was felt the relative methodological 
rigour of the case study approach would provide the necessary level of ‘quality 
control’, assisting in maintaining both the thoroughness and accuracy of the 
qualitative research. The case study approach demands that the rationale for 
selecting the individual ‘case sites’ can be explained and justified (see below for a 
detailed explanation of the criteria employed), and that the overall research design 
meets the ‘quality control tests’ of validity and reliability (addressed in Section 3.5). 
Furthermore, the data collection phase of this research was conducted along the lines 
of the traditional case study format, in that the bulk of the interviewees came from one 
of five ‘case’ schools.
Yet while this research design employed many components of the traditional case 
study approach, this design also modified the case study approach in one extremely 
important respect. In the data analysis phase, this research design rejected the 
traditional use of ‘cases’ as the main units of comparative analysis. The traditional 
approach calls for cases (in this instance, the schools and their governing bodies) to 
be compared to one another at the case (i.e., school) level. The research design for 
this study took a fundamentally different approach, as this research did not seek to 
achieve the results of traditional case study research. Instead, this modified design
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treated ‘cases’ as vehicles for the systematic collection of individual-level data, 
rather than as analytical units in and of themselves (for previous examples of this 
approach, see West et al. 1990; West and Vaarlam 1991). In sum: cases were used 
simply as an orderly way to acquire a critical mass o f  qualitative data for analysis.
This alternative analytical framework was deemed preferable because the aim of this 
research was to use cases in a fundamentally new way: to identify issues of common 
concern amongst governors, those issues that transcended the unique circumstances 
of any given individual school or governing body. The emphasis of this research 
was on identifying similarities between disparate sites, not on comparing individual 
sites and identifying their differences. As such, it was felt that this ‘modified’ case 
study framework offered three important methodological strengths in terms of 
qualitative data collection:
• First, this approach allowed the research to operate at the level of the individual 
governors, making the research more fine-grained than it would have been if the 
comparisons could be made only at the case level. By collecting the data in 
‘cases’, it was possible obtain a broad diversity of perspectives (for example, 
from different categories of governors) at the individual level without resorting to 
the ‘haphazard interviewing approach’ that is often criticised by sceptics of 
qualitative research.
• Second, this approach of acquiring individual-level data through an orderly rubric 
of ‘cases’ offered a significant advantage in terms of improving the internal 
validity of the data itself. By conducting multiple interviews within the same 
‘case’, many underlying variables (such as location, student intake characteristics, 
etc.) were effectively held constant. This made it easier to determine the 
‘representativeness’ of any given comment, since comments could then be 
evaluated in the context of similar comments within the same ‘case’.
• Third, this approach had advantages for data presentation. The orderly collection 
of individual-level data via the ‘case’ approach made it easier to identify where 
any given individual governor’s opinion fell on the contextual continuum of all of 
the governor comments collected in relation to a particular issue. This data 
collection process meant that it was then possible to clearly identify the 
parameters of overall governor opinion on a given issue. As such, it then became 
possible to illustrate the overall opinion of governors on that issue by using a set
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of quotations from individual governors that best reflected these general findings. 
This model therefore sought to shift the focus away from the inevitable 
‘institution-specific’ reasons for why individual schools may encounter problems 
in strategic planning, and towards the factors that appeared to affect many 
schools.
For all these reasons, it was felt that this ‘modified’ case study model offered the best 
methodological approach for researching the research questions identified herein. 
However, it should be acknowledged that pursuing this modified case study approach 
did mean sacrificing some advantages of the traditional case study approach. For 
example, because this research did not emphasise governing body observation (as 
traditional case study methods often do), there is no attempt made to evaluate how 
the mechanics of individual governing bodies in this study operated at the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ level. Similarly, this study does not provide as clear a view of the variety 
between the various schools that would be possible using a traditional case study 
approach (although as was noted above, this aim was not the intention of this study). 
However, this type of research into governing bodies has been conducted much more 
extensively (see Deem et al. 1995) than the resources of this study would ever have 
allowed, and it was felt that the ‘modified’ approach would provide a rigorous data 
collection framework that would maximise the breadth and scope of this research, 
with the acknowledgement that some detail would be sacrificed in the process.
Another advantage of the traditional case study approach is the opportunity it 
provides to acquire the highly detailed ‘rich descriptions’ that can result from the 
intense ethnographic observation of case sites over extended periods of time. 
However, as the intention of this study was to provide a viable policy model that 
could be used in practice by researchers, governing bodies and central government, it 
was felt that remaining completely faithful to the traditional case study method might 
lead either to findings that were obsolete or results that were largely ungeneralisable. 
As Walford (2003) argued in his Introduction to Investigating educational policy 
through ethnography:
‘Policy making and policy evaluation moves fast. One of the major reasons 
put forward for the lack of utilisation of all educational research is that the 
research time scale is often much longer than policy makers are prepared to 
wait, [and] if this problem exists for most educational research, it is greatly 
magnified with ethnographic work.... By the time such studies are published,
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so much else is likely to have changed that no direct recommendations for 
action can be made’ (2003:5).
In summary, it was deemed justifiable (for the reasons outlined above) to modify the 
traditional case study approach in order to enable this research study to meet its 
stated goals. This was done by retaining the rigorous data collection protocols and 
opportunities for intra-site comparisons offered by the case study approach, while 
jettisoning those components that were not compatible with the overall goals of this 
specific study.
3.3.3 Case Study Selection Criteria
For three main reasons, it was decided to seek five different case sites for this 
research phase. First, it was felt that five cases permitted enough variation between 
different types of schools and different geographical areas within inner London to 
give the study sufficient diversity and construct validity. Second, it appeared that 
given time and resource constraints, five was the greatest number of sites that could 
be included while still ensuring the rigorousness and thoroughness of the research 
process. Third, it was felt that five sites would ensure that a sufficient overall 
number of interview candidates could be obtained.
There were, of course, limitations to this study created by the decision to focus 
specifically on the governing bodies of inner London schools. For example, this 
decision meant that while these research findings are likely be applicable to other 
urban secondary schools, it is not possible to automatically generalise these findings 
to primary schools, or to secondary schools in suburban and rural areas. While the 
inclusion of a suburban or primary school case might have alleviated this limitation 
to some extent, it was felt that the value of doing so would have been significantly 
outweighed by two significant additional complications. First, determining the 
representativeness of a single individual site in the context of the population of all 
such sites nationwide would have been extremely difficult, particularly after having 
outlined such stringent selection criteria (see the two tests below) in seeking 
representativeness amongst the inner London case sites. Second, it would have been 
financially impossible to engage in a quantitative study that would have provided the 
level of supporting quantitative data for an additional external site comparable to that 
of the quantitative data acquired for the inner London sites. Another limitation of 
focusing on inner London was that inner city schools are, for example, well known to
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suffer from difficulties in recruiting governors. As such, it is possible that the issues 
of governor recruitment addressed in this thesis (see section 6.1.4) as well as some of 
the other issues raised herein, may be more prevalent in inner cities than they are 
elsewhere in the country. The general caveat to the reader, therefore, is that the 
findings in this study should be viewed as directly applicable to inner London 
secondary schools, whilst judgement on their applicability in other circumstances 
should be made with caution pending future testing and research.
In setting out the criteria for case selection, it was felt that potential case study sites 
needed, individually and collectively, to demonstrate a level of ‘representativeness’ 
of the 139 inner London state-maintained secondary schools. This term may prompt 
criticism because of its potential subjectivity, and not the least because of the cliche 
that ‘every school is unique’. However, it was felt that such tests were necessary in 
order to ensure that a) the findings and the conclusions of this research had strong 
face validity in the context of the inner London secondary system, and b) there were 
reasonable grounds to presume that the theoretical conclusions of this research could 
be applicable and testable in other similar situations. Two sets of tests were 
employed: the first set sought to determine the acceptability of an individual 
institution, while the second set sought to ensure the collective diversity of the set of 
cases as a whole.
Test One: Institutional Representativeness
This set of tests sought to ensure that the overall set of cases was not skewed by the 
inclusion of an institution whose circumstances were atypical to those of most inner 
London secondary schools. Three criteria were employed to identify and eliminate 
from consideration such institutions: recent designation of serious weaknesses or 
special measures, percentage of students eligible for free school meals, and overall 
governing body competence. Each of these is discussed below.
Serious Weaknesses or Special Measures
Serious weaknesses and special measures are designations that can be issued by 
Ofsted -  the government’s school inspection service -  in the event of an 
unsatisfactory inspection.4 Under Ofsted regulations (2003b), ‘serious weaknesses’
4 Office for Standards in Education. Ofsted manages the school inspection system, under which every 
school in the country is inspected thoroughly once every six years. After inspection, Ofsted issues a
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warns a school that an inspection has found severe problems that require close 
attention, usually in ‘one or more key stages; leadership...; the quality of teaching...; 
and the limited extent of school improvement given the previous inspected’ 
(2003b:54). Furthermore, the designation of ‘special measures’ is made when a 
school is ‘deemed through inspection to be failing, or [is] likely to fail, to provide 
[its] pupils with an acceptable standard of education’ (2003b:54). Such a designation 
requires a school to accept substantial external assistance to improve those problems. 
None of the fifteen schools whose most recent Ofsted report designated them for 
serious weaknesses or special measures were considered as candidates. This was for 
two reasons. First, it was felt that schools facing administrative, academic, or 
disciplinary problems severe enough to warrant the government taking ‘special 
measures’ were, as the name suggests, special cases that would be unrepresentative 
of the majority of inner London secondary schools. Second, it was felt that, given 
the time and energy required to solve these problems, the governing bodies of these 
schools would be unlikely to have either the time or inclination to participate.
Free School Meals
On the other end of the spectrum were those schools with extremely low percentages 
of their pupils eligible for free school meals. This statistic is the only nationally- 
collected and reported numerical indicator (albeit an imperfect one) available to 
researchers seeking to determine the relative economic deprivation of the student 
population. Across England, the mean percentage of secondary school students 
known to be eligible to receive free school meals in 1999-2000 (the school year with 
available statistics closest to the dates of the main study) was 16.5 per cent, whereas 
within greater London the percentage was 26.8 per cent, within inner London the 
percentage was 43.9 per cent (DfEE 2000c:35). Furthermore, the large majority of 
state schools in inner London reported percentages rising well above the national 
average, reaching over 80 per cent of students in schools located in some of the most 
deprived areas. It was therefore decided that none of the twelve inner London 
secondary schools with fewer than 20 per cent of its students known to be eligible for 
free school meals would be included in the case studies, as it was felt that such 
schools were not generally representative of the great majority of schools in the inner 
London secondary system. While it is true that these lower deprivation schools may
comprehensive report, providing an overall assessment of the school, identifying the school’s 
strengths and weaknesses, and offering recommendations for improvement.
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have strategies to offer to schools with higher levels of student deprivation, it seemed 
more judicious to focus on schools whose deprivation levels more closely matched 
those of the majority of inner London secondary schools.
Overall Governing Body Competence
Since this research focused on governors, it was decided that at minimum, potential 
case study sites needed to have governing bodies that were not determined to be 
liabilities to their respective schools. The level of governing body performance was 
determined by examining the most recent Office of Standards in Education (Ofsted) 
report for each of the 139 schools in the research area. Ofsted reports provided the 
best available indicator of governing body performance, since each Ofsted report 
includes an assessment of the governing body’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as 
an analysis of the extent to which the governing body helps shape the vision and 
direction of the school (Ofsted 2003a:41). Although this determination of overall 
governing body competence was clearly a subjective one, schools whose governing 
bodies were criticised severely by Ofsted were not pursued as potential case study 
sites. After applying the first two criteria of this section, this third criteria eliminated 
a further ten schools.
Test Two: Collective Representativeness
Approximately one hundred schools out of 139 met the three criteria of institutional 
representativeness outlined above. This second set of tests therefore sought to ensure 
that collectively, the overall set of cases was adequately balanced in terms of the 
main demographic characteristics of the inner London secondary system. Six main 
criteria -  geography, size, gender, school control, percentage of ethnic minority 
students, and average examination results -  were deemed relevant to determining this 
balance, and each is discussed below.5
Geography
Sites were drawn from the inner London boroughs as defined in Section 3.1.1. In 
order to acquire a measure of geographic diversity, no more than one case was drawn 
from a single borough. Further, an attempt was made to spread the cases
5 A seventh criterion -  student/teacher ratio -  was discarded due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate 
data. Institutional-level data on student/teacher ratios are not available from the DfES, and would 
have to have been obtained from the more unreliable self-reported figures contained in individual 
Ofsted reports.
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geographically across the research area, with two cases coming from schools north of 
the Thames, and three from schools south of the Thames.
Size
The size of inner London’s secondary schools varies from a low of approximately 
440 pupils to a high of over 2030 pupils, with a mean average of 949 and a median 
average of 899 (DfEE 2000d). Sites were selected in order to reflect this range, and 
varied in size from between 575 and 1500 pupils.
Gender
Of the five schools selected, four were mixed, and one was single-sex girls. For 
comparison, the overall distribution of inner London schools by gender is 55.8 per 
cent mixed, 27.5 per cent single-sex girls, and 16.7 per cent single-sex boys (DfEE 
2000d). Although attempts were made to reflect more closely the overall distribution 
by replacing a mixed school with a single-sex boys school, none of the boys schools 
approached responded positively to the request. However, it was not felt that the 
absence of such a school from the research rendered these findings inapplicable to 
such institutions.
School Control
Four of the schools in this study were community schools, while the fifth was a non- 
denominational voluntary aided institution. Admittedly, this ratio is weighted more 
heavily towards community schools than is the overall composition of the inner 
London secondary system (in which 53 per cent of secondary schools are community 
schools, 37 per cent are voluntary aided, and ten per cent are other types (DfEE 
2000d)). However, there was little that could be done other than to plead repeatedly 
with schools in underrepresented categories for their participation. Most notably, it 
was simply not possible to obtain the participation of any religious-affiliated schools 
as case studies, since ten such schools either declined or did not respond to requests 
for participation. However, while it would have been valuable to include a religious 
school in the qualitative study, the fact that these schools share many similarities 
with community schools (such as state funding, requirements to operate under many 
state statutes, and relatively similar governing body compositions), meant that the 
absence of one was not deemed vitally important.
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Percentage of Ethnic Minority Students
Because of the traditional emphasis placed on the importance of the ‘percentage of 
ethnic minority students’ variable, the research sought to include schools that broadly 
reflected the inner London range of this variable. According to the DfEE Annual 
Schools Census (2000d), the mean average for ‘percentage of ethnic minority 
students’ in inner London secondary schools was 54 per cent.6 Furthermore, nearly 
60 per cent of inner London secondary schools reported that over half of their pupil 
intake was comprised of ethnic minorities, whilst only ten per cent of inner London 
secondary schools reported an intake that was less than 30 per cent ethnic minority. 
These figures were reflected in the composition of the schools that participated in 
this research, as two schools were moderately below the inner London average, 
whilst three exceeded it.
GCSE Examination Results
This criterion was not a significant factor in determining the balance of the cases, as 
it was felt that average examination scores are often a misleading indicator. Low 
average scores can indicate that schools are dealing with pupils who experience 
significant existing constraints (such as poor English language skills), while high 
average scores can easily indicate the opposite. However, as with the ethnic minority 
percentage criteria, it was also felt that the schools selected for this study should be 
as ‘representative’ of the inner London system as was possible, since inadvertently 
including schools with only relatively high or low examination scores would fail to 
accurately reflect the state of the inner London system. Although all of the schools 
selected as case sites scored below the national average of 49.2 per cent of students 
achieving five GCSE passes at A*-C (DfEE 2000e), so too did 79 per cent of all 
inner London secondary schools. When evaluating these schools in the inner London 
context, however, it was clear that they provided a diverse representation of the inner 
London system. Three of the five schools in this study ranked between the 40th and
tVi55 percentile of all inner London schools in terms of the percentage of students
• tViachieving five good GCSEs, while a fourth school ranked above the 60 percentile, 
and a fifth below the 20th percentile.
6 A formal Form 7 request was made to the DfES for research access to school-level data on ethnic 
minority population and free school meal eligibility, as these data are not publicly available. This 
request was granted under the condition that the resulting research did not reveal the data of individual 
schools. Ethnic minority is defined as students classified by the DfES as being of: Black Caribbean 
heritage, Black African heritage, Black Other heritage, Indian ethnic origin, Pakistani ethnic origin, 
Bangladeshi ethnic origin, Chinese ethnic origin, or ‘any other minority ethnic origin’.
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3.3.4 Selection of Case Sites and Supplementary Interview Candidates
After assessing each school against the two tests outlined above, a preliminary list of 
fifteen potential case study sites was created. The chair of the governing body and 
the head teacher of each potential participant institution were contacted via letter, 
which explained the proposed study (see Appendix B). This letter was followed by a 
telephone inquiry. If the chair and head appeared willing to explore participation, an 
initial informal meeting was held to address questions, discuss concerns, and ensure 
the support of these individuals in soliciting participation from other governors. All 
case study participants were promised individual and institutional anonymity (for 
precedents see Esp and Saran 1995; Scanlon et al. 1999). This decision was taken 
because the goal of this research was to identify policy patterns, trends, and 
solutions, rather than to identify these attributes to specific institutions or individuals. 
Additionally, while the promise of anonymity reassured institutions who might 
otherwise have been wary of participation in this research, it was clear upon 
completion of this research that naming specific schools or individuals would not 
have improved the quality of the data analysis. Of the initial fifteen schools 
approached, four agreed to participate as research sites. An additional ten potential 
schools were then contacted in the manner described above, and one of those schools 
agreed to participate as the fifth case study site.
Within each case study school, seven to nine individuals were interviewed according 
to the protocols outlined below. As mentioned above, interviewing this number of 
governors (40 in all) had the advantages of providing both a significant amount of 
data for analysis as well as a spectrum on which to gauge the representativeness of 
individual governor comments (by interpreting them in the context of the comments 
made by their colleagues). Each set of interviewees included the chair of governors, 
a teacher governor, a parent governor, an LEA governor, and a co-opted or 
foundation business governor. Furthermore, at four of the five case study schools the
n
head teacher was interviewed as well. Governors also often recommended 
interviewing other additional specific governors on their governing body, due to 
either the interest or expertise of those particular individuals, and these 
recommendations were acted upon wherever feasible. Once a case study was begun, 
the majority of interviews within that case were conducted within four to six weeks.
7 The exception was the school identified in this study as Whitefrost, where the head approved the 
research but, despite repeated requests, was unable to find the time to participate as an interviewee.
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In addition to the interviews from the five case sites, it was decided to conduct a set 
of eight additional targeted interviews with chairs of governors from other inner 
London secondary schools. These interviewees were identified in several ways: 
some were recommended by the local governor services director, some were chairs 
of schools that were approached as potential case sites but which chose not to 
participate institutionally, and some were recommended by fellow chairs. By 
including these additional chairs in the research, it was possible to explore the 
broader general extent of patterns and themes identified through interviews at the 
five case sites, without the increased logistical difficulties of pursuing additional full 
case studies at numerous additional sites. This rationale for this decision came from 
the research design of Esp and Saran (1995), in which data were collected solely 
through interviews with chairs and heads. Esp and Saran’s focus on ‘elites’ implied, 
reasonably, that chairs (and heads) often had the most significant influence in 
guiding the general direction of the governing body. The main purpose of these 
supplementary interviews, therefore, was to maximise the breadth of the research, 
while remaining within the time and resource constraints. For example, including 
these eight chairs in the research meant that thirteen different schools were 
represented (or ten per cent of those in the research area), as were nine different 
boroughs (out of thirteen in the research area). Furthermore, the addition of these 
interviews raised the total number of interviews in the main study to 48, which was 
felt to be sufficiently robust so as to provide a broad enough source of data from 
which to draw conclusions.
3.3.5 Interviewing Protocols
Both the main study and the preliminary study interviews were designed to follow 
the same general format. Most interviews lasted for 45 minutes, although some were 
as short as 30 minutes and others lasted for over 90 minutes. All were arranged at 
the time and place most convenient for the interviewees, which usually meant in their 
home or office. When possible, each interviewee was sent a general written 
summary of the research study and a list of ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ prior to the 
interview (see Appendix B). This summary had two advantages. First, it provided 
the interviewee with the opportunity to think about some of the general issues prior 
the interview itself. Second, it permitted the researcher to avoid spending limited 
interview time on a lengthy explanation of the overall research project. Any 
interviewee who asked for an advance list of the interview questions was instead sent
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a list of the general topics that were to be discussed. This was done in order to avoid 
the possibility of interviewees preparing ‘safe’ answers instead of responding 
spontaneously. Each interview was conducted using a pre-designed interview 
schedule, consisting of approximately 20 questions. Three different interview 
schedules were used in this research -  two for use in the preliminary study (one for 
governor services directors and one for education business partnership directors -  see 
Appendix A), and a third for the main study interviews (see Appendix B). The 
interview schedules for the preliminary study were created as described in Section 
3.2.3, and, using the experience gained from the preliminary study, these preliminary 
interview schedules were then revised for use in the main qualitative study.
While Bell (1999) argues that ‘it is easier to acknowledge the fact that bias can creep 
in than to eliminate it altogether’ (1999:138), all attempts were made to eliminate 
sources of interviewer bias -  such as leading questions, interruptions, providing 
answers, and other similar factors. Additionally, the general question order within 
the schedule was maintained when possible, both in order to ensure a measure of 
uniformity between respondents and to aid in the subsequent data analysis process. 
However, the semi-structured format allowed for questions to be asked, when 
necessary, in the order that appeared to have the best chance of encouraging the most 
useful responses from the interviewees. This flexibility preserved the context and 
fluidity of the interview, while helping put the interviewee at ease by both preventing 
awkward shifts in emphasis and by lending a logical flow to the development of the 
discussion. Each interview was concluded by thanking the interviewee, providing 
contact information should the interviewee have additional questions or comments, 
and enquiring whether the participant would be amenable to being contacted should 
their comments require clarification or elaboration.
3.3.6 Tape Recording and Transcriptions Protocols
Although written notes were taken during each interview, interviews were audio 
taped for transcription purposes whenever possible. All interviewees were asked 
explicitly if their interview could be recorded, and all interviewees were given 
assurances that tapes would be erased after analysis. Additionally, all interviewees 
were promised that all of their comments, as well as reference to specific sites and 
individuals, would be made anonymous in the final written work. It was decided that 
the value gained by promising anonymity, in terms of the candour and comfort of the
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interviewees, outweighed the analytical value of identifying specific sites. Although 
on some occasions taping was not possible (either due to the interview environment 
or due to equipment failure), over 90 per cent of interviews were tape recorded, and 
only two interviewees refused on principle to be recorded. This high rate of 
acceptance was extremely important, as recording interviews has a number of 
advantages for qualitative research. For example:
• Recording provides the opportunity to hear the entire interview in context, 
which can often assist in interpreting specific sections of an interview;
• Recording eliminates the problem of ‘data distortion’ that can be created 
during the post-hoc recreation of interview content from written notes;
• Accurate verbatim transcription is possible for recorded interviews, whereas 
it is nearly impossible when transcribing from written notes;
• Recording allows for conversations to be revisited, permitting a greater 
attention to vocal emphasis and stresses that are not conveyed solely by 
written notes;
• Recording allows the interviewer to focus on the interviewee, rather than on 
transcription. This focus not only helps the interviewee relax, it also permits 
the interviewer to follow the conversation more closely and ask relevant 
clarification or follow up questions.
Every recorded interview was transcribed verbatim using a transcription machine and 
a word processor. In cases where recording was not possible, the extensive 
shorthand notes from the interview were written up as soon as was possible 
afterwards. This created a written ‘record bank’ of all interview conversations (the 
method of analysing these transcripts is discussed below in more detail). The 
logistical difficulty associated with providing each interviewee with a copy of their 
transcribed interview before quotation meant that offering a transcript was not 
standard practice, and no interviewee requested a transcript of their interview. 
However, if interviewees had expressly asked to review their comments, a decision 
had been made at the outset of the research to provide transcripts if so requested.
3.3.7 Qualitative Data Analysis Procedures
Interview transcripts were, on average, approximately 4,000 words apiece. In order 
to make this quantity of data manageable for analysis purposes, the general coding
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processes outlined by Bryman (2001:398) were employed. In particular, all 
comments that appeared clearly relevant to the analysis were colour-highlighted as 
they were being transcribed. This meant that although the transcripts were still read 
fully during the analysis stage, seeking out the relevant portions of each transcript 
became a relatively straightforward process. Identification of these sections was 
aided by the use of the field notes, as a point was made during the interviews to 
manually denote comments of particular value or interest. By cross-checking these 
notes with the relevant sections of the transcript, it was easier to draw out the most 
relevant sections for analysis. Additionally, all interviews from a particular case 
study were transcribed consecutively, which meant that common themes within case 
studies became easier to identify due to their repetition by various interviewees. 
Because the transcripts were stored as word processing files, it was extremely simple 
to move relevant sections from the transcripts into the body of the data chapter, and 
to view different responses to the same question simultaneously.
The use of a software package for qualitative data analysis was considered, but 
eventually rejected, for three reasons. First, the fact that not all of the interviews 
were able to be tape recorded meant that the value of the text-pattem identification 
features of these programmes would be substantially diminished. Second, 
respondents often referenced their responses to other portions of the interview, 
making it vital to have a thorough understanding of the context in which comments 
were being made. It was felt that the current limitations of the computerised 
packages were not adequately equipped to provide this kind of sophisticated 
contextual analysis. Third, many of the available qualitative analysis software 
packages operate by quantifying the occurrence of particular words or phrases. 
However, it was felt that counting alone provided minimal advantages a study that 
was seeking to identify themes and patterns. For these reasons, it was felt that the 
advantages of computerised qualitative data analysis packages would be minimal.
3.4 The Quantitative Survey
In the third phase of this research, a mail survey was employed in order to provide a 
quantitative balance to the issues that had been investigated through the qualitative 
case studies. The value of using a quantitative survey was fourfold. First, this 
survey provided additional ‘triangulation’ regarding governors’ perceptions about 
business involvement and strategic planning. Second, this survey enabled this
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research to cover the entire population of the research area. Third, this survey 
enabled the full range of variation in secondary schools -  from school control to 
school size to school gender -  to be represented in this research.8 Finally, as Robson 
(1993) argues, employing ‘multiple-method research’ (such as a quantitative survey 
in conjunction with qualitative research methods) can enhance the overall 
interpretability of research data, and permit a broader and more complete analysis 
than either a quantitative or a qualitative approach could provide alone (1993:289). 
In explaining the methodology employed for the quantitative component of this 
research, this section discusses the parameters of the survey, question design and 
survey creation, logistical issues, overall results, and analysis methods.
3.4.1 Survey Parameters
The survey was carried out during June and July of 2001. In order to obtain the 
greatest coverage of the research area while remaining within resource constraints, 
the survey was designed to be sent to the head teacher and the chair of governors at 
every (non-special) state-maintained secondary school within the 13-borough research 
area. This area comprised 139 schools, and therefore 278 individual recipients.9
3.4.2 Question Design and Survey Creation
Because the survey was intended to gauge the opinion and knowledge of the broader 
population in regards to the issues raised in the case studies, the survey questions 
were designed to mirror (as closely as was possible) the interview questions from the 
case studies. The survey questions were grouped into the same three main categories 
-  business involvement, strategic planning, and the role of central government -  and 
the same questions were sent to both chairs of governors and head teachers. The 
only difference between the surveys sent to the two groups came in the preparatory 
section of the survey, which requested information regarding the respondent’s length 
of service at the school and whether they had ever been employed in the private 
sector. In this section, minor alterations were made to reflect the position of the 
recipient (for example, ‘years on governing body’ and ‘years as chair’ were changed 
to ‘years at this school’ and ‘years as head teacher’.) All respondents were 
guaranteed that their responses would be held in confidence, but the survey did ask
8 While City Technology Colleges are technically ‘independent’ institutions, they were included in the 
mail survey since -  despite their status -  their funding comes almost entirely from central government.
9 One additional school was eliminated from the study as it was designated for closure at the end of 
the 2000-2001 school year.
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for their school’s name in order to match their survey responses with the school’s 
statistical data. This method had the advantage of not expending valuable survey 
space on asking factual questions, such as school size or affiliation. The survey 
instrument itself can be found in Appendix C.
Survey question response options were scaled in the manner deemed most 
appropriate to the question being asked. For the majority of questions, respondents 
were given an interval scale of one to five, with the polar points labelled in order to 
provide the scale definition. A one to five scale was chosen because it provided the 
respondent with sufficient gradation, while also permitting aggregated responses to 
be collapsed into three categories (i.e., low, middle, high) for analysis purposes. In 
one question (number 22) the scale itself was reduced to three response options, as 
this was a unidirectional question concerned with level of hindrance that the given 
set of factors had on governing body strategic planning. For other items, response 
options were given as simple nominal yes/no or yes/no/unsure choices, as appropriate.
Before distribution, the survey was piloted in order to assess the ease of its 
completion, identify confusing or ambiguous wording, and ensure that respondents 
were interpreting the questions as intended. While interviews permit the researcher 
to seek clarification of an interviewee’s responses, it is clearly impossible to 
determine the respondent’s interpretation of a particular survey question. Therefore, 
it was essential that questions were worded in a manner that ensured as uniform an 
understanding of the question as was possible. The survey was piloted on a number 
of governors who would not be eventual survey recipients, as well as on individuals 
with experience in education and on individuals with experience in survey design. 
These comments were all incorporated into the final survey design.
3.4.3 Survey Logistics
Although the literature on survey design is extensive (e.g., Sudman and Bradbum 
1982; Foddy 1993; Gillham 2000), little has been written on how to acquire good 
response rates to those well-designed survey instruments. Traditionally, response 
rates to mail surveys hover around 25 per cent, at which point serious questions arise 
about the representativeness of the results. In an attempt to avoid these problems, 
this survey was distributed using a modification of the method devised by Dillman 
(2000), whose research into survey logistics has been both thorough and extensive.
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First, the four-page survey was duplex-printed on a single sheet of folded A3, in 
order to ensure that pages were not lost during the response cycle. The survey was 
then packaged with three additional items: a personalised letter from the governor 
services director in the respondent’s borough, a personalised letter from the research 
supervisor, and a stamped addressed return envelope (examples of these letters can 
be found in Appendix C). The purpose of these personalised letters was to reduce 
any adverse ‘cold-call’ effect of the survey. The letter from the governor services 
director indicated a level of official approval of the research from a source that 
would be known to the respondent. This letter, on official borough letterhead, was 
always placed first in order to maximise its influence with the respondent. The 
research supervisor’s letter, also on official letterhead, served a similar purpose, by 
providing the imprimatur of a well-known academic institution. Finally, a second- 
class stamped addressed return envelope was included in the package, as Dillman 
(2000) determined that return envelopes with physical stamps increased response 
rates by nearly 10 per cent over metered or postage-paid return envelopes.
Both letters requested that the survey be returned within three weeks of its receipt, 
when possible. The timing of the survey sending was also carefully chosen, in order 
to avoid having the survey arrive during a time of high activity during the school 
year (such as the first few weeks of term), or when the school was not in session 
(such as half-terms). The survey was posted during the first week of June 2001, 
creating an expected reply window of the last two weeks of June 2001. Although the 
survey package was posted to head teachers at their school addresses, the survey 
package was posted directly to chairs of governors at their home addresses whenever 
possible. These home addresses were acquired from the LEAs in 10 of the 13 
research boroughs. Since mail sent to governors via their schools is often delayed 
due to rerouting (or discarded due to ‘selective sorting’ by school office staff), it was 
felt that sending the surveys directly to home addresses would increase the 
possibility of rapid response. Additionally, it was felt that in conjunction with the 
letter of support from the director of governor services, sending the survey package 
to a home address would increase the likelihood of a favourable response.
The second logistical stage occurred three days later, when a second letter was 
posted to each of the survey recipients (see Appendix C). This letter was sent from 
the governor services director on local authority letterhead (using a template
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provided by the researcher), and noted that the recipient should have received a 
survey several days earlier. Dillman (2000) determined that using this type of 
‘immediate follow-up’ letter increased response rates significantly for two reasons. 
First, respondents recognised that the survey was of sufficient importance to the 
researcher that he or she was willing to spend the time and money to determine that 
the survey had arrived safely. Second, such a letter encouraged respondents to 
complete the survey before they had the opportunity to discard it. By reaching 
respondents a few days after the arrival of the survey and jogging their memories, the 
risk of the survey being added to (and lost in) the ‘to do’ pile was greatly reduced.
The third stage occurred four weeks after the initial survey mailing, or one week after 
the stated deadline for receipt of the completed surveys. A third letter, authored by 
the researcher, was sent to all target recipients who had not returned a completed 
survey. This letter noted this fact, and a second copy of the survey instrument and a 
second stamped return envelope were enclosed. Although the response rate to this 
‘second sending’ was substantially lower (19 per cent) than the overall response rate 
(57 per cent -  see below), it was reasonable to expect a lower rate given the population 
to which this letter was sent (i.e., those who had not responded to the initial mailing).
3.4.4 Survey Response Results
All responses were recorded in an Excel spreadsheet, which expedited the tracking of 
completed and outstanding surveys. This method also allowed for the tracking of 
completed surveys by borough and respondent category (head or chair). Overall, 158 
responses were received. This comprised 63 per cent of all chairs of governors and 
50 per cent of all head teachers, giving a combined response rate of 57 per cent -  
well above the traditional response rate for such surveys. It also appeared that most 
respondents were satisfied with the promise of anonymity, as only four respondents 
(2.5 per cent) declined to provide either the name of their school or their borough. 
The response rates to questions within the surveys were also extremely thorough, as 
only five respondents (three per cent) did not answer at least 95 per cent of the survey 
items. Not only were these ‘internal’ response rates higher than expected, but several 
completed surveys were accompanied by notes and letters offering more thorough 
explanations of particular responses, and suggesting additional research ideas. Finally, 
at least 20 per cent of respondents requested copies of the survey results, suggesting a 
moderately high level of interest in the subject matter amongst the respondents.
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While these statistics assist in establishing the validity and potential generalisabilty 
of the results from the respondent level, three other important statistics assist in 
establishing the validity and potential generalisabilty from the school and borough 
level. The first of these is the ‘double-response’ rate; in 42 schools (34 per cent of 
all schools in the research area), both the head teacher and the chair of governors 
responded. The second of these is the overall school participation rate; out of the 
139 schools in the research area, responses were received from either the head or the 
chair of governors of 110 of them -  an impressive 79 per cent. This breadth of 
coverage is extremely important, as it suggests that the results of the survey reflect 
the situations in the full range of secondary schools, not just in one narrow segment 
of them. Finally, the response rate by LEA is important, as a low response rate from 
some boroughs might offer the misleading impression that those few responses to the 
survey represented the views of all those in the borough. Fortunately, as can be seen 
from Table 3.2, no borough’s response rate was below 40 per cent (Lambeth), and at 
the upper end, Greenwich achieved a response rate of 75 per cent.
Table 3.2: Response Rate (by LEA) to Survey of Chairs and Heads






Kensington & Chelsea 5 63









Anonymous Responses 2 N/A
Totals 158 57
3.4.5 Quantitative Data Analysis Procedures
All survey responses were coded and entered into an SPSS data file. Using the 
school name provided by the respondent, additional factual data were entered into the 
SPSS framework, including data on school size, gender, school control, and location. 
Using publicly available DfEE data (DfEE 2000e), information was added on the
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school’s GCSE results from 2000 (percentage receiving five grades A*-C, 
percentage receiving grades A-G, percentage of no passes), and the comparisons of 
these results to the overall percentages for both England and the LEA. Additionally, 
restricted-access school-level data were obtained from the DfEE Annual Schools 
Census (2000d) via a Form 7 request, since while ‘known eligibility for free school 
meals’ is the strongest proxy indicator for the school deprivation level, these data are 
not publicly available.
All data were then analysed either through the straight reporting of frequencies, or by 
cross-tabulating various variables and using tests of statistical significance to identify 
any statistically significant differences between the responses of chairs and the 
responses of heads. The chi-squared test was used for nominal data, and the Mann- 
Whitney U test was used for ordinal data. As was noted in Section 3.4.2, most 
survey questions with ordinal response scales offered respondents five discrete 
response options, and the full five-category data sets were used when executing the 
Mann-Whitney U tests. However, it should be noted that after executing these 
statistical significance tests, the full five-category ordinal data sets were always 
collapsed from five categories into three. This procedure was employed in order to 
improve the management of the data during analysis and to improve the clarity of the 
formal data presentation. In collapsing these ordinal data sets, the two lowest and 
two highest categories were combined, respectively, to form a single data category. 
(To illustrate, on a scale where ‘one’ indicated ‘strongly oppose’ and ‘five’ indicated 
‘strongly support’, the data were collapsed so responses of ‘one’ or ‘two’ indicated 
‘oppose’, a response of three indicated ‘neutral’, and a response of ‘four’ or ‘five’ 
indicated ‘support’.) This method made general trends easier to identify while still 
preserving the original gradation differences for future analyses.
3.5 Construct Validity, Reliability, and External Validity 
This section addresses how the overall research design addressed the ‘quality control 
tests’ of construct validity, reliability, and external validity. Kidder (1981) defines 
construct validity as ‘establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied,’ reliability as ‘demonstrating that the operations of a study can be 
repeated with the same results,’ and external validity as ‘establishing the domain to 
which a study’s findings can be generalised’ (1981:7-8). Demonstrating that this
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research design addressed these issues therefore provides an additional measure of 
confidence in both the design itself and the research data collected under its auspices.
3.5.1 Construct Validity
This research design addressed the issue of construct validity in two ways. First, this 
research relied upon multiple interviews, multiple sites, multiple survey respondents, 
and multiple data sources. This triangulation of data sources reduces the likelihood 
that the overall research findings are biased by outlier cases, or that any particular 
data source or contact unduly influenced either the evaluation of evidence or the 
perspective of the conclusions. Second, questions of validity often arise when the 
‘questions being asked’ are inaccurately designed for gathering information about the 
‘concepts being investigated’. For this research, this meant avoiding asking vague or 
poorly-worded questions that lead to responses that actually answer a subtly different 
question than the one the researcher believes is being asked. As was noted earlier, 
the preliminary testing of both the interview questions and the survey instrument was 
a great asset in this regard, and the corrections made as a result o f these processes 
serve to increase the confidence in the construct validity of the overall research.
3.5.2 Reliability
In this study, reliability was ensured via the consistent use of data collection 
techniques and methods. In particular, the methods for the qualitative interviews, the 
quantitative survey, and their respective preliminary studies were clearly 
documented, a log of interviewees was maintained, interviews were transcribed using 
recognised transcription procedures, and interview questions and survey were made 
available for future scrutiny and replication (see Appendices). It was felt that this 
record of the research process adequately addressed any concerns about either the 
replicability of the proposed study or the reliability of its results.
3.5.3 External Validity
The issue of external validity and generalisation is one that often plagues qualitative 
research, since it is often argued that case studies are not ‘representative’ of the study 
population, so therefore their findings cannot be generalised (and are therefore of 
limited value). This research design addressed this concern in two ways. First, a 
quantitative survey was carried out in conjunction with the qualitative research. The 
relatively high response rate to the quantitative study provided the overall study with
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a measure of ‘representativeness’ for the study population (inner London state 
secondary schools), and confirmed the external validity of the quantitative research. 
Furthermore, given that these quantitative results corresponded quite closely with the 
qualitative data, it can be argued that there the quantitative results offer an increased 
measure of supporting external validity to the qualitative data as well. Second, 
however, Yin argues that it is not necessary to apply ‘sampling logic’ to qualitative 
research, suggesting that the contribution made by generalising qualitative results is 
analytical-theoretical, rather than statistical. Yin states:
‘Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations.... [T]he case study, like the experiment, does not 
represent a sample, and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise 
theories...not to enumerate frequencies’ (1994:10).
This argument states that if clear patterns are observed during a qualitative study, 
such findings can be generalised as contributions to theory. These ‘theoretical’ 
contributions can then be tested in other situations where there is reason to believe 
that these theoretical patterns might help explain a certain pattern of behaviour. 
There are, of course, limits to the extent of the generalisations of this research, and 
these limitations are addressed more fully in the final chapter of this thesis. 
However, by casting the patterns identified in this research in the context of general 
theoretical propositions about the strategic planning barriers facing governing bodies, 
it is argued that this research adequately addresses the issue of external validity.
3.6 The Research Sample
This final section presents the description of the qualitative and quantitative research 
samples. First, Section 3.6.1 provides the profiles of the five case study schools 
whose governors participated in the qualitative research. Second, Section 3.6.2 
describes the governing bodies at each case study school, and provides the background 
context on the schools of the supplementary interview chairs. Finally, Section 3.6.3 
describes the quantitative research sample, and illustrates the representative nature of 
this sample in relation to the population of possible respondents.
3.6.1 Profiles of the Five Case Study Schools
Each of the five case study schools is profiled below, using the pseudonym assigned 
by the researcher. Some statistical data have been presented in intentionally general 
terms in order to preserve the promised institutional anonymity. The statistical data
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are drawn from the DfEE Annual Schools Census (2000d), which was the most 
recent uniform compilation of data available at the time of the data analysis. The 
remaining data come from Ofsted reports and from personal observations.
Bluewater School is a mixed community school in west London. Good access to 
transport means that over 50 primary schools are represented in each annual intake, 
and that only 60 per cent of Bluewater’s nearly 1200 students come from inside the 
borough. In addition, Bluewater has a 300-student sixth form. The school is quite 
ethnically diverse: its students speak over 60 native languages (indeed, over 60 per 
cent speak English as an additional language), and nearly two-thirds of students are 
identified as ethnic minorities (predominantly Black, Chinese, and South Asian). 
The school is situated in a relatively affluent residential area, yet despite this 
location, the school’s physical infrastructure is in dire need of repair, and Bluewater 
caters to a relatively disadvantaged student body. Over 40 per cent of its students are 
eligible for free school meals, nearly equalling the Inner London average of 43.9 per 
cent, and well exceeding the overall London average of 26.8 per cent (DfEE 
2000c:3 5). In addition, over 20 per cent have been designated as having special 
educational needs. Recent GCSE results reflect these difficulties, as the percentage 
of students achieving five or more grades A*-C between 1997 and 2000 has been 
steady at 30 per cent -  well below both the 2000 national average (49 per cent) and 
the 2000 borough average. However, Bluewater’s most recent Ofsted Report (1997) 
rated the school as satisfactory, taking into account the challenges the school faces 
given the range of its student abilities and socio-educational backgrounds. In terms 
of business involvement, Bluewater has engaged in a number of one-off projects in 
recent years, but in general the school community has strong reservations about the 
role business should or could play in education.
Brownstone School is a mixed community school located in a highly urbanised area 
of east London. Nearly all of the approximately 1000 students live in the immediate 
area, and there is no sixth form. This school serves a mainly ethnic minority 
community, as nearly all of the pupils are of Bangladeshi origin. For over 90 per 
cent of these students, English is an additional language, and over 75 per cent of 
students are eligible for free school meals -  one of the highest rates in the country. 
Academically, however, Brownstone has done exceedingly well in relation to its 
challenges, as its recent GCSE results have showed steady improvement.
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Approximately 30 per cent of students achieved five or more grades A*-C in 2000, a 
figure that, while falling below the national average, very nearly reaches the borough 
average. Acknowledging this progress, Ofsted’s most recent report (1999) noted that 
Brownstone was a strong school operating under challenging circumstances. Of the 
five case study schools, Brownstone is the most enthusiastic about business 
involvement. In recent years the school has vigorously sought specialist school 
status, created a large student-business mentoring scheme, and actively pursued both 
financial and in-kind contributions from the business community.
Greenleaf School is a girls community school south of the Thames. It is located in a 
mainly residential and working-class area, and is surrounded by a park and small 
retail stores in addition to terraced housing. The school itself is an amalgam of 
Victorian architecture and a substantial 1970s addition. There are 1200 girls in years 
seven to eleven, and an additional 300 students in the mixed sixth form cooperative. 
English is an additional language for nearly 50 per cent of pupils, and over 45 per 
cent are from ethnic minorities, predominantly Black African and Indian, 
respectively. Approximately 40 per cent of students are eligible for free school 
meals, which is near the Inner London average. Recent trends in GCSE results have 
matched the LEA average, with approximately 30 per cent of students achieving five 
or more grades A*-C. Although this is well below the national average, there has 
been a steady upward trend since 1997. Greenleaf s most recent Ofsted Report 
(1999) rated the school as having had weaknesses but improving, and the governing 
body was described as providing strong leadership. The school has received several 
honours and recognitions from central government in recent years, having 
participated in a statutory EAZ and been designated as a specialist school. In terms 
of business involvement, Greenleaf has had a small number of ad hoc activities over 
the past few years, but its major involvement with business has been the fundraising 
campaign associated with its specialist school bid.
Redwood School is a mixed non-denominational voluntary aided school, located 
along a busy local high street in a working class yet slowly gentrifying area of south 
London. Although somewhat cramped due to its Victorian quarters, the school is 
undergoing a major renovation and expansion, which officials hope will improve 
education provision in the near future. Because of its voluntary aided status, 
Redwood has the freedom to designate its own admissions criteria, and draws its
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approximately 500 students from a broad catchment area, including a significant 
number of students from outside its borough. Redwood also has a very small sixth 
form. While less than 20 per cent of students speak English as an additional 
language, approximately half of the students are from ethnic minorities, and 
approximately 45 per cent of students are eligible for free school meals (a figure 
quite near the Inner London average). From 1997 to 2000, a fairly consistent 30 per 
cent of students achieved at least five grades A*-C at GCSE -  well below the 
England average, but about average in relation to other schools in the borough. In 
general, Redwood is perceived as a generally average urban school; its most recent 
Ofsted report (1999) noted that the school had more strengths than weaknesses, and 
felt that it had improved since its previous inspection. While the school has had 
limited involvement with business in recent years, there have been recent efforts to 
increase the school’s engagement with the local community, and particularly with 
surrounding high street employers.
W hitefrost School is a mixed state community in south London, situated on a main 
thoroughfare between an affluent residential neighbourhood and a large council 
housing estate. Built in the 1960s, the school is physically dilapidated and in much 
need of repair. Drawing students from all across the borough, Whitefrost serves 
approximately 800 students to GCSE level, nearly two-thirds of whom come from 
Black African or Caribbean backgrounds. Whitefrost also serves an extremely 
underprivileged community; nearly 60 per cent of its students are eligible for free 
school meals (significantly above even the inner London average), and English is an 
additional language for over 50 per cent of pupils. These challenges are evident in 
the Whitefrost’s exam results, as less than 20 per cent of students achieved five or 
more GCSE grades at A*-C between 1997 and 2000 -  well below both the national 
and borough averages. However, Ofsted believes that Whitefrost is an improving 
school. The school was placed into special measures in the late 1990s, but, following 
a change in its head teacher and chair of governors, Whitefrost was removed from 
special measures and began moving forward. Although the school is situated within 
a statutory EAZ and aspires to become a specialist school, governors and teachers 
admit that they have not previously engaged in business involvement to the extent 
that they would have liked. However, the school has worked on careers days and 
mentoring projects with several local multinational companies in recent years.
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3.6.2 Profiles of the Case Study Governing Bodies
The Bluewater Governing Body
Eight governors plus the head teacher were interviewed at Bluewater. These were the 
chair of governors (a co-opted governor who was a former Bluewater teacher, and who 
acts as Curriculum Chair), three co-opted governors (two with significant business 
backgrounds, and one employed as a university professor whose daughter was a former 
pupil), one teacher governor, one parent governor, and two LEA governors (one a 
Labour councillor and one a Conservative councillor; the latter was also the Finance 
Chair). Bluewater’s governors were praised by Ofsted as being well organised and 
knowledgeable, and there were only a few vacancies on the governing body -  indeed, 
many governors had served on the governing body for a number of years. The 
governors at Bluewater were generally highly educated, vocal, and opinionated, and 
tended to be active professionals. The head teacher was a new -  external -  appointment, 
having arrived at the beginning of the school year in which this research was conducted.
The Brownstone Governing Body
Seven governors plus the head teacher were interviewed at Brownstone. These were 
the chair of governors (a co-opted governor who owns and runs a local business), 
two co-opted governors (one, the Finance Chair, was employed as an investment 
manager for a major City firm, and the other was employed in a similar capacity as a 
civil servant), two LEA governors appointed by the Labour party (one employed as a 
professional labour negotiator, while the other was a former teacher and the current 
Curriculum Chair), one parent governor, and one teacher governor. In its most 
recent report, Ofsted noted that the governing body worked effectively to support the 
school. However, while there were several Brownstone governors who are quite 
active, there were frequently a number of parent vacancies on the governing body. 
The governing body at Brownstone tended to be split between older local residents 
and younger individuals who worked near the school but resided elsewhere. The 
head teacher had been in post for nearly ten years, and had built a strong working 
relationship with the governing body.
The Greenleaf Governing Body
Six governors plus the head teacher were interviewed at Greenleaf. These were the 
chair of governors (an LEA governor who was the former head teacher of 
Greenleaf s main feeder primary school), two co-opted governors (one the former
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chair of governors, and the other an external advisor who came to the school in 
relation to their specialist school bid), one teacher governor, one parent governor 
(who was also the chair of governors at a local primary school), and one LEA 
governor appointed through the Labour party (who was also the Finance Chair). The 
governors at Greenleaf tended to have strong professional backgrounds in education, 
and lived in the immediate vicinity of the school. There were frequently a small 
number of vacancies on the governing body, but in general the governing body had 
maintained a fairly stable level of membership. The head teacher had been in post 
for a number of years at the time of the research, and had built a good working 
relationship with the governing body.
The Redwood Governing Body
Seven governors plus the head teacher were interviewed at Redwood. These were 
the chair of governors (a foundation governor who founded and runs his own major 
computer corporation, and who acts as Curriculum Chair), two foundation governors 
(one the vice-president of a major multinational and the Finance Chair, the other a 
retired individual), two LEA governors (one a social worker in another local 
authority, the other a university professor), one teacher governor, and one parent 
governor. In its most recent report, Ofsted deemed Redwood’s governing body to be 
well led and well informed, and due to the quota of foundation governors, there were 
rarely vacancies on the governing body. Many Redwood governors had attended the 
school themselves, although most had eventually moved well away from the 
immediate vicinity of the school. The head was fairly new at the time of this 
research, having been appointed within the past two years.
The Whitefrost Governing Body
Eight governors were interviewed at Whitefrost, although the head was not available 
to be interviewed. Those interviewed were the chair of governors (a co-opted 
governor employed as a civil servant, who had been recently elected as chair), two 
co-opted governors (one a local parent and Curriculum Chair, the other a City- 
employed manager and the Finance Chair), three LEA governors (one local Labour 
councillor and two appointed by the Conservative party), one parent governor 
(himself a former Whitefrost chair of governors), and a staff governor with 20 years 
service to the school. Although Ofsted has rated the governing body as satisfactory, 
there were frequent vacancies on the governing body, and governor turnover was a
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significant problem. Whitefrost’s governing body consisted of individuals from 
across the socio-economic and geographic spectrum; many of the most active 
governors joined because they were attracted by the opportunities for ‘making a 
difference’ during the school’s emergence from special measures. The head teacher 
had been in post for only twelve months at the time this research was conducted.
The Supplementary Interview Chairs
As was noted in Section 3.3.4, supplementary interview chairs -  four men and four 
women -  were identified in several ways: some were recommended by the local 
governor services director, some were chairs of schools that chose not to participate 
as case studies, and some were recommended by fellow chairs. Table 3.3 provides a 
brief overview of the schools at which these interviewees were chairs, using data 
from the DfEE Annual Schools Census (2000d). To preserve the anonymity of these 
interviewees, school enrolments are reported to the nearest hundred, and percentages 
are presented to the nearest decile.
























North 1000 50 50 30 Mixed Community
Northeast 1900 40 80 40 Mixed Community
East 800 50 80 40 Girls Vol. Aided
East 1000 40 60 50 Mixed Vol. Aided
East 1400 80 100 50 Girls Community
South 1000 50 60 20 Mixed Community
Southwest 900 30 60 20 Mixed Community
West 600 10 20 90 Girls Vol. Aided
3.6.3 The Quantitative Sample
This final section provides two sets of descriptive statistics. First, Tables 3.4 through 
3.11 illustrate the extent to which the quantitative sample was representative of the 
population of all possible survey respondents. This is done by comparing the 
characteristics of the schools of survey respondents to the overall population of 
schools (N=138) in eight key categories, using data from the DfEE Annual Schools 
Census (2000d).10 It should be noted that these data demonstrate that this survey
10 The discrepancy between the overall population N for this descriptive data (N=138) and the 
population N for the mail survey (N=139) is due to the fact that one new school opened in the interval
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was extremely representative, as none of the differences between respondents and the 
population in any category were statistically significant. Tables 3.4 through 3.6 
report the mean, median, and range of the data on pupil enrolment, percentage of 
students known to be eligible for free school meals, and percentage of students 
achieving five or more grades A*-C at GCSE, respectively.







Mean 949 928 964
Median 899 880 894
Range Low 437 437 437
Range High 2039 1932 2039








Mean 43.2 43.2 44.3
Median 43.0 41.7 43.6
Range Low 6.2 6.2 6.2
Range High 88.1 88.1 82.8







Mean 34.1 33.7 34.4
Median 32 34 32
Range Low 5 6 5
Range High 92 89 89
Percentages o f overall GCSE attainment levels are only reported by the DfEE in whole numbers.
Next, Tables 3.7 through 3.10 report the overall percentages in each sub-category of 
school type, religious affiliation, gender, and location, respectively.
between the collation of the data from the Annual Schools Census in January 2000 and the time the 
mail survey was conducted in 2001.
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Community 52.9 51.2 52.9
Voluntary Aided 38.3 39.5 36.8
Foundation 5.1 5.8 7.4
CTC 2.2 2.3 —
Voluntary Controlled 1.9 1.2 2.9







None 66.7 67.4 70.6
Roman Catholic 21.0 19.6 17.6
Church of England 10.9 11.6 11.8
Christian 0.7 1.2 —
Jewish 0.7 — —







Mixed 55.8 54.7 57.4
Single-Sex Girls 27.5 26.7 32.4
Single-Sex Boys 16.7 18.6 10.3







East 71.0 71.3 73.9
West 29.0 28.7 26.1
North 55.8 54.2 49.3
South 44.2 45.8 50.7
Finally, Table 3.11 compares the gender of survey respondents to the gender 
distribution of all chairs and heads in the survey population.
Table 3.11: Chair and Head Gender
Chairs Chair Heads Head
All Schools Respondents All Schools Respondents
(N=138) (N=85) (N=138) (N=69)
Male 61.9 64.0 46.8 35.3
Female 38.1 36.0 55.2 64.7
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Having established that this survey was representative of the population, the second 
set of statistics provides some insight into the survey respondents themselves. First, 
it was found that chairs in this survey tended to be foundation governors (40.2 per 
cent -  although such governors only exist at foundation or voluntary sector schools), 
with most other chairs reporting that they were either LEA (25.3 per cent) or co­
opted (19.5 per cent) governors. Only 3.4 per cent of chairs said they were parent 
governors, while 11.5 per cent did not report their affiliation (N=87). Turning to the 
time that respondents spent on governing body issues, Table 3.12 illustrates that 
chairs were more likely to spend significant time on such issues than were heads. 
Although statistically significant, this finding is somewhat unsurprising, as it would 
be expected that heads would find it easier to apply their daily in-school experiences 
to their governing body tasks.
Table 3.12: Hours Spent Per Week on Governing Body Matters
Chair Respondents Head Respondents
(N=86) (N=68)
Zero to Five Hours 48.7 74.1
5.1 to Ten Hours 35.9 22.4
Over Ten Hours 15.4 3.4
Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-3.2; p  < 0.05.
Looking further at the head respondents, the survey found that 55.9 per cent had been 
in post for five years or less, 26.5 per cent from between 5.1 years and ten years, and 
the remaining 17.6 per cent for over ten years (N=68). However, as can be seen in 
Table 3.13, the range in the total number of years that chair and head respondents 
had been at their schools was fairly well distributed.
Table 3.13: Total Number of Years at the School
Chair Respondents Head Respondents
(N=79) (N=67)
Zero to Five Years 33.3 47.8
5.1 to Ten Years 33.3 23.9
Over Ten Years 33.3 28.4
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
Finally, chairs and heads were asked about their public and private sector experience. 
When asked whether they had ever been employed in any capacity in the state
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education sector, 33.7 per cent of chairs said they had, while 66.3 per cent said they 
had not (N=83). However, when asked whether they had ever been employed in the 
private sector, 67.1 per cent of chairs (N=82) said they had, as opposed to only 13.6 
per cent of heads (N=66). This difference was statistically significant (chi-squared = 
42.5; p  < 0.05), although such a discrepancy was not necessarily surprising.
3.7 Chapter Three Conclusion
This chapter presented the methodology and research design employed for collecting 
and analysing the research data in this thesis. First, the overall scope and parameters 
of the study were explained, as was the tripartite structure of the final research 
design. The justification for and logistics of each of the three major components of 
this design -  the preliminary study, the qualitative study, and the quantitative survey, 
respectively -  were then discussed in detail. The steps taken to ensure that the 
research design met the ‘quality control tests’ of construct validity, reliability, and 
external validity were then discussed and finally, the data describing the 
characteristics of the qualitative and quantitative research samples were presented.
Given this research design, this thesis now proceeds to the presentation of research 
evidence itself, which is presented in three phases over the course of the next five 
chapters. Before doing so, three minor presentational notes need to be made.
• First, where possible, survey and interview responses are presented together. 
This decision enables the reader to construct a more complete picture of a 
given issue than might be possible if the survey and interview material were 
presented separately;
• Second, in the interest of conciseness, references to either opinions of or 
observations about ‘governors’ in the data chapters should always be 
understood to mean ‘governors participating in this study’, unless explicitly 
stated otherwise; and
• Third, in the interest of conciseness, when this thesis presents the quantitative 
responses of chairs and heads to the same survey question, it should be 
presumed that any differences between the responses two groups are not 
statistically significant, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r  
G o v e r n o r s  a n d  St r a t e g ic  P l a n n in g
4.0 Introduction
Having thus established the background and methodology of this research, this 
chapter now attempts to answer the first two of the four main research questions:
Do governors in inner London state secondary schools view their role as a 
strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?______
Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually evident 
in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?_____________
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 address the first research question. Section 4.1 examines how 
governors perceived their role, and whether governors believed that their role should 
include strategic planning. It will be argued that governors did see their role as a 
strategic one. Section 4.2 then presents evidence to demonstrate that governors 
appeared to share several common factors in their definition of strategic planning, 
and these factors are then described in depth. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 then address the 
second research question. Section 4.3 takes the common factors in governors’ own 
definition of strategic planning, outlined in Section 4.2, and presents evidence to 
suggest that governors perceived significant discrepancies between their stated 
criteria for strategic planning and the extent to which those criteria were realised in 
practice. Section 4.4 then examines the governing body’s role in the School 
Development Plan (SDP), seeking to determine whether governors saw the SDP as 
their schools’ main strategic plan, and whether the development planning process 
provided governors with meaningful strategic planning opportunities. Given the 
findings in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, it will be argued the lack of strategic planning 
implied by the literature is actually evident in the governing bodies of inner London 
state secondary schools. Section 4.5 summarises this chapter and provides a short 
concluding discussion of these findings.
4.1 Perceptions of the Governing Body Role
4.1.1 Central Government Perceptions of the Governing Body Role
The first issue raised in the first research question was whether governors felt that 
their role included responsibility for strategic planning. On paper, their
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responsibility to do so is incontrovertible, as was illustrated in Chapter Two. For 
example, the DfES’s Guide to the Law for School Governors (2001) clearly states 
that the powers and duties of governing bodies include ‘taking general responsibility 
for the conduct of the school -  in practice this should include how in broad strategic 
terms it should be run’ (2001:5.1). Notably, this duty of strategic planning is listed 
even before responsibility for ‘managing the school’s budget,’ suggesting that is 
strategic planning not simply one of many governing body responsibilities, but that it 
is an extremely important one. Further evidence of the relevance of this 
responsibility can be found in numerous other central government documents, 
including the section on governors in the DfEE Green Paper Schools: Building on 
Success (2001), which states:
‘At the heart of the framework for continuous improvement which we have 
put in place is the self-governing school responsible for the performance of 
its pupils, in control of its staffing and budget and planning its own future 
development [emphasis added]’ (DfEE 2001:85).
Yet while central government believes that one of the main responsibilities for 
governing bodies is strategic planning, it seemed possible that governors might have 
perceived this responsibility as less important than others. Clearly, if governors felt 
that strategic planning was a peripheral responsibility, the absence of their activity in 
this area would be unsurprising.
4.1.2 Governors’ Perception of their Role
However, both the survey and the case studies demonstrated that this was not the 
case. When asked what they perceived as being the governor’s role, the initial 
response from most governors was framed negatively: governors frequently noted 
that they were not responsible for ‘day-to-day management’. Additionally, almost all 
governors cited one of their main responsibilities as ‘supporting the head’ in his or 
her decisions, or more generally, ‘supporting the school.’ It was also clear, however, 
that governors believed strategic planning should be central to their responsibility as 
governors, and that they saw the benefits of engaging in strategic planning. Looking 
first at the quantitative evidence, the survey respondents were nearly unanimous in 
voicing their support for this notion -  an overwhelming 98.8 per cent of chairs 
(N=80) and 93.5 per cent of heads (N=62) agreed when asked whether ‘long-term 
strategic planning should be one of a governing body’s main responsibilities.’ In the 
qualitative component of this research, governors were asked the general question,
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‘what do you see as the governor’s role’, and were then asked a more direct sub­
question, ‘do you see that role as including strategic planning?’ if the response to the 
first question did not include strategic planning as an identified responsibility. In 
approximately 80 per cent of the governor interviews in this study, governors 
mentioned (unprompted) that their role included strategic planning. In the remaining 
cases where a follow-up question was required, all of those governors subsequently 
agreed that strategic planning was within their remit. In general, the comments of 
most governors from the case study schools were similar to these:
‘The role of the governing body needs to be at the level of understanding 
what the development plan is, [doing] strategic planning, understanding what 
the budget is, having an overview of what’s going on in the school.’ 
(Redwood LEA governor)
‘[Governing bodies should be] setting the strategy of the school, making sure 
that there are appropriate controls in place, and at a high level, monitoring the 
progress of the school towards its strategy.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘We are there in a support and advisory role, taking the strategic view on 
things like the curriculum and on things like physical development of the 
school.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
Yet while most governors interviewed saw strategic planning as a one responsibility 
of many, others were forceful in arguing that strategic planning should be the main 
priority -  and in some cases, the only priority. These governors, admittedly a smaller 
minority of the whole, believed that strategic planning was the role that lay 
governing bodies were best positioned to fulfil. As one Brownstone governor 
observed, the demand that governors act as ‘critical friends’ on a wide breadth of 
issues ‘isn’t really a valid role to ask governors to play, because they don’t have the 
capacity to do it.’ Alternatively, as one Bluewater co-opted governor argued:
‘I only believe that governing bodies, as constituted with their 
responsibilities, can sensibly do what I would call the ‘strategic direction 
setting’ and the approval of the operational and financial budgets for the year 
ahead. I think you have to lay down very clearly the objectives of the place, 
the resource base we accept the head is working with, the ways we’re going 
to measure their performance against that, and then, frankly, get out of the 
way.’
Overall, it therefore appeared that governors both recognised and supported the 
notion that they should be doing strategic planning, with some governors more 
adamant than others. However, it is certainly possible that definitions of ‘strategic
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planning’ differ between governors and governing bodies. As such, determining 
what governors meant by ‘strategic planning’ was the next step towards answering 
the first research question.
4.2 Governors’ Definitions of Strategic Planning
This research found that governors throughout this study shared strikingly similar 
conceptions of strategic planning. Although some individual governors emphasised 
particular facets of strategic planning more than others, several broader themes 
emerged that, together, created a picture of what strategic planning meant and 
entailed for governors. Overall, governors argued that there were three main 
components to strategic planning, each of which is addressed in the following 
subsections: setting goals over a long-term time frame and viewing specific actions 
within a long-term context (Section 4.2.1), ensuring that the ethos of the school was 
both protected and advanced (Section 4.2.2), and creating a common framework that 
would guide both decision making and resource allocation (Section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Time and Goals
One supplementary interview chair put it bluntly: to her, strategic planning was about 
‘Where are we now, and where do we want to be in five year’s time, and how are we 
going to get there.’ Although not always this pointed, nearly all interviewees agreed 
that time was the main component of their strategic planning definitions. While the 
length of this time period varied, the majority of interviewees felt the time span for 
strategic planning should be at least three years, preferably five years, and possibly 
longer; according to Bluewater’s chair, ‘the actual implementation of these things is 
probably [over] a ten year frame.’ Based on the ubiquity of this finding, and due to 
the need for consistency in the survey, a time-centred definition of strategic planning 
was used in the quantitative survey instrument: Tor the purposes o f  the following 
questions, ‘long-term strategic planning ’ means future planning beyond the current 
and next school year. ’ ’
However, the interview responses also provided strong evidence for why governors 
saw strategic planning within a five-year time frame. In one sense, governors felt 
that five years was the minimum time frame in which schools could pursue realistic 
goals for substantive change; to one Whitefrost LEA governor, strategic planning 
meant determining ‘Where are we now, to be absolutely honest. Where would like to
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be in five years time, ideally. What is practical for where we can be in five year’s 
time. And how can we achieve it.’ Similarly, a Brownstone LEA governor 
suggested that the five-year approach permitted forward thinking while also 
providing a framework for pursuing realistic and achievable shorter-term goals. This 
governor described Brownstone’s strategic planning as:
‘A five-year planning cycle where we’ve set specific targets under the various 
headings, and see where we want to be in five year’s time. Then each year 
we also set more specific time-limited targets for what we are going to be 
doing this year within that longer framework.’
Yet while a number of governors saw five years as the minimum necessary time span 
for implementing a strategic plan, other governors saw five years as the maximum 
time in which strategic planning could have any realistic relevance. One Bluewater 
LEA governor illustrated this point when he argued:
‘I think it’s silly to get too far into the long term. Because if you do that, you 
duck issues. I think realistically, you ought to have about a five-year time 
horizon. And if you’re going to achieve anything, if  you haven’t done it 
within five years, I don’t think you’re ever going to!’
The comment of this Bluewater governor touches on an important related facet of 
strategic planning identified by governors -  that strategy is about reaching certain 
goals within a period of time. Although the goals may vary -  governors at some 
schools saw strategic planning as a means for pursuing specific projects, while others 
saw strategic planning as a means for pursuing general ‘improvement’ -  all 
interviewees recognised that goal setting was integral to effective strategic planning. 
As the Bluewater head suggested:
‘Strategic planning is about having a very, very clear end goal in sight, and 
knowing exactly where you want to get to. The strategic plan is all the big 
things you can do in order to achieve that.’
Additionally, since governors were often keen to clarify that their role was not ‘day- 
to-day management,’ carving out a role in shaping ‘the bigger picture’ was a 
particularly attractive option for many respondents. ‘My idea of strategic planning is 
to look at a macro plan, to look at a particular direction, and to have some goals or 
achievements at the end of that plan,’ said a Brownstone co-opted governor. ‘I think 
that’s all a strategic plan is -  it’s an overview, an outlook, and it’s an approach in a 
particular direction.’
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4.2.2 Setting, Maintaining and Improving the School Ethos
Many governors felt that they were best able to take the aforementioned ‘broad- 
based approach’ by addressing their responsibility for the ethos of the school. 
Because of the ephemeral nature of ‘school ethos’, it appeared that many governors 
felt that if they were able to turn their strategic planning attention towards setting, 
maintaining, and improving the school ethos, they might avoid disagreements with 
school staff about whether the governors were infringing upon ‘day-to-day 
management issues.’ In one of the very few instances in this study where responses 
appeared to differ greatly between case study schools, this phenomenon of managing 
via ethos appeared particularly true in Bluewater and Brownstone, where governors 
had tried to draw a very clear line between ‘oversight’ and ‘management’. On the 
other end of the spectrum were schools like Whitefrost, where the school’s previous 
academic problems had blurred this management/oversight line and required 
governors to become more involved in making short-term decisions.
In general, however, governors saw the interaction of strategic planning and ethos as 
an integrated cycle. On one hand, governors agreed that the ethos of the school 
would guide their strategic planning; as one Brownstone governor suggested, ‘I think 
strategic planning starts from having an idea about [both] what the general ethos of 
the school is [and] what its aims are.’ In this sense, governors felt that their 
familiarity with ethos-setting activities put them in a good position to do ethos- 
influenced strategic planning. On the other hand, governors also felt that the school’s 
ethos itself would be influenced and maintained through strategic planning. As one 
Bluewater co-opted governor argued:
‘In a perfect world, I think of strategic planning as some kind of exercise 
[that] will have to do with establishing, maintaining, and enhancing the 
school’s identity, its ethos, its way of approaching not just instruction, but the 
school community, over that term.’
However, these two perceptions were rarely mutually exclusive. Most governors 
were able to accommodate both perceptions of the ethos-strategy connection 
simultaneously, and as such, strongly suggested that ethos should both be reflected 
in, and play an integral part in directing, strategic planning. Furthermore, several 
governors observed that a common understanding of the school’s ethos was a 
valuable tool for putting all relevant stakeholders on the same page. As one 
Redwood governor argued, strategic planning meant:
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‘Ensuring] that we have an idea of how the school should be run in terms of 
its ethos. We should ensure that the head master and the staff understand 
where the governors -  between them and the governors -  what we should be 
doing^or the school.’
Furthermore, most governors felt that ethos and strategic planning should play an 
important role in creating a common framework within which stakeholders could 
operate and relate to one another. This observation leads to the third and final 
component of governors’ definition of strategic planning, the importance of creating 
a common framework for decision-making and resource allocation.
4.2.3 Setting a Common Framework
It was clear from the case studies that governors believed that the first two 
components of their strategic planning definition -  goals and ethos -  should guide 
the third (and most ‘tangible’) component of their strategic planning definition: the 
design of a working strategic framework. The interviews elicited two main functions 
for such a framework: a) guiding decision-making and b) prioritising resource 
allocation. Turning first to the issue of decision-making, governors repeatedly 
defined strategic planning as the process of creating a shared framework that would 
assist the various school constituencies and stakeholders in their decision-making 
processes. However, two distinct modes of thought emerged regarding the rationale 
for having this shared framework. In the first rationale, governors perceived 
strategic planning as the mechanism for pursuing a defined set of specific projects. 
For example, one Whitefrost co-opted governor spoke of the need for a strategic 
framework that would meet a very specific goal -  in this particular case, improved 
institutional positioning:
‘In abstract terms, strategic planning is looking at the outside environment in 
which the school operates, and working out how the school needs to position 
itself to serve its stakeholders -  whether they be the kids, the community, 
government.’
However, other governors perceived the strategic planning framework in broader 
terms, as a means for ‘joining-up’ disparate responsibilities and goals under a more 
cohesive decision-making rubric. For one Brownstone governor who subscribed to 
this theory, strategic planning was about:
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‘[B]eing able to input into the school development plan, being able to see the 
role of governors in that, and also being able to support all the policies that 
have to be produced and have an input into them.’
Yet regardless of which perspective they took, governors generally agreed that a 
strategic planning framework both enabled them to start separating their ‘ideal’ aims 
for the future from their ‘realistic’ aims, and provided a common starting point for 
decision making and project evaluation. Redwood’s vice-chair articulated this 
‘amalgamated’ position extremely well, arguing that done correctly, strategic planning 
provided governors with a shared vision that could be applied to future decisions:
‘It’s thinking about the various components of the school -  direction, goals, 
plans on buildings, raising finance, whether it captures the future plans of 
government -  it’s pulling that together as a document. You’ve got to have 
some document to work to.’
Turning to the second advantage that governors saw in employing a strategic 
framework, governors argued that such a framework could provide a mechanism for 
managing resource allocation. Given governors’ heightened fiscal responsibilities, it 
was not surprising that this model was one proposed by several governors:
‘My definition of strategic planning is prioritising scarce resources over the 
middle to longer term.. .and a methodology that allows you to progress things 
effectively.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘[Strategic planning] is about having a goal, and finding the best way that you 
can reach that goal that’s economical, short in terms of time, but yet provides 
the quality of education.’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
The broad support for this component of strategic planning also highlighted the 
extent to which governors connected ‘strategy’ with ‘financial management’ -  as 
Brownstone’s head argued, ‘What schools need to do [is look] at where they are at 
the moment and then using that funding to try and support their aims the best they 
can.’ Yet more revealing was the comment of a Greenleaf parent governor, who 
suggested that for her governing body, ‘The main strategic areas are in finance and 
premises -  and then there are curriculum issues.’ By defining ‘strategy’ primarily in 
terms of managing financial or physical resources, this governor verbalised a 
practical distinction of strategic planning that was quietly implied by many 
respondents. This research found that for many governors, finance and curriculum 
were issues on parallel planes. As long as governors managed the financial health of
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the school well, many believed that they as governors could (and should) avoid 
becoming too closely involved with aspects of the governors’ role that could be 
perceived as ‘primarily education-related’. Such aspects encompassed most curricular- 
related issues, as well as almost any associated issue on which governors believed that 
-  regardless of their own opinions -  the opinions of professional educators should be 
respected and remain largely unchallenged. This reluctance of governors to engage in 
what will henceforth be referred to as the ‘primarily education-related’ aspects of their 
responsibilities will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Five.
4.2.4 The Rationale for Strategic Planning
The evidence presented above in Section 4.2 provides an answer to the second half of 
the first research question, regarding governors’ own definition of strategic planning. 
Yet despite their general agreement over time frames, goal setting, and the value of 
frameworks, and despite the minor institution-specific variations in their strategic 
planning perspectives, there was one aspect of strategic planning that almost all 
governors failed to address. Few governors could articulate the intrinsic reasons 
behind why a five year span was best suited for meeting their strategic goals, besides 
proposing that from experience, less than five years was inadequate and more than 
five years was too remote. Only one governor, the chair of Redwood, argued for an 
intrinsic justification for creating a strategic framework within a specific time frame, 
and a reason for why that time frame was best suited for strategic planning in 
secondary education. When asked for his definition, he replied:
‘Five years. It’s basically the first cycle -  the main cycle that most people go 
through is eleven to sixteen. When somebody enters at eleven, you should 
have an idea of what you expect out when they reach sixteen. So I would 
think if you’re looking at it as a strategist would, you’d tell them where they 
want to be when they reach sixteen. That doesn’t mean to say you wouldn’t 
have smaller cycles and plans within that, but the main strategy would be you 
want to reach your strategic outcome.’
The rarity of this insight, which ties the planning cycle to the schools’ reason for 
being -  the welfare of individual pupils -  may be part of the reason why governors, 
although they have a common definition for strategic planning, believed that in 
practice, their strategic planning was inadequate. It is this recognition of inadequacy 
that will now be explored.
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4.3 Realising the Ideals of Strategic Planning
Given the definition of strategic planning provided above, the next step in this 
research was to attempt to answer the second main research question: whether the 
lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature was actually evident in 
the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools. It will be argued that 
the great majority of governors felt that none o f the criteria mentioned in Section 4.2 
were employed by their governing bodies to any significant degree during the 
strategic planning process. Furthermore, while the survey data (based responses 
from chairs and heads) offers qualified support to this contention, it will be argued 
that the responses from the case study chairs of governors suggested that chairs were 
much more positive about strategic planning than were governors in general. Given 
this tendency for chairs to be more optimistic about strategic planning than non­
chairs, it is plausible to argue that the issues raised in the survey about strategic 
planning are even more serious in reality than they might appear at first on paper.
4.3.1 Adequacy of Strategic Planning: Chairs’ Views
Initially, the research evidence appeared to offer reasons to be optimistic about the 
engagement of governing bodies in strategic planning. The responses from four of 
the five case study chairs suggested governing bodies were doing a fairly good job in 
meeting their strategic planning obligation, despite their myriad responsibilities. 
Most enthusiastic was the Whitefrost chair, who when asked about how well his 
governing body did strategic planning, responded:
‘I’m going to be really biased in answering this by saying ‘we’re fantastic.’ 
We are now on an even keel and making good progress.... I’d say we’re on 
top of things now, [that] we’re highly focused, and we all know where we’re 
going, and it’s a shared vision.’
Similar positive observations came from the chairs of Greenleaf and Brownstone, as 
well as a more equivocal -  but still broadly supportive -  comment from the chair of 
Redwood:
‘I think we’re pretty good, actually, particularly on issues like finance. We 
have a budget meetings, and discuss everything with the head and the 
governors.’ (Greenleafchair)
‘We take our cues on strategic planning from the LEA, and we translate it in 
the light of our experience at the school. And we have our school 
development plan. The governing body takes a lot of guidance from the head
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teacher on [the development plan]...and they have done the job so far very 
well.’ (Brownstone chair)
‘It’s been effective, but it’s been a ‘lurching’ process. In other words, there 
are periods of self-examination when nothing much happens, and then a 
sudden step forward, another lurch forward, and then another period of 
introspection.’ (Redwood chair)
Given these generally positive responses from case study chairs regarding the 
effectiveness of their governors’ strategic planning, it was a bit surprising to find that 
their surveyed colleagues held a slightly less optimistic perspective on the issue 
(although it is certainly possible that this differential is due to an unintentional bias 
introduced through the case selection process). When asked to rate the clarity of 
their governing body’s long-term strategic vision for the school, just over half of 
surveyed chairs (54.7 per cent, N=86) and less than half of heads (45.1 per cent, 
N=71) thought that this vision was more than moderately clear. Furthermore, when 
asked how effective their governing body was in doing long-term strategic planning, 
only 46.0 per cent of surveyed chairs (N=87) and 43.7 per cent of heads (N=71) 
thought that their governing bodies were highly effective, while the majority of 
respondents (54.0 per cent of chairs and 56.3 per cent of heads) felt that their 
governing bodies were either only moderately effective or ineffective in this regard.1
4.3.2 Adequacy of Strategic Planning: Other Governors’ Views
However, the suggestion that governing bodies were doing strategic planning 
effectively was strongly refuted by interviews with non-chair governors at each of 
the five case study schools. First, it was discovered that the lack of strategic 
planning was common to all five case studies, not just to a select few. In each of the 
five case study schools, non-chair governors were practically unanimous in their 
assertion that their governing bodies were failing to adequately fulfil their strategic 
planning responsibilities. To provide an indication of the breadth of concern, the 
quotations below are representative of the thoughts of the non-chair governors at 
each of the five respective case study schools:
‘I don’t think we do enough strategic planning, to be honest. We ask 
questions to convince ourselves that we’ve looked at all the documents like 
the School Development Plan and come to a good decision, and we ask for 
three year trends in performance and spending and things like that -  but I
1 For a review of how data were collapsed for analysis and presentation purposes, see Section 3.4.5.
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don’t think we’re doing strategic planning in the way that we could be.’ 
(Bluewater LEA governor)
‘We don’t have as much input on the big issues as we should. When we do 
[have input] we tend to talk about the small issues. If issues are picked up, 
they tend to be minor issues. We don’t get into big strategic discussions at 
the governing body meetings.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘We’ll often turn to [pupil] exclusions, which generate a lot of discussion -  
but actually they don’t have a strategic value at all! And for all governing 
bodies in [the borough], the way they write the agenda, [exclusions are] 
always the first item on the agenda! ’ (Greenleaf parent governor)
‘We don’t address some of the issues we should do, so therefore we’re not 
thinking two and three years out -  or one year out. We’re just talking about 
the immediate issues of running the school. And the trouble is that those 
[other] things are just being left -  and therefore, sometime in the future that’s 
going to come [back] to you and you’re going to be in difficulty, because 
you’re not well prepared with your plans.... You do need to talk about 
things; you do need to debate things for half an hour. Where there’s a subject 
that needs debate, you should be able to put time aside to do that.’ (Redwood 
foundation governor)
‘[We’re] at the ineffective end of the scale, although somewhat improving.... 
For me, the issue is more around the terminal boredom of a lot of the stuff 
that goes on that’s just not necessary. The meetings are really boring, and a 
lot of it is really peripheral stuff -  not really strategic, not really decision 
making, and I think a lot of that can be cut out.’ (Whitefrost co-opted 
governor)
4.3.3 Governors’ Perceptions of Strategic Planning in Practice
The evident frustration in these quotations appeared to arise because governors’ 
conception of good strategic planning was not being realised in practice. As one co­
opted governor from Greenleaf complained:
‘It is more a question of seeing that the strategy that the school has signed up 
to is adhered to, and that progress is being made. I think that’s what most of 
my energy that goes into the school is concerned with.’
To identify the extent of the gap between theory and practice, each of the three 
criteria for effective strategic planning identified in Section 4.2 is examined in light 
of governor comments about their governing body’s strategic planning (or lack 
thereof). It was discovered that governors felt that their governing bodies were 
failing to meet each of these three components of strategic planning as defined in 
Section 4.2. The case study evidence to support this assertion is now presented in 
relation to each of these three components -  setting goals over a long-term time
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frame and viewing specific actions within a long-term context (Section 4.2.1), 
ensuring that the ethos of the school was both protected and advanced (Section 
4.2.2), and creating a common framework that would guide both decision making 
and resource allocation (Section 4.2.3).
Strategic Planning and the Long-Term Time Frame
Governors across this study argued that their governing bodies were not thinking 
within a long-term time frame -  the criteria that governors previously identified as 
the most important component of strategic planning. Most governors ascribed this 
problem to a) the number of short-term issues that required immediate decisions and 
b) the lack of an institutional-structural mindset that would encourage such longer- 
term thinking. First, governors repeatedly complained that short-term issues took 
precedence over any strategic planning (an issue that will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapters Five and Six). As one Bluewater co-opted governor noted:
‘I think the governing body is very badly hampered at the moment due to the 
infrastructure issues, and because of having to deal with the consistent 
turbulence -  in particular, of staff -  and the immediate issues of short-term 
crises of funding and things like that. I don’t think they don’t want to do 
[strategic planning] -  I just think it’s very difficult to do under the present 
circumstances.’
This last point -  that strategic planning was difficult to do under ‘present 
circumstances’ -  describes not only the circumstances of short-term crises that many 
governors claimed to face, but the circumstances surrounding the institutional 
approach (or lack thereof) towards strategic planning as well. Many governors noted 
that their governing bodies lacked any formal mechanisms for discussing strategic 
planning; as one Redwood governor argued: ‘Yes, decisions have to be made about 
things that need the approval of the governing body, but there also need to be agenda 
items that are about long term issues.’ It seems evident that if governors are not 
provided with either the reason or the opportunity to engage in strategic planning, it 
becomes increasingly unlikely that they will actually decide to do so. Brownstone’s 
head recognised this structural deficiency in her own governing body, noting:
‘I think we need to be more focused on the future rather than on term times, 
and that’s partly to do with the structuring of our committees and groups. 
Maybe what we need to do is to ensure that our [organisational] structures 
facilitate much more futuristic thinking than they do at the moment.’
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Clearly, in both the demands being made on governing bodies and the organisation 
of the governing bodies themselves, there appeared to be little opportunity for 
governing bodies to engage in the long-term thinking that governors argued was vital 
for effective strategic planning.
Furthermore, the dearth of opportunities for governors to think long term also meant 
that governors felt they were ineffective in setting meaningful future goals. 
Although many governors wanted to have the time to deal with the ‘major issues’ 
facing their school, they felt they rarely had the opportunity to do so in practice. As 
such, most interviewees felt that governing bodies were drawn towards the smaller 
issues -  which tended to be the easiest to fix -  at the expense of engaging in a 
discussion of longer-term matters. As a Brownstone teacher governor observed:
‘I suppose the governing body is meant to be at the macro level, and look at 
the ‘big decisions’, the ‘big changes’, the ‘big policy’. I think it’s human 
nature that we get stuck at little things, even when faced with those big 
problems. I think that’s what happens.’
Even in governing bodies that did seek to define their future goals, many governors 
felt that the lack of emphasis on the strategic long-term dimension meant these 
exercises merely resulted in lists of inexact platitudes. In particular, several 
governors pointed to their ‘mission statements’ as evidence that attempts at ‘strategic 
planning’ had done little to support their actual objectives of improving the school. 
‘You have to make sure the governors aren’t just writing mission statements and 
failing to connect those to what’s happening at the base,’ noted one Whitefrost 
governor. Furthermore, a Bluewater co-opted governor illustrated the problems that 
arose if governing bodies accepted the fallacy of presuming that such statements 
were synonymous with a school’s strategic goals, arguing:
‘We do have that vision, because we have to have a mission statement -  but 
that’s the thing, everything gets bureaucratised. So you have to have a 
statement about these things, but you’re not actually able to say -  at that 
longer range -  what it is you think you want to do.’
This evidence suggests that not only did many governing bodies fail to devote 
adequate resources and energy towards defining their strategic goals, but that even 
when they did do so, the results were frequently less valuable than they might have 
been under more positive circumstances.
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Strategic Planning and the School Ethos
The next issue is that of school ethos, as governors were clear in their definition of 
strategic planning that the school’s ethos should both guide, and be guided by, the 
strategic planning process. Unfortunately, this research found that in practice, few 
governors believed that their governing bodies were effective in translating the 
frequently ephemeral notion of ‘ethos’ into identifiable components that could 
inform the strategic planning process. Indeed, despite the fact that many governors 
felt philosophically that ethos and strategic planning were part of an integrated cycle 
(as discussed earlier), it appeared that there were myriad problems in actually 
implementing this symbiotic relationship. First, some governors reported that their 
governing bodies had difficulties in even identifying the components of their 
school’s ethos. Recalling his first impressions of the Bluewater governing body, one 
co-opted governor said:
‘Frankly, there didn’t seem to be anybody there who, no matter where their 
hearts were, had actually got their heads in gear to say ‘Why is this school 
here? What is its five year vision?’
Less dramatically, this research suggested that even when governing bodies could 
identify the important components of their ethos, these components frequently 
became lost during the process of creating detailed and complex plans. This inability 
to ‘see the wood for the trees’ had the potential to derail the connection between 
ethos and strategic planning, as this Redwood governor suggested:
‘The governing body should, first of all, be defining what the character of the 
school should be. Our ethos, as a small school, is to knit everybody together 
and give people a sense of loyalty and enthusiasm for the school, a pride in 
the school, and a pride in one’s self.... [However, then we] come up with 
this development plan, [with] a whole series of little flags for all sorts of 
different things -  [and] I think people don’t really understand what those 
flags mean. ’ (Redwood co-opted governor)
Second, some governors felt that their governing bodies merely ‘operationalised’ 
their school’s ethos and identified the results as ‘the strategic plan’. However, this 
often meant that the strategic plan was often as equally vague and generalised as the 
ethos. In practice, the tautological nature of such an approach meant that the ‘cycle’ 
of ethos and strategic planning driving one another could end in stagnation. As the 
Redwood chair complained about his school’s draft development plan (composed by 
the senior management team):
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‘Strategic thinking is not there. They’ve made a mission statement -  
‘Learning Together, Achieving Together’...[but] the first aim is: ‘To nurture 
competent, caring, participating pupils who value and celebrate equality and 
diversity.’ And I wrote after it ‘Achievement.’ Why are we not celebrating 
achievement? So they want a happy, pleasant environment -  which is good -  
but they’re not clear why they want it.’
In general, these discrepancies between the theory of ideal strategic planning and its 
actual implementation provide further support for the argument that in practice, 
governing bodies are failing to meet their own governors’ definition of how strategic 
planning should be pursued.
Strategic Planning and Common Decision-making Frameworks 
Governors frequently remarked that their lack of strategic planning meant that there 
was no decision-making framework preventing them from becoming bogged down in 
the details of their responsibilities. In every case study school, interviewees felt that 
this lack of a framework meant their governing bodies spent less time examining 
‘important issues’ and more time on what the Redwood head described as Tots and 
lots of minutiae.’ As the comments below indicated, governors suggested that the 
absence of a strategic framework meant their governing bodies often focused on 
smaller points rather than larger ones:
‘[Our agenda is] very bureaucratic, basically drawn up according to town hall 
guidelines and the chair’s view of how schools run... [and it is] concentrated 
on a whole lot of minor points, in my view.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘We spend too much of the governors’ meetings looking at trivia [and] we’re 
not informed in sufficient time to go to governors’ meetings with a clear 
understanding of what we would be deciding.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
In addition, although suggesting that his governing body was slowly becoming more 
strategically focused, one Whitefrost governor admitted that the lack of a decision­
making framework meant that his governing body was starting nearly from scratch. 
‘We had a period when the agenda was clogged, and there was very little time spent 
looking at the longer term stuff,’ he noted. ‘We were [simply] an administrative 
body.’
It also became apparent that this lack of a decision-making framework affected not 
only the full governing bodies, but their committees as well. One frustrated 
Brownstone governor related his own experience:
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‘In sub-committee [sic] meetings, we tend to spend a lot of time talking about 
the minutiae.... On the personnel sub-committee [sic], we’ve spent a lot of 
time recently talking about the use the school makes of discretionary 
additional payments to teachers to assist in recruitment and retention. Now, 
all we’re doing is reviewing a very small aspect of the school’s pay policy!’
Furthermore, the lack of a framework for deciding upon priorities means that governors 
may operate under the impression that all of their responsibilities are equally important. 
Numerous governors suggested that because governors had so many statutory 
responsibilities, they often ended up ignoring those that they did not deem important. 
However, without a common framework to guide governors, there is no shared 
understanding of what should and should not be given priority. As one Bluewater LEA 
governor observed, ‘There’s also the fact that if you have too much paperwork, some 
governors feel as though they have to read through all of it -  and that means that we may 
not get a sense of how it all fits together in the big picture.’ Together, this evidence 
suggests that without a strong strategic decision-making framework that clearly 
delineates governors’ responsibilities, many governors and governing bodies ‘default’ to 
addressing minor issues, administrative issues, or more pressing immediate issues, rather 
than addressing their responsibility for higher-level strategic issues.
Strategic Planning and Long-term Resource Allocation
Finally, the most common specific frustration amongst governors was that they were 
unable to use strategic planning to manage long-term financial resource allocations. 
Governors argued that while financial management would be one of the easiest areas 
in which to begin implementing a strategic plan, the current governmental funding 
allocation system was simply not conducive to enabling governing bodies and 
schools to engage in any serious long-term thinking. As governors from all five 
schools argued forcefully, the short-term nature of the funding system worked 
against any substantial attempts to pursue long-term objectives:
‘Finances are very hard to plan a year ahead, because our budget is only a 
year ahead. We don’t have that long-term planning flexibility. So although 
we have a three-year budget plan, it’s a guess in the dark, it really is. I do 
think we are wasting our time doing any advance budget planning, because 
we don’t know what we’re going to get.’ (Greenleaf parent governor)
‘We’ve seen how this year’s budget works, and we seem to be doing OK -  
but it’s always fairly late in the day. And long-term planning -  because 
there’s no surplus money, really, you can’t plan anything that’s going to be
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any kind of venture or investment, because you don’t have the capacity to 
predict a surplus.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘A great deal of what’s been happening with [the school’s] funding has been 
bits and pieces of grants that come thrown at you from all sorts of directions, 
you don’t know if they’re going to be renewed for over one year, you’re told 
you’ve got them and have to spend them within a very short time scale -  it’s 
not money that’s being incorporated into a thought-out strategy. It’s 
encouraging waste and inefficiency, and I don’t think that’s at all beneficial.’ 
(Brownstone co-opted governor)
Without exception, and even amongst chairs, governors pointed to the fundamental 
discrepancy between being asked by government to think strategically, whilst being 
provided with government budgets on a year-by-year basis. Governors felt that as 
financial management becomes increasingly integral to the running of schools, the 
inability of governing bodies to create long-term budgetary plans with confidence 
was a major obstacle to their ability to engage in effective strategic planning in other 
areas. Chapter Six will discuss this issue in more detail.
4.4 Governors and the School Development Plan
Although the findings in Section 4.3 strongly suggest that inner London secondary 
school governing bodies do not engage in strategic planning, it was deemed 
important for thoroughness to investigate the issue of the School Development Plan 
(SDP). Governors commonly combined their discussion of strategic planning with 
an analysis of their interaction with the SDP, and as was noted in Chapter Two, it is 
common for governor advice guides refer to the SDP as the strategic plan. As such, 
two main questions arose: 1) how involved are governors in the SDP process, and 2) 
should the SDP actually be considered a strategic plan? First, it will be argued that 
while governors are somewhat involved in monitoring the SDP, they are relatively 
uninvolved in developing it. Second, it will be argued that the SDP rarely 
encompassed the strategic issues that many governors identified in Section 4.2, and 
that the time frame covered by the SDP was usually more limited than the time frame 
that governors felt was necessary for effective strategic planning. Finally, it will be 
argued that both these findings serve to reinforce the argument that even in the 
activity that currently holds the most immediate potential promise for governors to 
do strategic planning -  shaping the SDP -  such action rarely materialises in practice.
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4.4.1 What is a School Development Plan?
The School Development Plan (SDP) is the main written document for setting out the 
governing body’s vision for the school. Up until the late 1990s the SDP usually 
encompassed one academic year at a time (Fidler 2002:85), although due to Ofsted’s 
inspection requirements, recently there has been pressure on schools for their SDP to 
cover three academic years. There is no set format or list of required contents for the 
SDP, although the SDP will often contain a school’s priorities and targets for 
academic achievement, ICT, staff development, pupil discipline, physical 
infrastructure, and other similar matters. Of the most direct relevance to this 
research, a number of writers have suggested that ideally, the SDP should set out the 
strategic framework within which school staff are meant to operate (Giles 1997:34; 
Martin and Holt 2002:18).
4.4.2 The SDP and its Connection to Strategic Planning
This research found that -  rightly or wrongly -  governors viewed the SDP as their 
main strategic planning document. The survey found clear evidence to this effect, as 
80.0 per cent of both heads (N=70) and chairs (N=85) said that they considered the 
SDP to be their school’s main long-term strategic plan. Furthermore, an 
overwhelming 69.4 per cent of chairs (N=85) and 70.0 per cent of heads (N=70) said 
that they did not have any longer-term written plans besides the SDP, suggesting that 
in most cases, the SDP is the only strategic plan. These findings were supported by 
the case study interviews, where governors at all five schools echoed the opinion of 
one Whitefrost co-opted governor:
‘The school development plan is the main strategic plan -  and it takes hours 
to put together, and consult, and by the time it’s done, it needs to be done 
again for the next year! ’
Although this note of futility often accompanied governors’ discussions of the SDP 
process, it did little to diminish the overall opinion of governors that the SDP was the 
main avenue through which their governing bodies would attempt to engage in 
strategic planning.
There were, however, a few governors who questioned whether the SDP alone was an 
adequate strategic planning instrument. Although they acknowledged the primacy of
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the SDP as their school’s main strategic plan, they also observed certain deficiencies in 
having only the SDP for guidance. As one Redwood governor complained:
‘It’s been a thing that the school ‘has to have’, demanded by the local 
authority.... And [writing] it was a ritual, a complete ritual. I was very 
frustrated, because I felt there ought to be some sort of steer from the 
governors based on [the SDP]. How else would we get a grip on anything? 
But we didn’t.... The school development plan is the only plan we have, and 
that has, in the past, been very problematic. Because it’s been very, very 
inadequate.’
Others, particularly at the Greenleaf specialist school, noted that their bid for 
specialist status had forced them to move beyond a reliance solely on the SDP for 
strategic guidance. One Greenleaf co-opted governor observed that this realisation 
had had a positive effect on the overall strategic direction of the school:
‘One of the advantages that most specialist schools have is that in order to 
become specialist schools, the governing body, headship team, and heads of 
departments have had to sit down and audit -  take stock of where they are, 
and define where they want to go.’
Yet regardless of their opinions about the SDP, this research demonstrated that the 
majority of governors saw the SDP as their school’s main strategic planning 
instrument. This research now therefore turns to examining what role governors 
played in actually monitoring and developing the SDP, and whether governors were 
using the SDP in practice for the strategic planning purposes that they claimed it 
served in theory.
4.4.3 Monitoring and the School Development Plan
This research found strong evidence that governors were quite conscientious about 
their responsibility for monitoring the SDP. Indeed, a majority of both chairs (74.4 
per cent, N=86) and heads (51.4 per cent, N=70) surveyed felt that their governing 
bodies were highly involved in monitoring the SDP. However, a statistically 
significant difference between head and chair responses was found at the other end of 
the scale, where while only 8.1 per cent of chairs felt their governing bodies were 
wmnvolved in this process, 18.6 per cent of heads felt the same way.2 This difference 
between the head and chair responses almost certainly indicates that chairs 
overestimated the involvement of their governing bodies in this process. For
2 Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-3.2; p  < 0.05.
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example, the explanation of this process provided by chair of Whitefrost was 
characteristic of the perspective with which many governors approached their 
monitoring role:
‘The curriculum committee has the main role in monitoring [the SDP], and 
reports to each governing body meeting. At each governing body meeting, 
each of the three committees gives a written and verbal report. And then 
governors have the opportunity to read the [committee] minutes previous to 
the main meeting, and comment on them. So it’s a fairly systematic 
approach.’
It should be noted, however, that some governors felt that ‘monitoring’ was a rather 
flexible term, and one that governing bodies often interpreted with a great deal of 
latitude depending upon the number of other issues they were required to address. 
When asked whether governors at his school ever referred to the SDP, one Bluewater 
teacher governor was sceptical -  as were a small number of other governors across the 
case studies -  about how well the theory of monitoring was put into practice. ‘I think 
staff, because it’s the nature of our work, we refer back to it because it’s constantly 
drummed into us,’ he said. ‘[For] most of the governors, it’s a document they ratify 
once a year, say ‘isn’t it marvellous?’ -  and then a year later ask, ‘what happened?”
Yet regardless of the frequency or the quality of governing bodies monitoring of their 
SDPs, it appeared from all of the case study interviews that governing bodies were 
conscious of the importance of doing so. The survey responses offered additional 
support for this conclusion, as the vast majority of respondents -  86.9 per cent of 
chairs (N=84) and 87.1 per cent of heads (N=70) -  reported that their governing 
bodies evaluated the SDP at the end of each school year.
However, the comments of one Greenleaf co-opted governor do raise a key point of 
distinction -  that although governors were often engaged in monitoring the SDP, 
governors were not very involved in its development. ‘The governors are very 
involved -  it’s a very active governing body,’ he argued:
‘They’re not involved in the sense of actively writing [the SDP], but they’re 
involved in the sense of being highly aware of it, and being highly informed 
about the ramifications. [And the school’s] broad strategic lines would be 
things that were agreed with the governing body in that plan.’
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Although this distinction between monitoring and developing might seem a minor 
issue, it goes to the heart of the question of how governors fulfil their strategic 
contributions to the school, and whether simply monitoring the school development 
plan adequately meets those responsibilities. This distinction is explored next.
4.4.4 Governor Involvement in Developing the SDP
If governors claim to be involved in strategic planning via the SDP, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the most influential involvement in the planning sense 
would come during the plan’s development stage. Monitoring most often entails 
commenting on existing plans and proposals, which the monitors may or may not 
have had any role in designing, developing, or creating. Furthermore, monitoring is 
often a reactive activity, as those carrying out the monitoring are usually asked to 
examine issues only when those issues are brought to the top of the agenda. If 
governors were found to be active at the development stage as well, this would be 
evidence that they were actively engaged in creating (or planning) policies, rather 
than simply monitoring the policies created by others.
However, this research found that governors in four of the five case studies reported 
minimal involvement in the SDP development process, with many governors noting 
that the development of the SDP was often dominated by the school staff. 
Interviewees argued that this arrangement meant that governors often had few 
opportunities to provide meaningful input into the SDP development process. One 
Brownstone parent governor succinctly summarised the situation in which many 
governing bodies found themselves:
‘Once we had a lecturer [sic] from the DfEE, and he said ‘the most important
function that a governor can play is in the school development plan.’
Unfortunately, not many governors understand it.’
Only in the case of Whitefrost, whose governors had been relied upon heavily by 
school management in drawing up a plan to raise the school out of serious 
weaknesses several years earlier, did governors suggest that they had been actively 
involved in the development stage of the SDP. However, Whitefrost’s particular 
circumstances suggest that such high activity might be the exception rather than the 
rule, and the survey provides some evidence to support this claim. Only two-fifths of 
chairs (43.0 per cent, N=86) and one-third of heads (31.4 per cent, N=70) thought
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their governing bodies had more than moderate involvement in creating their 
schools’ SDP, while 24.4 per cent of chairs and 32.9 per cent of heads felt their 
governing bodies were relatively /wactive in this process (differences between chairs 
and heads were not statistically significant). For most governors, their experience 
with developing the SDP was similar to that of one Redwood co-opted governor, 
who commented:
‘The problem is that, because of the volume of work that’s coming, 
sometimes on the agenda you don’t get to [the SDP]. It gets brushed aside 
very quickly, and therefore you’re not really developing that plan jointly.’
This issue of not ‘developing the plan jointly’ was a common concern amongst 
governors. Governors frequently suggested that any involvement they did have often 
came after the SDP had been largely agreed upon by the school staff and 
management, meaning that governor contributions to the strategic aspects of the SDP 
were severely constrained. One Brownstone LEA governor revealed his 
exasperation with this process, arguing:
‘Now, we’ve got, on the governing body, a number of governors who are 
interested, committed, and knowledgeable. And yet the school development 
plan is largely drawn up by the staff -  not necessarily only by the senior 
management team.... So I don’t think we were in a position to really suggest 
any changes to it, or refinements of it. And I think that’s the way in which 
we go about it. We have a little bit of input that has a cosmetic effect, so 
when Ofsted comes in they can say ‘governors have been involved in drawing 
up the school development plan’ -  which is always good because in most 
places they aren’t -  but the extent to which we’re involved is pretty minimal.’
Governors from Redwood, Bluewater, and Greenleaf supported this general concern 
about governor involvement, with a number of them complaining that even in 
instances where the governing body was involved, participation was often limited to 
those in leadership positions. As one Bluewater co-opted governor complained, 
governor input was limited to a rather pro forma exercise: ‘It is handed to most of the 
governors for comment,’ he said, pausing and then adding; ‘not to all -  but to most 
of them.’ These concerns about equal access to involvement in the process were 
echoed by other governors, including a Greenleaf parent governor who remarked:
‘I don’t think that governors are involved enough in the school development 
plan, to be honest. It’s formulated by the senior management team, and it’s 
only really seen by the chair and the committee chairs. There’s not nearly
139
enough involvement from the governing body, and I’d like to see [the plan] 
more widely discussed.’
On this point, the survey results showed that although two-thirds of both chairs and 
heads felt that their governing bodies should have the same level of involvement in 
creating the SDP as they did currently, 30.6 per cent of chairs (N=85) and 18.6 per 
cent of heads (N=70) felt that governing bodies should have more involvement. 
Furthermore, only 5.9 per cent of chairs and 15.7 per cent of heads thought 
governing bodies should have less involvement.3 These results were statistically 
significant, but the differences clearly came at the edges of the response range; it is 
evident that heads generally felt that governors should have less involvement in the 
SDP, while chairs felt governors should have more involvement. Yet given the 
concerns of governors raised above -  that chairs and heads had a disproportionate 
influence on the development of the SDP -  it seems reasonable to argue that amongst 
non-chair governors, the percentage who would like to see a greater level of 
governor involvement in the development process likely exceeds the reported 30.6 
per cent of chairs. Regardless of precise figures, the simple fact remains: in the area 
that governors reported as having the most promise for strategic planning, governors 
appeared to have very little involvement.
4.4.S Inadequacies of the SDP as a Strategic Plan
Given the findings above, this research now turns to question of whether the SDP 
should be considered the school’s main strategic plan. The evidence provided in 
Section 4.4.2 suggested that many governors felt it that this should be the case, yet an 
analysis of the survey and interview data in the context of governors’ strategic 
planning definitions suggests otherwise. Regardless of the level of governor 
involvement in the SDP, the evidence suggests that for many schools, the SDP in its 
present form is an inadequate strategic planning instrument.
One reason is the length of the SDP time frame. When surveyed about how many 
years their SDP covered, the median and modal response for both chairs (44.2 per 
cent) and heads (50.0 per cent) was three years, while the mean for chairs was 3.2 
years and the mean for heads was 2.7 years. However, a rather high 24.4 per cent of 
chairs (N=86) and 37.1 per cent of heads (N=70) said that their SDPs covered only
3 Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-2.2; p  < 0.05.
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one or two years, despite attempts by central government in recent years to have 
schools create plans on a minimum of a three-year timeframe.4 These figures imply 
that the SDP is often a short-term administrative plan rather than a long term 
strategic one, an observation made by many governors including this Brownstone 
parent governor. ‘[The SDP development process] happens once every year,’ he said, 
‘but that doesn’t mean that you have to plan only for one year, even though you get the 
money on a yearly basis!’ Several other interviewees commented on this point, noting 
that in their experience, the development of the SDP consisted more of technical 
revision and less of strategic planning. As one Bluewater LEA governor argued:
‘What would be useful is instead of simply updating the SDP every year, if 
we looked at the previous one and said ‘where were the difficulties in 
implementing this plan,’ and looked at how we could fix those aspects in the 
future.’
Viewing the three-year SDP time frame within a strategic planning context illustrates 
a second important discrepancy. The time frame that governors most frequently 
mentioned for effective strategic planning in Section 4.2 (five years) was not the 
same time frame that the survey revealed (see above) as the length of the average SDP 
(about three years). Yet despite this difference, most governors still insisted that the 
SDP was their main avenue for strategic planning. As such, a number of governors 
suggested that even though the SDP was called the strategic plan by many schools, the 
SDP frequently contained very little strategic planning as defined by the three criteria 
identified in Section 4.2.5 Instead, the SDP was more frequently a sort of ‘technical 
blueprint’ targeted at getting the school and its staff through the coming academic year. 
As a Bluewater teacher governor sarcastically described the SDP at his school:
‘It’s a very detailed document, which nobody else would go to the length of 
properly reading through. So [the governors] see a flashy full document, read 
it, and say: ‘It’s marvellous. It’s got coloured ink.”
Yet behind such pessimism was hidden a more honest perspective on the problems 
inherent in expecting the SDP to be both the short-term, detail-oriented blueprint and
4 Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-2.8; p  < 0.05. 
However, this is due largely to the fact that 21.0 per cent of chairs reported that their SDP covered 
five years or more, while only 7.1 per cent of heads reported the same. This difference likely 
indicates that heads were more knowledgeable about die precise length of their SDPs than were chairs.
5 These were: Setting goals over a long-term time frame and viewing specific actions within a long­
term context (Section 4.2.1), ensuring that the ethos of the school was both protected and advanced 
(Section 4.2.2), and creating a common framework that would guide both decision making and 
resource allocation (Section 4.2.3).
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the long-term strategy. As the Redwood chair noted, a short-term and detail-oriented 
administrative plan will usually prevail over a long-term and strategy-oriented 
document if governors are given only one opportunity to put forth a comprehensive 
document. Noting that the SDP usually follows the short-term administrative route, 
he (and a number of other governors) suggested the reasons for this short-term focus 
lay in the inherent confusion of education policy at the central governmental-level:
‘I think that the trouble is at the moment that there’s such restriction coming 
out of government, and I don’t see that they’re [providing a] clear view of 
what an education is. I haven’t received anything that I can recall, from the 
central government or the LEA, that tells me what the purpose of education is 
-  and this [SDP draft], I think, illustrates the confusion.... The detail of the 
planning of what [the staff] want to do and how to do it is very good, and I’m 
fully in favour of it. But there’s no statement of the strategic purpose.’
The research presented in this section suggests that although the SDP is seen as the 
main avenue for strategic planning by governors, governors have neither substantial 
involvement in its development nor confidence in its long-term applicability. 
Furthermore, if it is claimed that a) the SDP is too detailed and focused on ‘primarily 
education-related issues’ for lay governors to be able to participate substantially in its 
development, but also that b) the SDP is the main strategic plan, it means that c) 
governors are being excluded from any serious input into what is -  rightly or 
wrongly -  the school’s main strategic plan. However, as was clearly demonstrated at 
the beginning of this chapter, strategic planning is meant to be one of a governing 
body’s prime responsibilities. Taken together, these findings and those in Section
4.3 (regarding the implementation of the strategic planning criteria in practice) 
provide strong evidence that, in response to the second main research question, the 
lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually evident in the 
governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools.
4.5 C h a p t e r  F o u r  C o n c l u s io n
This chapter sought to answer the first two of the four main research questions:
Do governors in inner London state secondary schools view their role as a 
strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?_______
Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually evident 
in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?______________
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As was noted in Chapter Two, previous research and commentary on governance 
suggested that strategic planning should be an integral part of the governing body’s 
role. The research evidence presented in this chapter provides support for this 
argument from the governors themselves, and also makes several new empirical 
contributions to the research literature. First, the evidence presented in this chapter 
outlines a ‘governor’s definition’ of strategic planning -  that strategic planning 
should be long-term and goal-driven, adhere to and remain consistent with the school 
ethos, and provide decision-making and resource allocation frameworks. In doing 
so, this research provides an answer to the first main research question. Second, this 
research offers empirical evidence that governors did not believe that this definition 
was being fulfilled in practice, thus answering the second main research question. 
Third, in the course of answering the second main research question, this research 
provides new evidence in relation to both the involvement of governing bodies in the 
SDP process, and the role that governors feel the SDP does (or should) play in 
strategic planning. While this research supports the general finding of Scanlon et al. 
(1999) that governors often identify strategic planning with the SDP (1999:24), this 
research also provides additional empirical insight in relation to inner London 
governing bodies in specific. In particular, this research suggests that governing 
bodies in inner London tended to have low levels of involvement in the SDP process, 
and that governors believed the SDPs of their respective schools were often both 
inadequate long-term planning tools and less strategic than they themselves would 
have liked.
Having established that governors believed they should be doing strategic planning, 
and that these governors themselves believed that their current strategic planning is 
inadequate, this research now turns to investigating what factors contribute to this 
gap between theory and practice. Some of these factors were implied in the evidence 
presented in this chapter, and the aim of the next two chapters is to make these 
factors explicit. This research found that these factors could be divided into two 
main groups: those that manifest themselves at the institutional (and by extension, 
governing body) level, and those that appear to emanate from the central 
governmental level. The first of these two categories -  those factors relating to the 
institutional level -  are the subject of the next chapter.
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C h a p t e r  F iv e  
I n s t it u t io n a l -L e v e l  St r a t e g ic  P l a n n in g  B a r r ie r s
5.0 Introduction
The previous chapter established that governing bodies did not appear to engage in 
their strategic planning responsibilities effectively. This chapter therefore attempts 
to begin answering the third main research question:
If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why is 
this the case?_________________________________________________________
After reviewing the research evidence, it was determined that the reasons for why 
governing bodies encountered problems in strategic planning could be divided into 
two main sets of barriers -  those whose roots (and potential solutions) could be 
found at the institutional and governing body level, and those whose roots who could 
be found at the central governmental level. The former will be discussed in this 
chapter, while the latter will be discussed in Chapter Six.
Section 5.1 provides the context for understanding the approach towards data 
presentation taken in the remainder of this thesis. First, this section outlines the 
theoretical framework through which these data will be presented and interpreted -  
the concept of strategic planning barriers. Second, this section presents the 
quantitative data on ‘reported hindrances to strategic planning’. Sections 5.2 to 5.5 
then identify the four main institutional-level barriers that arise from the survey and 
interview data, and discuss how these barriers impede strategic planning. Section 5.2 
addresses the barrier created by the existence of a ‘monitoring culture’ amongst 
governing bodies. Section 5.3 addresses the barrier created by the varying level of 
involvement of various governor subgroups. Section 5.4 addresses the barrier 
created by the tendency for individual governors to focus on smaller, well-defined 
‘task-based’ issues. Section 5.5 addresses the barrier created by the tendency for 
governors to avoid ‘primarily education-related’ issues -  including strategic planning 
-  by allocating responsibility for such matters to school staff. Shifting briefly to the 
local level, Section 5.6 explains the decision to limit the extent to which this thesis 
examines the role of the Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in the governing body 
strategic planning process. Finally, Section 5.7 summarises the chapter findings and
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concludes by laying the groundwork for the presentation of the evidence regarding 
central governmental-level barriers to strategic planning.
5.1 Background Theory and Data
5.1.1 Theory: The Concept of Barriers to Strategic Planning
Before proceeding, it is important to understand the theoretical framework within 
which the research data will be presented and interpreted. As was noted in Chapter 
Two, the ‘advice’ literature frequently takes a pragmatic approach towards strategic 
planning, implying that many of the circumstances in which governing bodies 
currently find themselves cannot be substantially changed. As such, this literature 
often limits itself to providing governing bodies with valuable ‘stop-gap’ advice, 
while avoiding an investigation of the potential systemic causes of these problems. 
This is certainly not the fault of this kind of literature per se, yet the relatively limited 
state of the literature investigating potential systemic causes (see e.g., Corrick 1996; 
Creese 1998; Earley et al. 2002) can incorrectly imply that ‘stop-gap’ measures are 
the only available remedy for addressing institutional problems. As can be seen in 
the comments below, the current research study found several governors who were 
frustrated with the fact that their own governing bodies were operating under similar 
limited presumptions:
‘In terms of long-term planning, we tend to use what I think of as a very 
English pattern. Which is that we don’t engage big issues except through the 
pragmatics of small issues. That’s a very English way of solving a problem. 
If you look at [how a specific problem is solved in] English common law, the 
way you solve it has sweeping implications for every other problem. But you 
deny that this is your focus, and that keeps the conflict to a minimum.’ 
(Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘What we rarely have are big debates about the big issues -  instead [we 
debate] issues that impact upon the big issues, but [these discussions] don’t 
really consist of a set-piece debate about the future of the school.’ 
(Brownstone LEA governor)
Given these concerns, and upon thorough examination of the research data, it seemed 
that there was a valuable alternative approach for evaluating the problems 
surrounding strategic planning, one that had been neither fully conceptualised nor 
fully applied in previous research. This alternative approach is the concept of 
‘barriers ’ to strategic planning. While much of the advice literature is devoted to 
proposing ways for governing bodies to become more effective at strategic planning,
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the barrier approach takes the opposite tack, seeking instead to determine what 
structural barriers may be making governing bodies less effective. The underlying 
rationale of this approach is that identifying and eliminating these structural barriers 
can be just as valuable -  if not more so -  as proposing short-term solutions for 
circumventing them. While this approach was employed on a limited scale by Earley 
(1994a) and Scanlon et al. (1999) in relation to the general issue of governing bodies 
effectiveness (see Section 2.4.2), it has not been applied in either a systematic or a 
heuristic manner to the more specific issue of governing body strategic planning.
To illustrate this difference in approaches, the approach of the advice literature is 
generally to presume that while the tools for increasing effectiveness are available, the 
thinking about how to use them is somehow flawed. As such, much of the advice 
literature suggests that problem solving generally requires convincing governors to act 
differently within the constraints of their existing resources. In the case of strategic 
planning, the ‘improvement’ approach might suggest that by providing governors with 
new ideas for about improving efficiency at governing body meetings, streamlining 
their record keeping, and so on, strategic planning processes could be improved.
The ‘barrier’ approach acknowledges that some problems can, as with the 
improvement approach, be solved by convincing governors to act differently within 
the constraints of their existing resources. However, the barrier approach adds an 
additional dimension, suggesting that there are situations in which governors know 
what needs to be improved but find that there is a prevailing barrier that prevents 
them from doing so. These barriers make governing bodies less effective in their 
strategic planning, albeit sometimes through no fault of the governing bodies 
themselves. As such, the barrier approach has two important implications. First, this 
approach suggests that if a barrier remains in place, attempting to implement an 
‘improvement-based’ set of solutions (even with the best of intentions) will often be 
futile, frustrating, and ineffective. The corollary to this implication is that 
acknowledging and identifying barriers to strategic planning permits an exploration 
of how to eliminate such barriers, opening the way for the implementation of a more 
traditional improvement-based approach.
Until now, there has not been a systematic attempt to identify the barriers that may 
impede governing body strategic planning. One reason for this may be that
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confidence in having actually identified a barrier (as opposed to having identified an 
institution-specific idiosyncrasy) is only possible after examining and comparing a 
number of governing bodies. However, research on the necessary scale to do this has 
been limited (only Earley (1994a) and Scanlon et al. (1999), and to a lesser extent 
Sheam (1995) and Creese and Bradley (1997)). Another reason may be that because 
barriers can be created by entities other than the institution, the efforts required to 
eliminate them might be greater than the efforts that individual institutions can 
muster. Regardless of the reason, the data in the following chapters is presented and 
interpreted via the lens of barriers, as it is believed that the barrier concept provides a 
valuable heuristic device that can assist in the understanding of how problems in 
strategic planning might be identified and solved.
5.1.2 Data: Potential Hindrances to Strategic Planning
Although the barriers that will be identified in this chapter and in Chapter Six were 
identified after analysing both the qualitative and the quantitative data, it is easiest to 
begin understanding the potential strategic planning barriers faced by governing 
bodies by examining the survey data presented in Table 5.1 (below). The survey 
offered respondents a list of 24 potential hindrances to strategic planning, and asked 
respondents to indicate whether or not each factor hindered their governing body in 
doing long term strategic planning. Respondents were given the option of choosing 
‘not an issue,’ ‘hinders slightly,’ ‘hinders moderately,’ and ‘hinders greatly’; for 
analysis purposes, the resulting data were collapsed into a dichotomous ‘not an issue’ 
versus ‘hindrance’ scheme. While the 24 options can be grouped into four broad 
themes -  those dealing with time, those dealing with finance, those dealing with 
school-specific issues, and those dealing with governors themselves -  for 
presentation purposes, Table 5.1 is sorted by the descending weighted average of 
cumulative head and chair response, as shown in the rightmost column.1 As such, 
the rankings in Table 5.1 should be viewed as a rough guide rather than as a rigid 
hierarchy.
1 Calculated as: ((Chair per cent x Chair N) + (Head per cent x Head N)) / (Chair N + Head N). This 
approach allowed the data to be presented without having to sort the data based on either the chair 
rank or the head rank, an approach that might inadvertently suggest that one of these categories has 
greater importance than the other.
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Table 5.1: Hindrances to Strategic Planning
Percentage o f  respondents reporting that each given issue hindered strategic 










Amount o f time required to address statutory 
responsibilities
92.8 90.4 95.7 83 69
The amount o f paperwork 92.2 91.8 92.6 85 68
Amount o f time required to formulate and 
review statutory policies
90.7 89.2 92.6 83 68
The amount o f legislation and regulation 89.5 87.1 92.5 85 67
Pressure created by the timing of central 
government funding decisions 87.1 84.9
89.9 86 69
Pressure created by the timing of local 
government funding decisions 87.0 89.4
84.1 85 69
Difficulty in recruiting and retaining teachers 84.4 81.4 88.2 86 68
Uncertainty about central government’s 
future funding commitments 84.2 88.1 79.4 84 68
Uncertainty about central government’s 
future education priorities 83.8 82.4 85.5 85 69
Desire not to increase governor workload * 78.6 69.8 89.7 86 68
Amount o f time required to monitor targets 78.2 75.9 80.9 83 68
The need to address changes in the National 
Curriculum and assessment 77.9 75.6 80.9 86 68
Amount o f time spent on immediate ‘crisis’ 
issues * 77.8 84.7 69.1 85
68
Inadequate knowledge level o f governors 71.6 69.8 73.9 86 69
The need to show continuing improvement in 
the league tables 66.7 61.2 73.5 85 68
Difficulty in recruiting governors 64.6 60.5 69.6 86 69
Difficulty in balancing the school’s current 
budget 63.4 60.7 66.7 84 69
The volunteer status o f governors 59.5 56.5 63.2 85 68
The need to make improvements to satisfy 
Ofsted * 57.8 45.3 73.5 86 68
Uncertainty about changes in the school’s 
pupil intake 57.2 57.0 57.4 86 68
Lack o f administrative support for governors 57.1 52.3 63.2 86 68
Difficulty in retaining governors 51.6 46.5 58.0 86 69
Insufficient number of governor meetings per 
year 35.1 30.2 41.2 86 68
The increase in delegated funding to schools 34.9 30.6 40.3 85 67
* = Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: chi-squared > 5.3; p  < 0.05.
It is clear from Table 5.1 that there was broad and substantial agreement that many of 
these issues created hindrances to governing body strategic planning, as evidenced 
by the fact in only four categories did fewer than 50 per cent of chairs report 
hindrances, and in only two categories did heads do likewise. To put some of these
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extremely high percentages in context, it should be noted that in response to a 
separate question, only half of both chairs (50.6 per cent, N=87) and heads (49.3 per 
cent, N=71) surveyed rated their governing bodies as having a high ability to do 
long-term strategic planning, while 49.4 per cent of chairs and 50.7 per cent of heads 
felt their governing bodies had only a low or moderate ability to do so. It is also 
clear from Table 5.1 that time and funding issues, respectively, were those that 
respondents found to be the greatest hindrances to their strategic planning potential, 
and well as the fact that the top-rated concerns surrounded issues that were largely in 
the domain of central government control.
Qualitative evidence from the case studies permits a more detailed analysis of the 
survey data, and the attempt to answer the third main research question begins with 
an exploration of the institutional-level barriers that might hinder governing body’s 
strategic planning. As was noted in the introduction to this chapter, barriers created 
at the central governmental level, including those dealing with time constraints (the 
most widely problematic hindrance in Table 5.1), will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six. At the institutional level, however, four main barriers were identified: 
the existence of a ‘monitoring culture’ amongst governing bodies, the varying level 
of involvement of various governor groups, the tendency for individual governors to 
focus on well-defined, smaller, and ‘task-based’ issues, and the tendency for 
governors to avoid ‘primarily education-related’ issues -  including strategic planning 
-  by allocating responsibility for such matters to school staff. Each of these four 
barriers is now addressed in turn.
5.2 The ‘M onitoring Culture’ Barrier
‘I think that the governing body should be supportive of the head in general, 
and provide a monitoring role of what goes on in the school.’ (Greenleaf head 
teacher)
The first main barrier identified in this research was the existence of a ‘monitoring 
culture’ amongst governing bodies, which acted as a deterrent to proactive strategic 
planning. This tendency towards monitoring was first noted in Chapter Four in 
relation to the SDP, yet the research suggested that this monitoring-focused approach 
appeared to extend to other tasks as well. It should be made clear that there is 
nothing wrong with monitoring per se -  indeed, for strategic planning to have any 
influence, governing bodies need to know how well their strategic plan is being
149
implemented. However, it appeared from this research that many governors engaged 
in monitoring to the exclusion of other activities like strategic planning. As such, 
governing bodies were often largely (if not entirely) reactive rather than proactive in 
their approach towards their strategic planning responsibilities. In stating his ideal of 
strategic planning, one Bluewater co-opted governor observed:
‘Strategy, in my language, has something to do with prioritisation of scarce 
resources, [so] the question is whether you’re managing your board to key 
decisions -  the big ones over a period -  as well as their role in the day-to-day.’
However, this research found strong evidence that many governors were spending a 
significant amount of time on operational tasks, and very little on ‘managing the key 
decisions’. The survey provided evidence for this claim in two ways. First, despite 
77.0 per cent of chairs (N=87) and 57.7 per cent of heads (N=71) reporting that their 
governing bodies were generally proactive,2 the survey found that 60.3 per cent of 
chairs (N=83) and 63.3 per cent of heads (N=69) reported that their governing bodies 
spent only 30 per cent or less of their time on long-term strategic planning. This 
discrepancy implied that some other task is occupying the bulk of governors’ time 
and ‘proactivity’. Second, as was shown in Table 5.1, 75.9 per cent of chairs and 
80.9 per cent of heads said that the time they were required to spend on ‘monitoring 
targets’ hindered their ability to do strategic planning.
The qualitative data supported these survey findings. While governors indicated that 
they spent only a small percentage of their time on strategic planning, they noted that 
they spent the majority of their time engaged in the more mundane administrative 
and procedural issues of school operation -  often, precisely the type of issues that 
central government intended governing bodies to leave to school staff. Whilst 
governing bodies do have a statutory responsibility in many of these areas, it appeared 
that governors hewed closer to the administrative portion of those responsibilities than 
to the strategic portion of them. As one Redwood co-opted governor noted:
‘If I [were to] give quite a low percentage for [the time we spend on] fire 
fighting, then you might conclude that the balance of the percentage is spent 
on strategic issues -  and that’s not true. It’s not a particularly big proportion, 
but that’s because by far the biggest proportion is absolutely routine issues -  
not even fire fighting, just time filling .’
2 Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-3.5;p  < 0.05.
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Other governors voiced similar dissatisfaction with the ways in which their governing 
bodies were handling time management (i.e., by giving preference towards monitoring 
rather than planning). One Bluewater governor used the example of his governing 
body’s approach towards pupil exclusions to illustrate this type of situation. When 
asked how well his governing body managed its time, he replied, ‘Probably not very 
well. You take the exclusions issue -  far too much time was spent on [coordinating] 
the actual exclusions committee, rather than on the [overall] strategy as to ‘how to put 
it right.”  Other governors voiced similar frustrations, as can be seen here:
‘Relatively little of this particular governing body’s work is concerned with 
fire fighting or short-term measures.... I think probably a large part of 
governors’ time is spent on monitoring activities -  so it isn’t necessarily 
specifically doing anything other than reviewing, monitoring, and maybe 
commenting on, and occasionally offering some advice to the head.’ 
(Greenleaf co-opted governor)
‘A lot of the time on the governing body is simply spent taking reports from 
committee meetings -  which is fine. A lot of the governing body [meeting] is 
simply information. But it’s not information presented on either strategic 
issues or short term problems -  it’s information which is presented as ‘this is 
what the committee did, and this is what we decided in your name, and here’s 
the next draft, would you please sign on to this?”  (Bluewater co-opted 
governor)
‘Certainly, a lot of the things are fire fighting. Some of the things that come 
up are things you expect -  they come up cyclically anyway. But I think we 
should have plans in place to deal with these things that are cyclic, and that 
doesn’t appear to have been the case.’ (Redwood parent governor)
In all these instances, governors complained that the ‘monitoring approach’ taken by 
their governing bodies meant that the time that could be spent proactively on 
strategic planning was instead being spent monitoring existing situations and reacting 
to specific problems as those problems arose. (As an aside, while governors were 
quick to point out in the qualitative study that they did not necessarily spend 
substantial amounts of time ‘fire fighting’ short-term crises, the survey suggests that 
when ‘fire fighting’ was necessary, it too contributed to reducing the time that might 
otherwise have gone to strategic planning. As was show in Table 5.1, 84.7 per cent 
of chairs and 69.1 per cent of heads noted that time spent on immediate ‘crisis’ issues 
hindered their strategic planning ability. This difference between chairs and heads 
was statistically significant (chi-squared = 5.3;/? < 0 .05), suggesting that chairs saw 
dealing with crises as a much more time-consuming and diverting problem than did 
heads. Given the combination of the qualitative and quantitative evidence on this
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point, it was concluded that the philosophy of ‘governing means monitoring’ was not 
only prevalent amongst governing bodies in this study, but that this approach often 
impeded the pursuit of a more active approach towards governing that promoted 
strategic planning.
5.3 The ‘Varying Levels of Governor Involvement’ Barrier 
The second finding was that there were vast differences in the contributions made by 
the different categories of governors, and that in most schools, the burden of 
governors’ responsibilities were carried out by a small core of governors. This has 
several implications for strategic planning, particularly since Table 5.1 illustrates that 
the desire to avoid increasing governor workload was a strategic planning hindrance 
to 69.8 per cent of chairs and 89.7 per cent of heads. This difference in responses 
was statistically significant (chi-squared = 9.0; p  < 0.05), suggesting first that heads 
felt that governors required more information in order to fulfil their strategic 
planning responsibilities, and second that heads were more concerned than were 
chairs that governors would be unable to accommodate this increased involvement. 
This section presents evidence for three strategic planning implications of this 
varying involvement. Section 5.3.1 argues that if the core governors are 
overburdened, the likelihood increases that the governing body will relegate strategic 
planning to the background. Section 5.3.2 argues that different types of governors 
contribute at different levels, that some types of governors are more likely to be in 
the core than others -  and that those outside the core are less likely to participate in 
strategic planning. Finally, Section 5.3.3 argues that differential levels of 
involvement suggests that only a small number of governors have the understanding or 
experience to clearly define what their role should be. As such, it is argued that many 
less-involved governors may be making their limited contributions by sticking to ‘what 
they know’ -  and that their expertise is unlikely to include strategic planning.
5.3.1 Involvement of the Core Governors
Looking first at the concept of a ‘core’ of governors, there was clear evidence of the 
existence of a core at all five case study schools. As one Bluewater LEA governor 
acknowledged, ‘There is inevitably, with twenty governors, a core which tends to do 
most of the work.’ This use of a core appears to have become increasingly more 
important since the early 1990s, as governing bodies have been asked to deal with a 
wider range of administrative and substantive issues. This range means that it has
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become increasingly difficult for any single governor (at least amongst those 
interviewed in this study) to spend the time necessary to understand the relationships 
between different components of school planning. As such, the high amount of 
knowledge necessary for making informed decisions meant that responsibilities for 
planning usually fell to a small core of governors who were sufficiently 
knowledgeable. Most governors noted that the core was usually composed of the 
chair and the chairs of the various committees -  the Brownstone head suggested that 
her school had ‘probably a core group of about six or seven governors,’ whilst a 
supplementary interview chair noted that ‘There’s a small core of governors who do 
most of the work -  about half a dozen.’
Yet there was also an indication amongst interviewees that there were often an 
insufficient number of governors in the core, given the number of tasks required of 
them. ‘Does everyone tend to be involved?’ asked one Greenleaf LEA governor 
rhetorically -  ‘No, not really.’ Not only did the survey respondents report that 
recruiting and retaining governors hindered their strategic planning (60.5 per cent of 
chairs versus 69.9 per cent of heads, and 46.5 per cent of chairs versus 58.0 per cent 
of heads, respectively), interviewees frequently observed that there were constantly 
problems in convincing existing governors to contribute more broadly. As one 
Redwood parent governor observed:
‘I hear it many times when I go to conferences, [where] I’m meeting people 
of similar ilk to m yself-‘ we’re overstretched’. But we tend to shoulder the 
burden of the majority of the work, because the other governors [are there] 
just to make up [the] numbers.’
The Whitefrost chair noted that his governing body also suffered from this difficulty; 
‘There’s ‘here in name only,’ which is a common concern across governing bodies,’ 
he lamented. Additionally, one Brownstone LEA governor argued that the trend 
towards additional responsibility ran counter to the realities of governors’ ability to 
commit time and energy:
‘This idea that [government is] ‘setting schools free and putting them in the 
hands of governors’ is completely crackpot, because people are less inclined 
to be involved. Already it’s difficult to get people to be governors because 
there’s more work involved than there used to be.’
3 Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
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It could be argued that a small operating core of governors makes collective 
decision-making easier, since doing so requires agreement amongst a smaller number 
of people. Yet even granting this concession, it appeared that by relying on a core of 
governors -  whether by choice or by circumstance -  potential avenues of support and 
burden-sharing within the governing body were often shut off. It is possible that a 
vicious cycle then ensures, since with fewer governors having input into decisions, 
governors who are outside the core may feel further disenfranchised in regards 
having any real impact on governing body decisions. This in turn may require core 
governors to undertake even more responsibilities, and as these responsibilities 
increased, so to would the likelihood that governors would find less time to engage in 
strategic planning.
5.3.2 Involvement of the Non-Core Governors
The extent of this disenfranchisement of non-core governors can be inferred by 
examining which types of governors tended to have the greatest involvement on the 
governing body. As posited above, the core is likely composed of the governors with 
the greatest involvement, and this research found that certain types of governors were 
consistently more involved on the governing body than were others. As one 
Whitefrost co-opted governor noted:
Tt doesn’t surprise me that a core of governors is more involved than others -  
that’s just the nature of organisations. I think the specific issue [is] that the 
core governors are generally the ones who don't have their kids there. 
They’re generally professionals, articulate, often with a business or corporate 
background, and they feel comfortable in the governing body situation. 
There’s another group of parents and others who are much less involved, for 
a whole number of reasons -  partly their background.’
This research found that the governors who were selected by the governing body 
itself (the foundation and co-opted governors) were usually more involved than those 
governors who were selected by specific constituencies (the teacher, parent, staff, 
and LEA governors). Table 5.2 illustrates that both surveyed chairs and heads felt 
that foundation and co-opted governors were significantly more involved on the 
governing body than were other types of governors, and that only about half of chairs 
and heads surveyed felt that parent, staff, and LEA governors had similar levels of 
involvement. (In interpreting these data, it might also be valuable to reiterate the 
background of the 87 chairs who responded: 40.2 per cent were foundation 
governors, 25.3 per cent were LEA governors, 19.5 per cent were co-opted
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governors, and only 3.4 per cent were parent governors. The remainder (11.5 per 
cent) did not provide an affiliation.)
Table 5.2: Level of Involvement by Governor Type









Foundation4 76.7 72.7 33 32
Co-opted 72.0 61.3 75 62
Teacher 63.1 53.6 84 69
Parent 55.3 46.4 85 69
LEA 49.4 42.6 85 68
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
Complementing the quantitative findings presented in Table 5.2, one particularly 
insightful comment by the Redwood chair provided a particularly detailed overview 
of his perception of how different types of governors approached their 
responsibilities. While Redwood is a voluntary aided school, substituting ‘co-opted 
governor’ for ‘foundation governor’ in the following comment would provide a fairly 
accurate representation of the perspective of many governors interviewed in the case 
studies, regardless of school type:
‘The stability [comes from] the foundation governors -  that core of people is 
very stable. Parent governors are also quite stable, but not as stable. My 
view is, of what I have seen of the foundation governors in a voluntary aided 
school and the foundation governors at a grant maintained school, [that they] 
were a powerful influence because they were perceived as relatively long­
term. They were chosen competently, and play a very serious role. Parent 
governors are quite willing, but are mostly concerned about their own 
children. Teacher governors are particularly concerned about their own 
issues. And LEA governors tend to have their own concerns. I think the 
independence of a structure of foundation governors, properly constructed, is 
a powerful entity, and it creates the stability that’s necessary.’
While the survey findings demonstrate that foundation and co-opted governors 
usually had the greatest involvement with their governing bodies, the comments of 
the Whitefrost governor and the Redwood chair (above) both support this claim and 
indicate that many governors held additional concerns regarding the low level of 
parent governor involvement. These concerns were also mirrored in the survey data,
4 The lower N for responses about foundation governors is due to the fact that only voluntary-aided, 
voluntary-controlled and foundation schools have such governors, whereas community schools do not.
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as Table 5.2 shows that only 55.3 per cent of chairs and 46.4 per cent of heads felt 
that parent governors were highly involved in the governing body. As one 
supplementary interview chair argued, ‘most governors who do the work aren’t 
parents, and most of the parents contribute nothing to the governing body,’ while 
Brownstone’s head noted the clear discrepancy between parent governors and other 
governors in terms of involvement:
‘The people who tend to get more involved in that tend to be my LEA or my 
co-opted governors, which is a real issue. I don’t know what else I can do to 
try and encourage parents to become involved -  there may be something 
more we can do.’
The strategic planning implications of this relative lack of parent governor 
involvement are substantial. First, the effect of this mediocre reported level of parent 
governor involvement is magnified by the fact that parents are allocated the largest 
number of seats of any single constituency group on a governing body.5 As such, if 
parent governors are only partially involved, the effect will be that there are 
substantially fewer governors available to spread the burden of governing duties than 
there might otherwise have been. In turn, this has the potential to increase the 
pressure on the ‘active’ governors, thereby providing less time for the governing 
body to engage in strategic planning. Second, many interviewees confirmed that, in 
relation to other categories of governors, parent governors tended to have the highest 
turnover rate. As one Brownstone LEA governor confided:
‘I’m sceptical about parents, I suppose, because [this school’s governor] 
parents aren’t very vocal. I suppose there’s one chap, he’s the most active of 
the parent governors, and the most vocal, but the rest of them tend to have a 
bit of a turnover. They do a year or two, and drop out.’
While this high turnover is possibly because parents are involved in the governing 
body only while their child attends the school, high turnover also suggests that the 
‘parent governor’ bloc is frequently at the bottom of the ‘learning curve’ regarding 
the operation of the governing body (in relation to the governing body as a whole). 
As one Whitefrost LEA governor observed, ‘I think it’s quite hard for parents to very 
quickly become aware of the responsibilities of being a governor.’ The effect of this
5 Although foundation governors are required to outnumber all other categories of governor in schools 
where foundation governors are required, at least two or three of these foundation governors are 
required to be parents of pupils. While technically these ‘foundation’ governors, these ‘foundation 
parent’ operate in practice more as parent governors than as co-opted governors.
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higher level of turnover is to prevent the largest single group on the governing body 
from having the sustained involvement that is necessary for carrying through 
strategic planning initiatives. Finally, many governors raised the point that parent 
governors are frequently concerned about the ‘here and now’, since it is the actions 
with immediate effects that will have the greatest impact upon the experiences of 
their own children. As many governors observed, but which one Bluewater teacher 
governor articulated quite strongly:
‘The people who have less of an idea are the parent governors, who can’t see 
beyond this blinkered path about their child. And they’re really interested 
about student issues when it comes to finance, or any kind of curriculum 
planning -  if it’s not going to affect their son or daughter, then they’re not 
interested.’
Although this particular governor was one of the more critical governors in this 
respect, the notion of parents being ‘single-issue’ governors was common throughout 
the case studies. While this type of advocacy can be important, governors felt that 
the emphasis many parent governors placed on short-term issues meant that parent 
governors were unlikely to expend limited governing body time on planning 
strategically for a school that their children would have left by the time those 
strategic goals had been reached.
5.3.3 Concerns over the Definition of the Governor’s Role
However, the parent governor conundrum is simply the most obvious example of a 
more systemic problem: the confusion amongst governors over the definition of their 
role. While governors were firm in stating that they were not supposed to be 
addressing ‘day-to-day’ issues, it was also clear that their own definition of their role 
had been diluted by their myriad responsibilities and a frequent lack of clarity as to 
how to those responsibilities should be executed. One Redwood LEA governor 
provided her observations of this problem on her own governing body:
‘We’ve got two [parent governors] on our [sub]committee, and I don’t think 
they’re quite sure what their role is. I don’t think I  would be quite sure what 
my role was as a parent governor, to be honest. Do I bring in issues from 
that? How do I feed that back -  do I have meetings with parents? Do I send 
out a newsletter, do I have reps from every year, do I go through the parent 
teacher association?’
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Furthermore, these concerns not only go beyond parent governors in specific -  
similar concerns were voiced in relation to the role of co-opted, foundation, and LEA 
governors as well -  these concerns also go beyond the school level. While some 
governing bodies in this study did a better job than others at delineating the 
‘governor’s role’, such institution-level delineation is, almost by definition, both 
limited and variable.
In comparison, central government policy has a substantial impact on how governing 
bodies operate and how governors interpret their role. Indeed, many interviewees 
suggested that institutional-level problems with role definition were adversely 
influenced by central government’s overall policy approach, as can be seen here:
‘At a lot of the governing body meetings, you’re trying to help people 
understand not what the answer is, but what the problem is! I think there’s a 
fundamental weakness in British education policy in terms of the rhetoric 
about what the role of governing bodies is -  what’s expected of them -  and 
their competence to deliver.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘The role of governors needs to be more clear, since their roles still [largely] 
tend to be written by the lawyers. They need their role spelled out in clear 
language, and governing bodies need to be told what skills are expected on 
governing bodies, instead government leaving it to governing bodies to 
cobble together.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
The issue of role definition and central government will be taken up in detail in 
Chapter Six. However, the key point for immediate purposes is this: if governors are 
unsure how to represent -  or even identify -  their constituency, they will be less 
likely to express confidence in taking actions on behalf of that constituency. If the 
absence of a well-articulated role means governors are tentative about their authority 
or their responsibilities, this temerity will likely have a strong influence on the range 
of tasks that governors feel comfortable undertaking. The implications of this 
mindset for strategic planning are explored in the next section.
5.4 The ‘Limited to Tangible Tasks’ Barrier
This research suggested that the third main strategic planning barrier faced by 
governing bodies in this study was that governors limited their expertise and 
influence to issues on which a visible and relatively immediate result could be 
expected -  referred to henceforth as ‘tangible’ issues. For example, governors can 
see the new computers they purchased, the budget sheet they balanced, or the
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absence of a pupil they excluded for bullying. It will be argued that by limiting 
themselves to these kinds of tangible issues, fewer governors attempted to work on 
longer-term and more intangible issues like strategic planning, since issues like 
strategic planning are highly knowledge- and time-intensive while rarely providing 
immediately evident results.
The initial evidence demonstrated that in practice, the overall levels of influence and 
knowledge of governing bodies were often quite limited. For example, Table 5.1 
shows that 69.8 per cent of chairs and 73.9 per cent of heads felt that ‘inadequate 
knowledge amongst governors’ was a hindrance to governing body strategic 
planning. Additional survey data, as well as qualitative responses, suggest that there 
is a more nuanced explanation for this broad generalisation -  particularly as 
‘knowledge’ can be so broadly defined. As Table 5.3 illustrates, the survey revealed 
that governors tended to have low levels of influence in certain specific policy areas. 
The evidence in Table 5.3 suggests that when governors were influential, their 
influence was usually on issues of finance and premises, rather than on issues like 
curriculum and pastoral care.
























Differences between chairs and heads were all statistically significant: p  < 0.05.
6 For a review of how data were collapsed for analysis and presentation purposes, see Section 3.4.5. 
Only the two extreme ranges are displayed in this table.
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The differences between chairs and heads in each of these five areas were 
statistically significant. This is extremely revealing, given the fact that, as can be 
seen in Table 5.3, both chairs and heads provided the same rank ordering of the five 
areas in terms of relative influence levels. What this indicates is that while chairs 
and heads agreed that governing bodies were more influential in finance and 
premises and less influential on curriculum and pastoral care, heads found their 
governing bodies to be consistently and significantly less influential in any given 
area than did chairs.
5.4.1 Selection for Skills over Vision
The reasons for this imbalance towards finance and premises and away from 
curriculum are possibly attributable to a certain self-selection bias within governing 
bodies. First, the selection of governors who have identifiable ‘constituencies’ (i.e., 
teachers, parents, LEA representatives, and staff) is beyond the immediate control of 
governing bodies. However, in two categories -  co-opted and foundation governors 
(where applicable) -  governing bodies have greater latitude in selecting their 
members. Such governors are brought onto the governing body not in order to 
provide representation for a specific constituency, but because the governing body 
decides that they possess some ‘value added’ attribute. As such, this research found 
that in many cases, governing bodies tended to select these governors for their 
‘skills’ as opposed to their ‘vision.’
Of course, many governors said that they did not have the opportunity to select for 
either skills or vision, particularly since their governing bodies were often already 
under-strength; as one Brownstone governor said, ‘I think, unfortunately, there is no 
balance. We know that there’s a shortage of governors, and beggars can’t be 
choosers.’ This was reflected in Table 5.1, where 60.5 per cent of chairs (N=86) and 
69.6 per cent of heads (N=69) reported that difficulty in recruiting governors 
hindered strategic planning. Furthermore, governors in all five case study schools 
agreed that governing bodies often faced significant problems simply in filling the 
seats, never mind recruiting those who would bring substantial benefits to the 
governing body. As one Bluewater co-opted governor noted:
‘To be honest, you have such difficulty getting governors; you can’t be too
picky, on balance. That doesn’t mean to say that because you can’t afford to
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be picky, you end up with a lousy lot of governors -  but I don’t think you end 
up with a perfect balance.’
When asked what they would do if given a choice, however, it was clear that 
governors felt their governing bodies required skill-based governors in order to fulfil 
the tasks that governing bodies were being asked to complete. In some schools, like 
Bluewater, the skills versus vision debate carried additional political connotations; as 
one parent governor said:
‘For the [criteria in selecting the] one’s we co-opted, it’s always the same 
thing -  the lefties tend to favour the ethos, and the righties tend to want the 
professionalisation! ’
Yet for the other four case study schools, governors consistently observed that if 
given the option between skills and vision in the current educational environment, 
co-opted governor selection was often a strictly pragmatic decision based upon 
matching governor skills with the immediate needs of the school. One Redwood 
foundation governor described the needs of his governing body as follows:
‘In my twenty or so years there, [I believe that] in the make up of governors, 
you need certain skills.... You need professional people, there’s no question 
of that. You need someone who’s good on the legal side [and] certainly you 
need financial skills, so banking or accountancy needs to be there. You need 
industry skills -  you need to know what’s going on out there, and it’s no 
longer ‘we can run this school’. . ..You need [all those people] because it’s not 
all about education -  there are other issues, and you need their professional 
skills, which they can contribute very quickly.’
This need for governing bodies to assemble a roster of ‘operational specialists’ was a 
view supported almost uniformly by governors across the other case studies, as is 
demonstrated by the selection of comments below:
‘I think in the past, it’s very much been looking to fill the skills gaps that 
you’ve got.’ (Greenleaf parent governor)
‘When I got involved, it was most likely that the school was going to be 
closed down -  so in those circumstances we were quite ruthless about co­
opting anybody who was going to add something.’ (Whitefrost co-opted 
governor)
‘If we were looking for a new governor tomorrow, I’d say we’d want a 
person with experience in education and the local community.... But that’s 
simply the next choice. If we did lose someone with the exterior skills, I 
think I’d want them replaced.’ (Brownstone co-opted governor)
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‘There are issues there that reflect back on finance, and having a business 
background will help you particularly on finance.... You want governors who 
have got advisory skills that can be used? (Redwood LEA governor)
As is evident from these comments, governors were not arguing that a more holistic 
vision of the school was not valuable. Instead, governors appeared to be arguing that 
under the present circumstances, the ‘luxury’ of vision loses out when placed in 
direct competition with the need for skills. As one insightful Bluewater co-opted 
governor observed:
‘It’s a numbers game, isn’t it? I think the governing body ought, in principle, 
to identify the skills of the governors and the local authority members, many 
of whom are professional people in their own right, [and ask] ‘what is it we 
haven’t got around this table?’ But I personally would, if  it came to a trade­
off, sacrifice one or two of the specialist skills for the broad view.... I think 
the system desperately needs people who can do that -  but they’re very 
difficult to find.’
Not only does this dichotomy of ‘skills versus vision’ help to explain why the 
influence of governing bodies in Table 5.3 may be tilted towards the ‘task-based’ 
issues of finances and premises, it also helps explain why strategic planning is 
relatively underdeveloped amongst governing bodies. From this research, it appears 
that those individuals who could bring such wo^-task-based abilities to governing 
bodies are often not sought out by governing bodies for this expertise.
5.4.2 Low Governor Knowledge of ‘Primarily Education-Related’ Issues
In contrast, Table 5.3 suggests that neither governors nor heads found their 
governing bodies to be influential on curriculum matters. In addition to this finding, 
the survey revealed that when respondents were asked whether non-teacher 
governors felt comfortable offering their opinions and suggestions about curriculum- 
related issues, only 57.0 per cent of chairs (N=86) felt that such governors appeared 
more than moderately comfortable doing so, and only 41.4 per cent of heads (N=70) 
felt likewise.7 The qualitative research supported this finding, as governors at four of 
the five case study schools reported low knowledge of curricular issues (the 
exception was Greenleaf; see below). Furthermore, this research found that few 
governors who were not current or former education professionals (at any 
educational level) felt comfortable either in seeking additional information about
7 Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant. However, heads were much
more likely than chairs to report ‘moderate’ comfort levels: 37.1 per cent versus 19.8 per cent.
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‘primarily education-related’ issues or in offering their opinions on curricular 
matters. This issue was also one of only a few issues in this research where there 
were clear institution-specific reasons for differences between governor responses. 
In contrast to other interviewees, Greenleaf s governors reported that their colleagues 
did feel comfortable commenting on ‘primarily education-related’ issues. However, 
it needs to be noted that the majority of governors interviewed at Greenleaf were 
either current educators, former educators, or held jobs that frequently brought them 
into contact with either schools or primarily education-related issues.
In the four other case study schools, this research found that not only did governors 
gravitate towards issues with which they were comfortable (as noted above), it 
appeared that governors (or governing bodies) actively repelled away from the issues 
on which they were least comfortable. When asked about his governing body’s 
emphasis on curriculum and education issues, one Redwood co-opted governor said, 
‘it never really surfaces at governing meetings. It is very much bricks and mortar -  
and some general staffing things.’ A parent governor colleague of his concurred, 
noting, ‘I think a lot of [governors] relate the school to their own life and their own 
knowledge, and they feel happier keeping within an area that they feel safe in.’ 
Furthermore, this emphasis on ‘skills’ issues was not limited to Redwood -  when one 
Bluewater teacher governor was asked about whether governors felt uncomfortable 
dealing with education issues, he replied:
‘As opposed to [addressing] things they feel they have some knowledge of? 
Yes, that’s very much the case. There are very few of them who have any 
kind of educational background whatsoever.’
This issue of ‘no educational background’ was the other main reason that governors 
proffered in explaining their lack of activity on ‘primarily education-related’ issues. 
‘If you don’t have an educational background, you don’t really know what you’re 
talking about,’ said one Redwood LEA governor, and many other interviewed 
governors concurred. As one Bluewater co-opted governor pointed out:
‘In secondary schools, you’re talking about [governors] who are twenty or 
twenty-five years -  at least -  away from when they were at school. Things 
have changed a lot, and education uses a language of its own, which many [of 
them], frankly, don’t understand.’
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Because many governors felt unqualified to comment on educational decisions, they 
reported that they often deferred completely to school staff in relation to educational 
matters. ‘I think the governors are very much guided by the teachers and the senior 
management team, said one Brownstone co-opted governor. ‘The curriculum details 
are passed on, in a fairly general sense, to all the governors.’ The issue of how this 
deference to staff influences governors’ strategic planning will be addressed more 
fully in the next section. Yet regardless of the reason for this lack of curricular and 
educational involvement, this research found that few governors had the knowledge 
of these issues that would certainly be necessary for whole-school strategic planning. 
Although this knowledge need not be to the ‘expert’ level of the educational 
professionals, it might reasonably be expected to be of sufficiently high standards so 
as to allow governors to understand the implications of and reasons for financial, 
staffing, premises, and other decisions that bore upon curricular provision. While a 
small number of governors suggested that their lack of curricular and education 
knowledge did prevent them from doing their job better, this view was very much in 
the minority. However, one Redwood foundation governor argued that without this 
knowledge, governing bodies would be missing their main reason for existence:
‘The real issue you’re in place, as governors, is to oversee the management of 
the school and the teaching to the pupils in that school. I think that’s the area 
that’s suffering, no matter how you put the governing body together -  
because the volume [of work] doesn’t allow us to focus on that.’
5.4.3 The Influence of these Findings on Strategic Planning
As was implied by the definition of strategic planning by outlined in Chapter Four, 
governors believed that strategic planning was both complex and required long-term 
patience. However, the evidence presented in this section suggests that in practice, 
governing bodies often tended towards the opposite extreme, pursuing areas that a) 
had parallels with their everyday lives and b) provided observable ‘tangible’ 
outcomes in reasonably short periods of time. Fortunately, this research also 
provides a potential explanation for this behaviour.
First, this research suggests that governors pursued tasks that had parallels with their 
own lives because although the order of magnitude may be different, the basic task in 
many instances is often quite similar. As the comments below illustrate, governors 
often drew parallels from their own personal experience when deciding on which 
issues they were best positioned to contribute. Within this mindset, it appeared that
164
many governors felt that balancing a school’s finances required the same general 
skill set as managing a large chequebook or set of business accounts, or that 
managing premises upkeep and repair required the same skills used when negotiating 
for home improvements:
‘If you have a finance problem that comes up, and you ask an accountant, it’s 
his bread and butter -  he doesn’t need to prepare for that, he just says ‘this is 
what we need to do.’ But if they’re a bank manager, and you’re asking about 
a key issue on fourth year achievement -  unless they’ve done their 
homework, they struggle.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
‘Governors have experience in different things -  [for example, those] who 
have financial backgrounds generally go onto the finance committee.’ 
(Greenleaf parent governor)
‘If you’re involved with property, you can become much more specialist in 
dealing with the property portfolio of the school, and I think that helps to give 
people clearer directions to things they should be looking at.’ (Whitefrost 
LEA governor)
However, few of the lay governors in this research suggested that they possessed any 
similar type of ‘parallel’ skill set in relation to curriculum or pastoral care issues. As 
such, it appeared from this research that this lack of transferable skills in these 
‘primarily education-related’ areas made governors more apprehensive about engaging 
in them, despite the fact that without understanding of these issues, it is nearly 
impossible to make full and complete decisions about the operation of a school.
Second, the issues of finance, premises, and staffing are ‘tangible’ issues in the sense 
that they provide observable outcomes in a reasonably short period of time. It is easy 
to see the items and services purchased through the budget (or the need for those that 
were not), the repairs and renovations to the physical infrastructure (or the need 
thereof), and the addition of new staff members (or the need for more). In contrast, it 
is more difficult to distinguish between trends and outliers in short-term academic 
results, to observe additional effort put into homework, or to see the improved 
attention span of an SEN pupil. As such, this research suggests that many governors, 
faced with a situation in which they have both limited time and an understandable 
desire to see their contribution ‘making a difference’, will gravitate towards spending 
time on smaller issues, short-term issues, and the ‘tangible’ issues with which they 
feel most comfortable. The effect of this limitation appeared to be that governors, 
often unclear about the specific educational strategy of their school, preferred that
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these strategic planning responsibilities be shifted to school staff. This shift is the 
subject of the next section.
5.5 The ‘Staff Delegation’ Barrier
The previous section noted that governing bodies in this study tended to defer to staff 
on curriculum matters. This section presents evidence that besides relying on staff 
for education and curricular information, much of the information governors received 
in general was filtered through the senior management team. In and of itself, this is 
not unusual, given the volume of material and limited time of governors. However, 
it appeared that many governors accepted this information uncritically, and rarely 
took the opportunity (either by choice or by circumstance) to form their own opinions 
about it. Consequently, it will be argued that governors often felt that the imbalance of 
expertise between staff and governors meant that strategic planning should be the remit 
of the head, staff, and chair, rather than that of the governing body as a whole. 
Furthermore, it is argued that this approach appears to conflict with the statutory role 
of the governing body as a strategic planning entity, and in particular with the 
governing body’s role as an independent check upon the school administration.
5.5.1 Staff Influence on Governing Body Information
Looking first at the influence of the staff on the supply of information to governors, 
it was clear that head teachers saw their role as providing ‘good information’, 
particularly given the time constraints that many governors faced. The Brownstone 
head gave the following assessment of how she perceived her information- 
management role, an approach that was generally shared by the head teachers who 
were interviewed:
‘If there is something the governors have to make a decision on, I suppose I 
would tend to see my role as the person who needs to ensure that they have 
that information, that it’s been adequately distilled, and that we do make a 
decision within the timeframe that’s appropriate.’
It was equally clear, however, that governors often felt that they had to rely on the 
staff and chair for guidance more extensively than ideally they would prefer. A 
significant majority of governors, in all five case study schools, noted that while they 
welcomed the condensation of the issues they were being asked to decide upon, they 
also felt that in many cases, governors were not well-informed enough to fully 
understand whether the decisions they were being asked to make were the right ones.
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As can be seen from the selection of comments below, governors were often 
frustrated by the fact that while in theory the governing body was responsible for 
overseeing the operation of the school, in practice the governing body was forced to 
be guided by those it was charged with overseeing:
‘If I have the time, then I’ll go through things. Otherwise, the chair of 
governors will say ‘this was received; here, you should read this,’ key people 
will say ‘this is what it means, this is what you’re expected to do,’ and I think 
people [just] say ‘all right, that’s fine!’ (Greenleaf teacher governor)
‘I don’t think we are taking it all in, to be honest with you. We are looking to 
the professional advisors.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
‘A head can be really gung-ho about something, but we’re there in a 
responsible role to oversee the life of the school. But we’re not always given 
enough information at the time when decisions are made.’ (Whitefrost LEA 
governor)
‘I suspect that most of the time, we very much bow to the head, and to the 
head’s reaction to documentation. We do challenge the head, but you have to 
be guided by the people who are taking the time to read all the documentation 
the way through.’ (Greenleaf Parent Governor)
It should be made clear at this point that this study is not endorsing an adversarial 
relationship between governors and staff in order to promote better information 
provision. Indeed, the implications of a situation where staff are the ‘gatekeepers’ of 
information are probably minimal in the short-term. Yet in the long-term (or when 
looking at long-term planning), governors need to take some responsibility for 
informing themselves on these issues by visiting the school and constructing a 
comparative assessment of the school. If governors do not (or cannot, given time 
constraints), it is unlikely that they will acquire the knowledge necessary to make 
independent determinations about whether staff are steering the school in the right 
direction. However, it appears that this is precisely what many governors are content 
to have happen, as the next section demonstrates.
5.5.2 Governing Body Deference to Staff on Strategic Planning Issues
Although Chapter Four demonstrated that governors recognised that governing 
bodies had a role in strategic planning, this research found that many governors were 
reluctant to engage in strategic planning without taking their cues from the school 
staff. The survey data show this quite clearly, as can be seen in Table 5.4. Not only 
did chairs suggest that governors rarely initiated the strategic planning process, but
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heads were even more sceptical three-fifths claimed that their governing bodies were 
following rather than leading, while less than ten per cent claimed that governors 
took the lead on this issue.
Table 5.4: Frequency with which Governors Initiated the Strategic Planning 
Process






Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-2.3; p  < 0.05.
The qualitative data supported the survey data, as governors at four of the five 
schools felt that their governing bodies gave staff wide latitude in doing strategic 
planning. Only at Whitefrost, where governors were previously forced to take an 
extremely active role in rescuing the school from special measures, did governors 
report that their governing body had a role in strategic planning equivalent to that of 
the staff. In the other schools, governors reported (for a variety of reasons) that they 
acted more as junior partners in the enterprise. For some, like this Greenleaf LEA 
governors, it came down to practical reasons of expertise and time:
‘I think it’s more difficult to discuss things like the finances and the budget, 
because it’s not something I’ve spent much time on, so obviously we’re 
presented with more or less a fa it accompli...you can make your point, but 
you can’t oppose something if you haven’t got an alterative that’s clearer.’
Yet for other governors, the issue was tightly bound up with how governing bodies 
should ‘properly’ relate to the professional educators. As one Redwood LEA governor 
emphasised, ‘No one wants to be part of a hire-and-fire organisation, and we want to 
have sympathy for what the difficulties of the [staff] role are.’ One Bluewater 
governor expounded upon this staff issue, noting the delicate balance that she felt the 
governing body and the staff -  particularly the head -  needed to strike in terms of 
managing long-term and short-term school planning simultaneously. As she observed:
‘The long-term vision of schooling in Britain comes from the head teacher -  
it’s one of the head teacher’s functions to have a vision.... [Besides], nobody 
has the time to actually be in the school to anticipate problems, and we have 
tremendous respect for the management of the school -  they don’t need us 
breathing down their necks all the time.’
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Of course, this comment could also be interpreted as an eloquent abrogation of 
responsibility on the part of a governing body that does not want such 
responsibilities, even if they were on offer in practice. On this point, one Bluewater 
teacher governor provided the staff perspective on this issue, and pointed the finger 
at the governing body, arguing:
‘I think the strategic planning is very mixed. It’s the kind of governing body 
that wants to go there to ratify decisions that have already been made by people 
in the school, [since the governors] don’t like having to come up with ideas.’
It should be noted that the tenor of these comments was echoed in other case study 
schools as well, but that the Bluewater example above simply presents the clearest 
dichotomy. When taken together, the evidence in this section suggests that although 
lay governors may be wary about infringing upon staff prerogatives, the result is that 
governors may not be taking the decisive and proactive steps that their 
responsibilities require (and from which their schools would benefit). As one 
supplementary interview chair summed up the situation:
‘There is a practical paradox of governors being asked to make broad plans 
without the knowledge necessary to do so, since they fear that obtaining that 
information infringes upon the autonomy of the professional staff.’
5.5.3 The Influence of these Findings on Strategic Planning
The main implication of the evidence presented in this section is that it is extremely 
difficult to conceive of governors being able to challenge or improve the strategic 
plan if they do not fully understand either their school’s curricular and co-curricular 
offerings or how those offerings can or should change over time. As a corporate 
entity, the governing body is designed to provide a level of continuity for the school, 
and is therefore well placed to design the school’s long-term strategy. However, if 
this responsibility for planning is delegated to staff with only minimal governor 
input, there is a risk of losing this long-term perspective. Because staff are 
necessarily and primarily concerned with keeping the school functioning on a daily 
basis, their main concern -  and rightly so -  is often on the short-term. By giving 
staff primary responsibility for the long-term strategic planning, however, there is the 
potential that this short-term mindset -  which works well on the day-to-day level -  
will be applied to the strategic planning process as well.
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This is not meant to imply that governing bodies do not need staff input and advice 
in creating the strategic plan, since such information is undeniably crucial. However, 
it can be argued that the job of the governors is to complement the staff thinking by 
looking far enough ahead to identify and avoid any unintended long-term 
consequences of short-term decisions. As such, it appears that the staff should be 
making their short-term decisions within a long-term framework that the governing 
body has devised. Furthermore, leaving strategic planning to the education 
professionals may mean that these plans are drawn up to best suit the education 
professionals -  an approach that may or may not coincide with the best interests of 
the children. It is the governing body’s responsibility to make the best decisions for 
the children, not just the staff, which provides an even stronger rationale for why 
governing bodies need to take more independence in the strategic planning process.
5.6 The Local Education Authorities
Before proceeding to Chapter Six and the strategic planning barriers created by 
central government, it is necessary to address the reasons for the relative absence of 
the role of the LEA in this research. As was stated in Chapter Three, the scope of 
this research was limited to governors’ perceptions of strategic planning barriers. 
This approach was underpinned by the belief that regardless of the factual accuracy 
of such perceptions, it is often such perceptions that determine the extent to which 
policies succeed. Given this parameter, this research did not pursue the issue of 
potential LEA-level barriers to governing body strategic planning for one primary 
reason: few of the governors interviewed in this research felt that the LEA either was 
the source of, or held the solutions to, any major strategic planning barriers.
This section provides the evidence for the two main factors that led to this 
conclusion. First, evidence is presented to show that governors believed that LEAs 
lost a substantial portion of their power after the 1988 Education Act. Since 
governors argued that the main power bases were now the schools and central 
government, it seemed reasonable to focus this research on those two poles. Second, 
evidence is presented to demonstrate that the even in the one area where an LEA- 
level barrier to strategic planning might be expected to exist -  the content and quality 
of governor training -  governors believed that the barrier was primarily about time, 
rather than content. As will be shown in the next chapter, governors attributed this 
time barrier to unrealistic central government expectations, not to the LEA. Taken
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together, it is argued that although this research in no way precluded the possibility 
of LEA-level barriers, neither did this research find significant evidence to suggest 
that governors felt LEA-level barriers had substantial influence on their strategic 
planning processes.
5.6.1 Decline in the Influence of the LEAs
The first factor in omitting an extended analysis of the LEA role was the decline in 
LEA influence in the education hierarchy. Governors argued that the authority of 
LEAs had diminished substantially over the past decade, with governing bodies 
acquiring a significant level of new autonomy and responsibility as a result. ‘In the 
early days, it was very much that the head and managers were in charge -  and also, 
the local authority had a much stronger role,’ observed one supplementary interview 
chair. ‘Now, the local authority role is very diminished, the head has a very strong 
role, still, but the governors also must play a very active part.’ This comment 
succinctly summarises the views of nearly every governor interviewed in this 
research, as the breadth of this opinion is illustrated below:
‘Since the government has seen fit to reduce the role played by the LEAs, 
governors have picked up that slack.’ (Greenleaf parent governor)
‘Although maybe the LEA should affect what the governing body does -  it 
doesn’t anymore. Now, governors have more opportunities to set financial 
affairs and priorities then we did previously.’ (Supplementary interview 
chair)
‘There have been a lot of responsibilities devolved to governors; formerly, 
the LEA had staff that was being paid to do the things that governors are now 
doing for free.’ (Whitefrost parent governor)
‘There are fewer areas where people have to go into the LEA and the LEA’s 
priorities. On the other hand, there are no clear lines about how these 
additional functions are to be managed!’ (Bluewater chair)
In fairness, governors did recognise that there were both positive and negative 
aspects of a diminished LEA role -  as one supplementary interview chair argued, 
‘We have taken on responsibilities that used to be those of the local authority, [and] 
we have areas that we hold total responsibility for. In some ways, I think it’s 
unreasonable.’ Furthermore, governors did take pains to acknowledge that LEAs 
still retained an important administrative and training role, since LEAs provided a set 
of support services (legal assistance, SEN support, advice on building maintenance,
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etc.) that many schools would not be able to obtain or afford if such services had to 
be purchased separately from outside sources. However, governors appeared, on 
balance, to conclude that the overall advantages of a less powerful LEA outweighed 
the disadvantages, with the consequence that few of the governors interviewed felt 
that their LEA had any significant role to play in regards to strategic planning issues. 
Although most interviewees were respectful of the new LEA role, it was also clear 
that these governors welcomed the autonomy that devolution had provided:
‘The local authority still plays a key part, but they market their services, [so] 
you can choose to go it alone. They have a right to inspect, and they still 
have an involvement in certain staff issues like discipline and redundancy. 
There are obviously certain areas where they must be involved, but you are 
running the school.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
‘It was initially ‘[the governing body] versus the LEA.... Now, [the 
arrangement is] much more flexible -  we can say ‘these things are available, 
we can decide whether we want to do them or not, and on what terms we 
want to do them.”  (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘If something is a problem, it can be fixed within a week, because it’s our 
responsibility, the bursar gets onto it, and the situation is resolved. Whereas 
when [these responsibilities] were with the LEA you’d fill out a form, and by 
the time they’d recognise there’s a problem it would take weeks.’ 
(Brownstone co-opted governor)
As is illustrated by the comments above, governors simply appeared to believe that 
the LEA had become a less relevant factor in governing body decision-making than it 
once had been. Furthermore, governors not only believed that governing bodies had 
become more influential in the decision-making process, but (as will be shown in 
Chapter Six) that central government had become more influential as well. Together, 
this evidence provided the rationale for focusing this research on the two places 
where governors believed that the influential decisions were made -  the governing 
bodies and the central government.
5.6.2 LEAs and Governor Training
The second factor in omitting an extended analysis of the LEA role concerns the 
issue of governor training. Training is one of the main interactions between 
governing bodies and LEAs, and should -  in theory -  have the potential to influence 
the strategic planning ability of governors. It therefore seemed logical that if there 
were LEA-level barriers to strategic planning, examining the issues surrounding 
governor training would be a valuable starting point. Yet upon further investigation,
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this research revealed that the content of the training did not create nearly as 
significant a barrier as did the fact that governors did not have the time to attend.
If only the issue of the quality and content of governor training were examined, it 
might seem that a potential strategic planning barrier was indeed present. It was 
clear from this research that governors felt the quality of training varied greatly, as 
can be seen from the range of optimism to pessimism in just these four responses:
‘It would be wonderful if governing bodies had more training, and if we 
looked at the quality of that training. In [the borough] it’s pretty good, but 
I’m not sure it always is elsewhere.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
‘The LEA provides training for governors to learn different aspects of their 
responsibility, so [governors] are supported. But still, having done all that, 
it’s still a big challenge, because education...is more complicated now than it 
was even five or ten years ago.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘Trying to get a clear-thinking strategy into a school, or into an LEA, is 
almost impossible, because it isn’t any of their training, as far as I can see -  
compared to what we do in industry.’ (Redwood chair)
‘Government should do something about training for the governors -  there 
should be a set budget for training.... They should see that ‘this is required 
of the governors, they’re required to oversee the budget, they’re required to 
formulate policies for this school, let’s give them the support as well.’ 
They’re not doing that.’ (Brownstone chair)
However, it soon emerged that improved governor training would likely have only a 
minimal impact, as there was no evidence that governors were any more likely to 
attend improved courses than they were to attend the existing ones. As the comments 
below reveal, the most common reason in each of the five case study schools for why 
governors in this research did not attend governor training was because they felt that 
neither they nor their colleagues had sufficient time to do so:
‘Although [the borough] is very good at providing training services for 
governors, half the governors probably don’t have the interest in getting the 
training, and half the governors who may have the interest are working flat- 
out, because they’re like me, who’s on the board of seven British companies 
-  we just don’t have the time to get there! ’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘Often in a school, you’ll have one or two governors who perhaps have the 
time or commitment to really work well, go to the governors’ training, maybe 
give training themselves, work closely with the head, they have a head that 
involves them with things, and they really know what’s what. I don’t think 
that’s the case at the school I’m at.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
173
‘I think training for governors is a helpful thing. But that’s not to say it’s 
easy - 1 think being a governor of a school is quite hard work, and in a sense 
it’s not too difficult for me because [of my job]. But for some people, with 
their own lives, families, jobs, and so on, it can be quite a tough assignment.’ 
(Greenleaf co-opted governor)
‘There’s not very much emphasis laid on training upon appointment, so 
people who are appointed to the governing body aren’t pressed into it.... 
They run training courses about once a term, [but] very few people take 
advantage of them.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
As such, while governors acknowledged that the quality of governor training -  
although already generally good -  could be improved, this research demonstrated 
that the primary barrier in relation to governor training was not its quality, but the 
lack of time governors had to attend such sessions. As will be argued in the next 
chapter, the time expectations placed upon governors did create a significant 
strategic planning barrier. However, it is also argued that governors attributed this 
lack of time to unrealistic central government expectations, not any factor at the LEA 
level. Clearly, efforts to improve LEA governor training would be extremely 
valuable to those who attend, but the main barriers to improving strategic planning 
through training lie with institutions who do not mandate such training, and a central 
government that fails to provide governors with the time necessary to do so.
Given the two strands of evidence presented in this section, it therefore seemed 
reasonable to conclude that there was little evidence to suggest that governors felt 
LEA-level barriers had substantial influence on their strategic planning processes. 
Rather, governors seemed to report that their governing bodies had relationships with 
the LEA that, while important, were largely administrative and transactional. As 
such, it was deemed acceptable to restrict this research to the strategic planning 
barriers created at the institutional and central governmental levels.
5.7 Chapter Five Conclusion
This chapter was the first of two in which evidence was presented to support the 
assertion, made in Chapter Four, that many inner London secondary school 
governing bodies have difficulty engaging in strategic planning. This chapter first 
proposed and outlined the theoretical concept of ‘barriers’ to strategic planning, and 
then presented the survey evidence regarding the hindrances to strategic planning 
faced by inner London secondary school governing bodies. From this data, and from
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the qualitative interview data, this chapter identified four main institutional-level 
barriers that, it was argued, prevent governing bodies from pursuing strategic 
planning more effectively. These barriers were the existence of a ‘monitoring 
culture’ amongst governing bodies, the varying level of involvement of various types 
and sub-groups of governors, the tendency of governors to gravitate towards what 
were termed ‘tangible’ issues, and the frequent deference of governing bodies to staff 
on issues of strategic planning.
While some of the issues that form these barriers have been pointed out individually 
in previous governance literature, (the existence of ‘passenger’ governors (see Deem 
and Brehony 1993; Earley 1994a; Sallis 2001), the tendency of governors to focus on 
finance and not on curriculum (see Baginsky 1991; Earley and Creese 1998), and the 
information gap between governors and staff (see Sheam et al. 1995)) this research 
presents these issues in a new and different context, as components of a set of 
institutional-level barriers to strategic planning. Furthermore, this is the first study 
to outline and explore the issue of governing bodies engaging in monitoring to the 
exclusion of tasks like strategic planning. By proposing the concept of barriers, this 
research provides a new perspective for interpreting the institutional-level factors 
that impede governing bodies that might be seeking to fulfil their strategic planning 
responsibilities.
Yet both the qualitative and quantitative data collected for this study suggest that 
these institutional-level issues are only part of the reason for why governing bodies 
have difficulties with strategic planning. Despite having identified these more 
general institutional-level problems (to which the final chapter of this thesis will 
propose some institutional-level solutions), it is inevitably true that each school’s 
own approach towards strategic planning is dictated to some extent by its own unique 
circumstances. While it was demonstrated herein that the role and influence of the 
LEA in relation to governing body strategic planning was frequently quite minimal, 
the survey data presented in this chapter also illustrated that the most common 
hindrances to long-term strategic planning came from problems created by central 
government actions. As one Bluewater parent governor pointed out, the problems 
could not be traced solely to the institutional level, nor could they all be solved there:
‘The governors at [the school] are very reactive -  they’re trying to become
proactive, but they’re not fast enough or aggressive enough, combined with a
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certain level of apathy and resignation about how much can be done at the 
school level.’
In seeking a solution to the strategic planning conundrum that will help as many 
schools as is possible, it is logical to attempt to determine how these problems might 
be resolved at the policy level that affects all those schools more or less equally. In 
the education sphere, that level is central government. Although the issue of central 
government has been implicitly present in the data presentation to this point, it was 
clear from the literature and the research that central government initiatives and 
regulations have begun to both describe and prescribe governors’ ability to do what 
is being asked of them. To fully understand the ability of governors to perform the 
strategic planning responsibilities that are being asked of them, the central 
government’s role must be examined more closely. This, therefore, is the subject of 
the next chapter.
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C h a p t e r  S ix
C e n t r a l  G o v e r n m e n t a l -L e v e l  St r a t e g ic  P l a n n in g  B a r r ie r s
6.0 Introduction
Complementing Chapter Five, this chapter presents further research evidence in the 
attempt to answer the third main research question:
If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why is 
this the case?__________________________________________________________
While Chapter Five addressed the strategic planning barriers that stem from the 
institutional level, this chapter identifies and examines the six main strategic 
planning barriers that stem from the level of central government. Section 6.1 
addresses the barrier created by time pressures and the associated expectations of 
governors as volunteers. Section 6.2 addresses the barrier created by central 
government paperwork. Section 6.3 addresses the strategic planning barrier created 
by central government legislation. Section 6.4 addresses the barrier created by the 
current financing system. Section 6.5 addresses the barrier created by the lack of 
communication between central government and governing bodies on strategic 
planning. Section 6.6 addresses the barrier created by the lack of trust between central 
government and governing bodies. Section 6.7 summarises the research evidence, and 
concludes by examining these research findings in the context of the existing literature.
6.1 The ‘Time Constraints and Volunteer Expectations’ Barrier
‘I do wonder what other governors get out of it. I mean, who in their right mind 
would volunteer to give up so much time?’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
This research found substantial evidence that governors felt overworked and 
undervalued by a central government that expected governors and governing bodies 
to do too much, given the time governors were willing to expend. Section 6.1.1 will 
present evidence that the vast majority of governors did wish to be responsible and 
perform effectively, but that they felt the reality of the current time constraints meant 
that doing so was often difficult, if not impossible. Section 6.1.2 will present 
evidence of governors’ frustration with what they perceived as central government’s 
lack of appreciation regarding the amount of time that governors volunteer to their
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schools. It will be argued that governors felt central government either failed to 
recognise this contribution or intentionally ignored its implications.
Third, evidence will be presented regarding the implications that these findings have 
for strategic planning. Section 6.1.3 will provide evidence to show that governors 
felt that their responsibilities have increased in recent years without a commensurate 
increase in the commitment and support governors require in order to fulfil those 
responsibilities, leaving them less time for strategic planning. Then, Section 6.1.4 
will provide evidence of what the increased demands upon governors mean for future 
recruitment and retention of governors. This section concludes by pointing to how 
central government’s excessive expectations of volunteers can adversely impact the 
government’s goal of having governing bodies engage in strategic planning.
6.1.1 Governor Responsibility and Time Constraints
The context of the evidence below must be made clear at the outset: throughout this 
research, it was apparent that from their demeanour most governors wanted to do a 
good job. As one Whitefrost governor noted, ‘at the end of the day, it’s legally the 
governors’ fault if something goes wrong.' Many governors felt increasingly tom 
between meeting their statutory and legal responsibilities, yet having had the 
practical experience that they often could not meet all these requirements. This 
dilemma was also evident in the survey data, which found that, when asked whether 
central government expects governing bodies to do too little or too much, 66.7 per 
cent of chairs (N=80) and 91.4 per cent o f  heads (N=74) responded 'too much'. The 
statistical significance of this result (Mann-Whitney z  =-2.0; p < 0.05) indicates that 
although both chairs and heads were concerned about workload, heads were 
substantially more concerned that governors would not be able to cope with any 
additional responsibilities. The following excerpts demonstrate not only governors’ 
concern about this combination of statutory duties and practical realities, but their 
concern that governing bodies will be blamed for inadequacies that they themselves 
could not prevent:
‘It’s a lot of responsibility. There are so many [training] courses put up there, 
and there are too many meetings you have to go to. Then you sign on the 
dotted line -  any decision-maker has a lot of responsibility.... And government 
— either they have left it for schools to sort out on their own governing bodies, 
or they have a lot of expectations. (Greenleaf teacher governor)
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‘[Governors] have got to understand that as part of the community, they are 
also responsible to the community for what actions we take.... But the hours 
of work that go into something like that are such that a lot of governors find 
that the work is becoming too demanding. (Redwood head teacher)
‘We are responsible for preparing and monitoring the budget, and in other 
schools, governors do sit in and look at budget drafts and are involved with 
making budget decisions. But sometimes, you say ‘prepare \ From what 
stage do you prepare? Are we expected to start from scratch? (Greenleaf 
parent governor)
Furthermore, it was clear from the research evidence that the type of people who 
choose to become governors are often fairly conscientious individuals, and that as 
such, they are genuinely bothered by this discrepancy between expectations and 
reality. As one supplementary chair interviewee said, ‘I feel perpetually guilty - 1 have 
a very demanding, very busy, and very all-consuming job. In terms of the time -  there 
isn’t enough.’ Yet in the end, many governors said that in order to prevent paralysis at 
the point of delivery, they simply ignored government policies when necessary:
‘I would have said that [paperwork was a problem] about two or three years 
ago, when you had piles of documents coming -  now we just ignore them, and 
get on with our business. You can’t help it! ’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘An awful lot of the time the governors just ignore the legislation -  it only 
comes into being at their governing body two or three years after it should 
have done.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
Clearly, this is a priori not the kind of situation that central government desires, nor 
does it appear that the perpetuation of this situation would assist governors in 
reaching the stage where they could begin engaging in strategic planning. In short, 
while most governors wished to comply with the regulations and requirements to the 
greatest extent possible, they frequently found that they did not have the time 
available to meet these demands. Indeed, when asked what percentage of its time 
their governing body spent on long-term strategic planning, 60.3 per cent of chairs 
(N=83) and 62.3 per cent of heads (N=69) reported spending only 30 per cent or 
less, while nearly four-fifths (77.2 per cent of chairs and 79.7 per cent of heads) 
reported spending 40 per cent or less.
6.1.2 Governing Bodies as ‘Free Labour’
The research evidence further illustrated that governors were not concerned solely 
about the time constraints, but also about the manner in which they perceived these
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concerns were being addressed by central government. Governors complained that 
not only did central government fail to acknowledge this situation, but that central 
government continued to actively exacerbate the gap between the demands being 
made upon governing bodies and governing body capacity. As such, this research 
found that governors were overwhelmingly resentful of a central government that, 
they believed, perceived governors as an unlimited source of free labour. This issue 
provided one of the most unanimous displays of agreement amongst governors in the 
entire study; in every case study school, this complaint was raised repeatedly and 
forcefully by every category of governors:
‘The time and knowledge needed for governors has changed out of all 
proportion! Central government has taken this reserve of goodwill to the 
breaking point, since it’s effectively a pool of free labour that central 
government doesn’t have to pay for.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
‘I don’t think that the government should be putting more and more on the 
governor’s role without necessarily fully remembering that it’s a voluntary 
evening activity.’ (Brownstone head teacher)
‘Essentially, central government is getting free professional assistance, and I 
don’t think they’ve ever stopped to think about what this assistance would 
cost if these individuals charged for their time instead of volunteering.’ 
(Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘[Government is] getting a free service and yet the government makes out 
that ‘we’re doing [them] a favour by being there!’ I think it is an angel from 
heaven if it’s someone offering that much time -  certainly from business co­
opted governors.’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
Although the complaint about being asked to ‘do too much with too little’ is not new, the 
research evidence suggested that this problem has an important influence on strategic 
planning. On the quantitative side, the survey found that 56.5 per cent of chairs (N=85) 
and 63.2 per cent of heads (N=68) felt that the ‘volunteer status’ of governors hindered 
strategic planning. The qualitative research provides further insight into this finding, 
with two main consequences of the impact of time and voluntarism on strategic planning 
emerging from this evidence. First, governors felt that this approach by government 
ignored the fact that there had been an increase in governor responsibility without an 
increase in governor support. Second, governors felt that the increased time pressure 
created by central government meant that retention of governors would suffer, as would 
recruitment of new governors to replace those lost. The strategic planning 
consequences of each of these two issues are now explored in turn.
180
6.1.3 Strategic Planning and Increasing Governing Body Responsibilities
As was mentioned above, the first of these two time-related consequences is that 
governors believe they are being asked to undertake more complex responsibilities 
without the resources and tools necessary to do so successfully. Governors in every 
case study school felt their job had become much more complex in recent years, yet 
that there had been no concomitant recognition of this fact by central government. 
This complaint was expressed both philosophically and practically. In framing the 
former, one governor argued that although central government was asking too much 
of school governors, ‘I don’t think they realise they do. I think a lot of this is 
unspoken. In a sense, we’re acting out, or working out, what [central government’s 
proposals] mean.’ In articulating the latter, a Redwood governor point out, frankly, 
that ‘If you’re like me, with a busy job, long commuting time, not a lot of spare 
hours, you’re only going to get a certain level of commitment!’ Yet governors were 
broadly in agreement about the end result: that government was increasing its 
mandates for governors without increasing support for implementation. The 
following excerpts reveal some of the many examples of this sentiment:
‘I think the government is asking too much, and I  don't think the government 
understands what it is asking for. And I think a large school, with a difficult 
and challenging intake, takes up geometrically more time than a small 
nursery school with fifty kids.... The complexities get greater.’ (Bluewater 
co-opted governor)
‘The larger issue is that there have been a lot of responsibilities devolved to 
governors, and formerly, the LEA had staff that they were paying to do the 
things that governors are now doing for free. A huge amount of money must 
have been saved -  so where did it go?’ (Whitefrost parent governor)
[Government is] in danger of killing the whole process. Far too much to 
do.... They are too demanding by a million miles -  and we’re not paid 
employees. They’re trying to get us to do beyond the remit that I think 
should be -  making us an independent check as part of the process -  and I 
don’t think that [going beyond that remit] is feasible. (Redwood chair)
This animosity was so unanimous amongst governors that central government’s only 
support on this point came in the form of ‘damning with faint praise’. One 
Bluewater governor suggested that governors actually were not being asked to do 
more than was needed, ‘because I think that what’s expected of us is what it takes to 
actually govern the school.’ She immediately added, however, that this was probably 
of little consolation to her fellow governors on the ground. ‘I do think there’s a sense 
in which it’s much more taxing than people let on,’ she confided.
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6.1.4 Strategic Planning and Governor Retention and Recruitment Concerns
The second of these two time-related consequences for strategic planning is that 
many governors believed that the increasing governors’ workload would 
simultaneously accelerate governor turnover and discourage the recruitment of 
replacement governors. Governors argued strongly that central government bore 
substantial responsibility for creating an environment in which recruitment and 
retention of governors (at least in certain urban areas) was becoming more difficult. 
There were two main opinions amongst respondents as to why they felt this situation 
had come to pass. On one hand, some governors felt that the problem had been 
created through a lack of coherence and direction on the part of a well-meaning but 
uninformed central government:
‘Obviously central government has to operate on the basis that there will be a 
governing body for every school, [but] it makes no judgements as to whether 
or not there’s a pool of people out there who want to be governors.’ 
(Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘I’m not sure what government expects from governors. Our governing body 
tends to have the expertise necessary, but there’s often a difficulty in getting 
new governors at many schools in the borough.’ (Supplementary interview 
chair)
On the other hand, some governors felt that central government was simply arrogant 
in its attitude towards governing bodies. These governors suggested that far from 
attempting to accommodate governor concerns, central government was 
overestimating the capacity threshold of governing bodies while underestimating the 
antagonism created by such actions. In effect, these governors believed that the 
simple symbolism of government ‘ignoring the needs of governing bodies’ was an 
additional disincentive towards both encouraging the involvement of new governors 
and perpetuating the involvement of existing ones:
‘I think we’ve probably crossed the line already where we’ve got into areas 
where we’re trying to do things that are beyond our scope. And government 
is continuing to make claims on behalf of governing bodies that they won’t be 
able to fulfil -  and which they will increasingly fa il to fulfil, because 
increasingly they will be loathe to continue their terms of office. 
(Brownstone LEA governor)
‘I gave up executive work when I was sixty -  so I’ve been able to sort of fit it 
in. But there’s no way that [one of the other co-opted governors] is going to 
fit that in. There’s no way working mothers are going to fit that in -  so I
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think the time expectation is unrealistic if you’re going to do what you should 
do.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
This dearth of governmental understanding about the recruitment and retention issue 
is a problem in its own right. However, the more important issue for this thesis is the 
link between the adverse effect of central government policy on governor recruitment 
and retention, and the impact that recruitment and retention problems have on 
strategic planning. As was noted in earlier in Section 5.4.1, the survey found that 
60.5 per cent of chairs (N=86) and 69.6 per cent of heads (N=69) felt that difficulty 
in recruiting governors hindered strategic planning, while a substantial minority of 
chairs (46.5 per cent, N=86) and a majority of heads (58.0 per cent, N=69) felt that 
difficulty in retaining governors hindered strategic planning.1 Furthermore, as was 
argued in Chapter Four, long-term planning requires a measure of stability in the 
governing body itself, in order to set frameworks and pursue long-term objectives. 
The evidence presented above demonstrates that governors were troubled by the 
practical implications of central government’s approach (or lack thereof) to concerns 
about recruitment and retention. As such, it seems valid to posit that the 
government’s current position and policies may lead to both fewer qualified 
governors and less capacity within governing bodies to engage in long-term thinking. 
The Redwood head teacher captured the essence of this apparent conflict between 
strategic planning and government policy, arguing that he had, unfortunately, 
experienced this problem first-hand. ‘The governors have got a key strategic role to 
play, and the government has just tried to use them as agents for [itself],’ he said. 
‘As a result, we’ve lost governors.’
6.2 The Paperwork Barrier
This research next found that the effects of two additional and related barriers -  those 
of paperwork and legislation -  often compounded the time barrier. As is evident 
from Table 6.1 (extracted from Table 5.1), the categories that ranked as the top four 
greatest hindrances to strategic planning -  out of 24 options -  were all categories that 
dealt with how both government paperwork and government legislation or directives 
impacted upon adversely upon governors’ time.
1 Neither difference between chairs and heads was statistically significant.
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Table 6.1: Hindrances Related to Paperwork and/or Legislation








Amount of time required to address 
statutory responsibilities 90.4 95.7 83 69
Amount of time required to formulate 
and review statutory policies 89.2 92.6 83 68
The amount of paperwork 91.8 92.6 85 68
The amount of legislation and regulation 87.1 92.5 85 67
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
From the qualitative data, it became clear that complaints regarding paperwork and 
legislation were often complementary. This was not surprising, since in the context 
of governors’ responsibilities, ‘paperwork’ provides the delivery vehicle while 
‘legislation and regulation’ provide the content. Yet the evidence from the case 
studies strongly suggested that governors were not uniformly critical of all paperwork 
or all legislation. Instead, it appeared that the barriers of paperwork and legislation 
were caused by more targeted problems. The following two main sections present the 
evidence for these concerns about paperwork and legislation, and examine their 
implications for strategic planning. For clarity of presentation, the paperwork barrier is 
discussed in this section (6.2), while the legislation barrier is discussed in Section 6.3.
6.2.1 Paperwork and Volume
As is illustrated by the survey data in Table 6.1, ‘amount of paperwork’ was the 
highest-rated strategic planning hindrance for chairs, and the second highest-rated 
such hindrance for heads. It will be argued that governors’ two main concerns about 
paperwork were a) the volume of paperwork they received (to be discussed in this 
section), and b) the format of the paperwork itself (to be discussed in Section 6.2.2). 
The combined adverse influence of these two issues on governors’ information 
assimilation is then discussed in Section 6.2.3.
First, governors from each case study complained overwhelmingly about the sheer 
volume of material that they received as part of their duties. One Whitefrost 
governor neatly summarised both the sentiment and solution of most governors in 
this study: ‘At the moment, you have a ton of paperwork -  and I’m not going to read 
most of it, I chuck it in the bin.’ It was clear that governors felt central government 
was inundating governors with paperwork, without having assessed whether the
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paperwork was either a) necessary or b) capable of being completed by volunteers 
who had limited time available. The frustration with this excess volume of material -  
regardless of its format or content -  was made most vividly by those respondents 
who illustrated their burden through exasperated gesticulation:
‘Governors are capable, but the amount [of paperwork] they’re given is 
ludicrous. There’s a photograph of me with six month’s of paperwork I’d 
received, and it’s about this high [indicates about five feet]? (Redwood chair)
‘I’ve been a governor for 18 months, and I’ve probably got a pile of 
paperwork this big [indicates about three feet] -  and most of it is not worth 
reading. Totally ineffective.’ (Whitefrost staff governor)
‘This is the [amount of] literature just from the meeting last night [indicates 
about ten inches].... Last year we had a doctor we co-opted into the 
governing body. After two meetings, when he saw the pile of documents and 
papers that were arriving, he said ‘enough is enough, I don’t want to be a 
governor.”  (Brownstone parent governor)
Physical indications aside, almost every governor in this research voiced a similar 
complaint about the quantity of material received. ‘The amount of paper that flies 
around is incredible, it’s ridiculous,’ said the Whitefrost chair, reflecting the thoughts 
of many. ‘You should only have a small amount; otherwise it becomes meaningless, 
and you just drown in it.’ So if  there really is a problem with the volume of 
paperwork, why did not more governors simply ignore it or throw it out? As noted 
above, some did. But there seemed to be two reasons why many of them did not. 
First, it appeared that more experienced governors found it easier to distinguish 
between important and unimportant material. Yet if there is frequent governor 
turnover, individual governors may not be in post long enough to learn how to 
engage efficiently in this sorting process. The following comments point to this 
concern, particularly regarding the relevance of many documents to the needs of 
individual schools:
‘I’m not retired. I travel thirty-five miles from where I work to get to a 
meeting at six o’clock at [the school]. And then I’m faced when I get in the 
room with all these papers I haven’t got time to read! So we’ve gone from 
the point of not getting anything to the point of getting a lot -  but is the Tot’ 
you get the right stuff? I think that’s an issue.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘If you get too much paper, you don’t read any of it! And so much of it is not 
relevant to most governors. It would be valuable to have a central log of all the 
paperwork for reference, but most individual governors would prefer to have a 
summary of what they truly need instead.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
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Second, as was noted in Section 6.1.1, this research suggested that governors 
appeared to be generally responsible people. As such, governors often felt that they 
had a responsibility to read all the paperwork, a point illustrated by a Whitefrost 
parent governor. ‘Governors get too much stuff, and I get very angry about that,’ he 
said. ‘But you know that you have to read all the papers -  it’s your duty, your 
obligation.’ This research suggested that even though governors may think a lot of 
the material they receive is not very useful, they also did not want to ignore the 
wrong material. Given this level of concern, it is perhaps unsurprising that when 
asked whether the desire to avoid increasing governors’ workload hindered strategic 
planning by their governing bodies, 69.8 per cent of chairs and 89.7 per cent of heads 
agreed (chi-squared = 9.0; p  < 0.05). The statistical significance of this result 
suggests that while heads were much more pessimistic than chairs regarding the 
workload that governing bodies could reasonably undertake, the difference was more 
in terms of scale than perspective. One Redwood governor offered this simple plea 
to central government: ‘What you can’t do is load it all on governors and expect 
them to read it -  [that] doesn’t work! ’
6.2.2 Paperwork and Format
Although governors felt that a reduction in volume alone would give them more time 
to consider strategic planning issues, this research found that the problems associated 
with governors’ paperwork extended to quality as well as to quantity. Governors 
frequently complained about how the format of the paperwork they receive -  in both 
its style and its structure -  created additional problems. First, governors reported that 
the linguistic style in which many of the documents were written often led to 
confusion, exclusion, and exasperation amongst governors who were unfamiliar with 
government terminology and ‘jargon’:
‘There is information overload, most of it is complete nonsense, [and] it’s not 
written well.... The stuff is all written in committee language; it’s all in local 
government and central government terminology, which -  unless you’re 
familiar with it -  is completely over everyone’s head.’ (Whitefrost co-opted 
governor)
‘That’s the problem with it -  it’s not in layman’s terms. So consequently, a 
lot of governors skim-read it, read part of it, don’t really understand it, and 
just wait for the next meeting of the governing body for someone who has 
read it and does understand it to encapsulate, in a brief report, what you need 
to do with that information. So it effectively comes down to a few people 
who can digest, understand and assimilate information, and then regurgitate it
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back to us at governing body so we can understand it. And that is a major 
problem.’ (Redwood parent governor)
‘The correspondence that we get, the paperwork that we get, [it is] not all the 
time ‘user-friendly.’ When we say that the governors come from ‘different 
walks of life’, the government should appreciate that governors really come 
from different walks of life! [A governor] may be a street trader, and a street 
trader can have a lot of things to contribute to these schools...[yet] if 
[government officials] expect that we will read all the jargon, they are living 
in a different world.’ (Brownstone chair)
Second, governors felt that the lack of structure -  and particularly the lack of clear 
prioritisation -  in central government documents often made it difficult for governors 
to determine what central government was actually asking them to do. A number of 
governors felt that they had successfully negotiated the linguistic barrier of civil 
service jargon (as discussed above) only to become stymied by the general lack of 
prioritisation in the paperwork they received. In one instance, the Whitefrost chair 
illustrated this problem by pointing to a DfEE document he had pulled from his 
briefcase, inquiring:
‘So [this is categorised as] ‘Strongly Recommended’ -  it would be nice to 
know, what does that mean? Does that mean strongly recommended that you 
do something about it, or that you read it, or...?’
Levelling a similar charge from a slightly different angle was a Redwood parent 
governor, who complained:
‘In some cases [the paperwork] is ‘information-only’. [But then] you find 
that, in one small paragraph in a very large document, there’s something you 
actually need to do, that’s a legal requirement -  and I wish they’d actually put 
it in bold type and put it in front, rather than on page ninety-four, as is their 
wont.’
As these comments illustrate, the favoured linguistic and structural approaches of 
civil service policy drafters are often completely at odds with the needs of those for 
whom the policies are being written. As a consequence, a substantial number of 
governors felt that these twin problems of language and structure not only often left 
them with a sense of central government having wasted their (limited) time, but often 
served to exclude the very types governors -  parents and minorities -  that central 
government had been making a concerted effort to recruit.
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6.2.3 Paperwork and Problems of Information Assimilation
The third and final component of the paperwork barrier is the problem of information 
assimilation. Almost all case study governors felt that due to time constraints, they 
(personally) were often unable to assimilate the information they received in order to 
make informed decisions about it. When asked if governors had enough time to do 
so, one Redwood governor noted wryly, ‘Not governors who work for a living.’ 
Other governors concurred, arguing that it was time, not intellectual ability, which 
prevented governors from assimilating the information they received:
‘I think it’s chicken-and-egg -  I think we probably need the amount of 
information we’re getting, in order to make good decisions. The problem is, 
does any human being have the amount of time to actually use that 
[information]? The issue then is, how is that information managed for the use 
of the governors?’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘[Governors] assimilate it if they get it in enough time. Most of our 
governors are very good at reading stuff if they have the time. They’re an 
intelligent enough body to assimilate it.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
‘The only person who [has the time to assimilate the material] is the person 
who says ‘really, I’ve got nothing to do, and reading these papers is taking 
two hours’ -  that’s the retired, special type of person, and then he goes into it 
in some detail.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
‘It is too much. The way I work -  and I don’t know how other governors 
work -  [means] the most I can do is skim read. There’s no way I can get 
through most of that - 1 just don’t have the time. Certainly not as a teacher.’ 
(Brownstone teacher governor)
How does this assimilation problem impact strategic planning? One implication is 
found in the survey data, as Table 6.1 shows that 89.2 per cent of chairs and 92.6 per 
cent of heads felt that the ‘amount of time required to formulate and review statutory 
policies’ hindered their ability to do strategic planning. Together, the evidence 
presented above suggests that when governors already do not have the time to 
assimilate the information they receive, for central government to expect that 
governing bodies will also engage in strategic planning appears to be somewhat 
unrealistic. It appeared from this research that governors devoted much of their 
limited time towards constructing the statutory framework in which they operated, 
leaving less time to engage in activities like strategic planning.
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6.3 The ‘Legislation and Statutory Responsibilities’ Barrier
The previous section demonstrated that governors were adversely affected by the 
volume and format of the paperwork that they receive. However, governors also 
displayed a concern over volume and content, which is grounded in their 
apprehension about government legislation and regulations. Legislation is the 
foundation of the policies that comprise the volumes of paperwork, and it will be 
argued that central government’s approach towards education legislation and 
regulation creates two distinct problems for any attempts by governing bodies to 
engage in strategic planning. The first problem concerns the frequency and 
complexity of legislative initiatives, a factor that governors felt contributed to 
increased governor workload while reducing opportunities for strategic planning. 
The second problem concerns the intended time frame of legislation, as governors 
felt that central government was demanding ‘quick results’ from its legislative 
programme, an approach that governors often felt was contradictory to taking a 
longer-term view of their schools. Both factors these are now discussed in turn.
6.3.1 The Frequency and Complexity of Initiatives
This research found that governors felt overwhelmed by the number of new 
education initiatives from central government, the overall lack of apparent cohesion 
between them, and the time it took governors simply to comprehend what these 
initiatives meant, both in terms of their own statutory responsibilities and in what 
needed to be done to secure the benefits of these initiatives for their schools. 
Interviewees felt that not only did the plethora of government initiatives often failed 
to provide the desired results, but that the frequency and complexity of these 
initiatives meant that fully understanding them was often beyond the capacity of 
volunteer governors. As can be seen below, governors’ frustration about ‘initiative 
overload’ was both strong and frequent:
‘To get people in and involved takes a much more radical view, and my 
problem with the incrementalist view is that schools are in initiative overload 
-  and what you actually need is a big initiative, rather than a load of small 
ones.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘Although the initiatives sound good on paper, and I would never say ‘no, I’m 
not going to go for this,’ in terms of the workload for the teacher, it’s getting 
too much. It’s getting unbearable.’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
‘There are a lot of [initiatives] that are coming in that are affecting how you 
manage the staff, and which affect the professional side. And they’re also
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giving certain rights to parents -  and [these changes] are coming at you one 
after the other.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
‘There are so many new initiatives -  gifted and talented, mini-EAZ -  there 
are so many things. I think there was too much in too little time. I think that 
to [expect you to] give your thoughts and time effectively to each of those 
issues is not fair.’ (Greenleaf teacher governor)
Governors consistently argued that the frequency and complexity of legislative 
initiatives was leading to scepticism amongst governors about a) central government’s 
insistence on using initiatives as a way to increase institutional-level accountability, 
and b) central government’s overall education reform strategy. First, governors argued 
that if the aim of central government was to increase institutional-level accountability 
through a larger number of smaller, targeted, initiatives, this strategy was failing to 
produce the desired results at the institutional level -  usually because more 
programmes meant more time spent on applying for bids and monitoring progress:
‘Every time you have a new initiative you have different ways of evaluating 
that initiative. So you’ve got more forms to fill in, each individual student 
needs to be evaluated, and that’s where the red tape happens and that’s where 
the accountability gets a bit overwhelming.’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
‘There’s [so much] energy that you have to expend -  the governing body not 
so much, but certainly the paid staff -  doing what I call the ‘tap dance for 
government’.’ (Redwood head teacher)
More troubling, however, was the finding that several governors felt that the 
multitude of initiatives indicated that central government had no clear overall 
strategy for education reform, but was instead desperately ‘casting about’ for 
potential legislative solutions. As some argued, governors were being forced to deal 
with the consequences of central government’s indecisiveness: ‘I just don’t see a 
strategy [from central government] - 1 see a whole bunch of initiatives,’ complained 
the Redwood chair. ‘So there’s a false urgency put on things, because the strategy is 
not clear.’ To others, central government’s apparent strategy of ‘governing through 
initiatives’ suggested that central government was trying to have it both ways: 
seeking to retain central control, while foisting the burden of accountability onto 
local governing bodies. This is a theme that will be returned to in Section 6.6.
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6.3.2 Strategic Planning Consequences of this Frequency and Complexity
The adverse impact of the frequency and complexity of legislation on governing 
body strategic planning can be summed up as follows. In quantitative terms, the 
survey results (Table 6.2, extracted from Table 5.1) indicated that approximately 
nine out o f  ten chairs and heads felt that both the amount of legislation and the time 
required to address statutory responsibilities hindered their governing bodies in doing 
strategic planning.
Table 6.2: Hindrances Created by Legislation and Statutory Responsibilities









Amount of time required to address 
statutory responsibilities 90.4 95.7 83 69
The amount of legislation and regulation 87.1 92.5 85 67
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
In qualitative terms, this Bluewater LEA governor expressed these difficulties 
succinctly, arguing that ‘ [Recent government initiatives] are designed to hinder any 
long-term planning. They are a fundamental constraint to any serious long-term 
planning.’ Similarly, interviewees throughout the case studies felt that the time 
required to understand and implement new initiatives was usually spent on 
administrative, rather than strategic, objectives. Dealing with what one governor 
termed the increase in ‘straight business’ created by new legislation was seen to be 
taking up more -  and in some cases, all -  of governing bodies’ time:
‘The main governing body still [has] to deal with ‘straight business’; you’ve 
got to do it, because it’s required by either the LEA or the government. Some 
of that stuff is operational, really -  not strategic or policy making.’ 
(Supplementary interview chair)
‘A lot of it is what I would call ‘medium term framework setting.’ We have 
to have equal opportunities policies, we have to have pay policies...there’s a 
lot of work involving the governors in that, [and often] this in my view is not 
strategic.... ’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘You should have time to deal with...thinking about where the school is 
going in the future, what are the major issues. But we don’t get a lot of time 
to do that. And if we [do] spend an hour debating that, everything else is 
being left.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
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Given this evidence, it appeared that the opportunities for governors to engage in 
strategic planning were often circumscribed by frequent government initiatives that 
governors felt were often uncoordinated and time-consuming.
6.3.3 Short-Term Timetables and Priorities
The second major problem created by the legislative programme of central 
government was the difference in time frames of expected results. First, governors 
argued that the targets for short-term ‘results’ being set by central government were 
incompatible with asking governors to do strategic planning over a longer time 
period. Second, governors argued that the deadlines set by legislation and 
regulations often forced governing bodies to make trade-offs in favour of meeting a 
short-term target rather than planning for a long-term benefit. Third, governors 
argued that they felt this short-term prioritisation was indicative of a government that 
was using its legislative programme to seek political successes rather than offer 
substantive educational improvement. Each of these points is examined below.
First, almost every interviewee felt that central government legislation and regulation 
encouraged the pursuit of short-term results over long-term gains. Governors 
suggested that when an initiative did not produce the expected advantages quickly, 
government was prone to abruptly abandon it and propose new ones. As many 
governors pointed out, this short-term approach meant that governing bodies had less 
of an opportunity to determine how well individual policies were working:
‘They’re doing all these soaring initiatives and ideas -  it’s ludicrous. You’re 
working on a minimum five-year time scale, but they’re trying to come out 
with an initiative every year. You’ve got no chance to see what the outcome 
is. So I think it’s disastrous.’ (Redwood chair)
‘Five to seven years ago, the directives started coming at such a rate that the 
teachers were losing sight of teaching because of the administration.... 
[Now], I think the administrators in the education field are seeing how some 
of the policies are either not working in practice, or are counterproductive to 
what [was] intended.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘I think everything in education changes too quickly. There needs to be a 
period of stasis. We’ve got to get focused on teaching, and not be obsessed 
with funding. There’s got to be a period of no change to the exam system, 
the national curriculum, everything else.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
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Second, governors felt that government was contributing to an atmosphere of 
instability and confusion at the institutional level by failing to give consistent and 
long-term support to its own initiatives. A substantial majority of interviewees noted 
that their governing bodies were constantly being asked to meet short-term targets at 
the expense of taking longer-term decisions. These governors were also quick to 
emphasise that this confusion had an adverse impact not only on own administrative 
responsibilities, but also on educational provision at the classroom level as well. By 
seeking short-term results, respondents felt that governors, staff, and students alike 
were paying the price for the indecisiveness of central government policy makers. 
As one supplementary interview chair pointed out, ‘Even if we decided to go for [a 
new initiative], [our governing body] would already be behind the curve. The 
problem with many of these initiatives is that the government wants the results 
yesterday!’ Other respondents, like the Redwood head, took an even harsher 
perspective of this burden being placed on governing bodies, arguing:
‘Government is continually changing things, but I think what they’re actually 
trying to do is make governors tools of their own policy.... And governors 
resent being used as tools to direct all the different initiatives. The 
government has overburdened governing bodies with changes, rather than 
making the changes more broad-brushed and supportive.’
This comment leads to the third point, as many governors, although admitting the 
cynical nature of their response, felt that government was too intent upon conforming 
its legislative programme to the political timetable, and less intent upon targeting its 
legislation to assist the students in the classroom. As one Whitefrost parent governor 
argued, many governors felt recent legislative changes were largely cosmetic: 
‘They’re new words to replace old ones in order for the government to have 
‘progress’,’ he said. Other governors agreed, suggesting that central government was 
generating ‘newness’ and ‘excitement’ at the expense of those who were being asked 
to go beyond the hype and actually grapple with the implementation of these 
initiatives. As one chair of governors argued:
‘I don’t think they really are urgent issues. They’re made urgent by 
deadlines being imposed on them [by government]...but in reality, they’re 
not genuinely urgent! And that’s largely because there’s a huge lack of 
[government] strategy.’ (Redwood chair)
Not only did governors think that government lacked a coherent education strategy, 
governors also argued that at the implementation stage, it quickly became apparent
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that legislation was often more style than substance. The comment below illustrates 
how many governors felt that this approach revealed an emphasis on short-term 
political gains rather than long-term educational achievement:
‘Everything the government does -  particularly this one -  is very focused on 
being re-elected. You can’t have something that reproduces itself quietly 
over in the comer. Everything has to be ‘new’. So there’s no re-production, 
there’s only production. And that’s extremely destabilising.’ (Bluewater co­
opted governor)
6.3.4 Strategic Planning Consequences of Short-Term Timetables and Priorities
Once again, the quantitative and qualitative data provide clear evidence of the 
adverse affect that central government’s short-term legislative priorities have on the 
ability of governing bodies to do longer-term strategic planning. Looking first at the 
quantitative data, the survey found that 82.4 per cent of chairs (N=84) and 85.5 per 
cent of heads (N=68) felt that ‘uncertainty about central government’s future 
education priorities’ hindered their ability to do strategic planning. Qualitatively, the 
response was similarly strong, as governors felt that central government’s priority on 
achieving quick results made it extremely difficult for governing bodies to allocate 
time away from activities that would assist in meeting those short-term targets. As 
the Brownstone head remarked:
‘Inevitably, those structures lead to more pragmatic-type decisions based on 
what is required at the time, rather than on ideals and visions for the future . ... 
But increasingly within the UK -  because there is a greater degree of 
centralisation of control -  you’re working within a political framework that’s 
incredibly short-termist. [As such], I can understand governors and myself 
being frustrated by an inability to put [our] best-laid plans into action.’
Other governors noted that the proliferation of short-term-focused initiatives meant 
that it was extremely difficult to draw up longer-term financial strategies, since 
governors were unsure of how much money would be available, how long that 
funding stream would last, or how they might be required to allocate their finances in 
the future. This lack of budgetary planning capacity, which will be addressed more 
fully in Section 6.4, was viewed as a critical barrier to strategic planning. Yet the 
comments of the governors below illustrate the difficulties that year-to-year 
budgeting created for governors who were attempting to be strategic and innovative:
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‘I want to know what I’m going to get, money-wise, this year, next year, and even 
three years out, so I can make adequate plans. Central government will do things 
for only one year out, and that doesn’t help.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘We don’t have any capacity to find new things, wholly unthought-of new 
things. That definitely is not part of how we are able to proceed. Because we 
don’t have any kind of predictable budget, and because our only kind of 
predictor is that we’re never going to have a surplus, then we can’t really 
begin to imagine anything.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
Lest the evidence above appears to document only a minor complaint about 
workloads and administrative responsibilities, it is important to recognise the 
overarching reason for why many governors felt long-term consistency in legislation 
was so important. As one supplementary interview chair -  and parent -  argued, such 
consistency would enable governing bodies to engage in strategic planning on the 
timescale that served the interests of students rather than the interest of legislators:
‘With education, if you say that a child comes in at eleven and goes out at 
eighteen, then it seems clear that you should be looking at a seven year plan -  
so that child has some kind of consistency throughout her education. If 
government is re-jigging all the time -  even with the best of intentions -  it’s 
the students who suffer, as the guinea pigs for new every government 
initiative.’
6.4 The ‘Financing System’ Barrier
‘One of the major changes which actually [adversely] affects classroom 
teaching today is the financial changes. The way in which money is held, the 
way it’s issued by central government, and in some cases the difficulty 
schools have in actually obtaining extra resources, extra finance.’ 
(Whitefrost staff governor)
The fourth central governmental-level barrier to strategic planning is the current 
financing system. Although governors largely welcomed the increased fiscal 
autonomy granted by the 1988 Education Reform Act, they also felt that this 
autonomy had become a double-edged sword. First, it will be argued that governors 
had three interlinked complaints about the current use of ‘bid’-based financing 
programmes (such as the heavily-promoted specialist schools programme): the time 
required to investigate and apply for these funding programmes, the sheer breadth of 
the options available for bid, and the lack of flexibility in how the money they 
received from these bids could be spent. Second, it will be argued that governors 
were concerned about the short duration of many of central government’s finance
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initiatives, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the continuation of any given 
finance initiative. It will therefore be argued that together, these features of the 
current central government financing system made it difficult for governors to 
engage in effective long-term financial strategic planning.
6.4.1 Bid-Based Financing Problems: Time, Breadth, and the Lack of Flexibility
The first complaint by governors was that bid-based financing programmes required 
both governors and staff to devote a disproportionately large amount of time to the 
process of seeking additional funds or resources. As the Whitefrost chair noted:
‘The amount of time schools are spending -  you have to put in a bid 
document for each different thing, and each one’s got a different slant, and it 
takes time, you don’t know whether the bid’s going to be successful -  it’s 
gone too far.’
Although central government has recently taken steps to ‘streamline’ this process, 
many governors felt that the application system was still far from the point where the 
advantages of a successful bid outweighed the time and effort necessary to both 
make the bid and comply with its conditions upon receipt. Illustrating this difficulty, 
Greenleaf s head argued:
‘On the government funding programmes, the big issue has been that often 
there’s not much lead-in time that you have to make the bid within. 
Sometimes it has been ridiculous, and there’s been no time for preparation.’
In short, governors felt that the additional time required for this short-term process 
was yet another drain on the time they had available for long term planning. 
Furthermore, even success in bidding for a programme like the specialist school 
status did not mean a reprieve from the time that schools and governors needed to 
allocate towards continuing to remain qualified and to receive funding. As one 
supplementary interview chair pointed out, the pressure of remaining eligible for 
such funding was substantial; as she noted, ‘it’s a lot of money to loseV Yet the 
ultimate paradox appeared to be that the schools that required the most urgent 
infusions of financial support were often those schools most desperately in need of a 
strong overall future vision. These two issues may then link to form a vicious circle 
-  a problem apparent to many governors, including this Whitefrost co-opted one:
‘Writing that [bid] takes a lot of time, and the best [bids] are about planning 
for what you want to do. And when you’re in a position like this school has
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been for the last few years -  having to react to situations in order to address 
major issues -  you don’t have the time to do that kind of planning! ’
The second complaint about bid-based programmes was that the breadth and range of 
available initiatives made strategic planning extremely difficult, reiterating the issue 
of ‘initiative overload’ raised in regards to paperwork (Section 6.3.1). When applied 
to finance, governors argued that even if they could become fully informed as to the 
full range of funding options available, the breadth of these offerings meant that they 
would need to spend an inordinate amount of energy simply selecting the most 
appropriate programmes for which to bid. To many governors, this situation was 
both discouraging and disheartening:
‘The standards fund has just been a nightmare. There are so many initiatives, 
and of course, government has adopted this approach because the best way of 
being shown to be meeting your promises is to parachute money into schools 
for specific activities.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
‘You can’t go for everything -  you’d spend all your time filling the forms in, 
setting your outcomes and milestones, get a member of staff to monitor it, get 
the evidence together. It’s almost unbelievable.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘Rather than lots of people flooding in, with lots of little bits and projects 
worth £100, or a day here or a day there, [the government] actually [needs] to 
integrate its initiatives.’ (Bluewater head teacher)
The third concern governors raised about bid-based programmes (and the financing 
system in general) was the lack of flexibility, in conjunction with what governors 
perceived as central government’s overemphasis on accountability. Overall, 
governors felt that central government was using the financing system to demonstrate 
its apparent commitment to ‘local accountability and choice,’ while in reality forcing 
schools to select their funding streams from a pre-selected set of government 
initiatives. As one Whitefrost governor complained, ‘It’s not that governors decide 
what they want to do -  it’s more that government tells us what they have for us!’ 
Governors argued that this approach meant that the advertised flexibility of Fair 
Funding -  and with it, governors’ ability to be innovative in their future planning -  
was being limited by the rigidity of the financing system:
‘Recently we’ve had this plethora of initiatives...some initiatives can be 
contradictory to others, and it’s made it very difficult to have the whole 
picture. Because the funding has been so tied to a particular initiative, we 
haven’t had, as a school, the flexibility to .. .be able to use it in a way we think 
is best to raise achievement.’ (Brownstone head teacher)
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‘I think that’s a Treasury issue where they’ve kept too tight a control on 
spending where it’s needed, and they’ve not been flexible about relaxing 
regulations where such relaxation is necessary.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
Furthermore, governors felt that if central government’s intent in creating numerous 
small bid programmes was to increase local accountability, this result was not 
forthcoming. Instead, governors felt that not only did this approach actually increase 
the time that they were forced to devote towards demonstrating continuing 
‘compliance’ with the terms of the financing arrangement, it also ignored the realities 
of the situation on the ground. Governors argued that in practice, their schools 
usually used these initiatives to fund areas where there was the greatest actual need, 
regardless of the ‘official’ purpose of the bid:
‘They say it’s accountability], but the way most schools do it is that the 
money gets siphoned off into wherever it’s needed. I know we get all this 
money for special needs, but special needs gets nowhere near the amount of 
money that’s designated for it!’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
‘There are too many initiatives -  they are too difficult to keep on top 
of...[and] as a result, it’s ‘grab all the money that’s going, and not pay too 
much attention to devoting the money to what it was intended for.’ 
(Brownstone LEA governor)
In short, governors felt the current structure of the financing system offered the worst 
of both worlds, neither delivering accountability nor permitting flexibility. In the 
words of one Bluewater co-opted governor:
‘[The current financing system] hugely complicates the planning process, and 
indeed the management process. Because the nature of the bidding process is 
that by the time you know the outcome, it’s actually too late to make die best of 
it! And what you were doing was diverting a huge amount of already-stretched 
management time in schools to concocting yet more arguments for often 
relatively trivial sums of money. So I think die whole thing has been over­
complicated and bureaucratic, and over-uncertain in its outcome, and that is a 
real inhibition to taking a long-term view as to what the school is about.’
6.4.2 The Short-Term Approach to Finance
Second, the research evidence demonstrated that both the timing and the uncertain 
long-term viability of bid programmes and other government funding schemes 
severely hindered attempts to plan strategically for the long term. Both of these 
issues were near the top of governor complaints about hindrances to strategic
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planning in the survey, (see Table 6.3 (extracted from Table 5.1)), and these data 
were strongly corroborated by the qualitative evidence.
Table 6.3: Hindrances Created by the Central Government Financing System









Pressure created by the timing of central 
government funding decisions 84.9 89.9 86 69
Uncertainty about central government’s 
future funding commitments 88.1 79.4 84 68
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
The first of these ‘short-term’ problems was the timing of central government 
funding decisions. Governors constantly argued that they were being asked to set 
their own preliminary institutional-level budgets well in advance of receiving their 
predicted (or actual) funding allocation from central government. Additionally, 
governors argued that a year-by-year funding system often prevented them from 
engaging in multi-year financial commitments, even where this approach might 
provide the best value. Because governors felt forced to make educated guesses 
about their available finances (even for just the coming year), many of them noted 
how futile they thought their efforts would be were they to attempt to plan any 
further into the future:
‘You have no idea in April when you’re setting your budget how much 
you’re going to get. You assume you’re going to get the same the following 
year. So it’s nigh on impossible to know what special grants are going to 
come through.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
‘The government is not sure what they’re doing or what they’re telling or 
giving us before they’ve done it -  but we’d actually like to plan ahead of that. 
So we’re actually not able to plan with specific numbers as much as we’d 
like, because government doesn’t know what they’re giving us -  or we don’t 
know what the numbers are.’ (Brownstone co-opted governor)
‘This whole question of ring-fencing funds is a nightmare. The money has to 
be spent by a certain time -  whereas you’d get better value for money if you 
carried it over, but [the response is] ‘I’m sorry sir, you’re not allowed to do 
that.’ It’s a bureaucrat’s nightmare, and it’s getting worse.’ (Bluewater co­
opted governor)
Yet even when budgets and bids had been allocated and settled, governors suggested 
that this was only the beginning of their problems. As one Greenleaf governor
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summed up the second ‘short-term’ problem: ‘When there are lots of pots of money, 
it makes planning difficult, [because] you don’t know if that money is going to be 
there in a few year’s time.’ This uncertainty over how long funding streams would 
last led to an aversion by governing bodies to plan strategically regarding the use of 
this money over the long term. Instead, some governors reported spending the 
money on ‘safe’ short-term or one-off improvements, while others reported trying to 
plan long-term, but being forced to alter those plans when funding schemes were 
discontinued or altered. As the survey data showed, nearly 90 per cent of chairs and 
80 per cent of heads felt that ‘uncertainty about future funding commitments’ 
hindered governing body strategic planning, and this finding was well-supported by 
the numerous reports of difficulties experienced by case study governing bodies:
‘Once you start something, you want to be able to carry it on. In one case, 
we had the money to train a teacher for Reading Recovery, so we hired the 
teacher, trained her -  and then our budget got cut and we didn’t have the 
money to keep her on.’ (Greenleaf chair)
‘We’re covered by Excellence in Cities, and we’ve just got money coming at 
us from all sorts of directions. We haven’t got a bloody clue how long it’s 
going to carry on for, or really what they want to give us the money for.’ 
(Brownstone LEA governor)
‘Sometimes you’re not sure how long it’s going to last, so you might make a 
bid for a year, but you’re not sure if it’s going to carry on after that, so it’s 
quite difficult to set things up and develop them.’ (Greenleaf head teacher)
‘You get £50,000 off the Chancellor one year, and you spend it, you have to 
make sure it’s a one-off purchase -  you can’t do anything that’s going to have 
any developmental effect.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
In sum, governors argued that the short-term instability of many government funding 
schemes created a substantial barrier to governing bodies that sought to engage in 
strategic long-term planning. Furthermore, when these broader financial concerns 
are combined with the specific problems created by the bid system of financing, the 
role that the current financing system plays in hindering strategic planning at the 
governing body level becomes even more apparent.
6.5 T h e  C o m m u n ic a t io n  B a r r ie r
The fifth central governmental-level barrier to strategic planning related to the 
breakdown in communication between governors and central government. This 
research found that each case study governing body perceived the existing
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communication mechanisms between central government and governing bodies to be 
either deficient or non-existent. Governors further argued that the communications 
channels that did exist were primarily ‘one-way’ -  from government to governors -  
and that the current communication system lacked internal coordination between 
central government agencies. Overall, this research suggested that these 
communication breakdowns created a general lack of responsiveness on the part of 
central government in relation to local level concerns, as is evident from the tenor of 
the comments below:
‘The communication process, in the main, is totally inadequate. There is no 
way of passing concerns back up the chain to the people that matter....The 
trouble is, the communication link [still] goes via the local authorities. They 
haven’t got a direct one from schools to government.’ (Redwood parent 
governor)
‘To be quite honest, I don’t think central government knows what governing 
bodies do. I can’t see how they can do, because it doesn’t seem to me that 
they have any feedback loop.’ (Whitefrost finance chair)
‘In the education department, part is coming out of here, part is coming out of 
there, part is coming out of there. When you get down to the school, it’s all 
hitting the school at once. That’s the funnel. That hits the governors, and 
that hits the management team. Now that’s the problem.’ (Redwood 
foundation governor)
This research identified two main strands of evidence to support the assertion that 
central government was failing to communicate effectively with governing bodies. 
The first was central government’s lack of knowledge of how its policies affected 
governing bodies, and the second was the failure of central government to adequately 
clarify and communicate the governor’s role to governing bodies. These two issues 
and their consequences for strategic planning are now discussed in detail.
6.5.1 Central Governmental Understanding of Policy Effects
Governors felt that one clear indication of the poor state of communication between 
government and governing bodies was that central government appeared to have 
little understanding of the effects that its policies had at the institutional level. As 
one supplementary chair said simply, ‘They don’t have a clue.’ Looking at the 
quantitative data, the survey found that 79.5 per cent of chairs (N=83) and 77.1 per 
cent of heads (N=70) felt that central government had an extremely low 
understanding of the effects that its policies had on governing bodies and schools. In
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contrast, only 4.8 per cent of chairs and 5.7 per cent of heads thought that central 
government had a high level of understanding. The interviews provided further 
support for this perceived lack of understanding, as can be seen in these comments:
‘The DfEE hasn’t got a clue. They’re off in cloud-cuckoo land. Central 
government has no idea what they’re putting students and teachers through.’ 
(Greenleaf parent governor)
‘Ah, joined-up management. Policy makers have a lack of understanding of 
what’s happening on the ground, and as a result plan policy that just doesn’t 
match reality. And therefore, they have a lack of understanding of incentives, 
and unintended effects.’ (Whitefrost chair)
‘We’re always chasing the government for numbers that they haven’t come 
up with when we well and truly have our plans underway.’ (Brownstone co­
opted governor)
‘I think they [government] try to make things easier and simplify things, but I 
don’t think they really clearly visualise what it’s like to be in a position that’s 
legally constrained but which you’re doing on a voluntary basis.’ (Bluewater 
co-opted governor)
This research also found that governors felt there were two main reasons for why 
central government had a poor understanding of how its policies affected schools and 
governing bodies. First, governors felt that central government rarely engaged in 
effective ‘on the ground’ observation of policy implementation. Governors argued 
that this lack of local-level communication and on-the-ground evidence gathering 
meant that central government often devised its policies without having heard the 
concerns of those charged with implementation. As such, governors felt that central 
government frequently formulated policies that neither understood nor met the needs 
of individual schools. When asked if central government understood the effects that 
its policies had on schools and governing bodies, the responses from these three 
governors were representative of governor sentiment throughout the case studies:
‘In a word, no! Because they aren’t ‘in the field’, they don’t necessarily see 
how the proposals that they’re making would actually work -  or not work -  
in practice.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘How can it? You never get anybody from DfEE [to] come down and visit the 
school, and they’re totally detached, as I see it.... My perception is clearly 
based only on my own school, and I don’t know whether DfEE personnel go to 
other schools, but we have never seen anybody. So my perception is that they 
don’t really understand.’ (Redwood co-opted governor)
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‘I think [government] feels that as long as they’ve funded it, put the money 
in, and they’ve got a form back saying what you’ve done, then everything is 
hunky-dory.... [But we] know that as long as schools have got a nice little 
paper saying ‘we’ve done something’, there’s no one checking it. It’s a 
complete work of fiction.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
Second, governors thought that the problems inherent in the lack of an on-the-ground 
perspective were compounded by an overly-idealistic ‘Whitehall mentality’ amongst 
those actually drafting the policies. Governors argued that policies often appeared to 
focus more on the rhetorical and political value of policies than on the mechanisms 
that would be required to actually implement the policies themselves. In effect, 
governors were arguing that the absence of strategic planning at the central 
governmental-level was directly responsibly for hindering strategic planning at the 
governing body level. Governors felt that this approach often led to the creation both 
of policies that appeared strong in theory but fell apart in practice, and policies that 
contradicted one another. Because these potential problems were not addressed at 
the policy inception stage, governors felt forced into spending their own time 
weaving together the intentions of various central government entities:
‘DfEE is not a customer-focused department -  it generates papers and 
initiatives and things like that, without real reference to [actual] governing 
bodies.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘There’s nothing wrong with change, but it’s got to be at a pace so the sharp 
end, where it all comes together, can handle it. I would suspect that when 
you get to the DfEE and the ministers, there are six major departments 
handling these things -  and I don’t think they’re really sitting down to say 
‘I’m launching this, does it clash with anybody?’ They just plough ahead.’ 
(Redwood foundation governor)
‘My perception is that one the one hand, you’ve got departments competing 
against each other in the DfEE, and you’ve got different ministers with 
different ideas, and they hold onto that idea that is theirs in order to prove 
their success. I don’t think there is this ‘joined-upness’ of thinking at the 
DfEE level, partly because of people wanting to make their own political 
careers.’ (Brownstone head teacher)
Finally, governors believed that consequences for strategic planning of this lack of 
understanding were unambiguous. In one respect, governors felt that the lack of 
understanding and communication meant that central government did not realise 
when the point had been reached where schools and governors felt overburdened:
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‘The amount of work that the government imposes on the school -  I don’t 
think they realise how much pressure it puts on individual teachers, not to 
mention the students and the school as a whole and the governors.’ 
(Greenleaf LEA governor)
‘I really don’t think they [understand] -  not to the fullest extent. I think 
they’ve got their set of policies, and they ‘must carry those policies through.’ 
I don’t believe they realise the seriousness it can have on the pupils.’ 
(Whitefrost staff governor)
In another respect, governors argued that if central government continued producing 
initiatives without communicating with schools and governing bodies, attempts by 
governing bodies at strategic planning ran a high risk of being rendered prematurely 
obsolete:
‘What I really want to know as a governor is: how much money am I going to 
get each term, what are the key statutory things I need to implement, and 
what are the initiatives for next year.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘The lack of timely communication is an issue. [Although] it doesn’t 
necessarily stop us from doing anything -  we still have our plans, our 
thoughts, our strategies -  sometimes they cannot be put in place until we 
really know what the [next] policy is going to be.’ (Brownstone co-opted 
governor)
‘Government is producing so many things that we ‘ought’ to do. Many of 
them are sensible requirements, but the difficulty is fitting everything in. For 
example, we would have liked to do more in the arts -  but then the 
government gave us other priorities!’ (Supplementary interview chair)
Given the evidence presented above, it was clear that governors felt central 
government’s lack of understanding about policy impacts created two significant 
problems. First, governors felt central government was not providing them with a 
sense of how individual initiatives meshed with broader strategic vision for education 
improvement -  partly because governors felt that central government itself had no 
broader strategic vision on this front. Second, governors felt that central government 
was not providing a sense of how governing bodies would be expected to 
accommodate those new initiatives into the existing framework. Without this vital 
information, many governors felt that planning was being forced into a short-term 
time frame, simply due to the uncertainty surrounding central government’s future 
plans and the lack of meaningful dialogue between central government and schools 
in this arena.
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6.5.2 Central Government and the Definition of the Governor’s Role
Governors felt that the other indication of the poor state of communication between 
government and governing bodies was the gap between central government’s 
rhetoric about the governor’s role and the reality of the operating as a governor at the 
institutional level. As was outlined briefly in Section 5.3.3, if the absence of a well- 
articulated role means governors are tentative about either their authority or their 
responsibilities, this temerity will strongly influence the range of tasks that governors 
feel comfortable undertaking. This research found that there was substantial 
evidence for the absence of a well-articulated role, since interviewees throughout this 
study felt that the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality left governing bodies 
confused and hesitant about what they were actually meant to be doing:
‘There’s a lot of confusion with governing bodies across the country as to 
what they should and should not be doing.’ (Whitefrost staff governor)
‘I’m not really sure what the government wants out of governors, really. I 
don’t think it’s clear.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘It seems that it’s very difficult for governors to always tell where their remit 
extends and where it doesn’t, even though they know what the formalities 
are.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘The way to reduce the pressure would be to have greater clarity of what 
governors are expected to do, rather than [asking governors to do either] less 
or more. It’s about clarity in terms of what is expected.’ (Greenleaf LEA 
governor)
Governors acknowledged that central government did provide governors with a 
substantial amount of information regarding governors’ responsibilities. However, 
governors frequently pointed out that merely providing large quantities of 
information did not necessarily lead to greater clarity. As one Whitefrost LEA 
governor noted, ‘There’s a huge vacuum between understanding the government’s 
‘good practice’ guides on running meetings and understanding what’s required to 
manage a £3 million budget.’ Governors argued that paradoxically, this relentless 
barrage of information from central government actually increased the potential for 
contradiction and confusion:
‘[Regarding my] role as a governor, I have folders full of leaflets of what I 
should be doing, what I shouldn’t do, and so on -  guidelines for this, guidelines 
for that -  there’s a lot [to go] through.’ (Greenleaf teacher governor)
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‘When my colleagues on the governing body find out, [they] are horrified of 
what their liabilities and responsibilities are. I think the government is just 
naive about the role of governing bodies.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
Governors felt that the reasons for this lack of clarity were similar to those raised 
about the lack of understanding of policy effects -  little on-the-ground observation 
and a bureaucratic mentality at the central governmental-level. Additionally, 
governors criticised government for failing to recognise that schools in poorer urban 
areas like London often faced problems and challenges that were quite different from 
those in either non-urban or more affluent areas. As one Bluewater governor noted:
‘This whole concept of pushing power down to the governing body and 
parent governors worked well in a tight, cohesive community with fairly 
well-educated parents.’
Such governors argued that a uniform central government approach to governing 
body responsibilities often ended up frustrating governors whose schools’ problems 
demanded more flexibility in the governors’ mandate. As the governor quoted below 
pointed out, many governors felt that they were being told by central government 
that they were both capable and incapable of carrying out their responsibilities. Such 
inherent contradictions from different entities within central government therefore 
made it difficult for governors to determine precisely what role they were being 
asked to play:
‘You’re told that ‘you’re the governors, you’re in charge of the school,’ but in 
regard to everything else, they tell you what to do! It’s not as though the 
governors tell government what the school’s problems are, and then 
government responds to the governors. It’s really that the government tells 
the school what its problems are, and governors respond to the government!’ 
(Whitefrost co-opted governor)
Finally, governors felt that the lack of role clarity had two main strategic planning 
consequences. First, although governors felt that they should be doing strategic 
planning in theory (as shown in Chapter Four), this lack of role clarity meant that 
governors were not entirely confident that central government, despite its overt 
claims, actually wished governing bodies to be doing strategic planning in practice. 
Second, the research suggested that the lack of role clarity created a perverse 
incentive for governing bodies to pursue the safest and most uncontroversial options 
-  even though these options might not be most advantageous ones in the long-term -  
in order to avoid being criticised for stepping outside their jurisdiction. ‘The real
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question is ‘what do you want the board of governors to doT , said one Whitefrost 
governor. ‘One problem with governing bodies at the moment is that few governors 
can tell you why they’re there.4 This comment speaks to an important point. 
Governors were extremely worried about being seen as doing ‘day-to-day’ 
managing, but, being unsure of which tasks qualified as such, erred strongly on the 
side of caution. As one Bluewater governor noted:
‘One of our favourite things to say, when we’re a step away from doing 
something, is that someone will say ‘we don’t want to micro-manage this.’ 
But we’ve already looked at the thing right down to the ground, had every 
single thing explained, and we’re sufficiently informed -  but we hold back.’
Ironically, this cautiousness also incriminated some governing bodies, who found 
that the lack of clarity in their role mean that they were caught in a ‘no-win’ 
situation. While governors, in their caution, frequently restricted themselves only to 
the administrative-type tasks where they felt certain of their responsibility, (thus 
avoiding responsibilities like strategic planning), they also found that this caution 
(and lack of strategic planning) could be construed as dereliction if things went 
wrong. As one governor pointed out:
‘When there are problems in a school, the government lets the load fall on the 
governors like a ton of bricks. What we really need is advice beforehand 
from the government on where we might be going wrong.’ (Whitefrost co­
opted governor)
In summary, by de facto encouraging governing bodies to be reactive, this lack of 
clarity by central government served to stifle attempts at innovation or long-term 
planning. Instead, governors kept within the confines of the administrative tasks that 
they knew fell within their remit. As the Brownstone head teacher argued, this 
mentality, created by ambiguous role definition, had severe consequences for 
strategic planning on the part of governing bodies:
‘If you don’t have creativity, and experimentation, and the ability to make 
mistakes sometimes, then you’re not going to learn, and you’re not going to be 
able to think ‘yes, it is better to do it that way.” (Brownstone head teacher)
6.6 The Trust Barrier
Finally, this research found that both the consequence and cause of many of the 
problems that have been raised in this section appeared to rest on one underlying 
issue: governors believed central government did not trust governing bodies. First,
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this section will present the evidence for governors’ perception of a lack of central 
government trust in governing bodies. Second, it will be argued that there were two 
main reasons for this lack of trust: the centralising tendency of the present 
government, and the perception of governors that government thought governing 
bodies were incapable of all but the basic administrative responsibilities. Finally, 
this section argues that this perceived lack of trust both exacerbated the frustration of 
governors and increased their resignation regarding what governing bodies could 
achieve, thereby becoming a crucial barrier to strategic planning.
6.6.1 Evidence for a Perceived Lack of Trust
The evidence for a perceived lack of trust in governing bodies comes from both the 
qualitative and quantitative data. Table 6.4 shows that when asked how much trust 
respondents felt central government had in governing bodies, only 15.5 per cent of 
chairs and 17.9 per cent of heads felt that the level of trust was high. Although the 
overall differences between chair and head responses to this question were 
statistically significant, it is evident from Table 6.4 that the main difference between 
chairs and heads was regarding whether they felt the level of trust was low or 
moderate. In practice, this difference is somewhat moot, as neither ‘low trust’ nor 
‘moderate trust’ suggests a ringing endorsement on the part of respondents regarding 
central government’s attitude towards governing bodies.
Table 6.4: Level of Trust that Respondents Believed Central Government had in 
Governing Bodies






Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-2.0; p  < 0.05.
Similar results were found when respondents were asked whether they felt that 
central government trusted governing bodies, as is demonstrated below:
‘No. Is that a clear enough answer?’ (Bluewater head teacher)
‘They should learn to trust. They should be able to look at a school -  they’ve 
got Ofsted as well -  and say ‘this school has an adequate governing body,’ 
and then let us do it. And then tolerate some differences.’ (Redwood chair)
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‘It’s about time that central government started to have some confidence and 
trust in local education authorities and governing bodies. They don’t really 
have trust in either.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘No. Central government is central government -  it doesn’t want to trust 
anyone else! ’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘No, [but] in a school like this, they should allow and trust people. It’s a bit 
like trusting the twelve jurors on a trial -  you’ve got to trust people to do it.’ 
(Redwood head teacher)
A small number of governors thought that the main issue was more about a lack of 
central government engagement with governing bodies than about a lack of trust, and 
a few others felt that while central government was not overly trusting, neither was it 
overly mistrustful. However, the majority of respondents felt strongly that central 
government had displayed an abiding and systematic absence of trust in those whom 
it was asking to implement its policies.
6.6.2 Reasons for this Perceived Lack of Trust
This research discerned two main reasons for the perception of a lack of trust, both of 
which were founded in one overriding belief amongst governors: that central 
government was seeking to retain central control over education, while placing the 
burden of accountability and responsibility on local governing bodies. Although the 
strength of this sentiment will become apparent through the evidence presented in 
this section, the two comments below frame the overall issue quite clearly:
‘By imposing so many regulations, DfEE has acquired implicit authority over 
the control of schools, by so highly constraining the explicit authority it 
claims that governing bodies have.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘If central government wants to run schools, they should just run schools, and 
get rid of the governing bodies. But if they want governing bodies to reflect 
the individuality within each school -  then reduce the number of initiatives 
and keep out of it, really.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
The first reason for governors’ perception of a lack of trust surrounded what 
governors saw as the centralising tendency of the present government. As is 
demonstrated below, governors resented what they considered to be a central 
government that paid lip service to local accountability and autonomy when 
politically expedient, while simultaneously pursing a strategy of national solutions 
and consolidated central authority:
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‘This government wants as much central control as is possible, but 
centralisation is a massive burden to carry.... So while they write the 
guidelines, I  have to write the policies. Governors are there to determine the 
strategy and the long-term policy, but there is too much knee-jerk 
centralisation on the part of the government.’ (Supplementary interview 
chair)
‘You can see quite clearly the logic they’re using...and it has to do with the 
logic of re-election. And that pisses me off, I have to say. They’re not 
thinking locally, [and] in many respects, they’ve continued a hostility towards 
local control that was very much a mark of [the Conservative government].’ 
(Bluewater co-opted governor)
Governors further argued that this penchant for centralised control not only 
demonstrated a lack of trust in governing bodies, but that it often prevented the 
implementation of flexible, locally-tailored approaches that would do the most to 
assist individual schools. Governors argued that the success or failure of individual 
schools often depended upon intensely localised factors, and that a ‘broad brush’ 
approach from central government was therefore not always the best solution. As 
one Whitefrost governor argued: ‘You can’t penalise schools with a blanket order. 
It’s no good saying ‘schools have got to achieve this right across the country’ 
without considering things that would influence achievement.’ Yet because central 
government insisted upon continuing to centralise control over education, governors 
felt that central government was tacitly implying that governing bodies and schools 
could not be trusted to succeed if left to their own devices:
‘[Government has] seen so much money wasted that they believe the only 
solution is control -  by handing out little sums of money dedicated to do A, 
B, C, et cetera.... But it’s the total opposite of good management, it really is. 
I don’t think the civil servants in the DfEE know what good management is, 
and they wouldn’t recognise it if it stood up and hit them.’ (Bluewater LEA 
governor)
‘This is a very centralising government... [and] you can see a structure where 
everything leads up to this peak at the top, at national level...I think we just 
haven’t worked out a better way of doing it. And meanwhile, it gives them 
the ability to say ‘there’s lots of local involvement in education, it’s all 
terribly democratic, there’s possibility for parental involvement’ -  it’s 
bollocks!’ (Supplementary interview chair)
Second, there was a perception amongst interviewees that central government treated 
governing bodies as inferior amateur players, who were to be tolerated for the sake 
of local accountability, but not to be respected in the policy process. The majority of 
interviewees thought that central government acted as though it was being ‘forced’
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into trusting governing bodies due to the clamour for local accountability, but sought 
to rectify this ‘problem’ by minimising the ability of governing bodies to actually 
make substantive changes. When asked whether central government trusted 
governing bodies, governors were pointed in their opinions about central 
government’s patronising attitude towards governing bodies:
‘Because of the amount of policy involvement there is [by central 
government], I don’t think governing bodies are trusted 100 per cent by 
central government to be doing an efficient and effective job.’ (Whitefrost 
staff governor)
‘It trusts them, to an extent, simply because it has to trust them. The power is 
split between the governing bodies and the local authorities. And they 
already know that in the main, the local authorities don’t always tell them the 
truth.’ (Redwood parent governor)
‘No. That’s why there’s all this framework and detail - 1 think it’s a lot like 
‘two cheers for democracy! ([But then saying] if we could find a better way 
of doing it, we would get rid of them).”  (Supplementary interview chair)
‘There’s not much of a relationship between governing bodies and the 
government, and that in itself is counterproductive.... I don’t know how 
much value central government puts on governing bodies.* (Whitefrost LEA 
governor)
‘I feel they do [think that] giving [responsibility] to governing bodies seems the 
right thing to do. It’s politically correct. [But] at die end of the day, whether 
they feel that all the governing bodies out there -  or 90 per cent of them -  are 
capable of handling this well -  no.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
Why did governors feel that government took this somewhat patronising approach 
towards governing bodies? One Greenleaf co-opted governor stated explicitly -  and 
succinctly -  what many other governors implied. When asked whether central 
government trusted governing bodies, he replied:
‘I doubt it. Because governing bodies are a mixed ability group, and 
governing bodies vary enormously in their effectiveness.’
In general, governors argued that central government needed to clearly articulate in 
which situations -  if any -  governors were supposed to be quasi-administrators and 
in which situations governors were supposed to be governors. Governors also 
suggested that it was detrimental to all sides for central government to expect 
governors to act like governors while treating governors like administrators, since 
doing so meant that neither side wins. Instead, this breakdown in trust meant that
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governors felt mistreated and government failed to receive the optimum 
administration (or governance) that it desired.
6.6.3 Strategic Planning Consequences of this Perceived Lack of Trust
The main strategic planning consequence of this perceived lack of trust in governing 
bodies was an overwhelming sense of frustration and resignation (both metaphorical 
and literal) amongst governors. Because governors did not feel trusted, they often 
felt that they would be wasting their time and energy if they engaged in anything 
other than the most uncontroversial short-term administrative responsibilities. This 
research found that many governors were frustrated by the lack of respect they felt 
governing bodies received from central government, arguing that central government 
both ignored governing bodies when making major decisions and disregarded their 
concerns when problems arose:
‘They do not seek our advice, they lay down these edicts and put down what 
should be done, and there’s never any direct consultation at the governing 
body stage. They may speak to the Grand Lodge of Governors, or whatever 
they’re called, but my perception is that they have only just directed how they 
see the policy should be, and have not gone down to how this could be 
applied, and what practical problems exist within that approach.’ (Redwood 
foundation governor)
‘If they don’t [trust governing bodies], that’s their loss, isn’t it? At the end of 
the day, if the governing body is making a decision in the interest of the 
school, and the school is progressing, [then] central government shouldn’t 
have a problem .’ (Greenleaf teacher governor)
‘We really are being inundated by this ‘incompetent administrative approach’ 
-  where there’s enormous regulation about how you must behave, 
everybody’s got to be the same, there’s no difference to be tolerated at all -  
‘you all have to conform to this standard.’ And people are not like that.’ 
(Redwood chair)
Furthermore, governors were frustrated by their sense that central government was 
wasting a valuable resource by not trusting governing bodies. Governors felt that 
because central government treated governing bodies patemalistically, innovation 
and creativity that governing bodies could potentially contribute to education 
improvement was often stifled or discouraged:
‘Governors bring a whole range of abilities to the school and the governing 
body, which is something that should be valued by government. They may 
be amateurs, and not have a great deal of knowledge about some aspects of 
the school, but that can be important sometimes.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
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‘Government doesn’t seem to recognise that in governors, they have a select 
group of people who have both an interest in the school and who want to ‘do 
good’. That’s a fantastic resource, and I don’t think the government 
understands how valuable governors are.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘[The governing body] should be quite a powerful force. But I think because, 
on the whole, most governors are focused only on their school...they just 
don’t have time to take a broader role in terms of education development. 
And on the whole, why should they? The framework doesn’t allow for that.’ 
(Supplementary interview chair)
In conclusion, the lack of trust led to a sense of frustration and resignation amongst 
governors regarding what governing bodies had the opportunity to achieve. 
Governors believed that if central government trusted governing bodies, then central 
government would give governing bodies authority and make them accountable to 
their local communities, rather than reserving the right to both demand increased 
central accountability and to shift the blame onto governing bodies should things go 
wrong. In sum, governors in this research felt that central government viewed 
governing bodies as a force to be contained, rather than as partners to be valued. 
This approach increased governor frustration, leading many governors to wonder: 
why they should even bother with strategic planning at all. As such, this research 
suggested that the governors’ perceived lack of trust in governing bodies by central 
government might be the most significant -  and the most difficult -  barrier to be 
overcome in encouraging governing bodies to engage in strategic planning.
6.7 Chapter Six Conclusion
This chapter was the second of two in which evidence was presented to support the 
assertion, made in Chapter Four, that many inner London secondary school 
governing bodies have difficulty engaging in strategic planning. The evidence 
presented in this chapter provided four main new insights. First, this chapter 
identified six central governmental-level barriers to strategic planning that, it was 
argued, prevent governing bodies from pursuing strategic planning more effectively. 
These barriers related to time and volunteer expectations, paperwork, legislation and 
regulation, the structure of the current financing system, communication, and trust. 
By viewing these barriers as complementary to the institutional-level barriers 
identified in Chapter Five, it therefore becomes possible to begin understanding 
interrelationship between these two sets of barriers. For example, the institutional- 
level barriers of the ‘monitoring culture’ and the preference that governing bodies
213
give to governors with ‘tangible’ skills are barriers both inextricably related to the 
demands placed on governors by central government.
As with the institutional-level barriers identified in Chapter Five, some of the issues 
that form these central governmental-level barriers have been suggested in previous 
governance literature. For example, nearly every researcher on governance has 
argued that governors have too little time in which to fulfil their responsibilities, 
while others have pointed to problems with paperwork (Keys and Fernandes 1990; 
Education and Employment Committee 1999), legislation (Mahoney and Riley 1996; 
Creese and Bradley 1997; Glatter 1999), and, to a lesser extent, the financial system 
(Marren and Levacic 1994; Saran and Taylor 1999). Yet as was noted in Chapter 
Five, this research presents these issues in a new and different context, presenting 
them as interrelated components of a set of central governmental-level barriers to 
strategic planning. While previous researchers and observers have pointed to some 
of the issues identified above, these issues have usually been discussed individually 
in isolation, and have not been referred to (or interpreted within) the overall context 
of strategic planning barriers. Additionally, this research identifies and discusses 
two new factors that impede governing body strategic planning: those of 
communication and trust, respectively. As such, this research provides both a new 
context in which to interpret the interaction between governing bodies and central 
government, and new evidence regarding the types of problems that governing 
bodies face within this relationship.
Second, Kogan observed in his study of governing bodies that ‘No matter how free 
standing, the governing body will be strongly affected by the political and 
administrative systems which surround it’ (1984:168). This research provides 
substantial new information about the influence of central government on governing 
bodies, and suggests that Kogan’s observation is as true today as it was then. 
However, this research also provides evidence to suggest that one of Kogan’s main 
observations -  that governors generally had low expectations of what they could 
achieve -  may no longer always be the case. In particular, the evidence in this 
chapter demonstrated that while governors often wanted to act upon the autonomy 
that they now possess, they increasingly found themselves constrained in what they 
were actually able to pursue (and achieve).
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Third, this research provides new insight into how governors’ perceptions influence 
their actions. Although some might criticise this research for seeking out only the 
perceptions of governors and not pressing to determine whether these perceptions 
were objectively ‘valid’, it essentially does not matter (for policy purposes) whether 
these perceptions are objectively valid or not. The crucial point is that this research 
found that governors believed and acted as though these perceptions were true. 
Consequently, this research suggests that if governors cease to believe that central 
government can or will address their concerns, governing bodies may increasingly 
engage in only the minimum that is required, resigned to the fact that their best 
efforts may be overruled by central government in the future. Given this state of 
affairs, for central government to ignore the concerns raised in this chapter suggests 
that governors will continue to harbour discontent about the system in which they are 
required to operate. In this kind of an environment, the strategic planning that is 
necessary for future innovation and progress will often fail to materialise -  to the 
detriment of all involved.
Finally, it is argued that these six central governmental-level barriers, in conjunction 
with the four institutional-level barriers identified in Chapter Five, offer a robust, 
integrated and systematic evidence-based answer the third main research question:
If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why is 
this the case?
While it is obviously impossible to state with absolute certainty that this set of 
barriers constitutes the complete set of strategic planning barriers faced by governing 
bodies, the evidence presented herein strongly suggests that these barriers are the 
major ones. Having identified these barriers, the final phase of this thesis now seeks 
to answer the fourth and final main research question by applying these barriers to an 
actual issue of practical policy relevance: business involvement in education.
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C h a p t e r  Se v e n
St r a t e g ic  P l a n n in g  a n d  B u sin e s s  I n v o l v e m e n t  in  E d u c a t io n
7.0 Introduction
The first three data chapters -  Chapters Four, Five, and Six -  confirmed the lack of 
strategic planning amongst governing bodies in inner London state secondary 
schools, and proposed ten barriers that might explain this absence. Yet if these 
barriers are merely theoretical or abstract, and do not adequately or accurately reflect 
the main reasons for the absence of governing body strategic planning on real policy 
issues, then their practical value is clearly reduced. Therefore, in order to 
demonstrate the practical value of these barriers, the final two data chapters seek to 
answer the fourth and final main research question:
Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning barriers
has practical policy relevance and importance?_____________________________
The purpose of this question is to address two issues: First, whether the systematic 
application of these barriers to a policy issue of practical importance does provide a 
robust explanation of the reasons for the absence of governing body strategic 
planning on that substantive policy issue. Second, whether the systematic 
application of these barriers provides a valuable heuristic analytical tool for 
understanding the absence of strategic planning on other substantive policy issues, 
which in turn can offer policy makers new perspectives on how to better remedy 
such absences. While these issues will be addressed directly in Chapter Eight via the 
presentation of the relevant research evidence, Chapter Seven lays the groundwork 
for this presentation in two important ways.
First, as was noted in Chapter Two, the existing literature on central government’s 
increasing interest in business involvement in education suggested that business 
involvement was an issue on which governing body strategic planning was desirable 
yet potentially absent. As such, Section 7.1 seeks to confirm through research 
evidence that business involvement does provide an appropriate lens through which 
the practical policy relevance of the strategic planning barriers can be examined. 
Second, Sections 7.2 to 7.5 provide the context for interpreting the evidence on 
business involvement and strategic planning that is to be presented in Chapter Eight. 
These sections present governors’ perceptions of business involvement in education,
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outline the views of governors regarding business involvement, and present what 
governors saw as the four main potential advantages of incorporating business 
involvement issues into their strategic planning processes. Section 7.6 summarises 
the research evidence and concludes by providing the transition to Chapter Eight.
7.1 Strategic Planning in the Business Involvement Context 
In order to confirm that business involvement was an appropriate lens through which 
the practical policy relevance of the strategic planning barriers can be examined, two 
criteria needed to be met. First, it needed to be demonstrated that governors and 
governing bodies believed that business involvement was an issue where strategic 
planning was desirable, particularly as business involvement is not specifically 
mentioned in government policy guidance as an strategic planning issue. If the 
absence of strategic planning on business involvement was ‘issue-specific’ -  absent 
simply because governing bodies did not view business involvement as being either 
relevant enough (or important enough) to merit consideration within their strategic 
planning remit -  the question about why governing bodies were not engaging in 
strategic planning on this issue would be moot. Second, it needed to be 
demonstrated that governors and governing bodies were failing to address business 
involvement as a strategic planning issue. Clearly, unless there was an absence of 
strategic planning on this issue, the application of a set of barriers meant to illustrate 
the reasons for such an absence would be meaningless.
Before continuing, it is important to define the term ‘business involvement’ as used 
in the remainder of this thesis. As the research literature outlined in Chapter Two 
suggests, there are varying interpretations and definitions of the term ‘business 
involvement.’ As such, it was deemed vital to have a consistent baseline definition 
in order to ensure that responses would be comparable. Drawing on both suggestions 
from the preliminary study and observations from the existing literature, the following 
common definition was created for both the interviewees and the survey recipients:
‘Business involvement/links’ includes, but needs not be limited to: mentoring 
of students by business, in-kind and/or financial donations, Private Finance 
Initiative, work experience, for-profit management, teacher placements, and 
curriculum assistance.’
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7.1.1 Business Involvement and Strategic Planning in Theory
In order to meet the first criterion outlined above, it was necessary to determine 
whether governors and governing bodies believed that business involvement was an 
appropriate strategic planning issue. Clearly, if governors did not perceive business 
involvement as being either relevant or important enough to merit consideration in 
the strategic planning context, then business involvement would not be a suitable 
lens through which to examine the influence of the strategic planning barriers 
identified earlier. However, this possibility was rejected because of strong 
quantitative and qualitative evidence to the contrary, as governors in both the 
interviews and the survey reported that they believed business involvement was an 
issue that required strategic planning. Looking first at the quantitative evidence, 82.8 
per cent of chairs (N=80) and 71.6 per cent of heads (N=67) believed that the 
governing body’s philosophy and approach towards business involvement should 
form part of the school’s strategic plan.1 Similarly strong sentiments were found in 
the qualitative responses, as a substantial majority of interviewees stated that a 
governing body’s philosophy and approach towards business involvement should 
form part of its school’s strategic plan:
‘[Business involvement] should absolutely be part of the governors’ strategic 
plan. Because if the perspective isn’t clarified at the outset, it’s likely to all 
go pear-shaped when a specific situation arises. And it’s important for the 
school to sort out what it wants and why it wants zY.’ (Whitefrost co-opted 
governor)
‘I think we should have that say [as governors, about engaging in business 
involvement] -  I think it’s a philosophical decision that needs to come from 
the governors, and there are implementation issues that have to come from 
the head and the executive team. But you can’t expect them to do it if there 
hasn’t been a philosophical discussion, and examples of where that really 
works. So I absolutely agree with that.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘A good governing body will have a strategic plan for the school. And I think 
the idea of business partnerships, [and] the extent to which activities like that 
relate to the school, would be seen as strategic.’ (Greenleaf co-opted 
governor).
‘Plainly, if the governing body matters, then necessarily its view on business 
involvement should also matter, and we should also accept that it will be 
different from school to school. Because business will be active to different 
extents in different geographic areas. So therefore, yes, the answer should be 
that the view of the governing body on business involvement should have a 
large part to play.’ (Redwood chair)
1 Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
218
As can be seen from this evidence, governors believed that if governing bodies had 
any relevance at all, it resided in their ability to make the philosophical decisions that 
influenced a) the strategic direction and b) the overall ethos of their respective 
schools. Given this evidence, it appeared that governors believed that the issue of 
business involvement was sufficiently important within both of these contexts to 
require the attention of the governing body.
7.1.2 Business Involvement and Strategic Planning in Practice
In order to meet the second criterion outlined in the introduction to this section, it 
was necessary to determine whether governors and governing bodies were failing to 
treat business involvement as a strategic issue. Despite the evidence from Section
7.1.1 that governors believed business involvement should be a component of 
strategic planning, there was strong evidence that in practice, governing bodies did 
not generally incorporate their philosophy and approach towards business 
involvement into their strategic planning process.
Examining the qualitative evidence first, the majority of interviewees stated that they 
were largely unaware of the processes by which their schools engaged with business. 
Some felt that the reason for this was that the ‘process’ was often informal and ad 
hoc, and as such depended greatly on the independent momentum generated by 
individual governors. Others felt that governor understanding of business 
involvement processes suffered from the issue being too ‘cross-cutting’, since the 
issues surrounding business involvement did not fall neatly into the remit of a single 
standing committee (commonly finance, curriculum, staffing, or premises.) 
However, regardless of the cause or causes, interviewees were nearly unanimous in 
their opinion that these processes were frequently either amorphous or non-existent:
‘I’d be interested to know the answer to [how proposals for business 
involvement are addressed], because there’s never been such a discussion 
while I’ve been there! It’s never really got into the priority items for the 
school. The school has never got its head sufficiently above water to ask 
itself that question.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘There’s no policy on this at the moment -  it’s really done ad hoc. We 
probably should have a policy, but I know very little about this area.‘ 
(Greenleaf parent governor)
219
‘I suppose business partnerships have a strategic dimension that could 
involve governors -  but it’s never been discussed.’ (Supplementary interview 
chair)
‘There’s no sort of strategy for dealing with the involvement of business in 
the school at the present.... But I think there would be -  should be -  some 
sort of policy on the involvement that business has at the school.’ (Greenleaf 
co-opted governor)
‘Right now [business involvement] is done on an ad hoc basis, and I think 
that’s something we might have to look at as things develop and evolve.’ 
(Supplementary interview chair)
The quantitative evidence provides additional support for the qualitative findings. 
First, it was clear that business involvement was often an ad hoc process, as fewer 
than one-third of survey respondents -  30.6 per cent of chairs (N=85) and 32.4 per 
cent of heads (N=71) -  felt that their school had links with business that were 
structured systematically. Second, although 76.7 per cent of chairs (N=86) and 87.3 
per cent of heads (N=71) claimed that they knew how their school decided whether to 
pursue proposals for business involvement, it appeared that there was no regular 
mechanism for conveying that knowledge to the governing body as a whole. When 
those same survey respondents were asked whether their governing bodies had any 
written policy on business involvement with the school, nearly nine out of ten of 
chairs (N=85) and heads (N=71) reported no such written policy existed (85.9 per 
cent and 88.7 per cent, respectively). Furthermore, less than ten per cent of either 
group (5.9 per cent of chairs and 9.9 per cent of heads) actually reported that their 
school had a written policy on this issue, while the remainder -  8.2 per cent of chairs 
and 1.4 per cent of heads -  were not even sure if their school had such a policy.
Taken together, the evidence presented above and in Section 7.1.1 indicates that 
business involvement is an issue on which governing bodies believe strategic 
planning is desirable, but on which strategic planning is also largely absent at 
present. As such, these findings suggest that business involvement is an appropriate 
lens through which the practical policy relevance of the previously-identified 
strategic planning barriers can be examined.
As was noted in the introduction to this chapter, it would be possible at this point to 
proceed directly to determining whether the strategic planning barriers identified 
earlier provide a robust explanation of the reasons for the absence of governing body
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strategic planning on business involvement issues. However, in order to interpret the 
evidence in relation to this point, it is essential to understand how governors 
themselves perceived both the issue of business involvement in general, and the 
potential advantages that strategic planning about business involvement might bring 
in specific. The remainder of this chapter attempts to provide this context, as it 
emerged from this research that governors saw four main potential advantages in 
engaging in strategic planning on business involvement issues: that such strategic 
planning would enable increased involvement, guide existing or future involvement, 
help build community, and allow governing bodies to prepare for future challenges. 
The evidence for each of these advantages is now presented in turn.
7.2 E n a b l in g  Business In v o lv em en t th r o u g h  S tr a te g ic  P lann in g  
The first potential advantage was the benefit strategic planning could have in 
enabling business involvement. As the survey discovered, current attempts to enable 
business involvement revealed somewhat mixed results. On one hand, 77.6 per cent 
of chairs (N=85) and 73.9 per cent of heads (N=69) reported that their schools had 
actively sought business involvement in the past few years. Additionally, 65.9 per 
cent of chairs (N=85) and 56.5 per cent of heads (N=69) stated that they personally 
would like more such links, while only 11.8 per cent of chairs and 7.2 per cent of 
heads reported wanting to see such links reduced (differences between chairs and 
heads were not statistically significant). Yet despite these encouraging percentages, 
approximately two-thirds of both chairs (N=83) and heads (N=70) reported that their 
school’s existing links with business were not substantial (67.5 per cent and 64.3 per 
cent, respectively). Data from governor interviews seemed to support these findings, 
as governors noted that current methods for seeking and managing business 
involvement frequently lacked any forward-looking perspective. As such, governors 
drew attention to the importance of creating a framework that would permit their 
schools to approach business involvement in a more systematic and orderly manner. 
In its simplest terms, some governors perceived such a policy as a sorting device, as 
did this Greenleaf governor:
‘Yes, we could benefit from having a certain kind of framework. If any 
businesses fall into our framework, then we could say ‘this is the right move.’ 
We do need some kind of framework, some kind of criteria to say ‘this one 
fits, this one doesn’t.”
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However, governors also suggested that strategic planning could be used as a more 
sophisticated tool for enabling increased business involvement. In specific, 
governors argued that better strategic planning by governing bodies might allow 
business involvement to be used more intelligently than it was at present. For 
example, when asked about whether the governing body should include business 
involvement in its strategic planning, one Bluewater co-opted governor argued:
‘Yes. I think it helps with the strategic planning, but also insofar as a 
strategic plan will open up the various divergences between aspiration and 
realism, it then gives a framework within which business involvement can 
help fill some of those gaps. Business involvement, or any other involvement 
that can make a contribution. But [strategic planning] should identify what 
the school can do under its own resources and capabilities, and what 
additionality is required to deliver the full aspiration.’
This response was echoed by a Whitefrost LEA governor, who suggested that ‘a lack 
of clear aims will usually lead to a lack of clear results’ -  and that this maxim was 
certainly applicable to a governing body’s approach regarding business involvement:
‘If we don’t have a very clear approach to bringing business into the school -  
not just to advise the school in all kinds of areas, but just to connect with the 
school, and to make the school aware and alert to the changes taking place in 
the world of work -  then I  think the school will suffer. Both in terms of the 
education that it offers children, [and] because we won’t be equipping them 
with the expertise to tackle the kinds of problems they’re going to face.’
Overall, governors acknowledged that without a strategic framework within which to 
evaluate business involvement opportunities, there was a greater likelihood that 
valuable opportunities might be lost. In order to put this desire for an enabling 
framework into the proper context, however, it was also important to demonstrate 
that governors actually had some level of interest in how business involvement might 
assist their school. The evidence for this interest is therefore provided below.
7.2.1 Governor Opinions About and Support for Business Involvement
In both the interviews and in the survey, respondents were extremely positive about 
the potential role that business could play in education. This finding was important 
because it indicated that governors a) cared significantly about the role that business 
did -  or might -  play in their school, and b) recognised the significance that business 
involvement might hold for education. Both of these sentiments are evident in the 
comments made by governors throughout this research:
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‘I think that we should be developing links more with places like local 
hospitals, local IT employers, the few multinationals in the area -  BT and the 
like. [We need] more joined-upness.’ (Whitefrost chair)
‘I think we should try to get as much partnership with the schools, and with 
businesses it’s even better -  it’s preparation for the kids, the links are good 
for work experience, and certainly even jobs.’ (Brownstone teacher 
governor)
‘I think business has played an increasingly important part, and that work 
experience, business links, and partnerships are all very, very valuable.’ 
(Bluewater head teacher)
‘I would like more of the local businesses to have more to do with the school. 
Possibly in terms of representation on the governing body, having good links 
with the school, offering more work experience placements for kids.’ 
(Redwood parent governor)
There was similarly strong survey support for six of the eight main types of business 
involvement on which respondents were questioned (see Table 7.1). The two types 
of business involvement on which there was substantially greater opposition -  
Private Finance Initiative and for-profit management -  are discussed in more detail 
in Section 7.3.5.
Table 7.1: Respondent Opinions about Business Involvement Activities 
Percentage supporting, neutral about, or opposing each given issue.







Work experience/careers advice (Chairs) 98.8 1.2 — 81
Work experience/careers advice (Heads) 96.6 3.1 — 64
Mentoring of students by businesses (Chairs) 74.4 20.5 5.1 78
Mentoring of students by businesses (Heads) 88.7 9.7 1.6 62
Mentoring of staff / teacher placements (Chairs) 62.3 31.2 6.5 77
Mentoring of staff / teacher placements (Heads) 65.6 32.8 1.6 61
Curriculum assistance (Chairs) 41.8 41.8 16.5 79
Curriculum assistance (Heads) 56.7 35.0 8.3 60
In-kind donations (Chairs) 87.3 8.9 3.8 79
In-kind donations (Heads) 79.7 20.4 — 59
Financial donations / matched-funding (Chairs) 80.5 14.3 5.2 77
Financial donations / matched-funding (Heads) 78.9 17.5 3.5 57
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
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These survey results demonstrate extremely high support for a wide range of 
business involvement activities amongst both chairs and heads. Furthermore, even 
including the case of curriculum assistance products -  where outright support 
(around 40 per cent) was lower than for other types of involvement -  the percentage 
of respondents who were opposed outright to any of the six types of involvement was 
extremely low. In the case of curriculum assistance, only 16.5 per cent of chairs and
8.3 per cent of heads were opposed -  and in no other business involvement category 
did opposition rise to above 6.5 per cent amongst either heads or chairs. Together 
with the qualitative responses, these findings provide robust evidence for the 
potential value that governors see in business involvement.
Furthermore, in interview after interview, respondents weighed the advantages that 
business involvement could provide for children against the disadvantages -  and 
calculated that in most cases, children would benefit. This desire to improve 
children’s opportunities was reflected in the survey responses as well, as survey 
respondents were asked their opinions of the educational value to students that each 
type of business involvement activity provided. Table 7.2 shows the results for the 
five business involvement types that most often have a direct day-to-day impact upon 
classroom education.
Table 7.2: Perceived Educational Value of Business Involvement Activities
Percentage responding ‘moderate ’ or ‘high








Work experience/careers advice 96.3 94.2 81 69
Mentoring of students by businesses 73.6 80.6 68 67
Curriculum assistance 51.9 49.1 52 57'i
In-kind donations 72.3 52.4 65 63
Financial donations / matched-funding 63.6 67.7 66 62
As can be seen in Table 7.2, a majority of chairs in all cases, and a majority of heads 
in four of five cases, believed that these activities had a moderate or high educational 
value to students. The only statistically significant difference between the two 
groups came in the category of in-kind donations, which chairs were much more 
likely to perceive as having educational value than were heads. This difference may 
be due to chairs viewing such donations as inherently supportive of the classroom
2 Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-2.0; p  < 0.05.
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environment, whereas heads may have encountered logistical, administrative, or 
pedagogical difficulties in integrating in-kind donations into the classroom.
7.2.2 Governor Opposition to Business Involvement
Interestingly, both the survey and the case studies found an extremely low level of 
outright opposition to business involvement amongst respondents. As was shown in 
Table 7.1, the opposition amongst chairs and heads to the six classroom-related 
business involvement activities -  1) work experience, 2) student mentoring, 3) 
teacher placements, 4) curriculum assistance, 5) in-kind donations, and 6) financial 
donations -  was extremely low (usually around five per cent). Furthermore, as can 
be seen in Table 7.3, a majority of both chairs and heads expressed a personal desire 
for more involvement, while only approximately ten per cent wanted less.
Table 7.3: Personal Desire for More or Less Business Involvement in Schools






Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
This low level of outright opposition was evident in the interviews; of the 47 
institutional-level interviewees, only three (approximately six per cent) expressed a 
philosophical opposition to business involvement in education; the gist of their 
opposition can be seen in the comments below:
‘I think education should be run by people purely who see education as the 
goal. I think other organisations have different targets, different goals, 
different perceptions, and see schools perhaps as an easy target.’ (Bluewater 
teacher governor)
‘When you’re looking at input from the private sector, you’re then going to 
have a third body [in addition to the state and the community]; only that third 
body will be much more powerful once they’re putting money and resources 
into the school.’ (Whitefrost staff governor)
‘I’m against them in principle. I think all schools should be completely 
funded by the state -  because unless you have a rigid code of practice, there 
could be pecuniary interests of some of the businesses who would have more 
of a say in the running of schools that I would like.’ (Greenleaf chair)
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Interestingly, these three governors were all current or former education 
professionals: a former primary school head teacher (now a chair of governors at 
Greenleaf), a staff governor, and a teacher governor. Although this suggests that 
proposals to increase business involvement in education might meet with resistance 
from educators within the system, it is also worth noting that even these governors 
acknowledged that a) the pragmatic realities of the current system and b) the general 
support for some form of business-education linkage amongst chairs and heads, 
meant that their own energy was best spent in monitoring and managing business 
involvement, rather than in opposing it entirely.
The survey evidence also helps put the overall level of governor concern about 
business involvement into a broader context. Amongst survey respondents, only 
24.7 per cent of chairs (N=85), and only seven per cent of heads (N=71), reported 
feeling ‘generally suspicious’ of the reasons why businesses became involved in 
education. In contrast, nearly half of both groups (48.2 per cent of chairs and 47.9 
per cent of heads) were ‘generally supportive’ of business motives in education. The 
remainder of the respondents (27.1 per cent of chairs and 45.1 per cent of heads) 
were neutral on the issue.3 As such, these findings suggest that survey respondents 
who expressed limited concerns about business involvement were also generally 
confident that these concerns could be addressed if a commitment was made to do so.
7.3 G u id in g  B u s in e s s  I n v o lv e m e n t  t h r o u g h  S t r a t e g i c  P la n n in g
Second, governors recognised that without a strategic view of what business 
involvement could offer their schools, there was a greater potential for their school to 
engage in business involvement activities that did not fit with the school’s overall 
ethos and character. Whereas Section 7.2 addressed the proactive advantages of 
thinking strategically about business involvement, governors also acknowledged that 
there were defensive advantages of such planning as well. As one Whiteffost 
governor argued, it was the responsibility of the governing body to make clear ‘both 
‘How far are they going to let [business involvement] go’ and ‘what does [that 
involvement] mean to the school,”  whilst a supplementary chair provided a 
somewhat different rationale for having a policy and plan:
3 Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
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‘We have had, in the past, some rather odd people who wanted to work with 
us, and you need a way of being able to say ‘no’ politely!’
In general, governors suggested that there would be significant value in having a 
strategic framework that could guide staff and governing bodies both in evaluating 
potential business involvement proposals and in determining the compatibility of 
particular projects with the broader strategy of the school. As these governors argued:
‘Schools should absolutely be in a position to judge whether they want to be 
involved with a business, instead of possibly accepting business support ‘on 
the hoof without having thought through all the issues attached to it.’ 
(Bluewater LEA governor)
‘Although strategic planning should be about the school and where it would 
like to go -  rather than about business involvement per se -  when governors 
looked to ‘how you’d go about getting [to that strategic end], obviously you 
might say ‘looking into businesses’, or ‘bidding for funds’. And that’s where 
the [strategy] would come in.’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
Understandably, governors expressed their concerns about some facets and types of 
business involvement, and were clear that these concerns should be discussed and 
addressed before their school engaged in any substantial business involvement. 
These concerns were identified by asking governors where they would ‘draw the 
line’ between business involvement being valuable or supportive and such 
involvement being intrusive or undesirable. Besides governors’ common (if overly 
hopeful) sentiment that they would ‘know the line when they saw if ,  their most 
prevalent concerns about business involvement fell into five main categories: 
Advertising, curriculum control, independence and autonomy, over-dependence, and 
profit making. The evidence for each of these concerns is presented below.
7.3.1 Concerns about Advertising
The most common concern amongst interviewees was that businesses might use 
their relationships with schools as a marketing tool targeted at an impressionable and 
captive audience. According to one Bluewater co-opted governor, ‘I feel anxious 
about advertising, which pretty much limits everything -  because nobody’s going to 
give you money without wanting other people to know that they’ve done it! ’ The 
interviews clearly indicated there was widespread opposition to advertising amongst 
governors at all five schools, yet the qualitative data also suggested that governors 
differed as to when acceptable ‘recognition of business assistance’ crossed the line
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into unacceptable ‘advertising’. As one Whitefrost LEA governor argued regarding 
the value of business involvement for students:
‘It’s still important that you have a perspective of the business world -  but 
it’s not packaging a commercial product. You’re dealing with a much more 
sensitive quality than soap powder! ’
However, many governors recognised that there might be a necessary trade-off in 
negotiating business involvement projects, and acknowledged that there were some 
types of quid pro quo that might -  albeit reluctantly -  be acceptable:
‘If they’re providing something useful to the school and it just happens to 
have the logo in the comer, then all well and good, but there must be a line 
drawn between the altruistic things and those that have too much of an 
encouragement to link to a product.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘If a company wanted to help create a brochure for the school, and they 
wanted to have their name and logo tastefully displayed on the bottom saying 
‘sponsored by so and so’, then I wouldn’t have any problem with that.’ 
(Bluewater LEA governor)
Governors were more unified in their concern over advertising that was unrelated to 
a specific academic project or programme, and which might therefore be interpreted 
as the ‘general’ promotion of the company within the school. A related concern was 
voiced over ‘permanent’ advertising, where logos would become a fixture on either 
the school’s physical infrastructure or its curriculum materials. In both cases, 
governors were often quite forceful in their opposition to any attempt to turn their 
schools into high-profile ‘billboards’:
‘One of the things that we wouldn’t see as appropriate would be any sort of 
advertising in the school, particularly fo r  something that wasn’t 
educationally orientated. We would see that as quite inappropriate.’ 
(Brownstone co-opted governor)
‘The boundary I would draw is that what we’d like is to be a facility for the 
local residents and business community, but I wouldn’t want us to have 
adverts all over the children’s books -  or ‘this dining room is sponsored by 
McDonalds’, that sort of thing.’ (Redwood head teacher)
In effect, governors argued that they did not want to subject their schools to 
‘branding’, as they were very keen to avoid creating the visual impression that their 
school had been ‘captured’ by outside interests. Furthermore, governors were keen 
to prevent business from parading under the banner of ‘community involvement’
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whilst using schools to promote their products. As one Brownstone governor put it, 
‘it is not an opportunity for self-advertisement.’
7.3.2 Concerns about Curricular Control
The second concern that arose was that businesses might attempt to alter or impose 
upon the curricular direction of the school. In general, this concern was not over 
incorporating business involvement into the curriculum, since (as argued in Section 
7.3.1) many governors argued that business involvement had an important role to 
play in supporting and enhancing the curriculum offer. Indeed, the survey data 
(Table 7.2) showed that 51.9 per cent of chairs and 49.1 per cent of heads found 
business-produced curriculum assistance products to be of either moderate or high 
educational value -  as one respondent even argued, business involvement had not 
been integrated into the curriculum well enough:
‘If the involvement of business is in things like careers fairs, then that’s a 
bolt-on activity. ‘If they have an involvement through the whole range of 
activities and work placements, that is seen as very useful.’ (Bluewater chair)
Instead, governors’ main concern was that businesses clearly understood that their 
role should be what might be termed ‘supportive yet subordinate’. As can be seen 
below, governors voiced a strong desire to avoid any involvement that gave 
businesses the opportunity to prescribe the way in which the curriculum offer was 
delivered in the classroom:
‘As long as there’s not inference with decisions regarding curriculum, in 
terms of what we should be doing in our curriculum offer...then I wouldn’t 
mind.’ (Greenleaf teacher governor)
‘While [businesses] may commit to specific projects, the control of [those 
projects] is within the school [and] the governors of the school. We’re an 
educational establishment and they’re helping to support what we do, but 
what we do [needs to be] decided by the people who run this place, not [by] 
people who are external.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘So long as it doesn’t divert resources away from the basic educational task, I 
think that’s been our watchword.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
Many governors also raised a related concern -  that increasing the level of business 
involvement needed to be balanced with the concerns of teaching staff. Governors 
frequently noted that they believed teachers might fear that their curricular autonomy 
regarding decisions about content and/or presentation would be undermined by
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increased business involvement. Several interviewees, including the one quoted 
below, acknowledged the tightrope they felt they were walking in order to balance 
the educational needs of students with the professional needs of staff:
‘I think the teachers are worried that they would be training rather than 
educating, and I think that’s a legitimate fear. They’re worried that they 
would just be formulaic, turning out fodder to go into [being] supermarket 
staff.’ (Redwood chair)
However, this research also revealed that governors believed that teaching staff were 
less wary of business involvement than they had been in the recent past. Although 
several governors commented that educators still had a ways to go -  as one 
supplementary interview chair warned, ‘it’s going to take quite a long time for 
businesses to be trusted in schools in a way which is more to do with involvement 
and partnership-working,’ -  most governors felt that the atmosphere amongst 
educators had improved considerably from that of a decade ago. When asked about 
whether teachers were more accepting of business involvement, the long-time chair 
of governors at Redwood commented, ‘Oh yes -  and in the most enlightened schools, 
very much so. I think it has been -  where it’s occurred -  a successful experience for 
most people.’ Largely, as the comments below illustrate, governors felt both that the 
issue of business involvement had become less ideological over the past decade, and 
that such involvement was now more often able to be evaluated on its merits, rather 
than summarily dismissed due to stereotypes about what such involvement entailed:
‘People were very cynical in the early years about why business got involved 
in education, and we can all be cynical -  but actually sometimes we need to 
recognise private companies when they do good work.’ (Supplementary 
interview chair)
‘Schools have genuinely become more interested in active cooperation with a 
whole range of people in the world outside the institution.’ (Bluewater chair)
‘I think that [the change in control of the local council in the late 1980s] 
helped to make the business connections much more acceptable again -  
people started to realise that there are a lot of good practices and support 
elements that they’d been missing out on.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
In general, the case study evidence suggested that governors felt that while the 
concerns of teachers about the influence of business involvement on the curriculum 
needed to be given substantial consideration, governors also believed that educators 
felt less threatened by business involvement than they may have been previously.
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7.3.3 Concerns about Independence and Autonomy
The third concern surrounded the desire amongst governors to ensure that business 
involvement would not impinge upon the independence and autonomy of the school, 
the administration, or the governing body. Governors had three main contentions in 
this regard. First, governors argued that they would be worried by any restrictive 
conditions or constraints that might be placed upon their schools in exchange for 
business involvement:
‘I would not want to become involved with a business that put conditions on 
getting involved with [the school].’ (Brownstone parent governor)
T don’t think we’d ever allow anything that gave businesses to control 
activities of the school because they had provided assistance.’ (Greenleaf 
parent governor)
‘My worry [is] that if we start doing [more business involvement], and 
businesses start putting conditions on their funding, then we’ll start going 
down the line of some American schools...[where] because of funding, for 
the sake of getting funding, the schools have then had to compromise their 
status.’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
Second, governors clearly felt that for certain types or levels of business 
involvement, there needed to be an opportunity for the school to veto specific 
proposals. Every governors interviewed felt that if his or her school were to engage 
in business-education relationships, the school should also retain the freedom to 
decline offers of assistance from companies. As one interviewee noted, without a 
system or policy that allowed for checks and balances:
‘There could possibly be questions about whether the ethos of the business is 
the same as the ethos of the school, because businesses and schools make 
decisions based on different aims.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
Similar concerns were voiced by a supplementary interview chair, illustrating the 
delicate balance that governors throughout the case studies felt their schools would 
need to strike between ‘supportive assistance’ and surrendering a level of control:
‘We’ve got a breakfast club here at 6.00 in the morning, and suddenly 
Kellogg’s has decided to send us lots of breakfast cereal, and McDonalds sent 
us lots of polystyrene cups. And that’s been perceived as a foot in the door at 
the moment, but we’re watching it, very carefully. We’ll take off them what 
they’re prepared to give, but we’re not going to allow them in to tell us at the 
school what to do.’
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This issue of the ‘foot in the door’ captures the third concern: that governors wanted to 
be able to identify and avoid relationships with companies whose philosophical aims 
or ethical standards diverged from those of the school. Many governors named 
specific companies and industries of whom they were somewhat wary, frequently 
mentioning petrol companies such as Shell and BP, soft drink manufacturers, tobacco 
corporations, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the ubiquitous McDonald’s. Because these 
kinds of major multinational companies also often have the most well-developed 
business involvement programmes, governors were also concerned that these 
companies might try to use any ‘foot in the door’ to leverage more pervasive kinds of 
involvement in the future. As such, governors expressed a desire to ensure that any 
potential business involvement met certain minimum criteria of acceptability (although 
no governing body in this study had actually codified what these standards would be!) 
Whilst this concern was shared by governors in all five schools, it was most often cited 
by governors in schools who had sought (or were seeking) matching funding in then- 
bid for specialist status -  Greenleaf, Whitefrost, and Brownstone. Referring to their 
list of potential donors for their specialist sponsorship drive, Greenleaf s head said:
‘It didn’t arise, but I would have thought the ‘not environmentally friendly 
and not politically correct’ -  we didn’t write to [such companies], actually, 
and I can’t imagine that they would have said yes!
Other governors voiced similar worries about the involvement of certain kinds of 
companies, as illustrated below. Together, these comments underline the value that 
governors saw in having a framework and policy that would permit them to deal with 
such potential involvement proposals in a consistent and systematic manner:
‘I would worry if BP or Shell came and said ‘we’ll give you money or 
resources if you take it from us directly.’ And then you’d think ‘what’s their 
interest?’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
‘Certain multinationals I would have problems with.... [Or if] a body that was 
identifiable as racist, or supporting racist policies, or behaving that way. The 
school has enormous commitment to equal opportunities, and [I would not 
support] anything that would go against that.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘When people have gotten concerned about it here in the past, it’s always 
been that fear of the McDonald’s School, sponsored by Burger King, that 
kind of thing.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
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7.3.4 Concerns about Over-Dependence
The concern raised in the previous section -  the desire of governors to be able to 
decline offers of involvement -  dovetails with the forth concern of governors: the 
desire not to become over-dependent on business involvement. Although few 
governors felt that their schools were at a point where over-dependence was an issue, 
many wanted to ensure that if their schools did begin forging substantial business 
relationships, they would not be exposed to serious difficulties in their educational 
offer if there were a sudden inability of businesses to continue these commitments. 
Other governors were concerned about the unpredictability of business priorities -  
particularly if businesses perceived involvement in education as an ‘extra.’ As can 
be seen below, this concern of ‘here today, gone tomorrow’ was shared by a number 
of governors, particularly given the troubling signs of a slowing national and 
international economy that were emerging whilst this research was underway:
‘I don’t think we’d ever want to be in a position where we were so dependent 
on funding from a business source that an area of the curriculum would 
collapse if it was pulled out.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘You get a major recession [and] one of the other things [companies will] do 
is look where else the money is going, and if they’re putting a couple of 
million into a school, they’ll say ‘what result have we got from that?’ Once 
they start equating all this, they may say ‘it’s not worth putting all this money 
in, we’ll pull the plug.’ (Whitefrost staff governor)
‘It depends upon how reliable they are. It’s all well and good to have people 
coming in, but you can’t necessarily count on it. We had good links with 
[one firm] but they relocated.... So you don’t have the stability in planning.’ 
(Brownstone LEA governor)
‘I think with increased involvement of business, you must ensure a diverse 
element across the [business] spectrum. It’s too easy to get locked into 
almost incestuous relationships with a small core of businesses.’ (Redwood 
parent governor)
While being able to guard against over-dependence was clearly an important issue 
for governors, most saw over-dependence as the least of their concerns regarding 
business involvement. As one supplementary interview chair noted wryly:
‘Even the basics of business involvement don’t really happen in schools, so 
talking about potential worst-case scenarios may be jumping the gun a bit! ’
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7.3.5 Concerns about Profit Making
The fifth and final concern focused on business involvement activities that governors 
perceived as carrying an overt profit motive. Many governors were extremely 
uneasy about potentially profit-making business involvement activities, which were 
often viewed by respondents as an unwelcome attempt at the ‘privatisation’ of 
education. Two particular activities bore the brunt of this suspicion: central 
government’s proposals for paying for physical infrastructure improvement via the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and the for-profit management of schools. Looking 
first at the issue of for-profit management, many governors felt that significant 
uncertainty surrounded central government’s position. As can be seen below, 
governors expressed concern that a strong endorsement of for-profit management by 
central government might negatively affect the school ethos or create a situation in 
which profit -  rather than education -  determined policy decisions:
‘I would be concerned about business consultancies that are interested in 
following the course of privatisation -  the public private partnership type 
things.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘[If] you have a company rather than a school controlling things -  then maybe 
you’re going into a more contentious area where schools are being run by 
business motives. ’ (Greenleaf head teacher)
‘There is fear that [business involvement is] a way of the government running 
away from its responsibilities and wanting to privatise education generally -  
that it’s ‘thin-end-of-the-wedge-ism.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘I can only talk about the abstract, [but] if privatisation of school management 
was on the agenda, then.... I’d be nervous.’ (Whiteffost co-opted governor)
‘If you can deliver a better education at the end of the day, then that’s fine. 
But I am concerned about any move towards privatising schools or LEAs.’ 
(Bluewater LEA governor)
Governors concerns about the potential impact of PFI on the ethos and independence 
of their respective schools were even more pronounced than their concerns about for- 
profit management, as is illustrated by the comments below. Many governors 
expressed misgivings about the basic philosophy of PFI,4 arguing that the 
government should not encourage profit-making incentives in state education, as well 
as that such initiatives should not force schools to surrender a measure of their fiscal
See Section 2.4.3 for a brief explanation of how PFI is intended to operate.
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autonomy and administrative flexibility. Reflecting the beliefs of many 
interviewees, one Bluewater co-opted governor noted that:
‘[What] makes me object to [PFI] is that [it] is really a way of not spending 
public money, and not negotiating the bigger issues of the role of taxation and 
wealth transfer in maintaining a quality of life for the public.’
However, many governors also recognised that despite these concerns about profit- 
making types of business involvement, the current political climate meant that PFI 
was often the only way to obtain much-needed infrastructure improvements:
‘We’re just about to sign a PFI.... I’m opposed to PFI in principle, but if we 
don’t do it, the school will fall apart, literally.’ (Supplementary Interview 
Chair)
‘ I think in sheer economics, [PFI] is not particularly good terms for the 
public sector to buy resources -  but if it’s available and there’s no other 
choice, the choice is either we can have crap buildings or we explore PFI.’ 
(Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘We might, a few years ago, have had a lot of difficulties about [PFI], but 
now let’s be real. We need a [new] building, and if this is the way we’re to 
get it, for heaven’s sake, there’s no point in shooting ourselves in the foot.’ 
(Supplementary interview chair)
‘If we needed a new gym and the only way we could get it was through PFI, I 
suspect in the end it would come -  but there would be an interesting debate 
on it.’ (Brownstone head teacher)
These concerns over potentially profit-making types of business involvement were 
also reflected the broader survey group. Of the eight types of business involvement 
on which governors were surveyed, Table 7.4 shows that opposition to both PFI and 
for-profit management was markedly higher than was opposition to the other six 
types of business involvement (see Table 7.1), where opposition was only 
approximately five per cent. Although Table 7.4 demonstrates that PFI and for-profit 
management were the types of business involvement opposed by the largest 
percentage of respondents, it should also be noted that opposition to these activities 
was not as overwhelming as might have been expected. Not only were a significant 
majority of both chairs and heads either neutral or supportive of PFI (70.3 per cent of 
chairs and 70.2 per cent of heads), but on the issue of for-profit management, a 
majority of heads surveyed (52.7 per cent) were either neutral or supportive.
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Table 7.4: Opinions about For-Profit Management and the Private Finance 
Initiative







For-profit education management (Chairs) 9.3 36.0 54.7 75
For-profit education management (Heads) 10.9 41.8 47.3 55
Private Finance Initiative (Chairs) 33.8 36.5 29.7 74
Private Finance Initiative (Heads) 38.6 31.6 29.8 57
Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
7.3.6 A Note about Pragmatism
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, governors felt that a strategic 
framework would be a valuable tool for both evaluating potential business 
involvement proposals and determining the compatibility of particular projects with 
the broader strategy of the school. In light of the more targeted concerns elaborated 
upon above, it seems even more reasonable that governors would want to ensure that 
policies were in place to address such concerns. This seems particularly true since 
governors admitted (as illustrated below) that even where they harboured concerns, 
they were prepared to be pragmatic and consider all forms of business involvement, 
particularly if doing so might prove to be the only viable way to provide a better 
educational experience for students:
‘The involvement of business in schools is largely on the basis of needs and 
musts rather than cans and shoulds.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘The word ‘privatisation’ is my scare, and I’m worried about that. [But] I 
think that as long as there aren’t any conditions, I really don’t see the 
problem.... Why should we say no to the resources coming in as long as 
they’re condition free?’ (Brownstone teacher governor)
‘Our basic approach is that we’ve excluded nothing -  we haven’t necessarily 
signed up to everything, but we’ve excluded nothing, and I think that’s the 
kind of healthy approach we want to take.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
This pragmatic approach was also reflected in the survey, as a substantial minority of 
respondents felt that the financial and resource realities of running a state school had 
led them to examine business involvement in some form. When asked whether 
financial or resource constraints had ever resulted in their governing body 
considering business involvement or links that it might otherwise not have 
considered, 45.2 per cent of chairs (N=84) and 35.7 per cent of heads (N=70)
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responded in the affirmative.5 Given that governors were prepared to be pragmatic in 
their approach towards business involvement, it is not surprising that many governors 
felt a ‘defensive’ component to a business involvement strategy might be beneficial.
7.4 Business Involvement, Community Building, & Strategic Planning 
The third advantage was that governors felt business involvement could be an 
important strategic tool in developing relationships between schools and 
communities. First, it will be argued that governors felt governing bodies themselves 
had a responsibility to build relationships with the community -  not least because 
governors felt that effective strategic planning should consider community needs. 
Second, it will be argued that governors perceived business involvement as an 
important component in the general process of engaging the wider community in the 
life of the school. Finally, it will be argued that governors saw business involvement 
activities -  if properly implemented -  as a way to build community by breaking down 
the traditional mutual suspicion between the state schools and the private sector.
7.4.1 Community Involvement and Strategic Planning
Although the composition of governing bodies is supposed to provide a reflection of 
the various communities that the school serves, governors acknowledged that the 
relationship between schools and their surrounding communities was frequently 
underdeveloped. As is illustrated below, it was clear that interviewees felt that 
governors and governing bodies should be more proactive in both seeking to 
understand the needs of the broader community and considering those needs when 
making decisions about the school:
‘Without the perspectives of the... members of the community, the governing 
body can’t make decisions that it can confidently believe to reflect the 
opinions of these stakeholders.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘[There should be] community involvement in looking strategically at how 
the school operates.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘I think there needs to be a greater coordination of the community’s view, 
strategically, of what they want from their [local] education establishment.’ 
(Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘We have set ourselves the task of being a good community school and 
serving the needs of the community immediately around us. So within that,
5 However, while respondents considered such activities, there should be no presumption that 
respondents believed that such activities would be either beneficial or detrimental if implemented.
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our strategic planning is about setting the priorities we need to concentrate on 
to achieve those general aims.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘Ideally, [the school] being a community resource, the community should be 
allowed to feed into what they see as the role of their local school.’ 
(Whitefrost chair)
This evidence suggested that governors recognised the general planning benefits that 
could result from improving school-community relationships. Governors were also 
specific in relation to business involvement, noting that strengthening their schools’ 
relationships with the business community was an important component of this 
broader community-building process:
‘I believe that it should be part of the governors’ role to look at the 
community side of their job, in a much stronger way than they do [now] -  
community meaning firms and people.’ (Redwood co-opted governor)
‘My view is that if part of our strategic plan is around getting closer links 
with the community...then it’s inevitable that you’ll get more involvement 
with business.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘I think the [school’s strategy regarding] interaction with business 
partnerships is part of a wider issue, which is really the interaction [of the 
school] with the real world.’ (Greenleaf co-opted governor)
Given the responsibility that governors felt for acting as a liaison between the school 
and the community, the comments above suggest that governors felt it was important 
to engage the community in the life of the school. The next two sections examine the 
ways by which governors believed business involvement in particular might help 
schools become more integral members of the community whilst simultaneously 
eroding the perception of state schools as insular and change-averse entities.
7.4.2 Business Involvement as a Community Building Tool
First, governors noted the potential value of using business involvement to build or 
strengthen relationships with the community in general. Whilst governors 
acknowledged that building relationships with the local resident community was 
extremely important, they also argued that gaining the support of the business 
community was equally as valuable. Because businesses are frequently integral 
components of the local community, governors recognised that strong connections 
with business could provide an important base of community support for the mission 
of the school. As is evident from the comments below, many governors saw business
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involvement as a way for their schools to demonstrate their commitment to broader 
community involvement in the life of the institution. Governors hoped that this 
demonstration would not only create a positive image of the school in the broader 
community, but would also encourage other community stakeholders to become more 
engaged with the school and to view the school as a community resource:
‘[We’re working on] improving the relationship with the community 
generally -  and I think local businesses are quite important, because they’ve 
potentially got quite a high profile.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘One of the issues about becoming a technology college school is that we want 
to open the facilities to the community, so the idea is that we will have a 
relationship with both the local resident community and also the local business 
community.... If we draw in the local business community, that draws in a 
whole range of experience for the children’ (Redwood head teacher)
‘[The head] is quite into these things, having links with different 
businesses.... It brings a good reputation for the school as well, and makes 
the school quite proactive on that front.’ (Greenleaf teacher governor)
‘I think there has to be [business involvement], because it’s about the 
community, isn’t it -  and business is a key player in the community. I think 
it’s about aspiration for young people, really, in its widest sense.’ (Redwood 
LEA governor)
7.4.3 Business Involvement as a Bridge between Business and Education
Second, governors believed that besides demonstrating the school’s general interest 
and willingness to become an active member of the community, business 
involvement was a potential vehicle for assisting in fighting a more specific problem: 
the traditional mutual mistrust between industry and education. In its simplest terms, 
governors felt that increased familiarity was one of the strongest ways to engender 
and increase trust between both camps. Governors argued that business involvement 
activities, if properly designed, could provide both schools and businesses with an 
opportunity to work together in a specific and limited manner. By building 
relationships and trust through such small-scale and well-monitored interactions, 
governors believed that schools and businesses could begin forming a broader basis 
for mutual understanding:
‘Anything which breaks down the barrier -  well, there’s no barrier, it’s just 
another world -  anything that breaks down the difference between academic 
life and industry, etc. is a good thing.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
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‘I think the ways that we have business contacts at the moment is very 
valuable, hopefully for both sides. As for us, it’s most definitely [valuable], 
especially for staff and student development... [and] if you have a positive 
relationship with business, it helps.’ (Greenleaf head teacher)
‘The school isn’t the only educational institution, and I think that links with 
the community enrich the learning environment for the students. In order to 
achieve excellence, you need partnership with all concerned.’ (Brownstone 
parent governor)
While governors noted the opportunities that such an approach could offer to 
students, as well as to staff in terms of professional development, they also noted the 
benefits that mutual trust and sustained involvement might offer to school 
management. As these respondents noted, improved relationships between schools 
and businesses could eventually provide schools new perspectives on administrative 
issues as well:
‘I certainly think that at the level of management, huge opportunities are 
[currently] lost for senior management teams in schools to observe and share 
with senior management teams in business.’ (Bluewater head teacher)
‘I think business does need to be involved in schools; [business] brings an 
expertise to education which education doesn’t otherwise have. [And] it’s 
also about finding a meeting point between the needs of schools, the needs of 
education, and the needs of business.’ (Redwood parent governor)
‘Britain has a voluntary sector ethos, and business can provide the people 
who can assist in education management. These individuals can possibly 
help the management of schools be more efficient, effective, and visionary.’ 
(Whitefrost LEA governor)
Given the pressure from central government for schools to manage themselves more 
efficiently and effectively, such benefits -  if  they were to be realised in practice -  
might prove extremely valuable if the traditional suspicion between schools and 
businesses could be jettisoned in favour of a more harmonious relationship. 
Acknowledging the advantages that schools could gain by being more open to working 
with businesses and other community groups, Brownstone’s head summed up the 
rationale for using business involvement to foster stronger community relationships:
‘My increasing perspective is that if any initiative [for business involvement] 
is supportive of the achievement of the children, then I’m personally not 
opposed to it. Because clearly, we’re all here to support and raise 
achievement.’
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7.5 Preparing for the Future of Business Involvement through 
Strategic Planning 
Finally, governors argued that business involvement should be addressed 
strategically because it was their responsibility, as governors, to be prepared to 
contend with issues that were poised to impact upon the school in the future. Both 
the survey and interview respondents indicated that they felt that business 
involvement in education was a growing phenomenon. Given this trend, they further 
believed that they had a responsibility as governors to determine the extent of, and 
their school’s approach towards, business involvement in the coming years. 
However, governors also acknowledged the general absence to date of any 
substantial strategic planning regarding business involvement. Each of these issues 
is now examined in turn.
7.5.1 Governor Opinions about the Future of Business Involvement
Survey and interview respondents overwhelmingly felt that business involvement in 
education would become more common in the near future. First, 91.5 per cent of 
surveyed chairs (N=82) and 95.6 per cent of surveyed heads (N=68) saw business 
involvement becoming more common ‘over the next few years’. Second, nearly 
two-thirds of both chairs (63.5 per cent, N=85) and heads (65.7 per cent, N=70) saw 
their own schools increasing business involvement over the next two years, while 
only 4.7 per cent and 2.9 per cent, respectively, felt that such involvement in their 
own schools would decrease. The interview data strongly supported this finding, as 
respondents felt (see below) that business involvement in education was poised to 
increase in the coming years -  and that their respective schools would need to 
determine the approach they would take towards this broader trend. Notably, none of 
the 47 interviewees suggested that they expected a decrease in the levels of business 
involvement their respective schools:
‘At this point, we want more and more business involvement, leadership 
involvement, so that expertise can be imparted, and the children can be 
motivated. I think at this moment you don’t have that.’ (Brownstone chair)
‘[Business involvement] is not something, really, that we’ve talked a great 
deal about, but as we develop I think we will have to do that. Because as we 
improve our success as an institution, we become more attractive to other 
people [who will want to] work with us, and we will need to have a 
framework in which we do that.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
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One reason why governors felt business involvement would become more 
commonplace was because they believed that the advantages of business 
involvement often outweighed the disadvantages. As Table 7.5 illustrates, nearly 
two-thirds of survey respondents felt that business involvement activities were worth 
the effort necessary to sustain them. The interview data supports this survey 
evidence, as can be seen in the comments below.
Table 7.5: Opinion on W hether Education-Business Links are W orth the Effort 
Required to Sustain Them






Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
T, personally, would be a huge supporter of increased business involvement 
in the school. I think there’s an awful lot they could do -  not just as a 
supplier, but in a relationship way.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘I think [business involvement] should stay. I think it’s a superb way of 
broadening the offer we give the kids. As long as the businesses continue to 
support it, I think the schools will.’ (Brownstone head teacher)
T would like to see a marked increase in business involvement [and] I think 
the governing body must be involved in that. Because it is something which 
is still to be fully explored.’ (Redwood parent governor)
A second reason why governors may have felt business links were poised to increase 
in the future was because a substantial minority of survey respondents reported 
having already seen a positive change in the ethos of their school as a result of 
business involvement. While three-fifths of survey respondents (58.2 per cent of 
chairs (N=79) and 61.2 per cent of heads (N=67)) reported not seeing any such 
change, 35.4 per cent of chairs and 35.8 per cent of heads felt that such involvement 
had already led to a positive change in school ethos, while only 6.3 per cent of chairs 
and 3.0 per cent of heads felt that such involvement had led to a negative change. 
Presuming that the level of business involvement in each respondent’s school was 
sufficient to permit an informed response, it appeared that although existing business 
involvement was rarely seen as having a negative effect on school ethos, many 
respondents did not see it as having either a positive or a negative effect. However,
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it was also possible that some schools may not have yet had enough business 
involvement for such involvement to have had an discemable impact on the overall 
school ethos. If this was the case, then -  extrapolating from the instances in which 
respondents indicated either a positive or a negative change -  there appeared to be a 
trend amongst chairs and heads towards feeling that business involvement often has a 
positive impact when it reaches a ‘measurable’ level.
The third reason for why governors may have felt business involvement was poised 
to increase was because they perceived that central government supported such an 
increase. As can be seen in the comments below, governors noted that they felt the 
current Labour central government was strongly promoting public-private 
partnership initiatives in the social services. Given this governmental support for 
increasing private sector involvement in areas like education, governors felt that it 
was quite likely that the levels of business involvement in education would increase. 
As such, governors wanted to ensure that their schools were in a position to handle 
this potential increase if and when it materialised:
‘[I think] government has the view that if they can get more business 
involvement in schools, they’d be interested in doing so.’ (Supplementary 
interview chair)
‘They [central government] can see scope for the private sector to get 
involved in the delivery of education, and they’re going with it firmly down 
that road.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘One of the things is that [government is] very frustrated with what they see 
as the lack of progress -  [so they are encouraged when] they see the 
successful parts of the private sector doing things very quickly, and throwing 
money at things when you want to get things done.’ (Supplementary 
interview chair)
‘I think government feels that successful businesses are successful because 
they’ve got the right people in charge, and that some of these people ought to 
be looking in at these schools.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
7.5.2 Future Responsibility and Strategic Planning
The evidence above suggested that governors found the issues surrounding business 
involvement to be of growing importance, not least due to the potential increase in 
frequency and scope of these activities in coming years. Because of this perceived 
growing importance, the evidence also suggested that governors believed it was the 
within the remit of governing bodies to define the policies of their respective schools
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in this regard. Governors acknowledged that whilst the current approach of many 
schools and governing bodies towards business involvement was ad hoc, it was 
important for schools to have guidance on how to manage these activities more 
systematically in future. As is illustrated below, governors believed that providing 
this guidance and planning was, at least partially, within the remit and responsibility 
of governing bodies themselves:
‘I think one of the difficulties is that [business involvement activities] are 
nearly always add-on, additional projects. I think there is much to be gained 
by trying [in future] to make as many of those links as is possible integral to 
the structure of the school.’ (Bluewater head teacher)
‘There’s an awareness that we [on the governing body] need to be a bit more 
professional about tapping into the business community.... There are 
concerns that we haven’t really done as much as we could have done with the 
funding and the connections with the business world. [Particularly because 
if] we didn’t have interaction, I think it would be seriously detrimental to the 
future of the school.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
7.6 C hapter Seven C o n clu sion
This chapter was the first of two chapters designed to answer the fourth and final 
research question, and in so doing offers both a conclusion and a transition in 
relation to the issues of school governance, business involvement, and strategic 
planning. First, the conclusion. In the course of providing the context necessary for 
interpreting the evidence to be presented in Chapter Eight, Chapter Seven also 
provides a distinct new contribution to the literature in its own right. The research 
evidence presented in this chapter offers a thorough exploration of governors’ 
opinions about, concerns regarding, and perspectives on business involvement in 
education. The research evidence also outlines four potential advantages that 
governors felt would result from engaging in strategic planning in regards to business 
involvement. As such, the research in this chapter provides substantial insight into 
an area of emerging policy interest in which no substantial empirical research has 
been conducted since the brief survey research of Baginsky et al. (1991). Evidence 
presented herein therefore supports the main thrust of this thesis, while 
simultaneously making a unique contribution to both the school governance and the 
business involvement literature.
Yet Chapter Seven also provides a transition. The main purpose of Chapter Seven 
was to use empirical data to confirm that governors in this study actually supported
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the suggestions of Glegg (1997) and Tulloch (1999), who argued that governing 
bodies should take a strategic role in determining the level and type of business 
involvement in their schools. Evidence presented in this chapter confirmed that 
governors believed business involvement was a legitimate strategic planning issue 
that should be incorporated into governing body strategic planning processes, yet 
also confirmed that these same governors agreed that there was an absence in their 
schools of strategic planning on business involvement issues. This empirical 
discrepancy between theory and practice therefore demonstrated that business 
involvement was an appropriate lens through which to examine the practical policy 
relevance of the strategic planning barriers identified earlier. These findings 
therefore allow for the transition to the final data chapter, in which further research 
evidence on business involvement and strategic planning will be presented in an 
attempt to illustrate the practical policy relevance of the strategic planning barriers 
identified in Chapters Five and Six.
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C h a p t e r  E ig h t
St r a t e g ic  P la n n in g  B a r r ie r s  and  t h e  B u sin ess  In v o l v e m e n t  C a se
8.0 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated that business involvement was an issue on which 
governors believed that strategic planning was desirable yet absent. It was therefore 
argued that business involvement was a suitable policy lens through which to address 
the fourth main research question:
Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning barriers
has practical policy relevance and importance?_____________________________
Building upon the background information of Chapter Seven, this final data chapter 
seeks to demonstrate that the previously-identified strategic planning barriers have 
practical policy relevance and importance. This chapter seeks to do so by illustrating 
that the systematic application of these barriers provided a robust explanation of the 
reasons for the absence of governing body strategic planning on business 
involvement issues. By thus demonstrating that the strategic planning barriers 
identified earlier in this thesis did exist as practical and significant barriers to 
governing bodies in relation to their strategic planning on business involvement 
issues, it will be argued that the fourth main research question can be answered 
satisfactorily in the affirmative.
In order to fulfil this task, the absence of strategic planning on business involvement 
will be examined in the context of each of the strategic planning barriers. These 
respective assessments will seek to determine whether each barrier was influential in 
inhibiting governing body strategic planning. Sections 8.1 through 8.4 will seek to 
determine the influence of the four institutional-level strategic planning barriers 
(identified in Chapter Five) on strategic planning about business involvement. 
Section 8.1 presents evidence for the influence of the ‘monitoring culture’ barrier on 
strategic planning about business involvement. Section 8.2 presents evidence for the 
influence of the ‘varying involvement’ barrier on strategic planning about business 
involvement. Section 8.3 presents evidence for the influence of the ‘tangible-task- 
based results’ barrier on strategic planning about business involvement. Finally, 
Section 8.4 presents evidence for the influence of the ‘staff delegation’ barrier on 
strategic planning about business involvement.
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Sections 8.5 through 8.8 will then seek to determine the influence of the six central 
governmental-level barriers (identified in Chapter Six) on strategic planning about 
business involvement.1 Section 8.5 presents evidence for the influence of the ‘time 
constraints and volunteer expectations’ barrier on strategic planning about business 
involvement. Section 8.6 presents evidence for the influence of the ‘financing system’ 
barrier on strategic planning about business involvement. Section 8.7 presents 
evidence for the influence of the ‘communication’ barrier on strategic planning about 
business involvement. Section 8.8 presents evidence for the influence of the ‘trust’ 
barrier on strategic planning about business involvement. Section 8.9 summarises 
these research findings and concludes by addressing the value of using such a heuristic 
approach in illustrating the theoretical framework identified earlier in this thesis.
Finally, while quantitative and qualitative data are used in conjunction when possible 
in this chapter, in some contexts quantitative data were not available. In these 
instances, evidence was derived solely from the qualitative portion of this research.
8.1 The ‘Monitoring Culture’ Barrier
The first institutional-level barrier identified in Chapter Five was that of a 
‘monitoring culture’ within governing bodies. It was argued that in many governing 
bodies, there was a tendency to prioritise monitoring activities over strategic 
planning activities. It was also argued that whilst governors did have statutory 
responsibilities in many of these areas, it appeared that governors often hewed closer 
to the reactive administrative portion of those responsibilities than to the proactive 
strategic portion of such responsibilities. The influence of this barrier on business 
involvement and strategic planning is illustrated below.
8.1.1 The Influence of Monitoring Impediments
Despite the fact that governors thought business involvement was a legitimate and 
important strategic planning issue, it was apparent that in practice, the habit of taking 
a reactive monitoring approach rather than a proactive strategic approach still 
prevailed. Furthermore, this appeared to be the ‘best-case’ scenario, as the survey 
data suggested that in many instances, governing bodies had not even reached the 
point where a monitoring culture would begin to impede strategic planning. When
1 The barriers of paperwork and legislation will be discussed in the broader context of the time barrier 
for the purposes of the business involvement issue. Section 8.50 provides the rationale for this 
decision.
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respondents were asked whether they (or any other governors) were involved in 
monitoring business relationships with their school, fewer than half of both chairs 
(45.2 per cent, N=84) and heads (47.9 per cent, N=71) reported that monitoring by 
the governing body even took place. As the following comments illustrate, 
governors usually reported that their activities related to business involvement -  
where such involvement even existed -  focused around monitoring the outcomes of 
existing (and often ad hoc) business involvement activities, rather than around a 
proactive assessment of how those activities might fit into a broader and integrated 
strategic framework for the future of the school:
‘We do have reports to the governing body [about business involvement] -  
but they seem to go in one ear and out the other. So I’m not very well aware 
of [business involvement]. I think it doesn’t tend to be discussed very much 
in the governing body, and...there isn’t really an area where it slots neatly 
into the sub-committee [sic] structure.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘If [business involvement] did arise in our discussion, it would just be for 
information. So we’d probably be told about [business involvement 
activities], but I’m not sure they would really be discussed, or that the 
reasons for them would be discussed.’ (Greenleaf LEA governor)
‘On the question of how much our governors know about [business 
involvement] -  if there’s been a key event that has been sponsored by the 
EBP, then clearly they would be made aware of that. [And] some of them 
represent business, so in that sense they are directly involved in the 
governance of the school....’ (Brownstone co-opted governor)
Additionally, this research suggested that this propensity to monitor meant that even 
if governors did pay attention to business involvement issues, they rarely treated 
these issues strategically. Instead, the influence of a monitoring culture tended to 
mean that governing bodies treated potentially strategic issues in an ad hoc and 
reactive manner, dealing with such issues only when they were presented to the 
governing body by staff or external parties. In practice, the monitoring culture meant 
that governors frequently treated reports about business involvement as 
administrative records of past activities, rather than as lessons and blueprints for 
determining potential future ones. The comments below exemplify this tendency, as 
these respondents noted that how governors tended to approach business 
involvement issues in an ad hoc manner, rarely perceiving how such matters might 
be integrated into a greater strategic framework:
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‘I think [business involvement] would be addressed on a very specific, case- 
by-case basis. Just because it really is a standard pattern. You discuss a 
specific case, and then you end up having a wide-ranging discussion of all the 
issues, and you close that discussion with a particular decision about a 
particular issue.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
‘Rather than governors seeing [business involvement] as ‘oh, that’s 
something separate with business’ -  it’s really part of the process of strategic 
planning.’ (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
8.1.2 The Example of Work Experience
One key example of this monitoring tendency in relation to business involvement can 
be found in the issue of work experience. Initially, the survey appeared to provide 
encouraging signs regarding the approach of governing bodies towards strategic 
planning about business involvement. Indeed, over seven out of ten chairs (N=86) 
and heads (N=70) (74.4 per cent and 72.9 per cent, respectively) reported that their 
governing bodies did discuss their school’s business involvement or links, an 
impressively high -  although somewhat unexpected -  response. However, it soon 
became apparent that the dichotomous response option of the survey question itself 
might have created an overly-optimistic impression regarding the extent of governing 
body discussion about business involvement. Because the wording of the survey 
question asked respondents to simply report the presence or absence of such 
discussions, rather than the quality or frequency of them, even minimal discussions 
of business involvement would allow for an affirmative response.
However, the interview evidence offers a more detailed exploration of what 
governors usually meant by ‘discussion’ of business involvement, and this evidence 
points to very little strategy and a great deal of monitoring. The qualitative research 
found that such discussions rarely -  if ever -  focused on the potential strategic 
questions about business involvement. Instead, as is illustrated by the comments 
below, such ‘discussions’ almost always focused on monitoring the school’s work 
experience programmes -  indeed, governors frequently cited work experience as 
their main (or sole) knowledge of business involvement with their school:
‘[There’s] the work experience programme - 1 know a bit about that because 
[my employer is] part of it -  we’ve had quite a number of work experience 
students come in over the course of a year, and I always have one from [the 
school]. Apart from that, I’m not very clued up on the area at all.’ 
(Brownstone LEA governor)
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‘There’s not a huge amount [of business involvement] compared to other 
schools. The school has various links with the business community, in terms 
of work experience and things like that that can happen. But [the school] 
doesn’t have a lot [of business involvement] coming in, beyond the governors 
themselves.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘Obviously there are things like placements, for example, and I’ve got some 
people to take on students outside of school for work experience, and things 
like that. But I couldn’t actually name companies that have that relationship 
with the school.’ (Greenleaf LEA governor)
‘At sixth form level we have links with businesses in relation to work 
experience there, case study visits, and so on. But the only other real links 
are with the governors of the school, [some of whom] have got business 
links.’ (Redwood head teacher)
While governors may have limited their knowledge about business involvement to 
work experience programmes -  i.e., an issue on which the information was presented 
to them -  it was still theoretically possible that governors used this information to 
take a more strategic approach towards how business involvement more generally 
might either be improved or better integrated into future school strategy. However, 
the qualitative research found that governing bodies usually received reports on work 
experience in a pro forma manner. Governors noted that these reports usually 
consisted of boilerplate documents that provided the annual number of placements, 
the number of employers engaged, and summaries of student and employer 
experiences. Governors also felt that these reports were often simply administrative 
acknowledgements, rather than the starting points for substantive discussions. To 
illustrate, here are two typical governor responses, explaining how their respective 
governing bodies acquire knowledge about the work experience schemes:
‘Work placements are made through the staff of the school, and then they’re 
simply reported to the governing body at the end.’ (Greenleaf chair)
‘[Business involvement] is never mentioned at the governors’ meeting. [But] 
I think last year all the kids did work experience, and they got excellent 
records sent back by the employers about the kids.’ (Redwood LEA 
governor)
In conclusion, although work experience and/or other kinds of business involvement 
may be mentioned with some regularity at governing body meetings, the habits of the 
monitoring culture tended to inhibit any substantial discussion of how that 
information could be put to use in a strategic context.
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8.2 The ‘Varying Levels of Governor Involvement’ Barrier 
The second institutional-level barrier identified in Chapter Five was that of varying 
levels of governor involvement. It was argued that the burden of governors’ 
responsibilities was frequently carried out by a small core of governors, and that 
governors who were outside the core were often ‘single-issue’ advocates. It was 
therefore argued that the widely varying levels of governor involvement impeded 
strategic planning by creating a situation where neither core nor non-core governors 
felt that strategic planning was a personal priority. The influence of this barrier on 
business involvement and strategic planning is illustrated below.
8.2.1 The Role of the Core Governors
First, this research found that the general problems associated with the core 
governors and strategic planning were also evident in relation to the approach of core 
governors towards strategic planning on business involvement issues. Interviewees 
reported that the core governors often felt that they had numerous responsibilities 
that were more pressing than strategic planning, and that strategic planning about 
business involvement (as well as many other issues) received a lower priority as a 
result. While this approach by the core governors was partly attributable to the time 
pressures created by central government demands (see Section 8.5), some of 
rationale for this approach is clearly due to the fact that a small core of governors -  
either by choice or by circumstance -  frequently conducted a disproportionately 
greater amount of their governing body’s work. As these comments illustrate, the 
potential for focusing on the strategic planning aspects of issues like business 
involvement was frequently impeded by the pressures created by the disproportionate 
workload taken on by the core governors:
‘At the moment, there’s not a great deal [of business involvement], really. 
[Partly because governors] find it difficult to keep up with the detail that they 
need to keep up with. A lot of it has to do with the workload, but it’s also to 
do with focus.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘I think it’s [an issue of] time. In order to [pursue business involvement], you 
need to go out and meet people, and you need to come in and see things. And 
obviously, business is going to want to focus on what its [aims] are as well.... 
It’s a huge responsibility.’ (Greenleaf head teacher)
‘[Our school’s business involvement is] on an ad hoc basis.... If you see things 
triggered by industry in the school, invariably they’re triggered by the chair [in his 
capacity as industrialist]. But at some stage, he wants to stand down, and then the 
governors are going to be in a sorry state.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
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8.2.2 The Role of the Non-Core Governors
While the barrier of varying involvement impedes core governors because of their 
disproportionate responsibilities, the barrier impedes strategic planning by non-core 
governors for a different reason -  yet the results in terms of strategic planning about 
business involvement are the same. The research presented in Chapter Five indicated 
that for various reasons, non-core governors were often less confident about their 
role than were the (generally more experienced) core governors. It was argued that 
these non-core governors were therefore more likely to attempt to make their 
contributions either ‘on the edges’ or by sticking to ‘what they knew.’ However, as 
the following comments make clear, neither of these approaches is likely to lead to 
contributions on the strategic planning front, particularly on an issue like business 
involvement. Instead, respondents suggested that non-core governors generally left 
the issue of business involvement to ‘others’ -  presumably the core governors -  and 
that as such, non-core governors had little direct interest in how strategic planning in 
this area might be pursued:
‘We do talk about our business partners in the community, we do talk about 
the awards evening, but we don’t talk in great detail at the governors’ 
meetings about those things, because we have sub-committees [sic]...you 
definitely get more information if you’re on those specific committees.’ 
(Brownstone co-opted governor)
‘I think it’s hard for anyone to have an understanding of what all [the 
business involvement possibilities] are -  for instance, [the chair] has 
narrowed it down to three or four. I’m not even sure how up to date [the 
business co-opted governor] is on all the initiatives.’ (Whitefrost LEA 
governor)
‘[The school] has a business relationship with a management consultancy, 
something the previous head introduced, and which she always said was 
enormously beneficial. She never produced a report for the governing body, 
and no governor ever asked her to produce a report. I haven’t the faintest 
idea of what it led to or what it does.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
‘The extent to which the governors see what is going on is extremely 
limited.... I tend to go in[to the school] about once a year.... So [business 
involvement] may or may not be happening to a massive extent, and I 
wouldn’t be in a good position to judge.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
8.2.3 The Influence of Varying Governor Involvement
Not only do these qualitative findings suggest why there may be a lack of 
responsibility being taken in strategic planning about business involvement, so too 
do the quantitative findings. Nearly nine out of ten chairs (88.2 per cent, N=85) and
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heads (87.3 per cent, N=71) surveyed reported that there was no governor assigned to 
coordinate even the monitoring of business involvement activities. Furthermore, 
only about one in ten chair or head (11.8 per cent and 11.3 per cent, respectively) 
said that such delegated monitoring took place, while 1.4 per cent of heads were 
unsure. Clearly, strategic planning in regards to business involvement can and does 
slip through the crack created by such ‘two-tiered’ governing bodies. This problem 
can be traced directly to the widely varying levels of governor involvement; if 
governing bodies were more balanced in terms of commitment, this research 
suggests that there would be a greater likelihood of all governors having the 
opportunity to engage in strategic planning. With the core governors saying that their 
focus and workload forced them to put their priorities into areas other than strategic 
planning about business involvement, and with the non-core governors arguing that 
someone with more knowledge about the issue should be doing this work, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that strategic planning on business involvement is noticeably absent.
8.3 The ‘Limited to Tangible Tasks’ Barrier
The third institutional-level barrier identified in Chapter Five was the tendency of 
governors to apply their expertise and influence to a limited range of issues that 
provided ‘tangible’ results -  generally finance, premises, and staff relations. It was 
argued first that this tendency led governing bodies to seek governors who could fill 
certain ‘tangible skills gaps’ on the governing body (such as ‘a lawyer’ or ‘an 
accountant’), and second, that the pursuit of tangible results often meant avoiding 
paying attention to ‘primarily educational’ issues. As such, it was argued that the 
emphasis on tangible results meant that many governors had minimal understanding 
of the underlying (and more intangible) educational issues that faced their schools in 
the longer term. The influence of this barrier on business involvement and strategic 
planning is illustrated below.
8.3.1 Short-Term Tangible Results versus Long-Term Vision
The first main claim (above) was that governing bodies placed a greater emphasis on 
the skills that helped achieve ‘tangible’ short-term results than they did on the ability 
to set a broader general vision for the future of the school. In the context of strategic 
planning and business involvement, this emphasis was evident in three main ways. 
First, as suggested in Chapter Five, pursuing short-term tangible results usually leads 
to more immediate rewards for governors than does setting a broad future vision for
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the school. These kinds of results make the pursuit of short-term issues more 
attractive to many governors, while simultaneously making efforts to provide a long­
term strategic vision comparatively less attractive. Second, and compounding this 
problem, the skills necessary to contribute to such a strategic planning endeavour are 
rarely provided to governors, either via formal training or via the informal expertise 
of current governors. Since governors are rarely recruited for their vision, many do 
not possess such strategic planning skills. Instead, Chapter Five illustrated that 
governors often simply sought to apply the skills they already possess towards 
generating tangible short-term results. Given these two hindrances alone, governors 
noted that likelihood of anyone on the governing body actually pursuing strategic 
planning on business involvement was quite low:
‘It could only be beneficial if the governing body did [have a business 
involvement strategy] -  but you see, we aren’t trained in that way, so we all 
bring whatever we bring from our own lives.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘[The governing body] doesn’t ascertain, for potential governors, what their 
[non-professional] skills background is -  which would enable the appropriate 
additional information [about strategic planning] to be imparted to them. 
And that is a major concern.’ (Redwood parent governor)
Third, this research found that even if governing bodies did raise questions about how 
business involvement should be addressed, the same emphasis on short-term ‘tangible 
results’ over long-term strategic vision still applied. As the respondents below 
observed, the discussion of business involvement was often approached from the short­
term ‘tangible results’ paradigm rather than from the ‘long-term vision’ paradigm:
‘It’s about building [business involvement] into an essential framework for 
the school -  [but] we’re still thinking in terms of additionality, I fear, rather 
than locking it in at the substructure.’ (Bluewater head teacher)
‘Governors should also be fighting for the school externally, in relation to all 
the governmental and quasi-govemmental and community organisations with 
whom the school needs to build relationships in order to be successful. But 
most governors tend to stay on more familiar ground.’ (Whitefrost co-opted 
governor)
Although the ‘long-term vision’ paradigm would permit governing bodies to address 
the issue of business involvement in a more integrated way, such a strategy-based 
approach is also less likely to produce immediate results. As a result, the philosophy 
of many governing bodies -  to favour short-term results over long-term vision -
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makes achieving a strategic approach towards business involvement substantially 
more difficult.
8.3.2 Business Involvement as a Primarily Education-Related Issue
The second main claim in regarding this barrier was that the preoccupation of 
governing bodies with pursuing tangible issues -  to the exclusion of primarily 
education-related ones -  meant that governors often had low specific knowledge of 
the educational issues facing their schools. The evidence supported this contention 
in the context of business involvement, but it is first important to note the difference 
between governors’ opinions about strategic planning policy in regards business 
involvement and governors’ knowledge about the current state of business 
involvement at the school. As was amply demonstrated in Chapter Seven, 
governors’ opinions about the role of business involvement and strategic planning 
were extremely well developed. However, the evidence below demonstrates that 
because governors viewed business involvement as primarily an educational issue, 
they were less likely to have detailed knowledge about their school’s business 
involvement than they were about other, wow-educational issues. This lack of 
knowledge therefore makes strategic planning about business involvement much 
more difficult -  even where governors acknowledge that such strategic planning 
should take place -  simply because governors would be planning without detailed 
knowledge of their school’s educational needs.
Looking first at the survey data, it is striking to note the differences between what 
respondents reported as the current level of knowledge about business involvement 
within their governing bodies (Table 8.1), and what those same respondents reported 
as the desired level of that knowledge (Table 8.2). As is shown in Table 8.1, over 
half (56.4 per cent) of chairs and nearly two-thirds (63.4 per cent) of heads reported 
that their governing bodies had only low or moderate knowledge of such 
involvement. In contrast, Table 8.2 shows that 71.8 per cent of chairs (N=85) and
51.4 per cent of heads (N=70) felt that governors should have high levels of 
knowledge about business involvement in their schools. Although the difference 
between chairs and heads reported in Table 8.2 is statistically significant, this is 
likely to be a difference simply in the degree of positive enthusiasm between chairs 
and heads, with heads being more cautious than their chairs. As can be seen in Table
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8.2, less than ten per cent of either heads or chairs felt governors should have low 
knowledge of such activities.
Table 8.1: Current Extent of Governing Body Knowledge about Business 
Involvement
Current Extent Chairs (%) Heads (%)




Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
Table 8.2: Desired Level of Governing Body Knowledge about Business 
Involvement
Desired Level Chairs (%) Heads (%)




Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: Mann-Whitney z =-2.4; p  < 0.05.
The qualitative evidence provides a potential explanation, reconciling this 
discrepancy between what survey respondents felt their governing bodies did know 
about business involvement and what their governing bodies should know. The 
interviews revealed that many governors perceived business involvement as 
primarily an educational issue -  as opposed to, say, primarily a ‘tangible’ issue like 
finance. As was noted in Chapter Five, many governors were reluctant to engage in 
‘primarily education-related’ issues, often preferring to deal with non-educational 
administrative issues instead. Given this trepidation about engaging in primarily 
educational issues, it is therefore unsurprising that the most common response from 
governors (see below) was that they had extremely little knowledge about the 
involvement of businesses with their school:
‘In principle, we’re in the [statutory] EAZ, and we’ve had [business] 
involvement...for the performing arts specialist school status, but how much 
more involved the businesses are in the school, I don’t know. (Greenleaf 
parent governor)
256
‘I don’t know very much about [business involvement] -  we just know that 
we’re supposed to be going down that route, but I don’t know how we’re 
going to do it.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
‘I haven’t got a lot of knowledge [about business involvement]. We’ve had a 
good relationship with Barclay’s Bank to involve the kids in their relationship 
with business. But I don’t know all of what they’ve been up to recently.’ 
(Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘Nothing. Nothing. I have no knowledge. The last time I was on the 
governing body, it came up as a potential issue, and we were very reluctant to 
engage in it at the time. I don’t know what, if anything, has been put in place 
since then. But it’s never actually come up in discussion.’ (Bluewater co­
opted governor)
Furthermore, even those governors who expressed a personal understanding of their 
school’s business involvement felt that their colleagues were less well informed. As 
the two comments below illustrate, even in situations (such as pursuing specialist 
school status) where there are clear implications for considering the role of business 
involvement in the future of their respective schools, knowledge of business 
involvement amongst governors remained minimal:
‘If I’m honest about the whole governing body, it’s not something where 
there’s a very strong consciousness. They’re certainly conscious of what the 
specialist schools initiative is meant to do, in terms of working with 
professional groups -  but I think it does need a little expanding.’ (Greenleaf 
co-opted governor)
‘If you were to ask the governing body, outside people like myself who are 
aware of the [business involvement activity] because the council is involved 
in setting it up -  a high proportion of the governing body would have no 
knowledge of it.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
In short, the perception of business involvement as a primarily educational issue 
meant that governors were unlikely to have sought either background or expertise in 
this area. Instead, governors seemed more likely to seek to make their contributions 
through the ‘safer’ tangible issues. Of course, this somewhat false dichotomy 
between educational and ‘non-educational’ creates huge problems for ‘joined-up’ 
thinking and strategic planning. Clearly, if governors restrict their knowledge base 
to the latter -  to the general exclusion of the former -  it becomes extremely difficult 
to design a coherent or cohesive strategic plan that will deal effectively with the 
school as an organic whole. As the evidence above attempts to illustrate via the 
business involvement context, one main consequence of this low level of governor
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knowledge about educational-related issues is even when governors believe that a 
strategic plan would be valuable in theory, they are often poorly-positioned to stake 
out strategic planning positions in relation to these issues in practice.
8.4 The ‘Staff Delegation’ Barrier
The fourth of the four institutional-level barriers identified in Chapter Five was the 
tendency of governors to defer responsibility for strategic planning to the school staff 
and senior management team. It was argued that many governors accepted 
uncritically the information they received, and rarely took the opportunity (either by 
choice or by circumstance) to form their own opinions about it. Because of this 
information imbalance, it was argued that governors often felt that strategic planning 
was best left to the head, staff, and chair, rather than pursued as a responsibility for 
the governing body as a whole. The influence of this barrier on business 
involvement and strategic planning is illustrated below.
8.4.1 The Influence of Staff Delegation Impediments
The evidence of this barrier in the business involvement context comes from both the 
quantitative and the qualitative data. First, the survey demonstrated that -  
unsurprisingly -  heads consistently had a far greater understanding of the business 
involvement activity at their schools than did chairs. Table 8.3 shows the response of 
chairs and heads when asked about their knowledge of their school’s level of 
involvement in eight of the most prominent types of business involvement activities. 
By comparing the ‘don’t know’ responses (a ‘none’ response was taken to indicate that 
the respondent knew that there had been no involvement) to the aggregate of all other 
responses, it was possible to determine the particular areas of business involvement 
where respondents -  on aggregate -  had the highest and lowest levels of knowledge.
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Table 8.3: Respondents with No Knowledge of their School’s Level of 
Business Involvement
Percentage o f respondents responding ‘don’t know ’ on each given issue.








Work experience/careers advice 2.4 1.4 83 68
Mentoring of students by businesses * 14.3 0.0 84 69
Mentoring of staff/ teacher placements * 25.9 0.0 81 69
Curriculum assistance * 34.9 1.4 83 69
In-kind donations 14.6 0.0 82 69
Financial donations / matched-funding * 12.2 1.6 82 64
Private Finance Initiative 12.2 6.3 82 63
For-profit education management 14.6 10.9 82 64
* = Differences between chairs and heads were statistically significant: chi-squared > 10.7; p <  0.05.
In general, these figures illustrate the relatively high level of declared ignorance 
amongst chairs regarding business involvement activities. In seven of the eight 
categories, the percentage of chairs responding ‘don’t know’ was over ten per cent. 
Only in one category -  work experience -  did more than 90 per cent of chairs indicate 
that they had some knowledge about whether (or how much) business involvement 
was currently in place at their schools. Furthermore, in five of these eight categories, 
the difference between chair responses and head responses was statistically significant. 
Although it is generally unsurprising that head teachers would have fluent knowledge 
of the various schemes on offer in their own schools, these statistically significant 
differences illustrate the wide gap between chairs and heads regarding knowledge 
about business involvement. Furthermore, if chairs -  usually the most active and 
aware members of the governing body -  were unaware of these activities, it is likely 
that /^-involved governors would have even lower levels of awareness.
Further evidence of this barrier was evident from the qualitative data, which 
indicated that rather than seeking to rectify this information imbalance, most 
governors were content to defer to the staff on strategic planning about business 
involvement. As the comments below illustrate, governors frequently believed that 
because the staff held the information about business involvement, the staff should 
therefore be given the responsibility for strategic planning in this area:
‘We could be a lot better informed [about business involvement] than we 
are.... Senior management can, to a large extent, get on with it within the 
reporting and monitoring structure that governors set for them, and we don’t
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set much of a structure for them -  it’s not something that we call for, and it’s 
not formalised.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘In relation to the [specialist school bid], the governors weren’t really 
involved. Perhaps because they didn’t know how to, or they didn’t want to, 
or they just let the head and the senior management to try and do it 
themselves.’ (Greenleaf LEA governor)
‘[On issues like business involvement,] there would be a general discussion 
about things, the school is asked to draft the policy, and they consult with the 
student body and staff, and then it comes back to us for ratification.’ 
(Bluewater chair)
‘What do I know about business involvement? Very little! We hold 
conferences -  one former staff member at the school did everything [related 
to business involvement], and was very good. But he’s gone now, and hasn’t 
been replaced.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘At the moment we’re going for technology status, and the chap we appointed 
to the business manager, that’s one of his many tasks to do.... I don’t know 
very much about it -  we just know that we’re supposed to be going down that 
route, but I don’t know how we’re going to do it.’ (Redwood co-opted 
governor)
While it may seem easier and simpler in the short-term for governors to leave 
strategic planning on business involvement issues to a well-informed staff, there are 
(as was argued in Chapter Five) serious long-term consequences for taking this 
approach. Not only can this approach remove governors from the decision-making 
loop, this approach also has the potential to render governing bodies unprepared to 
act as an informed ‘critical friends’ to the school when issues surrounding business 
involvement arise. As was noted in Chapter Five, it should not be implied that 
governing bodies do not require staff input and advice in creating strategic plans. 
However, as was demonstrated by the evidence above, governors may actually be 
impeding effective long-term strategic planning by deferring this responsibility to the 
staff, whose emphasis is more frequently focused on achieving shorter-term results.
8.5 The ‘Time Constraints and Volunteer Expectations’ Barrier 
Sections 8.1 through 8.4 illustrated how the four institutional-level strategic planning 
barriers adversely affected strategic planning on business involvement issues. The 
next four sections illustrate how strategic planning on business involvement issues is 
impeded by the central governmental-level strategic planning barriers.
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The first central governmental-level barrier identified in Chapter Six was that of time 
constraints and volunteer expectations. It was argued that in general, central 
government expected governors to do too much, given the time that governors were 
willing to volunteer. Chapter Six also identified two barriers relating to issues that 
governors felt took up an inordinate amount of their time -  dealing with paperwork 
and understanding legislative and regulatory changes. However, for the purposes 
here, all three of these barriers will be addressed under the ‘time’ rubric. While 
neither paperwork nor legislation has a direct impact on governors’ strategic 
planning about business involvement, they do have an indirect impact, in that time 
spent on these activities is generally not spent on activities like strategic planning. It 
is therefore this more general point concerning time and volunteers that this section 
seeks to illustrate: that central government’s excessive expectations of these 
volunteers adversely influences governing body strategic planning on business 
involvement issues.
8.5.1 The Influence of General Time Constraints
This research confirmed that overall time pressures did impede governing body 
strategic planning on business involvement issues. Most governors in this research 
felt that the multiple demands on their limited time meant that issues like strategic 
planning about business involvement were often forced into the background. In 
particular, governors noted that it was difficult to find time to address business 
involvement issues when governing bodies and schools that were already under 
substantial pressure to fulfil existing obligations related to central government 
directives and programmes. While these respondents acknowledged that ideally such 
strategic planning would take place, they also admitted that finding the time to do so 
was often extremely difficult:
‘I would not rule out business involvement in the long-term strategy of the 
school.... [But] at the moment we have no involvement with business at all -  
whether this is a good thing or not, I’m not too sure, but the base line is that 
we are all frantically busy, and more input from anyone at all would possibly 
drive us over the edge.’(Supplementary interview chair)
‘The amount of time that there might be for somebody to do the amount of 
‘face-to-face’ meeting which is necessary to generate [business involvement 
activities]- is almost certainly going to [require] a school which is extremely 
stable, [a school] which is not under the pressure of rapidly changing pupil 
population or staff.’ (Bluewater chair)
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‘It would be a concern if an issue like business involvement was building up, 
and we were not dealing with it. And if we were presented with something 
we’d not had an opportunity to think about, I think we’d want to make sure 
we’d have time to consider what the implications were. But that’s not always 
possible [emphasis added].’ (Supplementary interview chair)
Overall, governors felt that they often did not have the time to construct a strategic 
plan that would address business involvement, despite their acknowledgement that 
such planning would be valuable. Given this predicament, it appeared clear that the 
lack of available time created a substantial impediment to strategic planning in the 
business involvement context. One reason for this paucity of available time, 
discussed next, is that although governors are volunteers, central government has 
given governors an increasing number of responsibilities to fulfil.
8.5.2 The Influence of the Volunteer Aspect of Governance
This research found that in the business involvement context, the combination of 
central government priorities and limited volunteer time created numerous strategic 
planning difficulties. It was argued in Chapter Six that governors felt their 
responsibilities had increased in recent years without commensurate 
acknowledgement of either the increased commitment that would be required of 
governors or the increased support that these volunteer governors would need. In the 
strategic planning context, it was argued that this situation only further exacerbated 
the difficulty in encouraging governors to engage in strategic planning, as governors 
tended to spend their time on activities that met central government’s immediate 
demands. Yet because central government does not provide either incentives or 
‘relief from these other activities in order to allow governors to actually engage in 
strategic planning, volunteer governors rarely make strategic planning a priority 
when allocating their limited time. The comments below illustrate how this 
divergence of theory and practice unfolds in the context of strategic planning about 
business involvement. These governors pointed out how the limited time that 
volunteer governors can commit to their schools meant that complex discussions of 
business involvement and strategic planning were often given lower priority than 
more immediate concerns:
‘For...things like donations, the main contribution of the governing body 
would be in discussion. You don’t progress unless you have ideas -  but 
[governors] are volunteers, too. We have a very strong governing body, I
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think, but they’re tied up in their own work and many other things.’ 
(Greenleaf chair)
‘The trouble at present is that [there are] more and more demands, and we 
have less and less time to give to them. [Many] church schools have full time 
people employed to deal with school business, and property. Where you have 
lay people who say ‘I’ll do that when I get home tonight,’ that’s when you 
have difficulties.’ (Redwood foundation governor)
‘So much of the work of secondary schools in inner London, particularly in 
poor areas, is just struggling to keep on top. So to ask [governors] to put 
effort into building business partnerships is a tough thing to do.’ 
(Supplementary interview chair)
The irony of this situation is that because governors were apprehensive about engaging 
in strategic planning (as they felt they did not have enough time to do so), their 
governing bodies often spent their time addressing issues like business involvement in 
an ad hoc manner. Yet when compared to the repetition and replication of effort that 
the ad hoc approach requires, it might be argued that a well thought-out strategic plan 
would be likely to eliminate the significant fragmentation and needless duplication of 
effort that often result from such a piecemeal approach. Consequently, in the long run 
a strategic plan is likely to save governing bodies more time than it costs. If a strategic 
plan is in place, it becomes easier for staff and governors to determine where limited 
resources should be focused, where duplicated tasks can be eliminated, and how to 
acquire more value-added delivery of the extent of business involvement that the 
school decides to pursue. Furthermore, if governors do not spend the time to 
proactively determine their philosophy about business involvement, desirable business 
involvement opportunities may be missed. Unfortunately, as the evidence above has 
shown, the increased demands on volunteer time often meant that strategic planning on 
important issues was frequently given a low priority.
8.6 The ‘Financing System’ Barrier
After the barriers of time, paperwork, and legislation, the fourth central 
governmental-level barrier outlined in Chapter Six concerned strategic planning 
impediments created by the current financing system. First, it was argued that in 
their desire to ensure that their schools did not ‘miss out’ on funding opportunities, 
governing bodies often sought funding for programmes simply because such funding 
was available, rather than because the specific programmes were necessarily well- 
suited to the long-term aims of the individual school. Second, it was argued that the
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uncertainties surrounding the long-term viability of many governmental funding 
schemes severely hindered attempts to plan strategically for the long term, creating 
incentives for governors to alter long-term priorities in favour of short-term 
opportunities. The influence of this barrier on business involvement and strategic 
planning is illustrated below.
8.6.1 The Influence of the Fear of Being Left Behind
First, this research found that governors’ fear of being left behind clearly factored 
into their thinking about strategic planning and business involvement. In most cases, 
governors mentioned central government programmes that required schools to seek 
outside sponsorship as a condition of receiving government funds. As the comments 
below indicate, governors felt that the current financing system forced them to give 
preference to short-term issues in order to avoid ‘being left behind.’ This approach 
points to a more general strategic planning impediment -  that the funding system 
encouraged schools to pursue short-term objectives (securing funding in order to 
keep up with their competitors) rather than to determine whether these initiatives 
actually fit well within the governing body’s long-term vision of the school. As one 
governor summarised the situation (in the context of his school’s potential bid for 
specialist status):
‘ When these things come, you have to respond, and it’s [all about] how good 
you are at responding to that kind of thing. These business cases and 
applications take time and effort, and if you’re not careful, you’re so busy 
trying to get £50,000 that your eye goes off what you’re in place to do -  which 
is to have a successful school -  and so it drifts.’ (Redwood co-opted governor)
Other governors noted that any strategic planning they might have wanted to do 
regarding business involvement was frequently impeded by the need to quickly gain 
business involvement in order to secure government funding. Instead of being 
allowed to consider how business involvement would be best integrated into the life 
of the school, many governors felt forced into such arrangements simply in order to 
‘keep up.’ These typical comments from governors indicated that they believed the 
fault in this particular process -  and the impediment to strategic planning -  lay firmly 
in the current structure of the central government financing system:
‘We wouldn’t do these kinds of initiatives if it hadn’t been for the money! 
Where else would we have raised that amount of funding from? There’s also 
a competitive element to these initiatives, in that other schools around us
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were thinking of becoming specialist, so we didn’t want to fall behind relative 
to them.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘We need the money, so we’re forced to make the bids. There’s no way 
around it.... I’m a bit cynical about these kinds of government initiatives, but 
to be honest and pragmatic about it -  we’re not in a position to say we can’t.’ 
(Greenleaf chair)
‘If, for example, it becomes that all schools are expected to become specialist 
status, I don’t want us to be left behind -  and I don’t think we should be. So 
we have to keep our eye on it, otherwise we [will] become left behind.’ 
(Brownstone head teacher)
8.6.2 Uncertainties Surrounding Long-Term Programme Viability
Second, it was argued in Chapter Six that strategic planning was often made difficult 
by the uncertainties surrounding the long-term viability of the various government 
funding schemes. This research found that this barrier also existed in relation to 
strategic planning on business involvement issues. In the first instance, governors 
argued that these uncertainties about viability made strategic planning about business 
involvement difficult, simply because governing bodies did not know what resources 
they would have at their disposal in the short-term future, much less the long-term 
future. As this Bluewater LEA governor observed:
‘You have to think about how you’re draining capacity away from the school, if 
people are off trying to get grant money, and you don’t actually have money 
enough to pay a project development person. And you can’t plan effectively, 
because you don’t know whether or not you’re going to get things.’
In the second instance, governors argued that strategic planning was made more 
difficult because central government policies requiring business collaboration were 
often designed as ‘unfunded mandates.’ In other words, although central government 
would strongly promote certain policy concepts, the financial support for these 
concepts was not always fully forthcoming. As such, although some initial central 
government funding might be available, governing bodies often felt that it would be 
challenging to sustain these programmes if additional outside support could not be 
retained. As a result, governors were -  understandably -  hesitant to make long-term 
commitments to programmes that they might not be able to financially support if the 
short-term government funding for these initiatives ceased:
‘Don’t tell us what we’ve got to do and then say, ‘and by the way, it will cost 
a million pounds -  and you’ve got to find a million pounds, because we’re 
not going to give it to you.” (Whitefrost staff governor)
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‘If you could galvanise the school to raise money and focus on something to 
get it done, there might be some hidden benefits. But [that’s] terribly 
difficult, and very divisive. Some schools just have real difficulty doing that 
kind of stuff, and always will have, you know? So I think it would be very 
bad if everything depended on you being able to raise £10,000 in order to get 
a programme.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
Another illustration of this concern about central government’s approach towards 
business involvement and finance surrounded the potential of too many schools 
pursuing the same limited outside resources. On one hand, governors understood 
central government’s desire to increase business involvement in education through 
incentives like the specialist school initiative. However, governors argued that 
central government appeared to have ignored the fact as these types of initiatives 
become more appealing, businesses may have to become more selective in their 
support of them. As one supplementary interview chair said, ‘The big firms, they 
have to spread themselves thinly.’ Many other governors concurred, noting that 
businesses may face an increased demand on their limited resources due to the very 
incentives that central government has created for schools:
‘It’s very difficult to foresee where we’ll end up. But there must be a 
[recognition of the] fact that if you have lots more school seeking business 
sponsorship, then there will be less to go around.’ (Greenleaf co-opted 
governor)
‘Business has endless calls on its charitable activities, and the time of its 
management and executives. Environmental issues, social and community 
issues, education. And increasingly, businesses are very hard-headed... 
[they’re] not prepared to write a cheque and hope that the outcome is broadly 
OK.’ (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘There are a certain number of rich companies that are prepared to put money 
in -  but they’re only going to do that to a certain extent. They won’t plough 
all their profits into education. And once they’re drained by schools across 
the country, it’ll stop -  so then what’s the government going to do? To a 
degree, I see it as a quick fix solution to bad government policy over the 
years.’ (Whitefrost staff governor)
Combining central government’s strong endorsement of these initiatives with the 
aforementioned desire ‘not to be left behind’, governors saw the potential that the 
demand for financial assistance from businesses would outstrip supply. Unfortunately, 
this uncertainty about whether the pursuit of such funding would be successful only 
contributed to governors’ belief that business involvement should continue to be 
perceived as a windfall ‘extra’, rather than as an integral component of a strategic plan.
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8.6.3 The Influence of a Short-Term Financial Policy Mindset
Finally, this research found that the short-term focus of the current financing system 
frequently created incentives for governors to favour short-term business 
involvement opportunities -  those that provided immediate results -  over those that 
might be more sustainable and advantageous in the longer term. Governors did 
recognise the potential problems of this situation; as is illustrated below, governors 
felt that central government often perceived business involvement as a short-term 
financial solution, rather than as a broader issue of long-term educational strategy:
‘I’d be concerned about [business involvement activities] that seemed not to 
represent long-term value-for-money.... My concern would be that you’ve 
really got to believe that it’s the best product in the long term.’ (Redwood 
LEA governor)
‘I think government...is almost totally dominated by the bookkeeping 
approach. It’s what I call the ‘clerical bookkeeper approach’ as opposed to 
the ‘far-sighted finance director approach.’ All they’re trying to do [through 
business involvement initiatives] is balance their books and get more down at 
least cost. There’s no vision at central government in funding at all.’ 
(Bluewater LEA governor)
Yet it was also clear that despite the potential for the financing system to distort their 
broader priorities, governors felt resigned to playing by its rules. Governors 
acknowledged that it would be more valuable if funding schemes were custom-fit to 
the unique strategic needs of their individual schools, rather than being designed as 
one-size-fits-all initiatives. Indeed, governors often felt that central government 
initiatives frequently forced them into making a ‘Hobson’s Choice’ in relation to 
business involvement -  taking the business involvement that was first offered, 
regardless of whether it is the best decision in the long-term strategy of the school:
‘[I think] the governing body would have a say in the involvement of businesses 
-  [we] would want to see that educational objectives overrode business necessity. 
But we need to be pragmatic, and when you’re short on resources, decisions are 
usually financially based! ’ (Greenleaf parent governor)
‘I think we find that within our strategic plan, [we are forced] to jump through 
the hoops we have to jump through in order to get the money. We play the 
game, and try to get as much of the benefit of it as we can, without skewing our 
overall sense of what we’re trying to achieve.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
‘I have to tell you, I think we just roll with it and try to survive. Whatever 
money is offered, we try to take it -  because you don’t like to turn money 
away. But it distorts our priorities. Because we go for the money.’ 
(Bluewater LEA governor)
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In summary, this section argued that the current financing system created substantial 
problems for strategic planning in the business involvement context, as governors 
frequently felt forced to pursue short-term opportunities at the expense of long-term 
benefits. This syndrome meant that effective long-term planning became extremely 
difficult, as governors frequently felt forced into pursuing new initiatives for their 
financial value rather than for their strategic planning merit.
8.7 The Communication Barrier
The fifth central governmental-level barrier related to the breakdown in 
communication between governors and central government. First, it was argued that 
governors perceived the existing communication mechanisms between central 
government and governing bodies to be either deficient or non-existent, leading to 
poor central government responsiveness to local-level concerns. Second, it was 
argued that governors felt these failures in communication led to a lack of central 
government knowledge about how its policies affected governing bodies, thereby 
leading central government to attempt to legislate its way out of problems by creating 
frequent new initiatives. The influence of this barrier on business involvement and 
strategic planning is illustrated below.
8.7.1 The Influence of Communication Impediments
On the first point raised above, it was clear that governors found the lack of 
communication about the central government position on business involvement to be 
a substantial hindrance to any attempts at strategic planning in this arena. 
Respondents repeatedly argued that there was little communication on the part of 
central government about why central government felt business involvement was 
necessary or valuable. Governors further noted that this lack of communication 
about the specific central government rationale behind pursuing these programmes 
made it extremely difficult for governors to understand how such programmes were 
meant to fit into their school’s broader strategic plans:
‘I don’t recall being told why the government is doing it. I’m uncertain that I 
know their reasons. I would imagine the reasons would be... [that] they want 
[business] to provide money and management skills for administration and 
running of the infrastructure.... I suppose those are the two things -  but on 
the other hand, I haven’t seen that stated.’ (Redwood chair)
‘I don’t know enough about this government’s thinking on business 
involvement. It wants solutions -  but at the same time, it’s trying so many
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things. For governors, that simply translates into concerns -  ‘who’s to know 
what the next programme will be?’, or ‘how long until it terminates?” 
(Supplementary interview chair)
‘I don’t want to give government any excuse for not fully funding the state 
sector of schools. And one of the grave risks is that government won’t fulfil 
its own obligations. If you can get genuine additionality from business 
money or in-kind, fine -  [but] my view is to drive government into declaring 
that as a rule o f the game.' (Bluewater co-opted governor)
‘Obviously, whomever the key players are in the government have got 
examples of very good practice. So they must have good examples of how 
they foresee things. But sometimes that doesn’t get filtered down.... It has 
to be a much clearer sense of what the idea is.’ (Redwood LEA governor)
One illustration of the impact of this communication deficiency can be seen in what 
governors believed central government was asking of businesses, versus what 
governors themselves thought would constitute the most valuable business 
contributions. As can be seen below, many governors thought that central 
government was merely seeking financial support from businesses. In contrast, most 
governors argued that if central government had asked governors how their schools 
would benefit most from business involvement, governors would prefer that 
businesses contribute experience rather than money:
‘Our link with the business in the community is normally in skills and 
expertise, not really in money or sponsorship -  from what I’ve seen. What 
the school gets out of the business community is actually experience.’ 
(Brownstone co-opted governor)
‘I’ll tell you what I’d love business to get involved in: into providing 
assistance and help in producing our budget and financial plans, and helping 
us monitor them. That, I think, would be a real contribution that could be 
made at very little cost to a business.’ (Bluewater LEA governor)
‘I think the expectation that [business involvement] will bring substantial 
additional resources is not right. What it hopefully will bring are new ways 
of working, and new skills. That’s the bit I’m more optimistic about, because 
I can see that being an area of crossover.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
These comments suggest that the communication breakdown between governing 
bodies and central government on issues like business involvement creates not only 
confusion and frustration, but hinders governors in their understanding of how 
central government policies might influence their schools. This research suggests 
that if governors are not informed about either why central government supported 
these initiatives or what impact central government expected from them, it is
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somewhat unreasonable to expect governors to guess at the motives of central 
government and then construct a strategic planning framework accordingly.
8.7.2 The Influence of a Poor Understanding of Potential Policy Effects
Second, it was argued that the lack of effective communication between governing 
bodies and central government led to a poor understanding on the part of central 
government regarding the effects of its policies. Because governors felt central 
government did not articulate effectively what it expected these policies to achieve, 
governing bodies were often unclear as to around which of these initiatives they 
should design their strategic plans. This scenario was evident in the business 
involvement context, as governors repeatedly complained that central government 
seemed to display a poor understanding of what business involvement might entail 
when implemented ‘on the ground’. In specific, governors felt that because of the 
poor communication channels between the school level and central government, 
there was often an evident gap between theory and practice in central government’s 
thinking about what business involvement might entail. When asked whether the 
current government was realistic in what it thought business could provide in either 
time or resource, one governor replied:
‘I’m not sure they are [being realistic], because they change what they feel 
business or industry should provide. And they change what they’re seeking 
in relation to public policy as a whole in terms of how business and industry 
can be part of that relationship. I think it’s evolving. So I don’t think really 
feel [the government is being] realistic.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
Numerous other governors concurred, which suggests that central government has 
not effectively explained to schools and governing bodies how it envisions business 
involvement developing in practice. As can be seen below, governors felt central 
government believed that businesses could -  and would -  do more for education than 
businesses were actually prepared to do:
‘Central government seems to view ‘the business community’ as simply 
another Department of State, and it’s not! Yes, ‘business’ may be permanent, 
but individual businesses can vary widely in their profitability from year to 
year. So you often cannot have the level of continuity that government would 
need if business were to play the role in education that government seems to 
want.'' (Whitefrost co-opted governor)
‘I think if you asked whether government expects business to be more 
involved than business can be, the answer would be yes. I think business, in
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general, would like to help education, and I see that through [my work with] 
the CBI. There’s a real wish to help. The problem is that we can’t match the 
sort of help we can give to the opportunities to give it.... Government 
imagines we can do a lot more than we can. ’ (Redwood chair)
‘Government needs to understand that businesses do not exist to be efficient -  
they exist to make money. Simply because government is enticed by the 
efficiency aspect does not mean that having businesses run schools is fiscally 
in the interest of businesses! ’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘I can see why central government wants business to be involved. [But] in 
my opinion, most business people -  or at least, the good ones -  aren’t really 
that interested. They do it as a public service, not because they think their 
business will get things out of it. Government wants business involvement in 
lots of things -  but... you can’t overcome the weaknesses in the government 
system [simply] by bringing in business people -  it just doesn’t work.’ 
(Whitefrost co-opted governor)
One illustration of how this poor understanding of policy effects led to problems in 
business involvement-related strategic planning can be seen in the issue of ‘policy 
unevenness’. Governors complained that central government appeared not to 
recognise how difficult it might be for some schools to achieve the level of business 
involvement that central government seemed to be encouraging. Although not all 
respondents expressed this view, many did believe that an insufficient understanding 
of the wide variation in local circumstances frequently led central government to 
formulate ‘blanket policies’. These policies created advantages for some whilst 
setting almost insurmountable barriers for others, and governors pointed to a number 
of specific practical matters -  geography, distance, neighbourhood -  that influenced 
the ability of schools to participate in various government programmes. 
Furthermore, governors argued that due to a lack of communication with the local 
level, central government did not appear to accommodate these specific local 
variations when constructing their initiatives and directives:
‘[There is] this disparity -  that people who are good at getting matched funds, 
and [who have] contacts in business and industry, could possibly go ahead 
and [pursue these initiatives]. Your rural school in the middle of nowhere, 
with no connections, can’t.... I don’t think it’s a very equitable way of 
dividing money.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
‘Those who work at [another school further away] -  I don’t know what sort 
of education business links they’ve got there, but I would think that they’d be 
less well established and less effective simply because it would take people 
longer to get there from work.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
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‘Government shouldn’t be asking schools to solicit contributions from 
business, because some schools simply won’t have the ability to do so. In a 
number of communities -  apart from the small shops -  there isn’t much in 
terms of business. So for schools who might lack the ability to acquire those 
resources, their children are now at a disadvantage -  and that’s not right.’ 
(Greenleaf chair)
Besides these specific criticisms of a central government that appeared aloof and 
unresponsive in terms of policy design, there was a broader critique from governors 
as well. In specific, governors expressed dismay about a central government policy­
making process in which a lack of communication about the potential impact of 
proposed policies continually generated policies that were often incompatible with 
local needs. Given the frequency of these new policies, governors argued that it was 
difficult to foster a long-term vision of school planning when new initiatives 
continually drew schools and governors towards short-term benefits as opposed to 
long-term planning. As these comments illustrate, governors felt that a lack of 
communication created substantial strategic planning problems due to central 
government’s overall approach towards policy making:
‘[These initiatives are] OK where you’ve got major employers or big 
companies in the local area that are willing to support the local schools and 
everything, but it’s not the same across the country. It’s patchy. One minute 
the government is saying one-size-fits-all, and then next minute it’s saying it 
doesn’t!’ (Whitefrost chair)
‘I think initiatives like the Education Action Zones -  and things similar -  in 
the main are very good i f  they work. The problem is a lot of them aren’t fully 
thought out, and the ideal which they embody does not, in reality, work in 
that way. It becomes an amalgam, a hodgepodge of effective and ineffective 
realities.’ (Redwood parent governor)
As the evidence presented in this section has sought to demonstrate, despite the 
positive rhetoric about business involvement emanating from central government, 
those on the local level were continually confused about both the objectives and the 
goals of central government’s support for business involvement. This poor 
communication led those ‘on the ground’ to believe that many central government 
policies were based on over-optimistic expectations. In turn, this reinforced 
governors’ beliefs that central government was pursuing an ad hoc programme of 
policies that were both poorly designed and targeted at creating short-term success. 
One consequence of this poor communication system was that central government 
appeared to lose a considerable amount of credibility in the eyes of the very
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individuals on whom implementation of these programmes depends. The other 
consequence, which has significant relevance to the issue of strategic planning, is 
that governors were extremely reluctant to engage in strategic planning when they 
themselves were unsure about the impact that future ill-designed government policies 
might have on their overall planning process.
8.8 The Trust Barrier
The sixth and final central governmental-level barrier was that governors believed 
central government did not trust governing bodies. First, it was argued in Chapter 
Six that the present government’s centralising tendency not only demonstrated a lack 
of trust in governing bodies, but often prevented the implementation of flexible, 
locally-tailored approaches that would do the most to assist individual schools. 
Second, it was argued that governors were extremely reluctant to devote their limited 
time and energy to strategic planning, as they believed that government would 
simply superimpose its own plans on schools and thereby render redundant or 
outmoded any strategic planning done by governors themselves. The influence of 
this barrier on business involvement and strategic planning is illustrated below.
8.8.1 The Influence of Centralisation
The first component of this barrier was that governors believed the centralising 
tendency of the present government created a lack of trust that impeded strategic 
planning. This component was clearly evident in the business involvement context, 
as a majority of governors in the case studies pointed to their concern that central 
government would continue its track record of centralising policy decisions. 
Governors felt that by centralising policy on many issues, including business 
involvement, central government was implying that governors were either incapable 
of making decisions at the local level, or that local needs were irrelevant to the 
strategic planning necessary on this matter:
‘Different conditions for business in different areas will lead to different 
outcomes. And that’s why I think the whole sense of ‘too much prescription’ 
[from central government] is bad, because the solution is going to vary.’ 
(Redwood chair)
‘What I wouldn’t want is some national diktat on such a [business 
involvement] policy. On policies and things, each governing body is there 
with its own views ideas and feelings, and is there to represent the unique 
feelings of that governing body.’ (Bluewater teacher governor)
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As was suggested in Chapter Six, this tendency towards centralisation and high 
levels of prescriptive regulation led to the perception amongst governing bodies that 
central government did not trust them. This was again the case in the specific 
instance of business involvement programmes, as governors voiced their concerns 
that central government was attempting to control too much of the business
involvement process, allowing little room for governors to use their discretion in
making decisions that would be best suited to local needs:
‘In these initiatives, like the Education Action Zones, it’s not so much 
business putting money in as it is government putting the money in. And 
when the cheque arrives, there are usually requirements on how it’s spent,
since someone needs to know what happened to the money.... It’s a lot of
bureaucracy, and the governors complain to the government about the process 
all the time.’ (Supplementary interview chair)
‘The aims and objectives of central government don’t always meet and 
accord with the aims and objectives of business.... I’m sure [governing 
bodies] can find accord somewhere between the two, and it’s a case of 
putting cards on the table. Government hasn’t fully put its cards on the table 
as to what it wants and requires...[but] governing bodies are more 
independent, and they can be more trusted.’ (Redwood parent governor)
In summary, Chapter Six noted that governors felt the centralising tendency of the 
present government often prevented the implementation of flexible, locally-tailored 
approaches that would do the most to assist individual schools. Based on evidence 
above, it appeared that this problem existed in relation to business involvement 
issues, and led to practical problems within governing bodies that were attempting to 
make the decisions that they felt were necessary for improving their schools.
8.8.2 The Influence of Governors’ Perceived Lack of Respect
The second component of this barrier was governors’ belief that central government 
treated governing bodies as entities who were to be tolerated for the sake of local 
accountability, but not to be respected as full partners in the policy process. This 
perception appeared to contribute significantly to the lack of governing body 
strategic planning on business involvement issues. Governors at each case study 
school noted that they felt that central government was creating business 
involvement policies that demanded governor accountability, whilst simultaneously 
sidestepping any significant local level input in design. Chapter Seven addressed this 
issue briefly, identifying many governors who felt that they were being coerced by 
central government into considering PFI proposals, rather than being convinced of
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the necessity of this type of financial arrangement. However, it was found that this 
concern about central government’s policy implementation approach spread to other 
kinds of business involvement as well. It was evident from the survey data that 
while central government had a slim majority of support amongst respondents for its 
business involvement agenda, this support was far from solid. Table 8.4 illustrates 
the responses to a question about whether the respondent had positive or negative 
perceptions of central government’s general business involvement proposals, 
whereas Table 8.5 shows the responses when respondents were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with specific proposals (e.g., specialist schools, Education 
Action Zones, and City Academies).
Table 8.4: Perceptions of Central Government’s General Proposals for 
Involving Business in Education






Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
Table 8.5: Level of Agreement with Central Government’s Specific Proposals 
for Involving Business in Education






Differences between chairs and heads were not statistically significant.
These tables suggest that despite government efforts to promote business involvement 
initiatives, a substantial minority of governors and heads remained unconvinced of the 
value of central government’s approach. Unfortunately, the qualitative evidence 
suggests that governors were not optimistic that central government would resort to 
‘convincing’ over ‘coercing’ in its effort to win converts to its initiatives:
‘I think schools see [the specialist schools initiative] as just another way to 
get additional money -  it’s not necessarily because they genuinely see 
specialising as advantageous in and of itself. Really, it’s perceived as ‘this is
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the way that government wants us to go, and they’re just bribing people into 
doing it.’ (Whitefrost LEA governor)
‘As Tony Blair [has] said, and I’ve said in the LEA, if [matched funding] is 
something politically that is going to be pushed really, really hard -  then I 
think we have to go down that road.‘ (Brownstone head teacher)
‘Education Action Zones -  what is it that they do, really? They’re simply a 
new name for catchment areas! Look at what they’re supposed to do -  they 
ask schools in the same area to work with each other. Years ago it was called 
‘catchment areas’, and now it’s ‘action zones’! Nothing has really changed; 
it’s just new words for old ideas. But we have to go along with it in order to 
keep up.’ (Whitefrost parent governor)
Another illustration of the lack of trust in governing bodies can be seen in central 
government’s approach towards business involvement as sponsorship-driven, rather 
than as partnership-driven. Governors saw a clear difference between sponsorship 
and partnership programmes, as the survey found that 83.7 per cent of chairs (N=72) 
and 81.7 per cent of heads (N=58) saw a practical difference between the terms 
‘sponsorship’ and ‘partnership’. The interview data shed further light on how these 
two terms were perceived by governors, as governors usually perceived sponsorship 
as a limited and financially-based commitment, whereas they saw partnership as a 
more dynamic and potentially longer-term relationship between parties that treated 
each other as equals:
‘Sponsorship pretty largely means ‘give us the money’.... Partnership, I 
think, means something really of mutual involvement, which may involve 
money directly, [but] may involve the sharing of time and resources.’ 
(Bluewater chair)
‘I think a lot of sponsors are not very effective partners. They monitor, but 
they don’t necessarily play an active role. Some do. Some sponsors demand 
an active role when they’re involved with a school, and I think that’s the 
healthier model.’ (Greenleaf co-opted governor)
‘[The difference is that] sponsorship has got money involved. Whereas 
partnerships are more joint working to achieve joint aims.’ (Whitefrost chair)
‘Sponsorship I see as a one-off occasion, a particular event that the school 
and the sponsor have been working together on. Sponsors, I think, are 
looking for a direct return, and immediate return. Partners are looking for a 
long-term gain, I think.’ (Greenleaf LEA governor)
‘I suppose sponsorship doesn’t imply participation in the sense that partnership 
does.... Sponsorship, to me, sounds like you’re not getting as much -  or as 
useful -  an input as you would from partnership.’ (Brownstone LEA governor)
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Yet despite these comments in favour of partnership over sponsorship, and despite 
governors’ preference prefer that businesses contributions come as experience rather 
than as money (see Section 8.7), the major recent central government business 
involvement initiatives -  specialist schools, education action zones, city academies, 
private finance initiative -  focus primarily on financial contributions from business, 
rather than on partnerships that offer experience. In summary, this research found 
that rather than being convinced by central government about the value of certain 
business involvement issues, many governors instead felt coerced. Ultimately, this 
perception is extremely detrimental to the strategic planning process, as it leads 
governors to wonder why they should even bother engaging in strategic planning if 
central government will simply set its own unilateral agenda regarding business 
involvement -  and then coerce governing bodies into compliance.
8.9 Chapter Eight Conclusion
This chapter was the second of two chapters designed to answer the fourth and final 
research question. By tying together the theoretical and practical components of this 
research study, this chapter sought to illustrate that the strategic planning barriers 
identified in theory actually had an adverse influence in practice. In order to meet 
this goal, evidence was presented to illustrate that the systematic application of the 
strategic planning barriers identified in Chapters Five and Six did a provide a robust 
explanation of the reasons for the absence of governing body strategic planning on 
business involvement issues. In so doing, the evidence in this chapter also confirmed 
that these barriers did exist as practical and significant barriers on a specific issue of 
practical policy importance. Given these findings, it is argued that this chapter 
answered the fourth main research question satisfactorily.
More broadly, this chapter also sought to illustrate that the systematic application of 
these barriers could provide a valuable heuristic analytical tool for understanding the 
absence of strategic planning by governing bodies on issues of policy importance. 
By applying this set of potential barriers in a heuristic and systematic manner, it was 
possible to acquire a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the issues 
facing governing bodies in relation to strategic planning about business 
involvement than would have been the case had the lack of strategic planning been 
addressed in an ad hoc manner. By illustrating the value of employing the specific 
strategic planning barriers identified through this research in order to achieve this
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increased level of understanding, this chapter thus illustrates the value for future 
researchers in identifying and employing sets of barriers for use as heuristic 
analytical tools in other policy contexts. As such, it is concluded that the 
systematic identification and application of such barriers does provide a valuable 
heuristic tool for future researchers. Having thus addressed the two main goals of 
this final data chapter, the final thesis chapter is devoted to presenting the overall 
conclusions and contributions of this study, offering policy recommendations, and 
providing suggestions for future research.
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Ch a p t e r  N ine  
C o n c lu sio n s
9.0 Introduction
This final chapter draws together the evidence and arguments of the first eight 
chapters in order to provide a final analysis of the value of this research study. 
Section 9.1 summarises the research findings from the data chapters, illustrating how 
these empirical findings answered the four main research questions proposed in 
Chapter Two. Section 9.2 discusses the implications of the research findings, their 
contribution to the existing research literature, and the extent to which they can be 
generalised. Section 9.3 proposes a set of substantive policy recommendations 
emanating from this research, and Section 9.4 suggests further avenues of potential 
research in this field. Finally, Section 9.5 provides a final set of reflective 
observations to conclude this thesis.
9.1 Summary and Analysis of Research Findings
The main goal of this thesis was to determine whether, given their brief from central 
government, school governing bodies in inner London state secondary schools were 
engaging in strategic planning to the extent that might be expected, and if not, why 
not? This section summarises the research findings and conclusions from the five 
data chapters, and analyses how well these empirical findings answer the four main 
research questions outlined in Chapter Two.
9.1.1 Answering Questions One and Two
Do governors in inner London state secondary schools view their role as a 
strategic one, and if so, how do they themselves define strategic planning?
Is the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature actually evident 
in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools?______________
In relation to the first research question, it was demonstrated in Chapter Four that 
governors did believe that their role included responsibility for strategic planning. 
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that governors shared a general set of common 
criteria in their definition of strategic planning: that strategic planning should be a 
long-term and goal-driven process, that it needed to adhere to and remain consistent 
with the ethos of the school, and that it required constructing decision-making and
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resource allocation frameworks. Armed with this definition of strategic planning, 
Chapter Four then turned to the second main research question, and examined 
governors’ perceptions of how well their own definition of strategic planning (as 
stated above) was met in practice. It was found that the majority of governors did 
not believe that their governing bodies engaged in strategic planning in a manner that 
reflected those common criteria. To confirm this finding, Chapter Four then 
examined whether the School Development Plan (SDP) -  which governors 
frequently identified as their schools’ strategic plan -  actually provided governors 
with meaningful strategic planning opportunities. It was shown that in practice, 
governing bodies often had limited involvement in creating the SDP, and that many 
governors found the SDP to be an inadequate long-term planning tool. It was 
therefore concluded that the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature 
was actually evident in inner London state secondary schools, as the combination of 
broad survey coverage (including responses from either the chair or head of 114 of the 
139 schools surveyed) and interview data from multiple sites lends confidence to this 
general assertion that strategic planning by the governing bodies in inner London state 
secondary schools was frequently either minimal or non-existent.
9.1.2 Answering Question Three
If the lack of strategic planning implied by the existing literature is actually 
evident in the governing bodies of inner London state secondary schools, why is 
this the case?__________________________________________________________
Chapters Five and Six then turned to answering the third main research question 
(above). The concept of ‘barriers’ to strategic planning was introduced in Chapter 
Five, providing the theoretical framework within which the research data were 
presented and interpreted. It was argued that the concept of ‘barriers’ provided an 
alternative heuristic tool for identifying and interpreting systemic problems that 
governing bodies might face in the strategic planning process. Chapter Five also 
presented the survey evidence regarding the main strategic planning hindrances faced 
by governing bodies, as reported by survey respondents. It was argued that the 
research evidence pointed to two sets of strategic planning ‘barriers’ -  one set 
created at the institutional level, and the other set created at the central governmental 
level. Each of these sets was then addressed in its own chapter.
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Chapter Five identified and explored four main institutional-level barriers to 
governing body strategic planning. The first of these four barriers was the existence 
of a ‘monitoring culture’ amongst governing bodies, which led to governors taking a 
less long-term or proactive approach towards their responsibilities. The second 
barrier was the varying level of involvement of the different categories of governors, 
as the burden of governors’ responsibilities was often carried by a small core of 
governors, while some categories of governors were consistently more likely to be 
involved in that core than were others. It was argued that this disparity, in 
conjunction with the confusion arising from the vague definition of the governor’s 
role, created severe strategic planning hindrances. The third barrier was the 
tendency for governors to engage in activities that were smaller, more well-defined, 
and more ‘task-based’ than strategic planning. It was argued that governors often 
gravitated towards issues of premises and finance -  which produced ‘tangible’ results 
that could be either seen or quantified -  and away from the ‘intangible’ issues like 
curriculum and overall strategic planning. The fourth institutional-level barrier was 
the tendency for governing bodies to defer strategic planning decisions to staff, since 
by allowing the head, staff, and sometimes the chair of governors to manage the 
strategic planning process, governing bodies often ceded effective control over the 
very strategic planning processes that they were entrusted to oversee. Finally, Chapter 
Five discussed the role of the local authority level in governing body strategic 
planning. Evidence was presented to support the decision to focus this research on the 
institutional and central governmental levels, as it was argued that governors did not 
believe that local authority factors played nearly as significant a role in governing body 
strategic planning as did institutional and central governmental factors.
Chapter Six then identified and explored six central governmental-level barriers to 
strategic planning. The first of these barriers was the limited amount of time that 
governors had available to volunteer, in contrast to the level of expectations placed 
upon them by central government. It was argued that the increasing demands upon 
governors’ time adversely affected not only the time available to engage in strategic 
planning, but also the recruitment and retention of a stable governing body. The 
second barrier was the volume and format of paperwork that governors received and 
were expected to understand, as many governors found themselves unable to 
assimilate this material effectively. Because of the time necessary to understand and 
act upon their paperwork, it was argued that governors had less time engage in ‘non-
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urgent’ activities like strategic planning. The third barrier was the frequency and 
complexity of the legislation and regulations affecting governing bodies and schools, 
as many governors often found government initiatives to be overwhelming, confusing, 
and designed to achieve short-term results. It was argued that the time that governors 
spent on understanding governmental proposals prevented them from devoting time to 
strategic planning, and that the short-term focus of many initiatives created further 
disincentives for engaging in strategic planning.
The fourth barrier was the structure of the current financing system. It was argued 
that bid-based funding schemes, the current system of year-on-year budgets, and 
the need to rely on fixed-term supplementary funding programmes created 
substantial strategic planning uncertainty for governing bodies. The fifth  barrier 
was the absence of effective two-way communication between governing bodies 
and central government, as governors felt that institutional-level strategic planning 
was being hindered by the lack of meaningful dialogue between governing bodies 
and central government regarding central government’s future plans for education. 
It was further argued that central government’s failure to clarify the responsibilities 
of governors meant that governing bodies -  uncertain of their authority -  had a 
perverse incentive to avoid making decisive long-term decisions. Finally, the sixth 
barrier was that governors believed that central government often did not trust 
governing bodies. It was shown that this lack of trust often led governing bodies to 
avoid engaging in strategic planning, since there was a perception that any such 
efforts would simply be ignored by central government if institutional needs were 
incompatible with national policy. Together, it was concluded that these six central 
governmental-level barriers and the four institutional-level strategic planning 
barriers identified in Chapter Five provided a thorough and robust answer to the 
question of why there was a lack of strategic planning amongst the governing 
bodies in inner London state secondary schools.
9.1.3 Answering Question Four
Can it be demonstrated that the identification of these strategic planning barriers
has practical policy relevance and importance?_____________________________
The fourth research question was posed in order to ensure that conclusions related to 
the third research question had practical -  not merely theoretical -  applicability to 
current policy issues. Chapters Seven and Eight therefore drew upon additional
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research into the issue of business involvement in education, in an attempt to 
determine whether systematically applying these ‘strategic planning barriers’ to a 
policy issue of practical importance could provide a robust explanation of the reasons 
for the absence of governing body strategic planning on that policy issue.
First, Chapter Seven confirmed that business involvement provided an appropriate 
lens through which the practical policy relevance of the strategic planning barriers 
could be examined. Evidence demonstrated that governors believed that business 
involvement was a legitimate strategic planning issue, and that there was currently an 
absence of strategic planning about business involvement in their schools. Second, 
this research examined the perspectives, opinions and concerns of governors about 
business involvement, and found that governors believed that there were four main 
advantages to engaging in strategic planning on business involvement issues. The 
first advantage was the potential role of strategic planning in enabling a more 
systematic approach towards business involvement in education. The second 
advantage was the potential role of strategic planning in guiding business 
involvement, which would permit schools to better identify the types of business 
involvement activities that they would or would not support. The third advantage 
was the potential role of strategic planning in building community via business 
involvement. Finally, the fourth advantage was the potential role of strategic 
planning in assisting governing bodies to prepare responsibly for the future 
developments in business involvement. Together, this evidence provided the context 
for interpreting the findings on business involvement and strategic planning 
presented in Chapter Eight. Finally, Chapter Eight built upon this evidence in order 
to demonstrate that the strategic planning barriers identified in Chapters Five and Six 
had practical policy relevance and importance. By systematically applying the four 
institutional-level strategic planning barriers and the six central governmental-level 
strategic planning barriers to the issue of business involvement,1 Chapter Eight 
illustrated that the heuristic and systematic application of these barriers did provide a 
robust explanation of the reasons for the absence of governing body strategic 
planning on business involvement issues. Given this research evidence, it was 
therefore argued that the fourth main research question could be answered 
satisfactorily in the affirmative.
1 The barriers of paperwork and legislation were discussed in the broader context of the time barrier -  
see Section 8.5 for the reasons behind this decision.
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9.2 Conclusions and Research Contributions
In Section 2.6.2, it was argued that if successful, this research study would be 
advantageous for seven main reasons. In specific, it was argued that a successful study 
would: 1) contribute to the understanding of how governors perceive their own role, 2) 
provide a systematic framework of strategic planning barriers through which the 
absence of governing body strategic planning could be better analysed and understood, 
3) demonstrate that these barriers had practical policy relevance, and in doing so 
provide new insights into the opinions of governors about business involvement in 
education, 4) contribute new evidence on the role of central government in governing 
body activities, 5) provide a more detailed understanding of governing bodies in inner 
London state secondary schools, 6) update the existing literature on school governance, 
and 7) provide independent research on school governance and business involvement. 
In the light of the evidence presented in the previous chapters and summarised above, 
this section revisits these claims in order to put forward the broader conclusions of this 
study, as well as to identify the contributions that this study has made to the existing 
literature. At the end of this section, the ability to generalise from this research (and 
limitations thereto) are discussed.
9.2.1 New Insight into the Governor’s Role
First, it was argued that this study would contribute to the understanding of how 
governors perceive their own role. Through the research presented in Chapter Four, 
this study demonstrated that governors saw their role as a strategic one, a finding that 
adds to the research into the role of the governors conducted by Earley (1994a) and 
Scanlon et al. (1999), respectively. This research also supports the argument of 
Creese (1998) that governors have a role in strategic planning, while building upon 
this argument by using research evidence to outline governors’ own definition of 
strategic planning. However, this study does not only conclude that the governor’s 
role needs to be clarified and addressed -  such an argument has been made 
previously. Rather, the evidence in this study provides a convincing argument that 
strategic planning needs to become one of the primary roles of governing bodies, 
rather than simply one of many, and that steps need to be taken to ensure that central 
government’s rhetorical promises to this effect are realised in practice. This study 
concludes that governing bodies are presently an under-utilised strategic planning 
resource, often engaging in complex administrative tasks in order to meet the 
demands of central government, rather than in the broader strategic planning
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responsibilities for which governing bodies (as lay collective entities) are more 
suitably structured to address.
This research also highlights the public policy value of qualitative research that 
focuses on the individual-level perspectives of respondents from multiple governing 
bodies. As was illustrated by the research into governors’ view of their role in 
Chapter Four, governors across the research area were generally concerned about 
similar problems and issues. However, it was equally evident to the researcher 
during the course of this study that few governors realised that other governors in 
other schools held similar concerns (and possibly, useful solutions). This isolation 
means the perspectives of governors are easy to overlook in the broader public policy 
discourse, since governors tend to approach problems on a school-by-school basis, 
rather than as an integrated and more cohesive whole. The value of studies like this 
one is that they provide individual governors with the knowledge that their concerns 
are shared amongst their colleagues, and that these concerns are rarely inherently 
local or solely ascribable to unique institutional factors.
9.2.2 New Theoretical Tools and Strategic Planning Barriers
Second, it was argued that this study would provide a systematic framework of 
strategic planning barriers through which the absence of governing body strategic 
planning could be better analysed and understood. This research accomplished this 
task in several ways. First, this research developed the nascent concept of barriers to 
strategic planning in greater detail. While Corrick (1996) argued that such barriers 
existed, this argument was based on a brief analysis of data collected by Earley 
(1994a), and was only a relatively minor aspect of that study. Furthermore, while 
there has been limited research into factors that impeded governing body 
effectiveness in general (Creese 1998; Scanlon et al. 1999), these factors had not 
been applied to strategic planning in particular. This research therefore built upon 
this broader research into governing body effectiveness by extending Corrick’s 
observation about the Tack of effectiveness’ of governing bodies into a formal 
theoretical concept of strategic planning barriers. In doing so, this research provided 
the first systemic and heuristic examination of what makes governing bodies less 
effective in terms of their strategic planning.
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This study also contributed to the literature by identifying ten specific barriers to 
governing body strategic planning. Various authors have pointed to the existence of 
some of these problems previously, as was discussed in the chapter conclusions. 
However, this research extended the existing literature in four new and unique ways. 
First, this study identified three new barriers that have not been raised previously in 
any existing research -  the barriers of the ‘monitoring culture’, communication, and 
trust. Second, this study is the first to classify all ten of these issues as ‘barriers’, and 
to view each of these issues -  individually and collectively -  through the lens of 
strategic planning. The current study permits, for the first time, the view that these 
‘problems’ (which are often viewed in isolation in the existing literature) actually 
interact to form significant barriers for governing bodies that might be seeking to 
fulfil their strategic planning responsibilities. Third, the current study is the first to 
define all ten of these barriers as components of a single integrated set, as it is 
believed that a systemic and dynamic understanding of these barriers is preferable to 
the ad hoc approach that exists in the current literature. In doing so, this research 
provides a more complex perspective regarding the potential interrelation between 
these issues than does the existing literature, which often focuses on one or two of 
these issues alone. Finally, the current research demonstrates that these barriers exist 
not solely at the institutional level but also at the central governmental level. As 
such, this research demonstrates that these barriers must be understood in the broader 
context of how governing bodies actually operate in the real world, where multiple 
demands arise from multiple sources. This research has therefore provided a new 
starting point both for understanding why problems in strategic planning may arise 
and for determining how those problems may be solved, as it is posited that 
identifying and eliminating structural barriers to strategic planning can be just as 
valuable as proposing short-term solutions for circumventing them.
9.2.3 New Perspectives on Business Involvement
Third, it was argued that this study would use the lens of business involvement in 
education to provide evidence for whether these barriers provided a robust 
explanation of the reasons for the absence of governing body strategic planning on a 
substantive policy issue. In doing so, it was argued that this study would also 
provide new insights into the opinions of governors about business involvement in 
education. Both of these goals were accomplished by this study. First, by 
demonstrating that the strategic planning barriers did provide a robust explanation of
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the absence of governing body strategic planning on business involvement issues, 
this research applied the theoretical barriers in order to illustrate how these barriers 
actually prevent strategic planning from taking place. From this evidence, it can be 
concluded that this systematic and heuristic approach provides a new theoretical 
framework through which a practical strategic planning problem can be analysed, 
and from  which potential solutions to remedying such problems might be 
constructed. While this framework will require future research in order to ascertain 
its explanatory strength, the evidence in relation to business involvement permits the 
conclusion that each individual barrier -  as well as the framework as a whole -  has 
both theoretical and empirical support.
Second, this study provides significant new evidence to supplement the limited 
research by Baginsky et al. (1991) into governor perspectives and opinions about 
business involvement issues. By demonstrating that governors were generally 
supportive of business involvement, within a certain set of restrictions and 
limitations, this research provides new data on which public policy in this area can be 
based. This study also provides the first analysis in the literature of governor 
perspectives on the strategic planning aspect of business involvement issues, using 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that governors supported the suggestions of Glegg 
(1997) and Tulloch (1999) that governing bodies should be engaged in the issues 
surrounding business involvement. More generally, this research provides new 
evidence in the field of business involvement in education, filling a gap in an existing 
literature that is comprised mostly of the analyses of specific government initiatives 
or the views of employers towards such projects.
9.2.4 New Insight into the Central Government Role
Fourth, it was argued that this study would contribute new evidence on the role of 
central government in governing body activities, the exploration of which has been 
limited to this point. The existing literature on governing body dynamics often 
focuses on the institutional level, while issues surrounding the governing body- 
central government relationship have gone largely unexplored. This study rectified 
this absence of research, focusing specifically on the influence of central government 
on the strategic planning of governing bodies, and identifying six main areas in 
which central government substantially hindered governing bodies. Most notably, 
this study suggests that governors and governing bodies have the clear potential to be
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great allies of government; the higher-than-expected level of support from governors 
in this study for central government’s ideas about business involvement (within 
certain well-defined constraints) provides strong evidence for this conclusion. Yet it 
is equally clear from this research that central government’s lack of perceived trust in 
-  and understanding of -  governing bodies has precluded central government from 
securing the support of governing bodies in its attempts to improve education. 
Equally, it is clear from this research that despite the statutory requirement for 
governing bodies to engage in strategic planning, governing bodies themselves still 
view strategic planning as a subsidiary (rather than a primary) responsibility, and that 
central government does very little in practice to reverse that perception. Given the 
demonstrated influence that central government has on governing body strategic 
planning, it is clear that the central government approach to governing bodies must 
be substantially revised in order to eliminate the structural barriers to strategic 
planning that have emerged from central government’s complacency.
9.2.5 New Insight into Inner London Governance
Fifth, it was argued that this study would provide a more detailed understanding of 
inner London state secondary school governors and governing bodies, as there was no 
existing research literature with this specific focus. Central government has recently 
displayed a significant level of renewed interest in inner London’s schools; indeed, as 
Tony Blair himself argued in the government’s most recent plan for improving 
London’s sefcondary schools (The London Challenge (DfES 2003d)), ‘Radical reform 
will be focused most urgently on the two areas of Inner London where the problems 
are greatest [emphasis added]’ (2003c:2). Yet the process of identifying problems is 
different from understanding the tools that will be necessary to solve them, particularly 
in an education system as complex and varied as that of inner London. If governing 
bodies of inner London schools are to play a role in solving these problems, this 
research offers policy makers a deeper understanding of how these governing bodies 
operate, the concerns that they hold, and the realities that they face. Furthermore, this 
study provides the first broad empirical analysis of how governors and governing 
bodies in inner London perceive of some of the very policies that central government 
is keen to pursue — such as the proposal in The London Challenge that ‘every London 
secondary school will have a high-quality link with a business’ (2003:15). It is 
therefore hoped that future policy decisions about inner London’s schools will be both 
informed and improved by the insights provided in this research.
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9.2.6 Update of the Existing Literature
Sixth, it was argued that this study would update the existing literature on school 
governance, as much of this literature was between five and ten years old. If nothing 
else, this research provides new and more recent evidence on governing bodies, 
strategic planning, and business involvement. As was noted in Chapter Two, it is 
important to base current policy decisions on current policy research, since policies 
based on old information often have difficulty adapting to recent events and addressing 
newly raised concerns. In relation to the literature on governing bodies, this research 
updates the surveys of governors and head teachers regarding ‘factors hindering 
governing body effectiveness’ (Earley 1994a; Scanlon et al. 1999), and by combining 
in-depth qualitative interviews with a quantitative survey (rather than relying upon the 
quantification of open-ended qualitative responses) this research provides a more 
accurate and complete evaluation of these factors in relation to strategic planning. 
Additionally, this research confirms and updates general research into governing 
bodies by those such as Earley (1994a), Deem et al. (1995), Creese and Bradley 
(1997), and Scanlon et al. (1999), as well as research into perspectives on governing 
body strategic planning by Creese (1998) and Earley et al. (2002). In relation to 
business involvement and governing bodies, this research provides a significant update 
on the research of Baginsky et al. (1991) and Thody (1992), and adds to the existing 
general research on business involvement in education.
9.2.7 Impartiality
Finally, it was argued that this study would provide independent research on school 
governance and business involvement, not sponsored or supported by the major 
governmental agencies or industry groups who may have a direct interest in its 
outcome. It was suggested that this independence would preclude any concerns 
about the impartiality or objectivity of either the data or the results on the grounds of 
conflicts of interest. A good deal of existing research on school governance is 
sponsored by central government, and a good deal of existing research on business 
involvement is sponsored by either central government or industry. In contrast, this 
study provided evidence and conclusions that can claim to be genuinely independent 
and uncompromised by influences external to the researcher.
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9.2.8 Generalisation and Limitations
One of the measures of the value of research is the extent to which its findings can be 
generalised. As was argued in Chapter Three, the issue of generalisation frequently 
plagues qualitative research, since it is often claimed that as case studies are not 
‘representative’ of the study population, their findings cannot be generalised (and are 
therefore of limited value). However, it was pointed out in section 3.5 that this 
concern was addressed by the research design in two ways. First, the use of a 
quantitative survey in addition to the qualitative interviews, and the strong 
confluence between the qualitative and quantitative results, provided strong 
supporting evidence for the ‘representativeness’ of the qualitative data. This 
therefore supports the potential for generalising from these findings. Second, it was 
noted that by employing an analytical-theoretical rather than a statistical approach 
towards data collection, clear patterns that were observed during a qualitative study 
could be generalised as contributions to theory. These ‘theoretical’ contributions can 
then be tested in other situations where there is reason to believe that such theoretical 
contributions might help explain certain patterns of behaviour.
The ten strategic planning barriers identified in this thesis constitute contributions to 
a theory of why governing bodies do not engage in strategic planning. In order to 
illustrate the strength of this theory, these barriers were applied to a specific issue 
(business involvement in education). The finding that these barriers provided a 
robust explanation for the absence of strategic planning therefore strengthened the 
argument that these barriers might explain the absence of strategic planning in other 
schools, and strategic planning on other issues. Additionally, the findings 
concerning governor perceptions of their strategic planning role and governor 
opinions about business involvement provide other theoretical frameworks that offer 
legitimate bases from which to generalise.
Before doing so, however, several potential limitations need to be considered. First, 
this research was conducted entirely in urban state secondary schools in inner 
London. While the generalisation of these findings may be directly applicable to 
governing bodies of other urban secondary schools, secondary schools in suburban 
and rural areas, as well as primary schools in all areas, face different sets of 
circumstances in which some of these barriers may not apply. Second, the 
qualitative portion of this study was conducted with schools that were at neither one
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end nor the other of the academic performance spectrum -  the area in the educational 
bell-curve where most of England’s schools reside. As such, this research did not 
focus on the governing bodies of schools in special measures, as much of the energy 
of these governing bodies will be focused on short-term tasks. Neither was this 
research targeted at governing bodies of schools with enviable exam results and high 
academic achievement, since these schools may have less pressure to improve their 
strategic planning, having already reached the upper echelons of the league tables. 
Certainly, the quantitative survey does provide a measure of equalisation in this 
regard. However, without further specific research on the applicability of these 
barriers to schools on the edges of the spectrum, it is safer to presume that the 
barriers identified herein are applicable to those schools whose positions are similar 
to those of the schools studied herein.
Yet in spite of these limitations, the applicability of the strategic planning barriers to 
a specific policy issue provides important evidence that these barriers may indeed 
provide a heuristic tool with which to understand the absence of strategic planning on 
other issues of policy importance. Furthermore, it is possible to propose that these 
barriers might also explain the absence of strategic planning in other types of 
organisations in which lay governing bodies are expected to undertake such 
responsibilities. Such organisations might include prisons, hospital trusts, non-profit 
boards, and other entities. Therefore, while the findings of this thesis should be 
generalised with caution, the theoretical propositions made herein provide a 
potentially valuable source of explanation for understanding discrepancies between 
the rhetoric and reality of strategic planning.
9.3 Policy Recommendations
Since the fourth research question of this thesis sought to determine the practical 
policy relevance and importance of the research findings, it seems appropriate to 
draw upon the observations made during the course of this research in order to offer 
suggestions for addressing the barriers identified in this thesis. This section therefore 
provides two sets of practical policy recommendations. The first set offers 
recommendations for policy makers seeking to mitigate the impact of the 
institutional-level strategic planning barriers, while the second set offers 
recommendations for policy makers seeking to mitigate the impact of the central 
governmental-level strategic planning barriers.
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9.3.1 Mitigating Institutional-Level Strategic Planning Barriers
• Restructure governing body committees. To address the ‘monitoring culture’ and 
‘tangible tasks’ barriers, individual governing bodies should re-evaluate their 
current approach to committees. Governing body committees reflect governing 
bodies priorities, yet the traditional committee structure of most governing bodies 
focuses almost entirely on administrative/operational matters -  usually premises, 
finance, legal, and personnel, with a final committee on curriculum. As Davies 
and West-Bumham (1990) argued, such an operationally-focused structure both 
encourages governors to engage in short-term tangible issues and discourages 
them from addressing issues that cut across committee jurisdictions. The existing 
committee structure should therefore be replaced by a structure in which 
committees are viewed as the means to the end of providing students with a better 
education. These core committees should be: strategic planning, operational 
matters, curriculum matters, and community relations. The strategic planning 
committee would establish the importance of strategic planning in the governing 
body remit, and would provide a standing forum for setting out the broad vision 
of the school. The operational committee would deal with issues of finance, 
premises, and personnel. Through consolidation of the operational committees, 
the curriculum committee would gain renewed importance as the forum for all 
academic matters. Finally, the community relations committee would enable the 
governing body to not only field complaints, but also to actively promote the 
governing body as a valuable bridge between the school, businesses, and the 
broader community.
• Require a minimum level o f  mandatory governor training, including training on 
strategic planning. Although this suggestion has been made by numerous 
previous researchers (see e.g., Schlechte 1995; Jones 1998; Phillips 2002), this 
research further affirms the necessity of such a scheme. Almost all of the 
institutional-level barriers would be mitigated to some extent if a minimum level 
of governor training were required of both new and continuing governors. 
Currently, new governors are expected to acquire the knowledge necessary to 
govern effectively on their own, and predictably, the results of this autodidactic 
approach vary substantially. For new governors who are unfamiliar with 
education terminology or intimidated by governing body meetings, the absence of 
training almost encourages them to limit their involvement and defer their
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responsibilities, therby further entrenching the strategic planning barriers 
identified in this thesis. The most common objection to a mandatory training 
requirement is the time such training would require of governors, and the 
associated negative impact such a requirement might have on governor 
recruitment. While some might argue that untrained governors are better than no 
governors at all, such an approach would simply perpetuate the status quo while 
ignoring the evidence that being a functional governor requires a certain 
minimum level of specialised knowledge. Furthermore, if individuals who wish 
to become governors are not willing to expend even a minimum amount of time 
in order to acquire a basic understanding of their responsibilities, it is difficult to 
understand why it should be presumed that, once appointed, these individuals 
would have the time necessary to provide effective governance of their school.
• Require governing body meetings to be open and public. Although Sallis argued 
in 1991 that ‘The business of governors is not, in general, confidential’ 
(1991b: 13), there has been almost no subsequent discussion of this topic in the 
literature since. This is unfortunate, since to address both the ‘monitoring 
culture’ and ‘varying involvement’ barriers, one of the strongest remedies would 
be requiring that all main governing body meetings be open and public unless 
specific circumstances warranted the use of ‘executive session’. Furthermore, it 
should be required that the names of all governors, as well as a method for 
contacting them, be made public. Opponents of this recommendation might 
argue that such standards could make governor recruitment more difficult. 
However, on a practical level, it is more likely that this policy would discourage 
individuals like those current governors who are ‘here in name only’ from 
applying in the first place -  and the argument here should almost always be 
focused on quality, rather than quantity. On a philosophical level, individuals 
who become governors agree to undertake a public position, in which they will 
have executive authority to make decisions about the provision of public 
education through the allocation of public taxpayer funds. As such, this proposed 
policy would eliminate the inherent imbalance of the current system, in which 
public authority is conferred upon governors without requiring a concomitant 
level of public accountability.
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• Increase the emphasis on recruiting governors for vision. In order to combat the 
tendency for governors to engage in task-based ‘tangible’ issues, governing 
bodies should refocus their recruitment of governors in order to give vision, 
passion, and the desire to think (and stay) long-term as much weight as practical 
skills in the selection process. Although some schools may claim that the dearth 
of potential governors means ‘beggars cannot be choosers’, it is nevertheless 
important even for these governing bodies to emphasise the importance of vision 
to potential governors. As Adams (2001) argued, governing bodies should not be 
some ‘ideal’ collection of useful professions, but rather ‘a set of committed 
individuals with a concern both for the quality of education offered by the school 
at present, and its plans for the future’ (2001:34). Yet currently, governing 
bodies tend to seek governors who offer particular skill sets -  ‘a solicitor’, ‘a 
banker’, ‘an IT specialist.’ Admittedly, this strategy is partly out of necessity, as 
the statutory responsibility of governing bodies currently requires them to carry 
out a number of operational and administrative responsibilities -  effectively 
providing a free management infrastructure at zero cost. However, if governing 
bodies are truly to fulfil their statutory obligation to engage in strategic planning, 
they require governors who can think beyond a specialised skill set.
• Provide governing bodies with adequate administrative support. In conjunction 
with the previous recommendation, it is vital that governing bodies be provided 
with adequate administrative support -  including secretarial, financial, and legal. 
The current ad hoc system of such support, varying substantially by school or 
LEA, has three consequences. First, it forces governing bodies to recruit 
governors with these skills (instead being able to hire administrative staff) in 
order to ensure that necessary statutory requirements are met. Second, it forces 
governors to spend their own limited time on such matters, rather than on broader 
issues of strategic planning. Third, it provides governors with an excuse for 
avoiding strategic planning issues, as governors can legitimately argue that their 
time is being spent on statutorily required task-based ‘tangible’ matters. 
Although this recommendation would require substantial financial resources (or 
possibly even in-kind donations of time from the business community!), it is 
essential if governors are to provide strong strategic leadership.
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• Provide and finance mechanisms for increasing governor interaction with 
students and staff This research found that one of the main reasons why 
governors deferred their strategic planning responsibilities to staff was that 
governors felt that staff had a better grasp of the major strategic issues -  both 
primarily educational and, to a certain extent, administrative -  facing the school. 
This lack of knowledge frequently appeared to result from the fact that governors 
did not feel comfortable visiting the school, fearing that they would be perceived 
as ‘inspectors’. Furthermore, governors often argued that they could not afford to 
take time off work to make visits during the school day. However, it was 
apparent during the conduct of this study that the governors who were most well- 
informed and comfortable in their roles were those who had spent the most time 
in their schools. This should not be surprising, as it should be apparent that trust 
is best built through frequent interaction (see Creese 1994). It is therefore 
essential for schools (or central government) to design and finance mechanisms 
that will enable governors to form independent and informed perspectives on 
matters facing their schools. One such mechanism would be encouraging 
increased opportunities for governors to meet with staff and with students in 
informal small groups during the school day. This system has already been 
adopted by some schools, which designate specific governors as ‘link’ governors 
with specific departments. A second mechanism would be encouraging staff to 
provide regular updates of departmental activities at governing body committee 
meetings, a system that is already in place at some individual schools. These 
types of activities would enable governors to increase their school knowledge and 
become more confident in engaging in debates over strategic planning issues.
• Consider the use o f  ‘super chairs ’ in struggling schools. It was apparent during 
the course of this research that the workload of many chairs of governing bodies 
was extremely onerous. Furthermore, it was apparent that in struggling schools, 
it was nearly impossible for volunteer chairs to fulfil the expectations placed 
upon them. Given this difficulty, it is proposed that struggling schools be 
provided with the option of employing a professional ‘super chair’: a paid chair 
of governors who would be able to work full-time, alongside the existing 
governing body, on improving the school. This recommendation departs from the 
government’s notion that all governors in a failing school could (or should) be 
replaced by an interim paid body, and does so for the following reason. Much is
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made of the use of ‘super heads’ in turning around the academic problems of 
failing schools, but little mention is made of the more mundane management side 
of the equation. When struggling schools are required to fundamentally review 
their working practices, new precedents are set for how that school will operate 
and manage its future. It is at this critical juncture where schools determine how 
their long-term strategy and management agenda will be pursued in future, yet it 
is equally crucial that there are local committed governors who will be able to 
carry on once the transformation is complete. As such, a paid full-time (yet 
interim) professional ‘super chair’ could play a valuable role in providing the 
basis for sound and secure strategic planning practices.
9.3.2 Mitigating Central Governmental-Level Strategic Planning Barriers
• Clarify and focus governors ’ role. One of the most pervasive strategic planning 
barriers was that of time, as governors argued that the expectations of central 
government exceeded the amount time they could afford to volunteer. To address 
this barrier, three steps should be taken in order to clarify the governors’ role. 
First, governor responsibilities must be clearly outlined and consolidated in a 
single document, instead of being spread throughout a diffusion of documents 
and reports. This would help combat the barriers of communication and trust as 
well as the barrier of time and volunteer expectations. Second, governor 
responsibilities in practice should be aligned with the main statutory 
responsibilities outlined in the Education Regulations (2000) -  notably, that 
governing bodies act as the strategic planning entity for the school. By clarifying 
the focus of governing bodies to reflect the tasks for which they are best suited, 
governors would have more time to fulfil these core tasks -  and could do so more 
thoroughly than is possible at present. Third, many governors complained that 
their current administrative responsibilities were all-encompassing, yet felt that 
now being charged with such responsibilities, it was unfair to then delegate them 
to members of staff. As such, central government must avoid the temptation to 
view governing bodies as ‘Christmas trees’ -  repositories of local responsibility 
that can always accept one more ‘ornament’ of regulatory oversight.
• Provide governors with adequate employment leave. Another way to combat the 
time barrier is by providing governors with more time. Currently, governors 
often find it necessary to use their own personal leave in order to meet these
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responsibilities, which clearly limits the extent to which they can engage in 
governor-related activities. If central government expects informed and capable 
school governance, governors must be given adequate employment leave in order 
to do their job properly -  to visit the school during the day, attend meetings or 
conferences, or read and assimilate paperwork and documentation. Systems for 
such leave already exist for individuals who are lay magistrates or members of 
the Territorial Army, and employers accept the value of these public 
commitments. School governors must be accorded similar stature if they are to 
perform to the level expected of them by central government. Surprisingly, the 
parliamentary Education and Employment Committee recently argued that it 
would not be ‘practical’ to require employers to offer governors paid time off to 
meet their essential duties (Education and Employment Committee 1999:19). 
However, if central government were to take the steps necessary to meet this 
recommendation, it would gain not only additional time from its governors, but a 
much needed measure of their trust and respect.
• Guarantee schools a minimum level o f  financing over a long-term time frame. 
This research found that a major strategic planning barrier was the short-term 
nature of the school funding system. Because governors do not know how much 
money they will be receiving in future years, it becomes extremely difficult to 
make long-term strategic plans. Central government should remedy this state of 
affairs by guaranteeing schools a minimum level of annual financing over at least 
a five-year time frame, subject to adjustment for inflation and unusual fluctuation 
in pupil numbers. Such forward guarantees would both give governors 
substantial additional confidence in engaging in strategic planning and 
demonstrate the importance that central government places on maintaining 
consistency in the education system. Critics of such a proposal might argue that 
central government would find such a system (based upon expectations of future 
tax receipts) financially irresponsible. However, it is clear from central 
government’s support of the private finance initiative that central government has 
few concerns about requiring schools to budget for long-term PFI debt 
repayment. If governing bodies are therefore deemed responsible enough to 
assume substantial long-term debt, it only seems reasonable to ensure governing 
bodies that a minimum level of future income is similarly assured.
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• Provide phase-out funding to assist governing bodies in future financial 
planning. Another financial strategic planning concern of governing bodies 
related to short-term fixed-term funding programmes. Governors repeatedly 
noted that although financial necessity often forced them to apply for such 
funding, the uncertainty over the renewal of such funding schemes made it 
difficult to integrate such funding into long term planning. As such, governing 
bodies often allocated such assistance on one-off capital improvements, even 
when they would rather have allocated such funding towards longer-term 
commitments. If such fixed-term programmes are to continue, central 
government should designate a certain amount of the overall programme fund as 
‘phase-out funding’. This ‘security deposit’ could be kept in an escrow account, 
and used to provide schools with a more gradual decrease in funding should that 
particular programme cease. Governing bodies would therefore have the 
opportunity to absorb this loss of funding more gradually than they can at present, 
which would in turn allow greater confidence in future financial planning.
• Create an internal review o f the paperwork load. Although the DfEE promised 
the National School Governors' Conference in 1999 that it would institute a new 
communication framework that ‘included clear categorisation of subject matter, 
status, related documents, audience, and action’ (NSGC 1999:17), the practical 
results of this framework appear to have been negligible. The current research 
found that governors still received far too much paperwork, and that they either 
attempted to read all the material they were sent, or became discouraged and read 
very little of it. Neither approach is the best use of governor time. To combat 
this problem, it would be valuable for central government to create its own 
‘internal governing body’, which would receive everything central government 
intends to distribute before its general issuance. This entity would simulate the 
‘sharp end of the stick’ that governing bodies feel they have become, and would 
provide central government with an ‘early warning’ system if its simulated 
‘governors’ felt they were becoming too overloaded.
• Improve the paperwork classification system. Another way to combat the 
paperwork barrier is for central government to be much more rigorous with its 
paperwork classification scheme. The current classification scheme identifies 
documents with categories like ‘strongly recommended’ -  yet in practical terms,
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this phrase has little or no contextual relevance for governors. Is it ‘strongly 
recommended’ that governors read it? Act upon it? Discuss it? Discard it? 
Although some LEAs seek to assist governing bodies in making these 
determinations, LEAs should not be forced to do a job that could and should be 
done by central government and the DfES. To eliminate this ambiguity and 
increase governor productivity, central government therefore needs to: better 
identify the target audience for each document, explain what determines the 
categorisation of any given document, and make explicit the expectations of 
governor action regarding each classification category. Such a system would 
assist in easing the paperwork pressure on governors, who currently find it 
difficult to prioritise and act efficiently upon the documents they receive.
• Require education policies to demonstrate a longer-term focus. Governors herein 
complained that education legislation and regulations were issued too frequently, 
were too focused on short-term results, and were too lacking in a comprehensive 
vision of the desired results. All of these issues contributed to difficulties in 
governing body strategic planning. As Davies and Ellison (1998) argued:
‘Schools, when faced with a series of new initiatives from central or local 
government, reach and adjust to them as they come along without seeing 
the pattern or purpose of what is happening’ (1998:464).
To remedy this barrier, central government needs to adopt a set of principles 
regarding education legislation and regulations, which should include the 
following. First, central government must clearly state its overall vision of the 
education system, which encompasses the entire learning cycle of a child. As 
such, this vision should treat the education system as a set of constituent entities 
that participate in delivering a single educative process, rather than as a set of 
loosely related autonomous entities at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. 
Second, given this framework, central government should then be required to 
demonstrate how any subsequent legislation or regulation provides a necessary 
component for achieving this vision. This would provide governors and schools 
with a clear rationale for implementation. Third, central government needs to 
ensure that legislation and regulations are written to encourage long-term 
priorities and planning, as well as the politically necessary short-term results. 
Finally, the frequency of major education policy announcements must be
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reduced, in order to provide governors with the opportunity to understand and 
implement the changes required therein, and in order for central government to 
acquire enough data about the effects of its existing policies so as to make 
intelligent decisions about the long-term value of these programmes.
• Reorganise and improve existing communication patterns. As central 
government increasingly bypasses the LEAs and operates more directly with 
individual schools, governors want their concerns -  and suggestions -  to be heard 
directly by central government, rather than being transmitted (and possibly 
transmuted) by the local authority. This is not a recommendation that local 
authorities should be heard less -  simply that governors and governing bodies 
need to be heard more, and that they require outlets for this kind of 
communication. Although part of the onus of this recommendation falls upon the 
national governor organisations, it also falls on central government to pay more 
attention to the issues raised by those on the ground, rather than by relying upon 
second-hand interpretation and delivery of this information.
• Appoint a minister for school governance. One visible and valuable way in 
which central government could help combat both the communication and trust 
barriers to strategic planning would be to appoint a minister for school 
governance. Such an appointment, preferably of a current of former school 
governor, would have numerous advantages. First, it would convey to governors 
the message that central government acknowledged the value and importance of 
school governors. Second, it would provide governors with a political contact 
point and ombudsman for comments or concerns, in addition to the existing 
administrative contact points within the DfES. Third, it would offer a measure of 
central government accountability in relation to governance concerns, as such a 
minister would be required to explain and justify decisions that impacted upon 
governors and governing bodies. The combined effect of such an appointment 
would be to demonstrate to governors that the communication and trust barriers 
could be addressed at the central governmental-level.
9.4 Issues for Future Research
While the previous section provided a set of policy recommendations for battling the
barriers expounded upon in this thesis, this section identifies a set of issues on which
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future research would be beneficial. These issues are those that emanated from this 
research, but which, due to constraints of time, resources, and scope, it was not 
possible to pursue. This list is by no means exhaustive; however, it is hoped that 
future researchers will draw upon these recommendations in order to expand upon 
the issues raised in this thesis. The potential issues for future research are divided 
into three categories: research on school governance, research on strategic planning, 
and research on business involvement in education.
9.4.1 Potential Research on School Governance
• Are the barriers to governing body strategic planning identified in this research 
relevant and applicable to different educational contexts? Due to the necessary 
constraints referred to above, this study was limited to inner London state- 
maintained secondary school governing bodies. However, it would be extremely 
valuable to determine the extent to which the common strategic planning barriers 
identified in this research, and their relevance to governors’ opinions about 
business involvement, can be generalised to other educational contexts. Such 
contexts might include:
o Governing bodies in other areas of England;
o Governing bodies not located in urban areas;
o Governing bodies of primary, higher, and further education 
institutions;
o Governing bodies of state-maintained special schools;
o Governing bodies of independent sector schools; and
o Governing bodies of secondary schools in other developed countries.
• How do those at the central government level perceive governing bodies? As 
was argued in Chapter Three, this research was focused on governors’ 
perceptions of the barriers to strategic planning, since regardless of the factual 
accuracy of such perceptions, it is often such perceptions that determine whether 
policies will succeed or falter. However, further research would be valuable to 
determine how those in central government -  both politicians and civil servants -  
actually perceived governing bodies, looking beyond the platitudes of the official 
policy documentation. Do these individuals trust governing bodies? Do they 
believe communication is adequate and sufficient? Do they appreciate the time 
pressures that governors feel? Research into this area could provide important
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insights into the issues on which there was genuine agreement or disagreement 
between central government and governing bodies, as well as the issues on which 
each side may have been genuinely uninformed. This kind of research could 
assist greatly in informing and improving the dialogue between governing bodies 
and central government.
• To what extent do governing bodies remain ‘rubber stamping ’ entities, influenced 
primarily by the degree to which the head acts as an information ‘gatekeeper ’? 
As was noted by Sheam et al. (1995) (see section 2.2.5), the role of the head 
teacher in determining the type and extent of information received by governing 
bodies is crucial, and as Bird (2002) argued, there are still concerns that 
governing bodies may not be receiving the information they need in order to 
operate effectively (2002:6). Building upon this research, it was argued in 
section 5.5 that one of the four major institutional-level barriers to strategic 
planning was the deference of governors to school staff, due largely to governors’ 
concerns about the validity and extent of their own educational knowledge. 
However, this thesis only examined issue of information asymmetry in the 
context of strategic planning. As such, further research into the extent to which 
governing bodies are hindered more broadly due to the information-provision 
philosophies of their heads would be extremely valuable, particularly in light of 
recent research suggesting that the governing bodies of many public service 
organisations are still largely engaged in ‘rubber stamping’ decisions that have 
already been made by others (see Steele and Parston 2003).
• What is the role, value, and effectiveness o f  national governor organisations? As 
Thody (1999b) argued, ‘To influence the system politicians, [governors] need 
unity and an ability to lobby’ (1999b:38). Yet while teacher governors in this 
research often mentioned the teacher’s unions in the context of their responses, 
no governors in this research referred to the role of the national governor 
organisations (such as the National Association of Governors and Managers) as 
an outlet for advocating their concerns. This was somewhat surprising, given that 
one of the cumulative conclusions of this research was that although governors in 
different schools frequently shared common concerns, they often failed to 
recognise that these concerns were systemic. It would seem that a major role of a 
national organisation should be to provide a collective voice on behalf of
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governors (see Morrish 1993; Watson 2001), yet governors did not seem to take 
advantage of this resource. It would therefore be advantageous to investigate 
how effective these organisations are in fielding, responding to, and promoting 
the redress of governor concerns.
• Why do non-core governors remain on governing bodies? This thesis argued that 
there was a small ‘core’ of governors on most governing bodies who performed 
the majority of the work, while there was a number of ‘non-core’ governors who 
contributed substantially less. However, this research did not seek to determine 
why these ‘non-core’ governors remained on their governing bodies, and with the 
exception of the brief mentions by Brehony (1992) and Thody (2000), no such 
research exists. Is it prestige? A commitment to the interest community (for 
example, the parents, teachers, or local authority) for whom they are delegates? 
Despite their relative inactivity, do these non-core governors serve an important 
symbolic function? How can they be better engaged in the life of the governing 
body? And how can core governors create better working mechanisms that 
would enable greater shared authority with and inclusion of all governing body 
members? Such research would assist both governing bodies and central 
government in re-evaluating the structure of governing bodies and the role that 
governors are expected to play.
9.4.2 Potential Research on Strategic Planning
• Can further exploration o f  the quantitative data provide additional insights? 
Although the quantitative survey data in this study were examined extensively, 
there are always additional tests that could be run and variables that could be 
added. While the time constraints and the space limitations of this thesis precluded 
further such testing, there are numerous ways in which these data could be 
analysed further -  for example, examining the extent to which factors such as 
known free school meal eligibility or specialist school status influence governing 
body strategic planning. Additionally, this data set could provide valuable baseline 
data for future longitudinal research, examining what factors contribute to changing 
attitudes towards strategic planning and business involvement over time.
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• Can the theoretical concept o f strategic planning barriers be usefully applied in 
different public service contexts? This thesis sought to apply the concept of 
strategic planning barriers only to one particular entity, school governing bodies. 
However, it would be beneficial to determine the extent to which this theoretical 
concept of barriers provides a valuable heuristic tool for evaluating and interpreting 
problems faced by lay governance bodies of other public services. Can researchers 
gain a new perspective on the problems faced by the governing bodies of hospitals, 
prisons, and other public services by seeking to determine what factors impede 
effectiveness, rather than by simply attempting to convince these governors to act 
differently within the constraints of their existing resources? Such research would 
help determine how the concept of barriers might be developed in order to improve 
public policy across a broader range of public services.
• How are approaches towards strategic planning in the public services influenced 
by the relative levels o f  centralisation or decentralisation therein? In this thesis, 
the intersection of strategic planning and centralisation was largely discussed in 
the context of trust. Arguing that there was a discrepancy between central 
government’s rhetoric and reality regarding decentralisation, governors 
contended that the level of prescriptive regulation that often accompanies 
decentralisation makes such autonomy nominal at best. However, there is a 
substantial opportunity for future research that offers a more complete 
understanding of the influence that levels of centralisation have on approaches 
towards strategic planning. Does a discrepancy in central government rhetoric 
and reality exist in other public services, and if so, does it affect strategic 
planning in similar ways? Are individual institutions really more proactive in 
engaging in strategic planning under more decentralised systems? In more 
decentralised public services, how well do the strategic planning processes of 
individual institutions balance the desire to improve institutionally with the public 
desire for high standards of minimum provision across the entire service? Such 
answers would be extremely useful in the context of the current debate over the 
level of centralisation in the public services.
• How can strategic planning be better ‘incentivised’? This research concluded 
that there are specific barriers to strategic planning that prevent governing bodies 
from engaging in such activities. However, it is foreseeable that while the
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mitigation or elimination of these barriers would enable more governing bodies to 
engage in strategic planning, some governing bodies would still fail to do so. 
Further research would therefore be valuable into what incentives might actively 
encourage governing bodies and educational institutions to prioritise strategic 
planning and sustain that commitment over the long term.
9.4.3 Potential Research on Business Involvement in Education
• To what extent can or will the private sector respond to central government’s 
desire for increased private sector involvement in education? While this research 
examined some of the issues surrounding central government’s promotion of 
increased private sector involvement in education, it would be extremely 
beneficial for further research to investigate the extent to which the private sector 
can or will cooperate in bringing these proposals to fruition. How would a 
downturn in the economy affect the implementation of such proposals? Do 
businesses view such proposals, particularly those calling for financial 
involvement, as a form of ‘double-taxation’? What lessons do the disappointing 
results of the City Technology College and statutory Education Action Zone 
programmes offer regarding the extent to which central government can expect 
private sector support in education? And are there enough willing businesses to 
meet the demand of all the schools that seek such involvement? Research into 
these and similar issues would provide an important assessment of whether these 
kinds of central government proposals would be viable if implemented 
nationwide over the long-term.
• Why do some schools receive more business involvement than do others, and 
what factors contribute to a school’s likelihood o f  receiving such assistance? It 
became clear in the early stages of this research that the level of business 
involvement in schools often differed dramatically between individual institutions. 
Some of this difference can be explained by institutional decisions about how much 
business involvement to allow. Yet even in apparently similar schools that were 
each actively seeking increased business involvement, some were significantly 
more successful than others. Further research would therefore be advantageous on 
questions such as: How important is the geographical proximity of the school to 
the business? Does the level of involvement correlate with the quality of the local 
education-business partnership organisations? How important is community
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outreach, by staff, parents, governors, and others, in attracting support? Does a 
school’s proximity to other schools with low levels of business involvement 
provide either a relative advantage or disadvantage? Answers to these types of 
questions would provide insight into the dynamics of private involvement in the 
public sector, as well as help to identify and provide support to those schools that 
might otherwise struggle in obtaining business involvement.
• What lessons for increasing the acceptance o f business involvement can be 
learned from the implementation o f  the work experience programme? While this 
research identified some of governors’ specific concerns about business 
involvement in education, this research did not attempt to address how these 
specific concerns might be allayed. One potentially valuable avenue for future 
research would therefore be to explore what lessons for increasing the acceptance 
of business involvement can be learned from the implementation of the work 
experience programme, which is now a relatively uncontroversial and integrated 
component of secondary education. The success of the work experience initiative 
in bridging the school-business gap suggests that other attempts at increasing the 
acceptance of business involvement in education could learn from its history. For 
example, under what conditions did the initial work experience model have its 
greatest successes? How were the main objections to and concerns about the 
work experience programme addressed? How have both businesses and schools 
been encouraged to sustain and improve upon the work experience model? 
Applying the answers to these questions to the current debate over business 
involvement could provide important insights into how the introduction of new 
forms of business involvement might be improved.
9.5 Final Remarks
For too long in the English education system, strategic planning has been a rhetorical 
promise rather than a practical reality. Governing bodies, being charged with the 
responsibility for strategic planning, have instead approached their task as one of 
‘muddling through’ rather than as one of setting out a vision for the future of their 
school. While some of this attitude can be attributed to historical inertia, this research 
has shown that much of the absence of strategic planning by governing bodies — at 
least in the secondary schools of inner London — can be attributed to barriers that are 
either created or perpetuated by the governing bodies and central government of today.
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At the institutional level, the increasing autonomy of governing bodies has also 
meant increasing responsibilities. However, rather than embracing this new 
autonomy as means for actively engaging strategic planning, many governing bodies 
have instead limited their own autonomy by focusing on short-term issues rather than 
long-term concerns. Furthermore, while governors argue that they are no longer 
engaging in ‘day-to-day management,’ it would be erroneous to presume that the 
absence of day-to-day involvement implies the presence of a strategic perspective. 
In too many cases, governing bodies have become monitors and observers, often 
involved in activities that have little to do with core educational issues while 
remaining tied up with the management of issues that are frequently administrative 
or peripheral. These attitudes and approaches must change if governing bodies are to 
become in practice what they are designed to be in theory: the voices of the 
community working not solely to maintain the school as it stands, but to provide the 
vision and leadership that will bring the school forward in years to come.
Yet the reasons for the current absence of strategic planning in the secondary school 
system do not rest only, or possibly largely, with the governing bodies. The current 
Labour government has created a school system in which central governmental aims 
take precedence over local plans when the two are in conflict, and a system in which 
governing bodies are expected to be accountable even as they are being denied the 
tools necessary to plan effectively. The word ‘governor’ is derived from the Latin 
gubernare, meaning ‘to steer’ -  originally, ‘governors’ were the helmsmen of the 
rowed ships in the Roman fleet. At present, it appears that while central government 
proclaims that governors have the freedom to steer, in reality central government 
treats governors as administrative ‘oarsmen’, giving them only the resources and 
responsibilities necessary to row. This approach only increases the reluctance of 
governing bodies to engage in strategic planning, since such local plans run a high 
risk of being disregarded in order to accommodate the next round of central 
government strategies. By treating governing bodies merely as a free management 
infrastructure, central government is playing a dangerous game: trying to reap 
immediate benefits while failing to recognise the underlying costs that pursuing such 
a policy incurs in volunteer time, expertise, and trust.
Lest this analysis sound overly pessimistic, it should also be noted that part of the 
reason why this situation in regards to strategic planning exists and persists is
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because little attention has been paid to the reasons for its perpetuation. With such a 
dearth of information, it is perhaps only to be expected that potential solutions to 
these problems have not been forthcoming. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to solve 
a problem when one possesses only limited evidence about the precise nature of the 
problem itself. By defining the barriers to strategic planning faced by governing 
bodies, this study provides both a wealth of evidence about the problem and a new 
way of understanding its causes. This evidence is, in turn, intended to provide those 
on all sides of the issue with the knowledge necessary to pursue an informed and 
lasting solution to the strategic planning challenge. While the problems outlined in 
this thesis are serious, they are not intractable. Both governing bodies and central 
government have the ability to respond to these issues in ways that can improve the 
process. However, the longer that these obstacles to strategic planning persist, the 
longer the education system will fail to live up to the expectations of the children 
whom it is designed to serve. This research was begun on the premise that governing 
bodies can make a significant contribution to the state of the education system. In 
the course of this thesis, it has been argued that governing bodies can make their 
most significant and lasting impact on the education system by focusing on their 
strategic planning role. It remains to be seen whether in the future, governing bodies 
will be able to overcome the barriers that prevent them from doing so at present.
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G o v er n o r  Serv ices  D irecto rs  In t e r v ie w  Sch ed u le
About Governors: Broad Questions
1. What is your perception of the governor’s role? Does that perception match 
the one that the governors themselves hold about their own role?
2. Is it important that governors are volunteers? Why?
3. How much autonomy do governors really have? Do they welcome that 
autonomy or are they overwhelmed by it?
4. Does the level of economic deprivation in a school’s cachement area 
influence the priorities of its governors? If so, how?
5. Overall, how important are governing bodies to schools?
About Governors and Policy Making
6. Do you find that governing bodies engage more in short-term firefighting or 
more in longer-term planning? How much knowledge about or interest in 
long-term policy issues do governors have?
7. Do you find governors feel qualified to give their opinions and ask questions 
regarding education-related policies, or would many rather leave such 
questions to the educators?
8. Do you find governors find themselves pushed to the margins of decision 
making on some policy issues? If so, on what issues and when?
9. At what stages in the policy making process have you found governors to be 
the most influential? At what stages are they least influential?
10. Could governors be more effective given existing legislation? How? What 
changes in legislation would make them more effective and valuable?
About Governors and Business Involvement
11. Do governors have opinions about business involvement in their schools? If 
so, do they view business involvement as a benefit or as a threat?
12. Are governors generally active in the monitoring of business relationships 
with their schools? If so, how? Should they have more or less involvement? 
Why?
13. Do you believe governors should have a role in business partnerships -  either 
in knowledge, involvement, assistance, or monitoring? Should governors 
have a role at the strategic planning stage of these partnerships?
14. Where do governors believe the public-private boundary should be drawn? 
Why there and not further?
15. Have governors ever come to governor services looking for assistance in how 
to manage partnerships with businesses?
16. What, if anything, have the co-opted business governors brought to schools?
About Governors and Partnerships
17. Do you find governors perceive central government’s promotion of 
partnership initiatives more as a) a positive development that brings together 
knowledge and resources from many sectors, or more as b) an attempt by 
central government to ask schools to find additional resources elsewhere?
18. Do you think governors and schools would become involved in partnerships 
schemes if there were no financial incentives to do so?
19. In your experience, what do governors believe is their role in making 
decisions about specialist school status? Do governors see their role 
changing should their school receive specialist status?
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E d u c a t io n -B u sin ess  P a r tn er sh ip  D ir ec to r s  In t e r v ie w  Sch ed u le
General Questions about the EBP
1. How is your EBP supported?
2. How do you answer the question: ‘If they’re so good, why aren’t there more -  
if they’re not so good, why are they being pressed?’ Is the constraint on the 
supply end or the receiving end?
3. What do you see as the benefits and tradeoffs of being involved with 
businesses?
4. What do you see as the keys to a good partnership? Are there some schools 
that are better suited for partnerships than others? What differentiates them?
5. Does being an urban EBP affect they kinds of partnerships you can arrange? 
If so, how?
6. How much partnering is arranged through the EBP and how much is arranged 
directly between schools and businesses?
7. Do you see a difference between partnership and sponsorship? If so, what?
8. Do you see a difference between private partnership and private 
management?
9. What do you think about ‘adopt a school’ initiatives?
10. What does the proposed increase in the number of specialist schools mean for 
your work?
11. Are there any schools who resist involvement with the EBP? Why? What 
causes schools to avoid extensive partnerships?
12. What do you think causes partnerships to be less than successful or to fail?
13. Beyond work placement, what kinds of schemes are the most popular?
Questions about Governors
14. What role do governors play in these partnerships in your experience? When 
are they most involved? How involved do they get? Where could they be 
more involved?
15. At what stage of partnerships have you found governors to be the most 
influential? At what stage are they least influential? How active do you 
think governors are in the creation/monitoring of these business 
relationships? Should they have more or less involvement? Why?
16. In your experience, how well informed are governors about partnerships?
17. What misconceptions from governors are common regarding business 
partnerships?
Questions about Schools
18. Do you believe schools would engage in partnerships if there was no 
financial incentive to do so?
19. What concerns do you hear the most from schools who are thinking of 
partnering with businesses? Are these justified? In what circumstances? How 
do you work to allay these fears?
20. Do you believe schools with business partnerships provide more equality of 
opportunity than do schools without partnerships?
21. Do you think schools act differently than they might otherwise in order to 
remain attractive to their sponsors?
22. What are the long term policy objectives of partnership involvement from the 
viewpoint of schools? What are their short-term objectives? Do these 
objectives coincide with those of businesses?
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Questions about Businesses
23. What are the reasons for why businesses become involved in education 
business partnerships? How do they vary? What do the businesses get out of 
their partnership agreements?
24. There is an argument that some businesses get involved for largely symbolic 
reasons. How prevalent is this? Does it matter in the end?
25. What have you found to be the longitudinal ‘involvement trajectory’ of 
private sponsors? Do you worry about loss of support? What do you do to 
minimise that potential?
26. Do different kinds of outlay from the business sector attract different types of 
recipients in terms of students and schools? Do these actions systematically 
exclude some types of schools and students from being at the top of the list 
for private sector assistance?
27. Do private resources generally go to schools where parents are less involved 
(in effect substituting for missing resources) or where parents are involved 
(because the parents make the effort to get partners)?
Questions about the Future
28. Do you believe partnerships will become more or less prevalent in the 
coming years? Why?
29. Do education-business partnerships indicate a decline of governmental 
involvement in, or control over, traditionally governmental functions?
30. Have you noticed any signs of partnership fatigue, in either schools or 
businesses?
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I am currently a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics under the 
supervision Dr Anne West (director of the LSE Centre for Educational Research), and I am 
writing to ask for your assistance.
My doctoral research centres on the policy-making role of governors in state-sector London 
secondary schools; specifically, on governor’s involvement in and opinions about local-level 
education-business partnership schemes. The research design relies upon interviews with 
governors and head teachers, in an attempt to get beyond the quantitative league-table 
statistics and provide a more in-depth understanding of these issues.
I am writing to you because I believe that is an excellent candidate for
inclusion in this project, due to both its history of involvement in education-business 
partnerships and its location within London’s urban centre. In addition, several of my 
colleagues have suggested that the governors of might offer valuable
perspectives for this research project.
Besides forming the basis of my doctoral dissertation, this research will provide guidance to 
both the government and other secondary schools on how governing bodies can best 
contribute to educational policymaking in this era of increased school-based management. 
As such, I am hoping that you and your colleagues will be able to assist me in this 
endeavour.
The research itself is designed to keep the demands upon the valuable time of you and your 
colleagues to an absolute minimum. In general, each individual would only need to provide 
one hour for an interview, which would be arranged at the time and place most convenient 
for the interviewee. Furthermore, any references to specific places or individuals will be 
made anonymous in the final written work.
My own background in education policy includes consulting work for the Department for 
Education and Employment and program management for the United States Department of 
Education. I would stress, however, that the current project is independent, and not 
sponsored by any public or private organisation.
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience to discuss ’s
involvement in this project. I can be contacted on 020 7955 6522, or via email at 




Research  Sum m ary  a n d  
Frequently A sked Questions Sheet
School (Governance Case Study: Information and Frequently Asked Questions 
Tad Heuer, London School o f  Economics
What is (he goal o f  (his research?
• Hie research centres on the policy-making role of governors in state-sector London secondary 
schools. It seeks to examine governors’ knowledge o f and opinions about education-business 
partnership schemes (in specific), and their thoughts the governors’ policy-making role (in general).
• Besides forming the basis of my doctoral dissertation, this research will provide guidance to both the
government and secondary schools on how governing bodies can best contribute to education policy­
making at a time when there is an increasing emphasis on school-based management.
How does our schoolfa in to this study?
• Your school is one of five case studies. It was selected as a potential candidate after a comprehensive 
review of the most recent Qfsted reports for all 139 central London secondary schools. The selection 
criteria attempted to balance variables such as location, size, percentage o f students eligible for free 
school meals, and involvement with business partnerships.
• Interviews have been conducted already with the Directors of Governor Serv ices and Directors of the
Education Business Partnerships in each of the central London boroughs.
•  A mail survey of all chairs and heads in inner London secondary schools was carried out in June, in 
order to test the findings of the case studies.
What commitment would be required, and when would this research occur?
•  The demands upon your time are kept to an absolute minimum. At most, each individual would need 
to provide only tltree-quarters o f  an hour to one hour for a single interview, which would be arranged 
at the time and place most convenient for the interviewee.
•  All interviews will be conducted during the next two months, and will be completed by this July.
•  Two school-based interviews are requested, one with the head teacher, and the other with a teacher 
governor. Six governor interviews are requested, with the following governors: The Chair, vice-chair, 
head of the finance committee, head of the curriculum committee, a parent governor, and a co-opted 
governor (preferably from the business community).
•  Copies of I) recent governor reports to parents, 2) the school development plan, 3) the school 
prospectus, 4) the head’s report to governors, and 5) any additional materials or minutes relating to 
either business partnerships or strategic planning would be extremely useful.
What will our school get in return?
•  A volunteer time commitment, as 1 am offering your school one hour of my time -  in either an 
administrative or educational/visiting speaker capacity — for every hour of interview time provided. I 
understand the difficulties of sacrificing your valuable time simply for my benefit, and I believe that 
this type of timc-exchangc provides a positive benefit to all parties involved in the research process.
•  A short policy report, which will be written on the cumulative findings of this study. This report will 
be sent to all participating schools and governing bodies, the inner London borough governor services 
directors and education business partnership directors, and any other interested parties.
What guidelines govern the use ofthe information that you collect?
•  The anonymity of all schools and individuals will be preserved. As the goal of the research is to 
provide an environment where participants can offer their honest perspectives on these issues, any 
quotations or references to specific places or individuals will be made anonymous in the final work.
•  Research protocol calls for all interviews to be tape recorded to ensure the accuracy of quotations. 
However, all tapes will be transcribed immediately, and then erased upon conclusion o f the research.
What is your background, und who is funding your research?
•  I am currently a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics, and 1 hold Bachelors and 
Master’s degrees in Public Policy from Brown University. My background in education policy 
includes consulting work for the DfEE and program management for the U.S. Department of 
Education. I am funded by the Marshall Scholarship, a programme set up by an Act o f  Parliament in 
1953, which annually sends forty American scholars to any British university for two or three years. 
The scholarship is administered by the Association of Commonwealth Universities.
What i f  t  have other questions?
•  Please feel free to call me on 020 955 6522,or to reach me via email at T.A.Heuer@lse.ac.uk.
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Sc h o o l  G o v er n o r  In t e r v ie w  Sc h ed u le
Questions about Governing Bodies
1. From a school administration perspective, what is your perception of what the 
governing body’s role should be? How well do you think the governing body 
meets that perception in practice?
2. How would you definite the term ‘strategic planning?’
3. Given your definition, how effective do you think your governing body is at 
strategic planning?
4. What would help your governing body do better strategic planning?
5. Does central government expect too much from governing bodies? If so, how 
should these expectations be changed to help governors do their job better?
6. Do you think the governing body’s philosophy on business involvement should 
form part of the strategic plan for the school?
Questions about Central Government
7. Does the amount of legislation and paperwork influence your ability as a member 
of the senior management team to do long-term planning? If so, in what way?
8. Does the number of targeted government funding programmes (including 
programmes that require ‘bids’ from schools) affect that long term planning 
ability? If so, in what way?
9. What do you believe are central government’s reasons for promoting increased 
involvement of business and the private sector (through initiatives like Specialist 
Schools, EAZs, City Academies, etc.)?
10. Following on from that question, do you think central government is expecting 
that private sector can (and is willing) to contribute more than it really will?
11. Do you think central government understands how its policies affect governing 
bodies and schools?
12. Do you think central government trusts governing bodies and senior management 
teams?
Questions about Opinions on Business Partnerships
13. What is your opinion about the nature and extent of the links your school has 
with business? (These links could include everything from work experience and 
student or staff mentoring by businesses, through donations (financial or in-kind) 
from business, to PFI initiatives.)
14. Would you like more business links at your school? If yes, what constrains it, 
and if no, why?
15. What do you see as the best and most helpful role that business can play in state 
education?
16. Where do you think the public-private boundary should be drawn? What types of 
involvement from business would you find uncomfortable?
17. Why do you believe that businesses get involved with state education?
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A p p e n d ix  C
Main Quantitative Study Documents
• The Quantitative Survey Instrument
• Survey Cover Letter from LEA Governor Services
• Survey Cover Letter from Research Supervisor
• First Survey Follow-up Letter (from LEA Governor Services)
• Second Survey Follow-up Letter (from Researcher)
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T he  Q u a n t it a t iv e  Su r v e y  In s t r u m e n t
[P a g e  1 o f  4]
School Governance Survey
A l l  r e s p o n s e s  a r e  h e l d  in  c o m p l e t e  c o n f i d e n c e  -- n o  s c h o o l  w i l l  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  
Please return by 6 Julv 2001 using the enclosed pre-slamped envelope
School Name: Borough:.
[Type of Governor (circle): Co-Opted_____ Foundation_____Parent_____ LEA [ Years on Governing Body .
Number of Years as Chair  On average, how many hours a week do you spend on school governance matters?.
► If Yes, for how many years7.1 Are you, or have you ever been, employed in the private sector ? Yes No j
j Are you, or have you ever been, employed in the state education system? Yes No [►If Yes. for how many years?.
Section 1: Business Involvement/Links with Your School
For the following questions, 'business involvement/links' includes, but needs not be limited to: 
mentoring o f students by business, in-kind und/or financial donations. Private Finance Initiative, 
work experience, for-profit management, teacher placements, and curriculum assistance.
Please circle the number that best reflects your answer:
1. In general, what is the extent of your governing body’s knowledge 
about business involvement/links with your school .’
2. How much do you think governors should know about business 
involvement/links in their schools?
3. How active has your school been in encouraging business 












4. For the following list, simply circle Yes or No to indicate your response:
a) Would you consider your school to have substantial involvement/links with business?
b) Would you consider your school to have effective involvement/links with business?
c) In general, do you know how your school decides whether or not to pursue proposals for business 
i n vol vement/l inks?
d) Does your governing body ever discuss your school's business involvement/links?
e) In general, do you think business involvement/links with schools will become more common over the 






5. For the following list, please circle Yes, No, or Unsure to indicate your response:
a) Does your governing body have a written policy on business involvement/links with your school?
b) Are you (or other governors) involved in creating any business relationships with your school?
c)‘ Are you .{of other governors) involved \\\ monitoring any business relationships with your school?
d) Does your governing body have a governor assigned to monitor business involvement/links?
e) Has your governing body ever been in contact with your borough’s Education Business 
Partnership office?
0  Do you see any practical difference between the terms ’sponsorship’ and ‘partnership’?
g) Have financial or resource constraints ever resulted in your governing body considering 
business involvement/links that it might otherwise not have considered?
h) In general, do you think education-business links are worth the effort required to sustain them?
| Yes No Unsure
| Yes No Unsure
| Yes No Unsure
| Yes No Unsure
1 Ves No Unsure
- :
| Yes No Unsure
r
No Unsure
| Yes No Unsure
->  NEXT PAGE
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[P a g e  2 o f  4]
6. For each type o f  business involvement below, please:
• Tick a box in section A, and
• Circle the appropriate number in sections B, C, and D.






A: Tick the box 
that reflects the 
strength of your 
opinion about 





































n cia l  value to 


























- 1 I T
Work Experience/ 
Careers Advice 1 2 3 4
* 1 2 3 4 * i\ ♦ I 2 3 4 * ♦
Mentoring of Students by 
Businesses 1 2 3 4
* 1 2 3 4 * ♦ 1 2 3 4 * ♦
Mentoring of Staff/ 
Teacher Placements 1 2 3 4
* 1 2 3 4 * ♦ 1 2 3 4 «r ♦
Curriculum Assistance 
(e.g.. prc-dcstgned course 
materials from business, etc.»
1 -) 3 4 * 1 ■) 3 4 * [ ♦ 1 2 3 4 * ♦
In-kind Donations (e.g., IT 
equipment, supplies, etc. ) 1
2 3 4 * 1 2 3 4 * • 1 2 3 4 » ♦
Financial Donations or 
matchcd-funding initiatives 1
T 3 4 * I 2 3 4 * ♦ 1 2 3 4 * ♦
Private Finance Initiative 1 2 3 4 * 1 2 3 4 * ♦ 1 2 3 4 ♦
For-Profit Education 
Management 1
2 3 4 * 1 2 3 4 + ♦.. 1
2 3 4 • ♦
For the following questions, please circle the number that best reflects your answer:
7. Would you say your school's involvement/links with business 







S. Do you see your school increasing or decreasing its 
involvement/links with business over the next two years?
Greatly-
Decreasing




9. In general, would you personalty like to see more or less 
business involvement/linkages in your school?




Much More J 
5 1
10. Are you generally supportive or suspicious of the reasons 
that businesses give for becoming involved with schools?
Very
Suspicious




11. Have you seen a positive change or a negative change in the 
ethos of your school due to business involvement/links?
Very-
Negative




12. Do you agree or disagree with central government's specific 
proposals to encourage more business involvement in 








13. Do you view central government’s general proposals for 
involving business in education as a positive development or 
as a negative development?
Very
Negative






T he  Q u a n t it a t iv e  S u r v e y  In s t r u m e n t
[P a g e  3 o f  4]
Section 2: Long-Term Strategic Planning and Your Governing Body
For the purposes o f  the following questions, ‘long-term strategic planning' 
means future planning beyond the current and next school year. ’
14. Should long-term strategic planning be one of a governing body’s main responsibilities? J Yes No |




1 2  3 4 5
16. How' would you rate the clarity of your governing body’s 
long-term strategic vision for the school?
I Poor Excellent 1 
1 2 3 4 5 1
17. Do you think your governing body is effective or ineffective 
in doing long-term strategic planning?
Very Very 
/^effective Effective 
1 2  3 4 5
18. About what percentage of its time does your governing body 1 
spend on doing long-term strategic planning? 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 |
19. Do you think your governing body should place more or less 
emphasis on long-term strategic planning?
Much Less Much More 1 
1 2  3 4 5




1 2 3 4 5
21. How' frequently is the long-term strategic planning process 
initiated by governors (as opposed to being initiated by staff)? |
Never Alw'ays I 
1 2 3 4 5 1
22. Please indicate whether or not the following factors hinder your governing body in doing long-term strategic planning:
Not an Hinders Hinders Hinders
Issue Slightly Moderately Greatly
The amount of legislation and regulation ♦ 1 2 3
The amount of paperwork ♦ 1 2 3
Amount of time required to address statutory' responsibilities ♦ 1 2 3
Amount of time required to formulate and review statutory policies ♦ 1 2 3
Amount of time required to monitor targets ♦ 1 2 3
Amount of time spent on immediate ‘crisis’ issues ♦ 1 O 3
Uncertainty about central government's future funding commitments ♦ 1 2 ' ' 3 ’ ...
Difficulty in balancing the school’s current budget ♦ 1 2 3
The increase in delegated funding to schools ♦ 1 2 3
Pressure created by the timing of central government funding decisions








i i t .v y u iv  v iL u i tU  U t U Iv lU ju tiU  \/ i  Ma m i  J'UVL.t miK-Ht lU U U IIlt UCclNiUIIN
Uncertainty about central government’s future education priorities ♦ 1
s (
2 3
The need to address changes in the National Curriculum and assessment ♦ 1 2 3
Uncertainty about changes in the school’s pupil intake ♦ 1 2 3
Difficulty in recruiting and retaining teachers ♦ 1 2 3
The need to show continuing improvement in the league tables ♦ 1 2 3
The need to make improvements to satisfy OFSTED • 1 A 3
Desire not to increase governor workload ♦ 1 2 3
Difficulty in recruiting governors ♦ 1 2 3
Difficulty in retaining governors ♦ 1 A 3
The volunteer status of governors ♦ 1 2 3
Inadequate know ledge level of governors • 1 y 3
Insufficient number of governor meetings per vear ♦ 1 2 3
Lack of administrative support for governors ♦ 1 2 3
LAST PACE
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[P a g e  4 o f  4]
23. In general, how influential is your governing body in shaping school policies 
Not Influential
in the following are*IS?
Very Influential
Curriculum 1 2 3 4 5
Finance 1 2 3 4 5
Pastoral Care 1 2 3 4 5
Premises 1 2 ? 4 5
Staffing 1 2 3 4 5
24. On your governing body, what is the general level of involvement of the following categories of governors?
Very Low Very High
Co-Opted Governors 1 2 3 4 5
Foundation Governors 1 2 3 4 5
Parent Governors 1 2 3 4 5
LEA Governors 1 2 3 4 5
Teacher Governors 1 2 3 4 5
Staff Governors 1 2 3 4 5
25. Do you find your governing body to be effective or 








26. Do you find non-teacher governors are comfortable or 








Section 3: Your Governing Body and the School Development Plan








28. Do you think your governing body should have more or less 













30. How many years does your School Development Plan cover? 1 2 3 4 5 , Don’t 6 + Know
31. Does your governing body have any written long-term strategic plans beyond the length of the School 
Development Plan?
32. Do you consider the School Development Plan to be your school's main long-term strategic plan?
33. Does your governing body evaluate the School Development Plan at the end of the school year? 
Section 4: Central Government
Yes No
| Yes No 
I Yes No
34. How well do you think central government understands the effects Not Very Well Very Well
its policies have on governing bodies and schools? 1 2 3 4 5
35. How would you rate the level of trust that you think central Very Low Very High
government has in governing bodies? 1 2 3 4 5
36. In general, do you think central government expects governing Too Little tagaag Too Much
bodies to do too little or too much? I 2 3 4 5
Section 5: Final Question
37. Do you think the governing body's philosophy on business involvement should form part of the
long-term strategic plan for your school? Yes No
Thank you very much for your time! Please return to: 
Tad Heuer/Centre for Educational Research 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE
Comments or Questions? 
Email: T.A.HEUERtS LSE.AC.UK 
Phone: 020 7955 6522
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S u r v e y  C o v e r  L e t t e r  f r o m  LEA G o v e r n o r  S e r v i c e s
[E x a m p l e ]
H Hackney
Alan Wood, Director of Education, Edrtn Ca/ei! Ewding, Ente&l Read. London Ni 5BA
Phone: 020 8366 
Fax; 020 83S6 






As you will see from the enclosed documentation, Tad Heucr, a doctoral candidate at 
the London School of Economics, is conducting a focused survey of the chairs of 
governors and head teachers in Hackney’s secondary schools as part of his research.
We are happy to support Mr Heuer by circulating this survey to Hackney’s secondary 
heads and chairs on his behalf, as wc believe this research will be extremely valuable 
both for Mr Heuer and for Hackney schools. In particular, the conclusions of this 
study will assist the LEA in planning and providing future services for Hackney’s 
governors.
Recognising the many demands upon your time, this survey has been carefully 
designed to be completed in approximately ten minutes. Although the survey may 
appear long at first glance, there are no ‘open-ended’ questions, and every question 
can be answered by simply circling your response. Most important, although you will 
be able to view the survey results at http://www.lse.ac.uk/depls/CER/govemance.htm. 
all individual responses are guaranteed to remain confidential.
Please endeavour to return this survey by 6 July 2001, using the stamped return 
envelope enclosed for your convenience. Should you have any questions, please 






S u r v e y  C o v e r  L etter  from  R e se a r c h  S u p e r v iso r
[E x a m p l e ]
The London School of Economics 
and Political Science
CENTRE FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Director: Dr Anne West 
15 June 2001
Dear
Research Project on School Governance
I am writing to ask for your co-operation in an important research project being carried out by Mr 
Tad Heuer, a PhD student in the Department of Social Policy at the London School o f Economics 
and Political Science. The project is concerned with a very pertinent topic, namely governing 
bodies and their role within schools.
As part of his research. Tad Heuer is carrying out a survey of head teachers and chairs of governing 
bodies o f secondary schools in London, l^ocal education authorities (LEAs) and education business 
partnerships across the capital have been involved in this research and the findings should be of 
great interest to many stakeholders, including policy makers in central and local government. 
Moreover, the policy implications arising from the research should inform and influence 
government policy and aid LEAs with planning and provision of services for governing bodies.
I do hope that you will be willing to complete the attached questionnaire (no school will be named 
in any reports that are produced). 1 am very aware of the enormous pressures that you are currently 
under but 1 hope that you will find 10 minutes to complete this questionnaire. A stamped-addressed 
envelope is attached for you to return your questionnaire to the LSE. It would be most helpful if 
you could return the questionnaire as soon as possible and if at all possible before 6 July 2001. If 
you would like a summary of the findings to be sent to you, please let Tad Heuer know. 
Alternatively, the results of the survey should be available via the Internet during the autumn term, 
at www.lse.ac.uk/depts.CER/govemance.htm.
If you have any queries, please contact either Tad Heuer (t.a.heuer@lse.ac.uk) or me 
(a.west@lse.ac.uk or: 020 7955 7269). Thank you in advance for your co-operation without your 
views it will not be possible to obtain a full picture of how school governing bodies manage their 
ever-increasing responsibilities.
With best wishes
LSE. a School of the University of London, is incorporated m England a$ a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Acts (Reg No 70527}
Dr Anne West
Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE Telephone: 020 7955 7809 Fax: 020 7955 7733
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F ir st  Su r v e y  F o llo w -u p  L e t te r  (fr o m  LEA G o v e r n o r  Ser v ic es)
[Ex a m ple]
19 June 2001
Dear :
Several days ago, we sent you a school governance survey on behalf of Tad Heuer, a 
doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics.
If you have already completed and returned this survey, many thanks for your 
prompt response!
However, if you have not already done so, we would greatly appreciate your doing 
so as soon as you can, and by 6 July 2001 if at all possible. Remember that the 
survey has been designed to be completed in ten minutes, and all responses are 
guaranteed to remain confidential.
Should you have any questions, or if you have either misplaced or not received the 





Sec o n d  Su r v e y  F o ll o w -u p L e t t e r  (fr o m  R esea r c h e r )
[Ex a m ple]
16 July 2001
Dear :
I am writing to you in connection with a survey on school governance and business 
involvement that is being conducted at the London School of Economics. This 
survey was sent to all chairs of governing bodies and head teachers of inner London 
secondary schools about three weeks ago.
We have been very pleased with the response rate so far -  altogether, over 50% of 
chairs of governing bodies and head teachers have completed the survey. However, 
to date, we do not appear to have received your survey.
With the debates over business involvement in schools and the overall role of school 
governors having gained considerable importance since the General Election, I 
wanted to ensure that you had the opportunity to have your opinions heard on these 
timely and crucial issues.
I am therefore enclosing another copy of the survey and a pre-stamped envelope in 
order to provide you with another opportunity to do so. I do hope that you will be 
able to help.
As I fully understand how extremely busy you are as the term nears its end, please 
remember that the survey has been designed to be completed in approximately ten 
minutes, and that all responses are guaranteed to remain confidential. I would 
greatly appreciate your returning your completed survey as soon as you can, and by 
31 July 2001 if at all possible.
Should you have any questions, please contact me directly — via email at 




Enel: School Governance Survey 
Pre-stamped return envelope
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